Hon. Wilford D. Carter v. H. Lynn Jones, II, Clerk of Court

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 07-297

HONORABLE WILFORD D. CARTER

VERSUS

H. LYNN JONES, II, CLERK OF COURT, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2006-195
HONORABLE ANNE LENNAN SIMON, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

JOHN D. SAUNDERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and James T. Genovese,
Judges.

Pickett, J., concurs in the judgment and assigns reasons.

Genovese, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.

AFFIRMED.

Rudie Ray Soileau, Jr.
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 721
Lake Charles, LA 70602
(337) 433-0110
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant:
Honorable Wilford D. Carter

David Frank Dwight
Stephen C. Dwight
Dwight Law Firm
1400 Ryan St.
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 439-3138
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
H. Lynn Jones, II, Clerk of Court

Rick J. Norman
Norman Business Law Center
145 East Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 436-7787
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
Division I

John B. Scofield
Robert E. Landry
Scofield, Gerard, Singletary & Pohorelsky
P. O. Box 3028
Lake Charles, LA 70602
(337) 433-9436
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees:
Honorable R. Richard Bryant, Jr.
Honorable David Alexander Ritchie
Honorable Guy Ernest Bradberry
Honorable Robert Lane Wyatt
Honorable David Kent Savoie
Honorable G. Michael Canaday

Allen J. Mitchell, II
Mitchell & Blanco
One Lakeshore Dr., Suite 1135
Lake Charles, LA 70629
(337) 436-8686
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
Honorable Alcide Joseph Gray

SAUNDERS, Judge.

This is a case challenging the constitutionality of La.R.S. 13:587. The plaintiff,

a sitting judge of the Fourteenth Judicial District Court (hereinafter “the District

Court”) in Calcasieu Parish, challenged the statute in a suit against the clerk of court

and the remaining eight judges of that district. After a trial on the merits, Judge Ad

Hoc Anne L. Simon (hereinafter “Judge Simon”) found for the defendants. The

plaintiff appealed to this court, charging three assignments of error. For the reasons

set forth below, we affirm the trial court’s decision in full.

FACTS:

Pursuant to La.R.S. 13:587, the judges of the District Court in Calcasieu Parish

voted unanimously in 1999 to enact Local Rule 23, which designated two of the

court’s nine divisions, “C” and “I”, as Family and Juvenile divisions. In January

2006, Judge Wilford D. Carter (hereinafter “Judge Carter”), duly elected judge for

Division “F” of the District Court, sought to alter this arrangement by exercising

original jurisdiction in his division over a pro rata share of family and juvenile cases

filed in the district. To this end, Judge Carter issued on January 10, 2006, an Order

directing the Clerk of Court, Mr. H. Lynn Jones (hereinafter “Clerk Jones”), to assign

one-ninth of all subsequently filed family and juvenile cases to Division “F”. Seven

of the remaining eight judges disagreed with Judge Carter’s Order, and they promptly

issued on January 12, 2006, an Order of their own forbidding such case

reassignments.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Judge Carter applied to this court for writs of certiorari, asserting that the

issuance of the seven judges’ countermanding Order was an invasion of our appellate

court jurisdiction. We denied the writ application on March 3, 2006, on grounds that

we lacked supervisory jurisdiction over the matter presented. Contemporaneous to

such writ application, Judge Carter brought suit in the District Court on January 12,

2006, initially asserting a mandamus action against Clerk Jones for failing to adhere

to Judge Carter’s Order of January 10, 2006. On July 5, 2006, Judge Carter converted

his petition to an ordinary proceeding, joined as parties respondent the remaining

eight judges of the District Court, and directly challenged the constitutionality of

La.R.S. 13:587 and Local Rule 23.

Judge Carter’s claims were considered by Judge Simon at a trial on the merits

on December 7, 2006. Judge Simon filed a formal judgment on January 8, 2007,

denying all relief sought by Judge Carter’s petition. Judge Carter timely perfected a

devolutive appeal of Judge Simon’s judgment, which appeal was filed in the record

on January 18, 2007.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR:

1. Did the lower court commit legal error in finding that La.R.S. 13:587 is not an

unconstitutional delegation of the legislature’s exclusive authority to establish

courts of limited jurisdiction?

