Marcelle Anderson Stelly v. Michael Stelly

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-640

MARCELLE ANDERSON STELLY

VERSUS

MICHAEL STELLY

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERMILION, NO. 63195
HONORABLE PHYLLIS M. KEATY, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks, and
Billy Howard Ezell, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Roger Chadwick Edwards, Jr.
Edwards & Edwards
P. O. Box 217
Abbeville, LA 70511-0217
Telephone: (337) 893-2884
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Michael Stelly

Anthony Jerome Fontana, Jr.
210 North Washington Street
Abbeville, LA 70510
Telephone: (337) 898-8332
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee - Marcelle Anderson Stelly

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

The defendant-appellant, Michael Stelly, filed an exception of no cause

of action in September 2006 against the plaintiff-appellee, Marcelle Stelly, when she

requested a hearing on remaining issues in her earlier-filed rule on various child

support issues. Michael Stelly contends that because the issue of past due support

was resolved in a hearing and a consent judgment signed the year before, the consent

judgment terminated all other causes of action asserted in Marcelle’s original rule,

even though the other issues were not addressed at the hearing or in the consent

judgment. The trial court set a new hearing, denied Michael’s exception, and issued

a judgment granting Marcelle relief on all remaining issues in her rule. On the issue

of an increase in child support, the trial court granted the increase and made it

retroactive to the filing date of the rule, June 21, 2005.

I.

ISSUE

Where multiple issues in a domestic case are set for
hearing, and only one of the issues is addressed at the
hearing and resolved by a consent judgment, does the
resolution of one issue by judgment operates to terminate
all other pending issues?

II.

FACTS

Michael Stelly was behind in his child support obligation of $250.00 per

month. In June of 2005, Marcelle Stelly filed a “Rule for Past Due Support,

Contempt, Attorney’s Fees, Increase in Child Support and Income Assignment.” At

the August 2005 hearing, Marcelle and Michael consented to a judgment ordering

Michael to pay past due child support of $3,150.00 by paying $750.00 up front and

by having $500.00 per month ($250.00 for the original obligation, plus $250.00

toward the arrearage) deducted from Michael’s paycheck until the past due child

support obligation was satisfied. No other issues were addressed at the hearing.

Likewise, the resulting consent judgment addressed only the past due

support and did not address the parts of Marcelle’s motion asking for damages for

contempt of court, attorney fees, and an increase in future support payments. In

August 2006, Marcelle asked for a hearing on these remaining issues. Michael filed

an exception of no cause of action, arguing that the consent judgment of August 2005

terminated all issues before the court at that time, and that the judgment’s silence on

certain issues was deemed a denial of the relief sought on those issues. Marcelle

argues that the law requiring that all issues be raised or abandoned specifically

excludes divorce, custody, visitation, and child support actions.

The trial court denied Michael’s exception and, based upon calculations

and stipulations entered at a Hearing Officer Conference the previous week, issued

a judgment increasing Michael’s child support payments retroactive to June 21, 2005,

the date of the filing of Marcelle’s rule for an increase. The trial court’s judgment

also ordered an income assignment for the new amounts and the resulting arrearages,

and it ordered Michael to pay Marcelle $500.00 in attorney fees.

III.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

In the present case, Michael contends that the trial court erred in granting

a judgment on a motion that had been previously compromised by a consent

judgment. He cites Duhon v. Lafayette Consol. Government, 05-657 (La.App. 3 Cir.

12/30/05), 918 So.2d 1114, for the proposition that once a claim or cause of action

has been reduced to judgment, all other issues which were raised or could have been

raised are conclusively resolved. Michael then cites Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. of

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Alexandria, La. v. Carter, 394 So.2d 701 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 399 So.2d 599

(La.1981), and various cases for the proposition that a judgment that is silent as to

part of the relief requested is deemed to have denied that relief.

