Dr. Donald Falgoust v. Hart Eye Center, LLC

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 07-725

DR. DONALD FALGOUST

VERSUS

HART EYE CENTER, LLC, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2002-3523
HONORABLE WILFORD D. CARTER, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JOHN D. SAUNDERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, John D. Saunders, Marc
T. Amy, Michael G. Sullivan, Billy Howard Ezell, Judges.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.

Ezell, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.

Albert Dale Clary
Attorney at Law
4041 Essen Lane, #500
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
(225) 922-5110
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees:
Langley, Williams & Co.
Daphne B. Clark

James Buckner Doyle
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 5241
Lake Charles, LA 70606-5241
(337) 474-9989
Counsel for Secondary Defendants/Appellants:
Hart Eye Center, LLC
Dr. William B. Hart

David Harmon Hanchey
The Hanchey Law Firm
P. O. Box 6510
Lake Charles, LA 70606
(337) 478-8383
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant:
Dr. Donald Falgoust

SAUNDERS, Judge.

This is a case involving the calculation of damages owed for breach of contract

upon the termination of a business relationship between doctors. For the following

reasons, we vacate the decision of the trial court regarding reimbursement owed,

dismiss with prejudice the issue of damages, and affirm the trial court’s ruling

regarding its dismissal of the reconventional demand in the case at bar.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Dr. Donald C. Falgoust (hereinafter “Dr. Falgoust”), a board certified

opthalmologist, began discussions in late 1998 to enter into a medical practice with

Dr. William Hart (hereinafter “Dr. Hart”) at his medical clinic, Hart Eye Center, LLC

(hereinafter “HEC”), in Lake Charles, Louisiana. On June 1, 1999, Dr. Falgoust and

Dr. Hart confected a Professional Services Agreement (hereinafter “the PSA”), in

which Dr. Falgoust agreed to work at HEC, and in which the doctors set forth the

terms of their business relationship.

In relevant part, the PSA reads as follows:

5. Payment to Company by Physician for Administration and
Buy-in.
a. Subject to the adjustment in Subparagraph (c) below,
Physician shall pay Company an amount equal to 15% of
gross collections for administrative services and for the
acquisition of an interest in the ownership of the Company
...
....
c. After the initial 12 months of this agreement, if Physician
and Company agree to extend the term of this Agreement,
Physician shall become a member of the Company. In such
event, Physician shall continue to pay Company 15% of
Physician’s gross collections for an additional 48 months
beginning on July 1, 2000 and continuing through June,
2004. After June 30, 2004, the percentage charged to
Physician for administrative services and “buy-in” shall be
reduced from 15% to 5% and all sums due by Physician for
his membership interest in the Company shall be deemed
fully paid and nonassessable. Nothing herein shall be
deemed to restrict the ability of Physician to acquire

additional membership interest in Company in accordance
with the operating agreement.
....
13. Payment Upon Termination. The Physician shall be paid
net collections due after date of termination (by reason of
death, discharge, disability, retirement or voluntary
withdrawal) as provided below in this Agreement.
a. The “Net Collections” of a terminating Physician shall be
the actual collections of accounts receivable, attributable to
terminating Physician’s Professional Services outstanding
on the date of the termination, less the sums due by
Physician as set forth in Sections 5 and 6. This
computation shall be made in a manner consistent with
Section 7.
i. All Amounts paid or to be paid to Physician under this
Agreement shall also be reduced by the premiums due for
the purchase by Company of a “tail” errors and omissions
insurance policy for Physician with limits of not less than
$100,000/$300,000 per occurrence and participation in the
Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund for Physician.
Physician shall have the option to be included as a named
insured under the provisions of said insurance policy; and
ii. All amounts to be paid to Physician under this Agreement
shall be further reduced by any other debts owed by
Physician to Company including but not limited to any
amounts due Company for Physician’s purchase of his
capital interest in the Company as provided in subsection
5(c), (d), or (e).
....
14. Non-Competition Agreement.
a. Except as provided herein, if Physician and Company
terminate this agreement with or without cause on or before
July 1, 2004, Physician shall not, for a period of two (2)
years from and after the date of termination of this
Agreement, directly or indirectly, own any interest in,
manage, operate, be employed by, control or participate to
any extent to the ownership, management, operation or
control of, or be connected in any manner with, any
business which in any manner competes with Company, its
successors, assigns and/or joint venturers in the practice of
medicine in the specialty of opthalmology or optometry
within Calcasieu Parish. After July 1, 2004 this condition
shall continue to apply to Physician unless this agreement
is terminated by Company voluntarily and without cause.
For purposes of this non-competition agreement the term
“Physician” shall also include Donald C. Falgoust,
individually.
b. In the event of a breach of this non-competition agreement,