2. Did the lower court commit legal error in finding that La.R.S. 13:587 and

Local Rule 23 do not unconstitutionally restrict Judge Carter’s exercise of

general jurisdiction?

3. Did the lower court commit legal error in finding that La.R.S. 13:587 does not

violate the La.Const. art. 3, § 12(A) prohibition against local and special laws?

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR #1:

2

Judge Carter argues that the lower court erred in finding that the enactment of

La.R.S. 13:587 did not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of the legislature’s

exclusive authority to establish courts of limited jurisdiction. Specifically, Judge

Carter contends that in imbuing the District Court with the power to assign family and

juvenile cases to specified divisions within the court, La.R.S. 13:587 gives the

District Court the authority to transform itself, either in whole or in part, from a court

of general jurisdiction to one of limited jurisdiction. We disagree.

Louisiana Constitution Article 5, § 16(A) provides that district courts have

jurisdiction over all civil matters. As a rule, a district court is considered to have

general jurisdiction unless specifically denied it. Tomas v. Conco Food Distributors,

95-348 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/25/95), 666 So.2d 327. The authority to effect such denial

lies solely within the purview of the legislature: “The legislature by law may establish

courts of limited jurisdiction with parishwide territorial jurisdiction . . . .” Louisiana

Constitution Article 5, § 15(A). Further, as with all powers that fall within the

exclusive purview of a particular branch of government, the exercise of such power

by another branch is unconstitutional: “[N]o one of these branches, nor any person

holding office in one of them, shall exercise power belonging to either of the others.”

Id. at La.Const. art. 2, § 2. Thus, if La.R.S. 13:587 truly empowers the District Court

to create courts of limited jurisdiction by assigning family and juvenile cases to

specific divisions within the court, the statute must be an unconstitutional delegation

of legislative power to the judicial branch.

By way of counterargument, the appellees contend that La.R.S. 13:587 does not

represent a constitutionally impermissible delegation of the legislature’s authority to

create courts of limited jurisdiction, in that the statute contemplates the creation of

3

no courts at all. In support of such contention, the appellees cite Piper v. Olinde

Hardware and Supply Co., Inc., 288 So.2d 626 (La.1974). There, the supreme court

was asked to interpret the proper application of La.Code Civ.P. art. 2006, which

directs that an action to annul a judgment must be brought “in the trial court.” At

issue specifically was the question of whether the statutory language pertaining to

“the trial court” necessitated that such a suit be brought before the same division of

the trial court as that which originally rendered the judgment. In holding that an

annulment action may be brought before any division of the district court, the Piper

court distinguished, for purposes of statutory interpretation, the relationship between

the terms “court” and “division”: “The clear implication from the applicable

provisions currently in force is that each judicial district constitutes a single court,

and the creation [of] different divisions does not operate to sever a single district

court into multiple courts.” Piper, 288 So.2d at 629 (citing Block v. Marks, 16 So.2d

649 (1895)). Thus, Piper stands for the proposition that the statutory term “court”

does not reach each of the internal divisions that make up a district court, but rather

embraces the district court as a whole. See also Block, 16 So.2d at 650 (“The civil

district court, composed of five divisions, is still one court.”)

Appellees further cite State ex rel. Guste v. Green, 94-1138 (La.App. 1 Cir.

6/23/95), 657 So.2d 610, wherein the first circuit was called upon to settle a

constitutional challenge to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s appointment to the

Nineteenth Judicial District Court of a judge pro tempore to preside over cases

involving insurance matters. There, the appellants argued that the supreme court’s

appointment of such an “insurance judge” stripped the district court’s other judges

of jurisdiction over insurance matters, thus violating separation of powers doctrine

4

by creating through extra-legislative means a specialized court of limited jurisdiction

within the district court. The Guste court held that the referral of insurance cases

arising within a district court to a particular division of that court falls short of the

creation of a court of limited jurisdiction: “Nor does the order create a ‘specialized’

court wherein all insurance cases must be heard by Judge Landry . . . [T]he use of a

system by the Nineteenth Judicial District to distribute civil matters which are before

the court does not create a specialized court.” Id at 622. In so holding, the first

circuit brought Guste directly into line with Piper, affirming the proposition that, as

with questions of statutory interpretation, questions of constitutional interpretation

are resolved properly by construing the term “court” to mean the district court, rather

than its internal divisions.

