Chester Wright v. 3p Delivery, LLC

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-683

CHESTER WRIGHT

VERSUS

3P DELIVERY, LLC

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APPEAL FROM THE
ALEXANDRIA CITY COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 104848
HONORABLE RICHARD E. STARLING JR., CITY COURT JUDGE

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ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and J. David Painter,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Karleen J. Green
Phelps, Dunbar LLP
P. O. Box 4412
Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4412
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
3P Delivery, LLC

Thomas D. Davenport, Jr.
The Davenport Firm, APLC
1628 Metro Drive
Alexandria, LA 71301
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
Chester Wright

PICKETT, Judge.

The defendant, 3P Delivery, LLC, appeals a judgment of the trial court

dismissing their Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation. We affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

FACTS

The facts of this case and the actions by the trial court are succinctly stated in

the trial court’s “Reasons For Ruling:”

This case arises as the result of a contract entered between the
plaintiff, Chester Wright, and the defendant[,] 3P Delivery LLC. The
plaintiff was to provide transportation services along with handling,
loading and unloading of shipments. The plaintiff has filed suit
claiming breach of contract. The defendant has filed a motion to compel
arbitration and to stay these proceedings. There is no disputing the
contract contained an arbitration clause. The primary issue is whether
LSA- R.S. 9:4216 is applicable in excluding this contract from the
Louisiana Arbitration Law [LAL]. This statute states that the LAL does
not apply to “contracts of employment of labor.” While this contract
refers to an independent contractor relationship, it begs the question of
whether this was an employment of labor. It seems clear that one of the
purposes for the exclusion of labor contracts versus managerial or
professional contracts is the obvious inequality in bargaining positions
and intellectual superiority by the employer. The cornerstone of
arbitration would be an equality between the parties to prevent
adhesionary provisions. The court finds from the four comers of the
contract that the parties intended that Chester Wright engage primarily
in labor services comprising of transportation services. This would
mean driving, handling, loading and unloading shipments which would
comprise solely of labor. The court can only conclude that this contract
was intended as a contract of labor employment and is excluded from
the Louisiana Arbitration Law. Accordingly, the defendant's motion is
denied and dismissed at defendant’s cost.

On appeal, the defendant argues two assignments of error. However, the only

issue to be decided is whether the contract between the parties was one wherein the

plaintiff provided service(s) to the defendant, thus making the arbitration clause valid,

or was the contact one wherein the plaintiff provided labor to the defendant, thus

exempting the contract from mandatory arbitration.

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LAW AND DISCUSSION

The issue before this court is a question of law. Its is well settled that “when

an appellate court reviews a question of law the standard of review is simply whether

the lower court's interpretive decision is correct. Jackson v. BASF Corp., 04-2777

(La.App. 1 Cir. 11/4/05), 927 So.2d 412, writ denied, 05-2444 (La. 3/24/06), 925

So.2d 1231.” Johnson v. Calcasieu Parish Sheriff’s Dept., 06-1179, p. 3 (La.App.

3 Cir. 2/7/07), 951 So.2d 496, 499. See also, Moreau v. Avoyelles Parish School Bd.,

04-1613 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/9/05), 897 So.2d 875, writs denied, 05-910 (La. 6/17/05),

904 So.2d 704, and 05-997 (La. 6/17/05), 904 So.2d 705, citing, Forum for Equality

PAC v. McKeithen, 04-2477, 04-2523 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 715.

The defendant relies on the following clause in the contract: “3P DELIVERY

and CONTRACTOR [the plaintiff] agree that any controversy or claim arising out of

[or] relating to this Agreement (a “Claim”) shall be settled through binding

arbitration....” and upon La.R.S. 9:4201 which provides:

A provision in any written contract to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of the contract, or out of the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing
between two or more persons to submit to arbitration any controversy
existing between them at the time of the agreement to submit, shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

The plaintiff argues that the contract at issue is a contract “of employment of

labor” and thus is exempt from the LAL under the provisions of La.R.S. 9:4216

which states in pertinent part: “Nothing contained in this Chapter shall apply to

contracts of employment of labor. . . .” Hence, the question before the trial court and

before us is what was the nature of the contract—was it a contract for services or for

labor. Our colleagues of the fifth circuit recounted the law applicable to the

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interpretation of contracts in Kappa Loyal, L.L.C. v. Plaisance Dragline & Dredging

Co., Inc., 03-124, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/19/03), 848 So.2d 765, 769, writ denied,

