Jeffery J. Baudoin v. Carlos Ramirez Montoya

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-910

JEFFERY J. BAUDOIN

VERSUS

CARLOS RAMIREZ MONTOYA, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 20044877
HONORABLE MARILYN C. CASTLE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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MARC T. AMY
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Marc T. Amy, and Billy Howard Ezell, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Ian A. Macdonald
Perret Doise
Post Office Drawer 3408
Lafayette, LA 70502-3408
(337) 262-9000
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Lone Star Temporary Services, LC

R. Scott Iles
Post Office Box 3385
Lafayette, LA 70502
(337) 234-8800
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Jeffery J. Baudoin

Joseph H. Garbarino
Jeff Raymond Rytlewski
Skylar J. Comeaux
345 Doucet Road, Suite 104-A
Lafayette, LA 70503
(337) 983-0170
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT APPELLEE:
Midwest Air Technologies

AMY, Judge.

Factual and Procedural Background

The record indicates that on August 10, 2004, the plaintiff, Jeffery J. Baudoin

(Baudoin) was injured when a vehicle operated by the defendant, Carlos Ramirez

Montoya (Montoya), collided with his vehicle. Baudoin instituted this suit against

Montoya and his automobile liability insurer, United Automobile Insurance Company

(United). By amended petition, Baudoin added Midwest Air Technologies (Midwest)

as a defendant, alleging that Montoya was in the course and scope of his employment

with Midwest when the accident occurred. During discovery, Midwest averred that

it was not Montoya’s employer in that he was “on loan” from Lone Star Temporary

Services, L.C. (Lone Star).

On November 18, 2005, Baudoin signed a receipt and release document

whereby he settled his claims with Montoya and United. Baudoin subsequently filed

a motion to dismiss the suit and all claims against Montoya and United with

prejudice. The trial court signed the order of dismissal on December 7, 2005. In a

second supplemental and amended petition, Baudoin added Lone Star as a defendant.

In response, Lone Star filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that “Montoya

was not employed by Lone Star . . . on August 10, 2004 or any other time and was not

on a mission for Lone Star . . . at the time of the motor vehicle accident which serves

as the basis for . . . Baudoin’s claims.” The trial court denied the motion.1 Lone Star

subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, in which it moved “pursuant to La.Code

Civ.P. arts. 927(2)2 and 966, to dismiss plaintiff’s claims in this matter on the grounds

1
We note that the minutes for September 25, 2006, state that “[a]fter evidence was
presented, based on counsel agreeing that there is an issue of fact, the Court denied [Lone Star’s]
Motion for Summary Judgment without prejudice.”
2
Pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 927(2), res judicata may be raised through a peremptory
exception.

that Jeffery J. Baudoin’s claims against Carlos Ramirez Montoya have been settled.”

Midwest filed a motion to dismiss on the same grounds. Following a hearing on

February 21, 2007, the trial court ordered that Baudoin’s claims against Lone Star and

Midwest be dismissed with prejudice. Baudoin now appeals. For the following

reasons, we affirm.

Discussion

Release

According to Baudoin, he “compromised his claim against the individual who

caused the accident, as well as his personal insurer, and maintained a claim against

the defendant’s employer who was a named defendant within the four corners of the

legal proceedings at the time of the dismissal.” Baudoin points out that Lone Star and

Midwest neither participated in the settlement negotiations nor paid anything towards

the settlement. Baudoin cites Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So.2d 326 (La.1981)

for the proposition that he can “release an employee from personal responsibility and

maintain an action against an employer.”

The “Receipt and Release” document, which was entered into evidence, stated:

Appearer further declares that for and in consideration of the
receipt of said payment of NINETEEN THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED AND NO/100 ($19,500.00) DOLLARS, he does hereby
release, acquit and forever discharge CARLOS RAMIREZ MONTOYA
AND UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, its
employees, officers, directors, stockholders, agents and representatives
and any and all other persons, firms, corporations (including, but not in
any way limiting the same thereto, the officers, directors and
stockholders of said corporations), partnerships and parties
whomsoever, from any and all past, present and future claims, demands,
compensation, medical expenses, costs, expenses, penalties, attorney’s
fees, damages and any and all causes and rights of action, whatsoever,
which he may or might have and to which he may be entitled, known
and unknown, anticipated and unanticipated, under the workers’
compensation laws of the State of Louisiana, the tort laws, and any and

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all other laws whatsoever, in any way resulting from and/or to result
from the accident which occurred on or about August 10, 2004.

Appearer further declares that he knows and understands that the
injuries he sustained may be permanent and progressive and recovery
therefrom is uncertain and indefinite and there may be injuries or results
of injuries not yet evident, recognized or known and in making this
release, appearer relies upon his judgment, knowledge and belief as to
the nature, extent and duration of said injuries and as to the questions of
liability involved and have not been influenced by any representations
regarding the same. Appearer understands that his claims are doubtful
and disputed and the above consideration is accepted in full
compromise, accord and satisfaction thereof, and the payment of said
consideration is not an admission of liability.