Applying the wisdom of these cases to the case at bar, this court finds no basis

to rule that the lower court erred in holding that La.R.S. 13:587 violated neither of the

relevant provisions of the Louisiana Constitution. Here, as in both Piper and Guste,

the determinative question is whether the allocation of certain types of civil cases to

less than all of the divisions within a district court is sufficient to create a court of

“limited” or “specialized” jurisdiction. The lower court saw fit to answer this

question in the negative, and in light of relevant case law, this court agrees. In

enacting Local Rule 23 pursuant to La.R.S. 13:587, the District Court did not create

a court of limited jurisdiction, in that no court was created at all. The District Court

was already in place, and it remains in place. Further, as in Guste, neither does the

instant case involve the deprivation of any sitting judge’s authority to hear all civil

matters, including family and juvenile cases, under art. 5, § 16 of the Louisiana

Constitution. Local Rule 23 merely authorizes the allotment of cases to particular

5

divisions within the District Court, which does not violate any provision of the

Louisiana Constitution. Accordingly, we reject the validity of this assignment of

error.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR #2:

Judge Carter next argues that the lower court committed legal error in finding

that La.R.S. 13:587 does not restrict unconstitutionally Judge Carter’s exercise of

general jurisdiction. More particularly, Judge Carter argues that in failing to provide

for the random allotment of family and juvenile pleadings amongst the divisions of

the District Court, La.R.S. 13:587 and Local Rule 23 unconstitutionally impede his

ability, as a district court judge, to exercise general jurisdiction over matters before

the court. We find this argument without merit.

“The Louisiana Legislature, elected by the state’s citizenry, may enact any

legislation that the state constitution does not expressly prohibit.” Strata v.

Williams, 94-1150, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/30/94), 646 So.2d 522, 525, writs granted

and aff’d by, 94-3133, 94-3160 (La. 4/28/95), 653 So.2d 549. “The opponents who

are challenging the constitutionality of a statute bear the burden of proving clearly

that a particular statute is barred by a provision of the state constitution.” In re Am.

Waste & Petroleum Control Co., 588 So.2d 367, 373 (La.1991) (citing Moore v.

Roemer, 567 So.2d 75, 78 (La.1990); Bd. of Dir. of the Louisiana Recovery Dist. v.

All Taxpayers, Prop. Owners, and Citizens of the State of Louisiana, 529 So.2d 384,

387 (La.1988); State v. Griffin, 495 So.2d 1306, 1303 (La.1986)) . “Specifically, the

party must rely upon a constitutional provision which restricts the power of the

legislature to enact the particular legislation and must establish that the legislation

is barred by such provision.” Strata, 646 So.2d at 525 (citing In re Am. Waste, 588

6

So.2d. At 373; State Bond Comm’n of the State of Louisiana v. All Taxpayers, Prop.

Owners, and Citizens of the State of Louisiana, 525 So.2d 521 (La.1988)). “[T]he

opponents must clearly and convincingly prove that the Legislature’s action is in

contravention of a specific provision of the constitution.” In re Am. Waste, 588 So.2d

at 373 (citing Bd. of Dir., 529 So.2d at 388; Ancor v. Beldon Concrete Prod., Inc.,

256 So.2d 122, 125 (1971)).

In the instant case, Judge Carter points to Article 5, § 16 as the constitutional

provision of which La.R.S. 13:587 stands in contravention: “[A] district court shall

have original jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters . . . .” La.Const. art. 5, §

16(A)(1). Specifically, Judge Carter contends that the constitution’s grant of original

jurisdiction to the district courts precludes the legislature from enacting a statute,

such as La.R.S. 13:587, which restricts a district court judge’s exercise of that

jurisdiction. As discussed above, however, Piper and Guste instruct that the

applicability of such a constitutional grant of jurisdiction to a “district court” must

stop at the level of the court, as a whole, rather than extending to the smaller

segments of that court’s internal structure, including its judges. Further, as Judge

Carter discusses extensively in his trial memorandum, the 1973 convention floor

debates reveal the overriding intent of the constitutional framers in drafting Article

5 to be entrusting the legislature with paramount authority in exerting control over

the future development of the Louisiana judiciary,1 with specific reference made to