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Company shall be entitled to injunctive relief against
Physician for such breach, which injunctive relief shall be
cumulative to other remedies and in addition to any other
relief ordinarily available, and shall not be construed as an
exclusive remedy or relief[.]
....
16. Complete Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the full,
entire, and complete employment agreement between the
parties hereto and expressly supersedes any prior
agreement concerning the matters covered hereby. This
agreement may be amended and any right or remedy may
be waived, but only by the express terms and provisions of
a written amendment or waiver. Other written agreements
executed by both parties are part of the entire legal
relationship between the parties to this Employment
Contract.

The parties continued to operate under the terms of the PSA until it was

terminated by Dr. Falgoust on May 15, 2002. During that time, Dr. Falgoust made

“buy-in” payments under the PSA totaling $211,201.00. On July 18, 2002, Dr.

Falgoust filed suit for breach of contract against HEC and Dr. Hart in the 14th Judicial

District Court in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, seeking reimbursement of the total

amount of his “buy-in” payments. Dr. Hart and HEC subsequently filed a

reconventional demand against Dr. Falgoust seeking damages for, among other

things, unfair trade practices and breach of a non-competition agreement.

This case was previously before this court on an appeal by Dr. Falgoust from

a summary judgment dismissing all of his claims. See Falgoust v. Hart Eye Center,

LLC, 04-40 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/12/04), 875 So.2d 139. There, we reversed summary

judgment and remanded the case for a trial on the merits. On remand, Judge Wilford

Carter) hereinafter “Judge Carter”) found in Dr. Falgoust’s favor after a bench trial

on December 11, 2006. Judge Carter awarded Dr. Falgoust $31,598.00 in damages

and dismissed the reconventional demand of Dr. Hart and HEC. A written judgment

in accordance with Judge Carter’s ruling was signed on February 22, 2007. Dr.

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Falgoust timely appealed, asserting as error that the trial court’s damage award was

improperly low. Dr. Hart and HEC also assert that the trial court erred by awarding

Dr. Falgoust any damages, by considering extrinsic evidence in its interpretation of

the PSA, and by dismissing their reconventional demand without proper

consideration.

DR. HART & HEC’s ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR:

1. Did the trial court commit error in awarding Dr. Falgoust $31,598.00 in

reimbursement of his ownership “buy-in” payments?

2. Did the trial court commit error in considering extrinsic evidence in its

interpretation of the PSA?

3. Did the trial court commit error in dismissing Dr. Hart and HEC’s

reconventional demand?

DR. FALGOUST’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

1. Did the trial court commit error by awarding only $31,598.00 in damages to

Dr. Falgoust for reimbursement of his ownership “buy-in” payments?

DR. HART AND HEC’S & DR. FALGOUST’S ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

#1:

In his only assignment of error, Dr. Falgoust asserts that the trial court erred in

its calculation of Dr. Falgoust’s damages, in that the award of $31,598.00 granted to

Dr. Falgoust for reimbursement of his ownership “buy-in” payments is improperly

low. Similarly, in their first assignment of error, Dr. Hart and HEC also argue that

the trial court committed error in calculating Dr. Falgoust’s damages, in that awarding

Dr. Falgoust any reimbursement at all for “buy-in” payments is not supported by a

proper interpretation of the PSA. Because both assignments of error hinge upon the

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interpretation of the agreement in question, we will address them together.

“Interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the

parties.” La.Civ.Code art. 2045. “When the meaning of the words are clear and

explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made

in search of the parties’ intent.” La.Civ.Code art 2046 (emphasis added). “[W]hen

a clause in a contract is clear and unambiguous, the letter of that clause should not be

disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” St. Mary Operating Co. v.

Guidry, 06-1495, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/4/07), 954 So.2d 397, 402, writ denied, 07-

962 (La. 6/29/07), 959 So.2d 520 (citing Martin Exploration Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co.,

93-349 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/20/94), 637 So.2d 1202, writ denied, 94-2003 (La. 11/4/94),

644 So.2d 1048). “Where the meaning of a contract is to be determined solely from

the words upon its face, without the necessity of extrinsic evidence, the appellate

courts are as competent to review the evidence as the trial court, and no special

deference is usually accorded the trial court’s findings.” Schroeder v. Bd. of

Supervisors of La. State Univ., 591 So.2d 342, 345 (La.1991)(emphasis added); see

also Regions Bank v. Kountz, 05-1106 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/31/06), 931 So.2d 506.

Thus, so long as the wording of the PSA conveys a clear and explicit meaning and

leads to no absurd consequences, this court may interpret its language without

deference to the interpretation of the trial court, and must determine its meaning

without the use of extrinsic evidence.

Dr. Hart and HEC argue that the amount owed to Dr. Falgoust upon

termination of the PSA was clearly and explicitly spelled out by the language

contained therein, such that the letter of that language should control the damage

calculation of the case at bar. Specifically, Dr. Hart and HEC argue that Paragraph

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5 of the PSA—entitled “Payment to Company by Physician for Administration and

Buy-in”—dictates that Dr. Falgoust is owed no reimbursement for his ownership

“buy-in” payments. We agree.

The trial court saw fit to award Dr. Falgoust $31,598.00 in reimbursement upon

his termination of the PSA on May 15, 2002. This payment apparently was meant to

serve as restitution for equipment that Dr. Falgoust purchased for HEC and did not

take with him upon terminating the PSA. Although such a refund could conceivably

be owed to Dr. Falgoust had he acquired an ownership interest in HEC prior to the

termination of the PSA, Section 5(c) of that agreement makes clear that such an

ownership interest could not have developed until at least June 2004: “Physician shall

continue to pay Company 15% of Physician’s gross collections for an additional 48

months beginning on July 1, 2000 and continuing through June, 2004. After June 30,

2004 . . . all sums due by Physician for his membership interest in the Company shall

be deemed fully paid and nonassessable.” Thus, when Dr. Falgoust terminated the

PSA in May 2002, he had not yet attained the character of an owner of HEC. As

such, because Dr. Falgoust never acquired an ownership interest in HEC, Dr. Hart and

HEC correctly argue that they owe Dr. Falgoust nothing in terms of reimbursement

of his “buy-in” payments. Whatever the amount of reimbursement that Dr. Falgoust

may have been owed had he acquired such an ownership interest, his termination of

the PSA prior to June 2004 precludes him from now asserting a claim for

reimbursement as an owner of HEC.

Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s decision awarding Dr. Falgoust

$31,598.00 in “buy-in” reimbursement and dismiss the issue of damages in the instant

case with prejudice. Dr. Falgoust’s related assignment of error requesting an increase

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in the reimbursement award is without merit.

We note further that Paragraph 5 of the PSA dovetails agreeably with

Paragraph 13, entitled “Payment Upon Termination.” Under this section, upon

termination of the contractual relationship, HEC is obligated to pay Dr. Falgoust his

“Net Collections”, which is defined therein as “the actual collections of accounts

receivable, attributable to terminating Physician’s Professional Services outstanding

on the date of termination, less the sums due by Physician as set forth in Sections 5

and 6.” As such, upon terminating the PSA, the amount due to Dr. Falgoust under

this paragraph served as the only amount owed to him under the agreement. Dr.