During the hearing, the trial court explained:

Dismissal and release are not the same. And a number of cases
have recognized that. It doesn’t really matter what you do in the
dismissal. What matters is what’s in the transaction and compromise,
the release document. That’s what counts.

And so, in this case, there’s no mention of -- you know, of
releasing him only in a certain capacity. And, again, what I find unusual
about this situation is that his employer would only be liable for -- based
on the fact of their status as the employer.

And the release is very broad. And it says it’s releasing Mr.
Montoya and its releasing employees and agents on all parties. And
there is no -- there’s nothing in the release that says, only in his personal
capacity, not as an employee, which I don’t even know if you could do
that.

And, furthermore, there -- when the actual dismissal is done, even
though I don’t think the dismissal is controlling, there’s no reservation
in the dismissal. I know that the dismissal says only he’s -- and his
insurer, but at no point in the record does there seem to be any
reservation.

And that’s what I’m having some problem with, because the
release is very broad and the employer -- I mean, if I were reading it as
the employer, I would think I was released as well, too.

After further arguments from both parties, the trial court dismissed Baudoin’s claims

against Lone Star and Midwest with prejudice.

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At the outset, we note that Baudoin alleged that Midwest and/or Lone Star was

liable for the actions of its (their) employee, Montoya, under the theory of respondeat

superior. In Sampay, 395 So.2d at 329, the supreme court explained that, “[t]hat the

employer’s liability is vicarious is important only in relation to the ultimate allocation

of the obligation between the employer and the obligee. From the viewpoint of the

victim, the employer and the employee are solidary obligors.” Overruling Williams

v. Marionneaux, 124 So.2d 919 (La.1960), the supreme court held that the derivative

nature of the employer’s liability did not preclude recovery against it even though the

employee had been released.

Since Sampay, the legislature has enacted La.Civ.Code art. 1803, which

dispensed with the requirement that the plaintiff reserve his or her rights against a

defendant who was solidarily liable with a released party. See Weber v. Charity

Hosp. of La., 475 So.2d 1047 (La.1985). Louisiana Civil Code Article 1803 provides

in pertinent part: “Remission of debt by the obligee in favor of one obligor, or a

transaction or compromise between the obligee and one obligor, benefits the other

solidary obligors in the amount of the portion of that obligor.”

In Migliore v. Traina, 474 So.2d 980 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1985), the plaintiff, after

settling with the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor’s insurer, signed two releases. The

plaintiff’s UM carrier argued that the releases also discharged it because it was

solidarily liable with the tortfeasor and her insurer. The fifth circuit, finding that the

UM carrier was also released, explained:

The language [of the release] is so broad it clearly covers any liability
of any persons whatsoever arising from the accident. Plaintiff neither
struck out the expansive language nor made any attempt to limit it to
[the tortfeasor] and [her insurer]. See Ritchey v. Azar, 383 So.2d 360
(La.1980). Further, despite her claim she did not intend to release the
UM carrier, she failed to supply any factual evidence to that effect in

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response to [the UM carrier’s] motion for summary judgment. Simply
asserting lack of intention to release all defendants, when the release
plainly states all parties are released, is not sufficient to raise a genuine
issue of material fact on such a point. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966.

Id. at 983-84.

In the instant case, we find that the broad language of the receipt and release

agreement “evinces nothing other than an intent to settle and dismiss all claims

against anyone arising of the accident made the basis of the lawsuit.” Black v.

Anderson, 06-891, p. 8 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/13/07), 956 So.2d 20, 24, writ denied, 07-

794 (La. 6/1/07), 957 So.2d 180. Such intent is established from the following

language:

[Baudoin] does hereby release, acquit and forever discharge . . . any and
all other persons, firms, corporations . . . , partnerships and parties
whomsoever, from any and all past, present and future claims, demands,
compensation, medical expenses, costs, expenses, penalties, attorney’s
fees, damages and any and all causes and rights of action, whatsoever,
which he may or might have and to which he may be entitled, known
and unknown, anticipated and unanticipated, under the workers’
compensation laws of the State of Louisiana, the tort laws, and any and
all other laws whatsoever, in any way resulting from and/or to result
from the accident which occurred on or about August 10, 2004.

(Emphasis added). Baudoin did not attempt to limit the release language to Montoya

and United. Nor did he present any evidence to prove his “lack of intention to release

all defendants, when the release plainly states all parties are released[.]” Migliore,

474 So.2d at 984. Cf. Mallet v. Credo Oil & Gas, Inc., 534 So.2d 126 (La.App. 3 Cir.

1988), writ denied, 536 So.2d 237 (La.1989) (wherein this court found that “the

language used by plaintiff in the partial dismissal of [the defendant] clearly showed

his intent not to release its insurers(s).”)

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In light of this evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not err in

dismissing Baudoin’s claims against Lone Star and Midwest with prejudice.

Therefore, this assignment has no merit.

DECREE

For the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of

these proceedings are assessed against the plaintiff, Jeffery J. Baudoin.

AFFIRMED.

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