1
Senator Samuel Nunez, Jr. proposed, on August 17, 1973, an amendment to the Judiciary
Committee’s constitutional draft Section 15(A), in which he sought to add a local referendum
requirement to the existing language of the draft, which gave the legislature the exclusive power
to abolish or merge courts of limited or specialized jurisdiction. In voting down the Nunez
amendment by a count of 40 votes to 66, several drafters expressed their intent to imbue the
legislature with overarching control over matters of jurisdiction, particularly at the sub-district
court level. Of some note were comments made by several delegates to the constitutional
convention. Delegate Burson argued against the amendment: “[I]f you do adopt this amendment,
you will be taking away from the legislature a significant power which it has not at the present

7

family and juvenile matters.2 Accordingly, with respect to Judge Carter’s exercise of

original jurisdiction, La.Const. art. 5, § 16 cannot serve as the requisite constitutional

provision restricting the power of the legislature to enact La.R.S. 13:587. Not only

does Judge Carter not possess, in his capacity as a district court judge, the very

constitutional rights he now claims have been violated, but the intent of the framers

in drafting Article 5 actually places La.R.S. 13:587 squarely within the purview of the

legislature. Whatever the restrictions imposed by La.R.S. 13:587 and Local Rule 23

on Judge Carter’s exercise of jurisdiction, they are not unconstitutional in nature.

Nevertheless, Judge Carter asserts that La.R.S. 13:587 stands in direct conflict

with the express statutory requirement for random allotment of filings in district

court, as embodied by La.Code Civ.P. art. 253.1: “All pleadings filed shall be

randomly assigned to a particular section or division of the court . . . .” Buttressing

the plain language of La.Code Civ.P. art. 253.1, Judge Carter further cites State v.

Sprint Communications Co., L.P., 96-3094 (La. 9/9/97), 699 So.2d 1058, in support

of his argument. There, in holding that the Eighteenth Judicial District Court’s

system of transferring cases to other divisions of the same court on a non-random

basis was improper and violative of La.Code Civ.P. art. 253.1, the supreme court

proclaimed:

No single judge sitting in a district court has the right or prerogative to

time and ought to have to run the business of the state.” 32nd Day Proceedings–Aug. 17, 1973,
p. 777. Similarly, Delegate Abraham stated in opposition to the Nunez Amendment: “If we’re
ever going to get some order to this court system, we’re going to have to give the legislature the
authority and flexibility to set the thing up as it should be . . . . Id. at 780. Delegate Stoval
echoed these sentiments, as well: “It seems to me that there is something very basic and
fundamental here that we need to consider. It is the question of whether or not we are going to
trust the wisdom and integrity of the legislature of our state.” Id.
2
Constitutional draft Section 18, as amended on August 28, 1973, reads: “The juvenile
and family courts shall have such jurisdiction as the legislature shall provide by law.” 37th Day
Proceedings–Aug. 28, 1973, p. 983.

8

try class action suits, maritime cases, medical malpractice claims, or any
other particular type of litigation to the exclusion of other judges on the
same court to whom the cases are randomly assigned . . . .

....

. . . Transfers that circumvent the random allotment process to funnel
particular types of cases to one judge are . . . inappropriate and
impermissible.

Id. at 1063 (footnotes omitted). In effect, Judge Carter contends that La.R.S.

13:587 and Local Rule 23 are similarly inappropriate and impermissible, in

that they conflict with La.Code Civ.P. art. 253.1 by allotting the family and

juvenile cases filed in the District Court on a non-random basis. We disagree.

Judge Carter places great reliance on the persuasive authority of Sprint,

yet the issue presented by that case is actually quite different from the question

placed before us today. Whereas Sprint involved a conflict between La.Code

Civ.P. art. 253.1 and a non-random allotment policy that was autonomously

implemented by a district court, the case at bar concerns a conflict between

La.Code Civ.P. art. 253.1 and a non-random allotment procedure authorized

by legislative statute, La.R.S. 13:587. “Where a law is clear and unambiguous

and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be

applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the

intent of the legislature.” La.Civ.Code art. 9. “Laws on the same subject

matter must be interpreted in reference to each other.” La.Civ.Code art. 13.

“Where it is possible to do so, it is the duty of the courts in the interpretation

of laws to adopt a construction of the provision in question which harmonizes

and reconciles it with other provisions.” Bunch v. Town of St. Francisville,

9

446 So.2d 1357, 1360 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1984). “In instances of a conflict, the

statute specifically directed to the matter at issue must prevail as an exception

to the statute more general in character.” Horil v. Scheinhorn, 95-967, p. 3

(La. 11/27/95), 663 So.2d 697, 699.