In the first argument, Michael is essentially asserting the doctrine of res

judicata, as he states that “the very issue later litigated was the focus of the [previous]

hearing.” This statement is factually incorrect. The motion filed by Marcelle in June

of 2005 was entitled “Rule for Past Due Support, Contempt, Attorney’s Fees, Increase

in Child Support and Income Assignment.” A hearing was set for the rule, but the

only part of the rule that was actually addressed at the August 2005 hearing was the

issue of past due support, and an income assignment was ordered as to the issue of

support already due. The remaining issues of damages for contempt of court, attorney

fees, and an increase in future child support payments were raised in the rule but not

addressed or litigated at the first hearing in 2005. Therefore, these issues were

neither omitted from the rule nor later re-litigated, which are the situations generally

covered by the laws of res judicata.

More specifically, res judicata has two different aspects: (1) foreclosure

of relitigating matters that have never been litigated but should have been advanced

in an earlier suit, and (2) foreclosure of relitigating matters that have been previously

litigated and decided. La.R.S. 13:4231; La.Code Civ.P. art. 425; Stroscher v.

Stroscher, 01-2769 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/14/03), (La.App. 1 Cir. 2003), 845 So.2d 518.

The res judicata doctrine must be strictly construed, and any doubt concerning its

applicability is to be resolved against the party raising the objection. Id. In general,

La.R.S. 13:4231 and La.Code Civ.P. art. 425 preclude the same parties from bringing

multiple suits on the same issues by requiring them to state all causes of action in one

suit arising from an event, and by disallowing the relitigation of a particular issue in

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subsequent suits when that issue was actually litigated. However, both statutes have

exclusions for divorce actions and the matters incidental to divorce. Specifically, the

pertinent law states as follows:

La.R.S. 13:4231. Res judicata

Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final
judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on
appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:

(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of
action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment.

(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes
of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a
subsequent action on those causes of action.

(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the
defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between
them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and
determined if its determination was essential to that
judgment. (Emphasis added)

La.R.S. 13:4232. Exceptions to the general rule of res
judicata

....

B. In an action for divorce under Civil Code Article 102 or
103, in an action for determination of incidental matters
under Civil Code Article 105 [custody, visitation, child
support, spousal support, injunctive relief, use of property
issues], in an action for contributions to a spouse’s
education or training under Civil Code Article 121, and in
an action for partition of community property and
settlement of claims between spouses under R.S. 9:2801,
the judgment has the effect of res judicata only as to causes
of action actually adjudicated. (Emphasis added)

La.Code Civ.P. art. 425. Preclusion by judgment

A. A party shall assert all causes of action arising out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the litigation.

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B. Paragraph A of this Article shall not apply to an action
for divorce under Civil Code Article 102 or 103, an action
for determination of incidental matters under Civil Code
Article 105, an action for contributions to a spouse’s
education or training under Civil Code Article 121, and an
action for partition of community property and settlement
of claims between spouses under R.S. 9:2801.

Marcelle argues that there is good reason for the exception in domestic

cases because domestic matters are tried over time, and issues of support and custody

are important and cannot wait for all other rules to be prepared. She further argues

that in the present case, Michael had not provided her with his current wage

information at the time of the first hearing. Therefore, an increase of child support

could not be addressed at that time, while the arrearage, the income assignment, and

the additional $250.00 per month toward the arrearage were ready to go forward, and

indeed had been recently agreed upon pursuant to an earlier conference. She asserts

that the exclusion for domestic matters was added to Article 425 to assist those in

need of support.

We find no need to conduct exhaustive research into the legislative intent

of La.Code Civ.P. art. 425 and La.R.S. 13:4231-32 in order to agree with Marcelle

on that point. The very existence of interim support is an illustration of the urgency

with which the courts treat the welfare of children. It is well-settled that child support

issues revolve around the best interests of the children involved, and that the

children’s needs, as well as the parents income, are ever-changing factors in

determining support, leading to repetitive calculations, the separation of issues, and

the resetting of hearings in this area of the law. Accordingly, we find no error on the

part of the trial court in setting a new hearing on the remaining issues not litigated or

adjudicated in the first hearing, nor in the resulting judgment of September 2006.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

AFFIRMED.

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