Falgoust concedes that these “actual collections” have in fact been paid to him and

argues instead that he is owed a reimbursement of his “buy-in” payments. As

previously discussed, we find no such “buy-in” equity provided for in the contract.

The payment that is owed upon termination is clearly set out in Sections 5 and 6, and

that amount has been paid. The contract is thus clear and unambiguous, and has been

enforced as a whole.

DR. HART & HEC’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR #2:

In their second assignment of error, Dr. Hart and HEC argue that the trial court

committed error by considering extrinsic evidence—or, evidence not contained in the

body of an agreement or contract—in its interpretation of the PSA. Specifically, Dr.

Hart and HEC contend that because no evaluation of the PSA limited to the four

corners of that document could have led Judge Carter to the conclusion that Dr.

Falgoust was owed $31,598.00, Judge Carter must have considered some evidence

external to the PSA in arriving at this sum. Because we find the PSA to be clear and

unambiguous, we agree that the consideration of extrinsic evidence would not be

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appropriate in the case at bar. However, as we have already afforded Dr. Hart and

HEC the remedy sought by this assignment of error, we find this argument to be

moot.

DR. HART AND HEC’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR #3:

In their third assignment of error, Dr. Hart and HEC assert that the trial court

erred in dismissing their reconventional demand charging Dr. Falgoust with

misappropriation of trade secrets under the Unfair Trade Practices Act (hereinafter

“UTPA”), La.R.S. 51:1401, et seq., and in not finding Dr. Falgoust liable for violation

of the “Non-Competition” clause of the PSA. We will address each assertion in turn.

UTPA:

The standard of review of a trial court’s decision not to award damages alleged

in a reconventional demand is whether the court’s factual findings were manifestly

erroneous or clearly wrong. Begnaud v. Camel Contractors, 98-207 (La.App. 3 Cir.

10/28/98), 721 So.2d 550, writ denied, 98-2948 (La. 2/5/99), 738 So.2d 1. Thus,

unless the record shows the trial court to be clearly wrong in its decision to dismiss

Dr. Hart and HEC’s reconventional demand, the dismissal must stand.

Dr. Hart and HEC argue that the trial court erred in dismissing the

reconventional demand without properly considering the evidence presented in

support, thereof—namely, a proferred deposition containing the testimony of Mr.

Michael Platt, the owner of a software vendor doing business with HEC.

Specifically, Dr. Hart and HEC contend that Mr. Platt’s deposition supports their

claim that Dr. Falgoust violated the UTPA by using Mr. Platt’s medical software to

improperly acquire confidential patient information from HEC.

In support of such contention, Dr. Hart and HEC cite Huey T. Littleton Claims

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Service, Inc. v. McGuffee, 497 So.2d 790 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1986). There, this court

held that an ex-employee of an insurance claims adjusting firm violated the UTPA

when he copied his employer’s confidential client lists before going into business for

himself. As the language of that opinion makes clear, however, the liability of that

defendant under UTPA hinged on his engaging in the improper conduct before he left

the employ of the plaintiff: “From the facts in this case, it is crystal clear that

defendant, John McGuffee, violated La.R.S. 51:1401, et seq., by soliciting his

employer’s customers prior to resigning.” Id. at 794 (emphasis added); see also

DuFau v Creole Eng’g, 465 So.2d 752, 758 (La.App. 5 Cir.), writ denied, 468 So.2d

1207 (La.1985)(“The solicitation and diversion of an employer’s customers prior to

termination constitutes unfair competition entitling the plaintiff to recover

damages.”). Thus, unless the record evidence in support of Dr. Hart and HEC’s

UTPA claim—which consists solely of Mr. Platt’s deposition—establishes that Dr.