Here, the statute in question clearly and unambiguously sanctions the

non-random allotment of juvenile and family pleadings to certain divisions

within the District Court:

The judges of the Fourteenth District Court may by rule adopted
by a majority vote of the judges sitting en banc, designate and assign to
one or more divisions of the court any or all types of juvenile matters of
which the court has jurisdiction and any or all types of domestic
relations matters of which the court has jurisdiction.

La.R.S. 13:587(A). At the same time, it is equally clear that La.Code Civ.P.

art. 253.1 calls for all pleadings to be allotted randomly. In such cases, our

jurisprudence directs us to attempt, wherever possible, to harmonize and

reconcile the statute at issue with other statutes that speak to the same subject

matter, with the added directive in cases of conflict to construe the more

specific of the two statutes as an exception to its more general counterpart. In

the instant case, La.R.S. 13:587 is the more specific of the two statutes.

Whereas La.Code Civ.P. art. 253.1 speaks generally of “all pleadings” filed in

“the court,” La.R.S. 13:587 applies specifically to “juvenile . . . [and] domestic

relations matters” brought before “the Fourteenth Judicial District Court.”

Thus, in accordance with general rules of statutory interpretation, this court

holds that La.R.S. 13:587’ s non-random allotment procedures for family and

juvenile pleadings before the Fourteenth Judicial District Court must prevail

as an exception to the prohibitions against non-random allotment contained in

10

La.Code Civ.P. art. 253.1, as the former is the more specific of two statutes that

touch upon the same subject matter. Accordingly, we find this assignment of

error to be without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR #3:

Finally, Judge Carter asserts that the lower court committed legal error in

finding that La.R.S. 13:587 does not violate the art. 3, § 12(A) prohibition against

local and special laws. In particular, Judge Carter argues that La.R.S. 13:587 is a

special law. We find this assertion without merit.

Louisiana Constitution Article 3, § 12(A) provides: “Except as otherwise

provided in this constitution, the legislature shall not pass a local or special law: . .

. [c]oncerning any civil or criminal actions, including . . . regulating the practice or

jurisdiction of any court.” “[A] statute is special if it affects only a certain number

of persons within a class and not all persons possessing the characteristics of the

class. In essence, a special law is one directed to secure some private advantage or

advancement for the benefit of private persons.” Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of Louisiana v.

Vial, 317 So.2d 179, 183 (La.1975). The supreme court delved further into the

rationale behind the constitutional prohibition in Polk v. Edwards, 626 So.2d 1128,

1135 (La.1993) (citations omitted):

This Court has long recognized that the constitutional prohibition
on designated types of local or special laws was not intended to restrict
the use of legislative power to further the state’s interest. Rather, the
prohibition was intended to prevent abuse of legislative power on behalf
of special interests and to prohibit the exemption of an individual or
private corporation from the operation of a general law.

Viewing the facts of the case at bar through the lens of constitutional and

jurisprudential authority, this court finds no justification for invalidating La.R.S.

11

13:587 as a special law. Judge Carter contends that the “class” affected unequally by

the statute is that comprised of the judicial districts of the state, yet La.R.S. 13:587

does not speak to the judicial districts of the state as a whole, but instead constrains

its scope to the Fourteenth Judicial District Court. As such, the circumstances of the

instant case reflect those of State v. Dalon, 35 La.Ann. 1141 (La.1883), the relevance

of which has not been diminished in its more than a century of existence. There, in

upholding the validity of a statute organizing the criminal district court for Orleans

Parish, the supreme court held: “The argument that a law which relates solely to the

machinery of a court of justice having jurisdiction over the territory of one parish

only, is a local or special law, because it does not operate throughout the State and

all the parishes thereof, is perfectly preposterous . . . .” Id. at 1142. The only

classification implicated by La.R.S. 13:587 is that of the judges of the District Court,

and the statute affects the members of that class equally: “The judges of the

Fourteenth Judicial District Court may . . . .” Further, in attempting to square our

application of La.Const. art. 3, § 12(A) with the intent of that provision, this court

finds the instant case devoid of any “private corporation” or “special interest” that

stands to gain an advantage from the enactment of La.R.S. 13:587. On the contrary,

the Fourteenth Judicial District Court, as a subdivision of the state’s judicial branch,

is a public entity, and its efficient administration of juvenile and family matters stands

as an interest of decidedly general applicability. Thus, this court finds this

assignment of error to be without merit.