03-2348 (La. 12/12/03), 860 So.2d 1154, quoting, Fleniken v. Entergy Corp.,

99-3023, 99-3024, p.14 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/16/01), 790 So.2d 64, 73, writs denied

01-1269 (La. 6/15/01), 793 So.2d 1250,and 01-1295 (La. 6/15/01), 793 So.2d 1252,

as follows:

We are obligated to give legal effect to contracts according to the true
intent of the parties. LSA-C.C. art.2045. The true intent of the parties
to a contract is to be determined by the words of the contract when they
are clear, explicit, and lead to no absurd consequences. LSA-C.C.
art.2046. When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead
to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in
search of the parties’ intent. LSA-C.C. art.2046. In such cases, the
meaning and intent of the parties to the written contract must be sought
within the four corners of the instrument and cannot be explained or
contradicted by parol evidence. LSA-C.C. art. 1848. Contracts, subject
to interpretation from the instrument’s four corners without the necessity
of extrinsic evidence, are to be interpreted as a matter of law, and the use
of extrinsic evidence is proper only where a contract is ambiguous after
an examination of the four corners of the agreement. In cases in which
the contract is ambiguous, the agreement shall be construed according
to the intent of the parties. Intent is an issue of fact which is to be
inferred from all of the surrounding circumstances. A doubtful
provision must be interpreted in light of the nature of the contract,
equity, usages, the conduct of the parties before and after the formation
of the contract, and other contracts of a like nature between the same
parties. LSA-C.C. art.2053. Whether a contract is ambiguous or not is
a question of law. Where factual findings are pertinent to the
interpretation of a contract, those factual findings are not to be disturbed
unless manifest error is shown.

Although the contract between the parties is entitled “Driver Service

Agreement,” the terms of the contract belie its true nature, which can be discerned

from the wording thereof. The contract calls for the “Contractor” (the plaintiff

herein) to “provide pickup and delivery service,” to “provide loading and unloading

of . . . shipments,” and to “handle, load, unload and transport shipments . . . and

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equipment.” Although these activities may provide a “service” to their recipient, all

of these activities are accomplished through physical labor.

The LAL does not specifically define what constitutes “labor,” however, we

find the following except from Wright v. Round the Corner Restaurants, of Louisiana

Inc., 252 So.2d 341, 344 (La.App. 4th Cir.1971)(emphasis ours) instructive:

In the only case involving Louisiana law and interpreting this
provision [La.R.S. 9:4216], the court held that a baseball manager who
played only occasionally and whose real value to the team lay in his
mental skill, his personality and leadership qualities, and his general
managerial abilities was not employed as a ‘laborer’ within the meaning
of LSA-R.S. 9:4216 so as to exclude him from the substantive effects of
the Louisiana Arbitration Law. Livingston v. Shreveport-Texas League
Baseball Corp., 128 F.Supp. 191, W.D.La. (1955). In the course of this
opinion Judge Dawkins stated at page 201:

“In our opinion, however, this exclusion does
not apply to the present case. An annotation
found at 129 A.L.R. 965, entitled
‘Construction and Application of Provisions
of general arbitration statutes excluding from
their operation contracts for labor or personal
services’, reads as follows:

‘In construing a provision in an arbitration
statute that it ‘shall not apply to contracts
pertaining to labor’, it has been held that the
word ‘labor’ does not include the performance
of mental tasks, or the services or those
recognized generally as professional men or
women.

‘Then in Universal Pictures Corporation v.
Superior Court, (1935) 9 Cal.App.2d 490, 50
P.2d 500, the court, in adhering to this rule,
held that a contract for the employment of a
motion picture actor to perform in the
production of a photoplay for a salary of
$1000.00 per week came within the
Arbitration Statute, since it was not a contract
pertaining to labor. The Court said: ‘It seems
to be generally conceded that individuals
whose principal efforts are directed to the
accomplishment of some mental task * * * or

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those persons generally known or recognized
as professional men or women, even though
in its broad sense, perform ‘labor’, are not to
be, nor should be, classified as ‘laborer’, * *
*. In its present connection, the meaning that
should be attributed to the word is that it
applies to that kind of human energy wherein
physical force, or brawn and muscle, however
skillfully employed, constitute the principal
effort to produce a given result, rather than
where the result to be accomplished depends
primarily upon the exercise of the mental
faculties’.’”

Loading, unloading and handling of shipments and equipment clearly require the

application of “physical force, or brawn and muscle.” Hence, we find the contract at

issue was a contract for labor excluded from binding arbitration under the provisions

of La.R.S. 9:4216.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this

appeal are assessed against the defendant, 3P Delivery, LLC.

AFFIRMED.

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