Stephanie Hayes v. Jason C. Covey

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 07-108

STEPHANIE HAYES

VERSUS

JASON C. COVEY, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWELFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF AVOYELLES, NO. 2004-6641-B
HONORABLE MARK A. JEANSONNE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JOHN D. SAUNDERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Oswald A. Decuir, and Marc T. Amy, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

David A. Hughes
Hughes & LaFleur
P. O. Box 1831
Alexandria, LA 71309-1831
(318) 443-4090
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Shelter Mutual Ins. Co.
Jason C. Covey

Darrel Dee Ryland
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1469
Marksville, LA 71351
(318) 253-5961
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
Stephanie Hayes

SAUNDERS, Judge.

This cause of action arises from an automobile accident. Defendant driver was

attempting to make a left turn across two lanes of traffic when he and the plaintiff

driver collided.

The trial court granted plaintiff driver’s Motion for Summary Judgment

asserting that defendant driver was 100% at fault for the accident. Defendant driver

and his liability insurance company appealed the granting of this motion. On appeal,

the summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff was reversed.

After a trial on the merits, the trial court found that defendant driver was 100%

at fault for the accident. Defendant driver and his liability insurer have now appealed

that allocation of fault. We find no error in the trial court’s findings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

On January 23, 2004, plaintiff, Stephanie Hayes (hereinafter “Hayes”) and

defendant driver, Jason Covey (hereinafter “Covey”), were in an automobile accident.

The accident took place at a T-intersection where Louisiana Highway 6 meets with

Tarleton Drive. The accident occurred in Hayes’ lane of travel while she was

proceeding straight on Louisiana Highway 6. Covey and Hayes collided when Covey

failed to yield the right of way to Hayes as he attempted to make a left turn from

Louisiana Highway 6 across Hayes’ lane of travel in order to get onto Tarleton Drive.

Hayes filed suit against Covey and his insurer, Shelter Mutual Insurance

Company (Covey and Shelter Mutual Insurance Company hereinafter collectively

known as “Defendants”). Hayes filed for and was granted a Motion for Summary

Judgment on the issue of liability. Defendants appealed the trial court’s judgment that

no reasonable person could find that Covey was not 100% at fault in the accident. The

Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s finding on Hayes’ Motion for

Summary Judgment and remanded for a trial on the merits.

A trial was conducted in the Twelfth Judicial District Court, Parish of

Avoyelles, on November 16, 2006. After reviewing the evidence brought forth at

trial, the trial court found that Covey was 100% at fault for the accident and issued

a judgment for Hayes and against Defendants.

Defendants appeal this judgment asserting one assignment of error. Defendants

assert that the trial court was unreasonable in finding that Covey was 100% at fault

for the accident. We find that the record has ample evidence that supports the trial

court’s finding regarding the allocation of fault and affirm its judgment.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

1. Was the trial court manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong in concluding that

Covey was 100% at fault for the automobile accident with Hayes?

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR #1:

Defendants assert that the trial court was manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong

in allocating 100% of the fault to defendant driver Covey for the automobile accident

with Hayes. We find that this assertion lacks merit.

A trial judge’s findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are manifestly

erroneous or clearly wrong. Stobart v. State, through Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 617

So.2d 880 (La.1993). “Absent ‘manifest error’ or unless it is ‘clearly wrong,’ the jury

or trial court’s findings of fact may not be disturbed on appeal.” Sistler v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 1106, 1111 (La.1990). “If the trial court or jury’s findings

are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may

not reverse, even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would

have weighed the evidence differently.” Id. at 1112.

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The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Duncan v. Kansas City Southern Railway

Co., 00-66, p. 10-11 (La.10/30/00), 773 So.2d 670, 680-681, set forth the standard for

reviewing comparative fault determinations as follows:

This Court has previously addressed the allocation of fault and the
standard of review to be applied by appellate courts reviewing such
determinations. Finding the same considerations applicable to the fault
allocation process as are applied in quantum assessments, we concluded
“the trier of fact is owed some deference in allocating fault” since the
finding of percentages of fault is also a factual determination. Clement
v. Frey, 95-1119 (La.1/16/96), 666 So.2d 607, 609, 610. As with other
factual determinations, the trier of fact is vested with much discretion in
its allocation of fault. Id.

Therefore, a trier of fact’s allocation of fault is subject to the manifestly

erroneous or clearly wrong standard of review. This court recently addressed these

well established principles in Williams v. Aymond, 05-1547 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/06),

945 So.2d 823, 831, when it stated as follows:

[T]he Clement decision dictates that the allocation of fault is not an
exact science, nor is it the search for a precise ratio. Rather, much like
that of quantum assessment, allocation of fault is the finding of an
acceptable range and any allocation by the trier of fact within that range
cannot be disturbed under the manifest error standard of review.
Therefore, in order for this court to disturb the trial court’s allocation of
fault, the defendants must show that, based on the evidence in the
record, no reasonable person could have allocated the fault in the
manner that the trial judge did in this case.

The Louisiana Supreme Court addressed what factors to consider when

attempting to review an allocation of fault in Watson v. State Farm and Cas. Ins. Co.,

469 So.2d 967, 974 (La.1985):

[V]arious factors may influence the degree of fault assigned, including:
(1)[W]hether the conduct resulted from inadvertence or involved an
awareness of the danger, (2) how great a risk was created by the
conduct, (3) the significance of what was sought by the conduct, (4) the
capacities of the actor, whether superior or inferior, and (5) any
extenuating circumstances which might require the actor to proceed in

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haste, without proper thought. And, of course, as evidenced by concepts
such as last clear chance, the relationship between the fault/negligent
conduct and the harm to the plaintiff are considerations in determining
the relative fault of the parties. Id at 974.

We find that there is ample evidence in the record for the trial court to find that

Covey was 100% at fault for the accident in question. Hayes testified that she was not

speeding, that she was not in a hurry to get anywhere, and that even if she had seen

Covey as she approached the intersection, under the same conditions, she could not

have done anything differently to avoid the accident.

Covey’s testimony was that he was stopped at the intersection and had already

yielded the right of way to vehicles preceding Hayes. As such, Covey testified that

he did not give any indication to Hayes that he was going to fail to properly yield and

attempt to cross her lane of travel. According to Covey, he was not bringing any

attention to his vehicle and felt that there was no reason for Hayes to think that he

would pull right out in front of her.

Defendants argue that because Hayes did not see Covey before the accident

that she should at least share some of the fault for the accident. Defendants’ base their

argument on cases wherein the driver of a vehicle with the right of way was attributed

some fault for an accident when he or she did not see the left turning vehicle.

Defendants’ reliance on cases that find it reasonable for a driver with the right

of way to be attributed some fault for an accident with a left turning vehicle is

misguided. The burden on Defendants here is not to demonstrate that it would be

reasonable to find some fault on the part of Hayes. Rather, Defendants must show that

it is unreasonable for the trial court to have made the allocation of fault that it made

in its judgment. We find that a reasonable person has a plethora of evidence to find

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that Covey was 100% at fault for the accident in question. As such, after a thorough

review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s allocation of fault in the case before

us.

CONCLUSION:

Defendants raised one assignment of error regarding the allocation of fault

between Covey and Hayes. We find no error on the part of the trial court in its 100%

allocation of fault to Covey for the accident. We assess all costs of this appeal to

Defendants.

AFFIRMED.

THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Rule 2-16.3, Uniform Rules,Courts

of Appeal.

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