Falgoust appropriated HEC’s client information before the termination of the PSA,

the trial court’s dismissal of the UTPA claim will not be manifestly erroneous.

Dr. Falgoust argues that Mr. Platt’s deposition does not establish such wrongful

conduct prior to the termination of his employment relationship with HEC. We agree.

In the deposition, Dr. Falgoust’s attorney, Mr. David Hanchey, asked Mr. Platt: “At

some point, were you consulted, once you learned that Dr. Hart and Dr. Falgoust

would be separating, to provide Dr. Falgoust with some information on patients

before he left?” In response, Mr. Platt replied: “Not—before he left [sic]? I don’t

know about before he left . . . .” As such, Mr. Platt’s deposition proves wholly

insufficient in establishing Dr. Falgoust’s appropriation of trade secrets prior to the

termination of his association with HEC. Even assuming arguendo that everything

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in Mr. Platt’s deposition is factually correct, that deposition, alone, is simply not

enough to prove Dr. Falgoust’s liability under the UTPA. Thus, we find Dr. Hart and

HEC’s argument regarding their UTPA claim to be without merit.

NON-COMPETITION CLAUSE:

Dr. Hart and HEC further argue that the trial court erred in not finding Dr.

Falgoust liable for violating the “Non-Competition” clause of the PSA. We find this

argument to be without merit. Dr. Hart and HEC’s claim for breach of the “Non-

Competition” agreement here was dismissed by the trial court via summary judgment

on September 3, 2003. Although they devolutively appealed from that judgment at

an earlier juncture of this case, Dr. Hart and HEC moved on November 18, 2003, to

voluntarily dismiss such appeal. Thus, the judgment dismissing the non-competition

claim against Dr. Falgoust is final, and cannot now be resurrected on appeal.

CONCLUSION:

For the above-stated reasons, we vacate the trial court’s decision regarding

reimbursement owed to Dr. Falgoust, dismiss with prejudice the issue of damages,

and affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Dr. Hart and HEC’s reconventional demand.

Costs are to be shared by the parties.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.

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STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-725

DR. DONALD FALGOUST

VERSUS

HART EYE CENTER, LLC, ET AL.

EZELL, J., dissenting.

I have read the majority’s opinion in this case, and I must respectfully dissent.

Upon reading the contract, I find that it provides for what would happen should these

parties form a surgical center and optical shop, but fails to set forth what happens

with distribution of Dr. Falgoust’s interest in this company upon termination. It is

clear to me that Dr. Falgoust is an owner and has an interest in the company. It is also

clear that the agreement does not set forth what will happen to the funds paid in by

Dr. Falgoust in the buy-in portion of the agreement should there be a termination of

the agreement. The contract is ambiguous and thus, extrinsic evidence should be

allowed to clarify the meaning of the contract.

I would find that Dr. Falgoust is an owner and he is entitled to have his interest

of ownership and that interest should be determined. Dr. Hart’s position to limit Dr.

Falgoust’s recovery to only accounts receivable does not make sense. The contract

provided that Dr. Falgoust owned his accounts receivable outright after the first year

of the parties relationship irrespective of his buy-in payments. Since, both parties

testified that ownership issues regarding the company were not to be governed by the

PSA, it is clear that nothing in this contract sets forth how the buy-in payments would

be treated upon termination.

There is nothing in the PSA to support Dr. Hart’s position that Dr. Falgoust had

to complete buy-in payments to become an owner in the company. The evidence

clearly shows that the buy-in payments were made for the purpose of investing in

ownership of the company. This court found in an earlier appeal that the “express

language” of the PSA between the two parties support Dr. Falgoust’s claim that he

made buy-in payments for the purpose of purchasing an ownership interest in the

company.

In view of the facts set forth above, I would reverse and remand for further

testimony to determine the percentage of ownership interest. I would further affirm

the reimbursement payments of $31,598.