Notably, although Judge Carter does not press the issue now, in constraining

the scope of La.R.S. 13:587 to a single judicial district, neither has the legislature

enacted a constitutionally impermissible local law: “[A] law whose application and

12

immediate effect is restricted to a particular locality is not considered local where

persons throughout the state are affected by it or it operates on a subject in which the

people at large are interested.” Kimball v. Allstate Ins. Co., 97-2885, 97-2956, p. 4

(La. 4/14/98), 712 So.2d 46, 51. As Judge Carter concedes in his original brief,

La.R.S. 13:587 is not local law, in that it applies equally to all persons who are

litigants or parties to a proceeding before the Fourteenth Judicial District Court.

Thus, there is no basis under La.Const. art. 3, § 12(A) to invalidate La.R.S. 13:587

as unconstitutional.

CONCLUSION:

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

All costs to be taxed to the appellant.

AFFIRMED.

13

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-297

HONORABLE WILFORD D. CARTER

VERSUS

H. LYNN JONES, II, CLERK OF COURT, ET AL.

PICKETT, Judge, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the ultimate conclusion reached by Judge Saunders that Judge

Carter’s suit lacks merit. However, I would find that Judge Carter lacks standing to

raise the issue of the effect La.R.S. 13:587 has on random allotment as required by

La.Code Civ.P. art. 253.1, thus I would recognize, sua sponte, an exception of no

right of action. See La.Code Civ.P art 927(B). Therefore, I must concur in the

judgment.

As discussed in the opinion, the court, rather than an individual judge of the

court, exercises the jurisdiction conferred by the state constitution. See Piper, 288

So.2d 626, and Guste, 657 So.2d 610. I agree with the opinion, then, that La.R.S.

13:587 does not unconstitutionally infringe on Judge Carter’s rights, as he lacks those

rights in the first instance. For the same reason, I would find that Judge Carter cannot

assert a claim that La.R.S. 13:587 and Local Rule 23 improperly infringes on the

random allotment procedures required by La.Code Civ.P. art. 253.1. I would,

therefore, reserve judgment on the issue of whether La.R.S. 13:587 contains a valid

exception to the prohibition against non-random allotment contained in La.Code

1

Civ.P. art. 253.1 until it is properly presented to this court by a party with a valid right

of action.

In all other respects, I join the opinion of Judge Saunders.

2

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-297

HONORABLE WILFORD D. CARTER

VERSUS

H. LYNN JONES, II, CLERK OF COURT, ET AL.

GENOVESE, J., dissents and assigns the following reasons.

The majority affirms the trial court in upholding the constitutionality of La.R.S.

13:587. I disagree. The establishment of divisions (such as Divisions C and I) within

the Fourteenth Judicial District Court to hear juvenile and domestic relations matters

is a permissive delegation of legislative authority pursuant to La.Const. art. 5,

§ 15(A). However, a serious constitutional question is presented when a majority of

the judges, not the people who elect the judges to these specified divisions, decides

which judges are to hear these cases. When a majority of the judges make such a

designation, that is an exercise of judicial authority. Yet, our state constitution only

grants that authority to the legislature. Technically, these specified divisions could

be changed at will, pursuant to court rule, at the whim of a majority of the judges at

any judges’ meeting of the Fourteenth Judicial District Court. Not only Judge Carter,

but each and every judge of the Fourteenth Judicial District Court, and the people

whose cases are in those respective courts, are affected by a simple majority vote of

the judges of the Fourteenth Judicial District Court pursuant to court rule enacted at

any duly called judges’ meeting. It is the people who have a constitutional right to

elect those persons they deem fit and proper to these special divisions of court to hear

their respective cases, not the then existing majority of the judges of the Fourteenth

1

Judicial District Court pursuant to court rule at any judges’ meeting.

For these reasons, I find that La.R.S. 13:587 is an unconstitutional grant and

delegation of legislative authority to the judiciary in violation of the separation of

powers doctrine set forth in our state constitution as interpreted by our supreme court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority and would reverse the trial court judgment in

this case.

2