Clint Desoto v. Ford Motor Company

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-1097

CLINT DESOTO, ET AL.

VERSUS

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWELFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF AVOYELLES, NO. 2005-8574
HONORABLE MARK A. JEANSONNE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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MICHAEL G. SULLIVAN
JUDGE

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Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Michael G. Sullivan, and James T. Genovese,
Judges.

REVERSED.

Robert G. Nida
Gold, Weems, Bruser, Sues & Rundell
Post Office Box 6118
Alexandria, LA 71307-6118
(318) 445-6471
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees:
Clint Desoto
Jayleen Desoto

Robert W. Maxwell
James C. Rather, Jr.
McCranie, Sistrunk, Anzelmo,
Hardy, Maxwell & McDaniel
195 Greenbriar Blvd., Suite 200
Covington, Louisiana 70433
(504) 831-0946
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants:
Ford Motor Company
Hixson Autoplex of Alexandria, Inc.

SULLIVAN, Judge.

In this products liability case, the plaintiffs assert that their 2000 Ford F150

truck caught fire as the result of a manufacturing defect. The manufacturer and the

seller appeal the trial court’s judgment in plaintiffs’ favor. For the following reasons,

we reverse.

Facts

On May 21, 2005, Clint and Jayleen Desoto’s 2000 Ford F150 pickup truck

caught on fire during the early morning hours while they were sleeping. The evening

before the fire, Mrs. Desoto had parked the truck, which had a manual transmission,

in gear near the front of their mobile home. The Desotos were awakened early the

next morning when they heard a loud noise and felt their mobile home begin to shake.

They ran outside and saw the truck against the mobile home.

Mr. Desoto testified that the truck was making a cranking noise and that the

rear wheels were spinning. About the same time, he saw flames burst through the

hood of the truck. The burning truck caught the mobile home on fire where it had

contact with the mobile home. Mr. Desoto was able to extinguish the mobile home

fire but was unable to extinguish the truck fire.

Mrs. Desoto called 911. The volunteer fire department arrived while the truck

was burning; the firemen pulled it away from the trailer and extinguished the fire.

The firemen were unable to determine the source of the fire.

The Desotos filed a claim with their insurance company and were paid

approximately $5,000 for their loss. After paying the Desotos, the insurance

company took possession of the truck then had it destroyed.

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After the fire, the Desotos learned that Ford had issued a safety recall on certain

vehicles, including their truck, because the speed control deactivation switch could

melt, smolder, or catch on fire. Mr. Desoto initially believed that someone had been

trying to steal the truck when the fire occurred. However, after learning of the recall,

he thought otherwise, and he and Mrs. Desoto filed suit against Ford and the

dealership from which they purchased the truck, claiming the fire was caused by a

redhibitory defect. The truck had 45,000 miles on the odometer when purchased and

165,000 miles on the odometer when the fire occurred. Mr. Desoto testified that he

performed routine maintenance on the truck but no major repairs. He had no

knowledge of any repairs made by the previous owner(s).

The matter was tried on the merits. At trial, the Desotos presented their

testimony, the testimony of a volunteer fireman, documentation concerning the recall

by Ford, photographs of the truck and mobile home while the fire was burning and

after the fire was extinguished, and correspondence from Ford in support of their

claims. Ford presented the testimony of Larry Helton, an expert in fire and explosion

investigation. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court applied the evidentiary

doctrine of res ipsa loquitor and awarded judgment in favor of the Desotos, finding

the truck’s speed control deactivation switch caused the fire. The trial court awarded

the following damages:

Loss of Truck $ 4,500
Damage to Mobile Home 1,800
General Damages Jayleen Desoto 500
General Damages Clint Desoto 250
Attorney Fees 3,000

Ford appealed, assigning error with the trial court’s determination that the

speed control deactivation switch caused the fire. The Desotos answered the appeal,

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seeking increases in their general damage awards, general damages for the children

who were present during the fire, and an increase in attorney fees for work performed

on appeal.

Standard of Review

Ford argues that the Desotos did not prove the existence of a defect which

caused their truck to catch fire. Sufficiency of the evidence is a legal issue.

Darbonne v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 00-551 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/00), 774 So.2d 1022,

(citing Evans v. Lungrin, 97-541 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731). Under Louisiana

jurisprudence, the manifest error standard of review is not applicable if a trial court

commits legal error which interdicts the fact-finding process. Id. In such situations,

the appellate court should make its own independent de novo review of the record and

determine by a preponderance of the evidence if the record is complete. Insufficiency

of the evidence arguments apply when, as here, the appellant argues that the party

with the burden of proof lacks the necessary evidence to tip the scales over to the

level of the applicable standard. In reviewing the trial court’s judgment, we must still

resolve any factual conflicts by application of the manifest error rule and cannot

disturb express or implied factual findings of the trier of fact. Id.

Discussion

The supreme court observed in Lawson v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America,

Inc., 05-257, pp. 7-8 (La. 9/6/06), 938 So.2d 35, 40, that “[a] products liability claim

is, by its own nature, extremely ‘fact-intensive,’ and as such, the heart of [a

plaintiff’s] claim lies with the sufficiency of the evidence submitted at trial.”

Pursuant to La.R.S. 9:2800.54(A), a plaintiff who asserts a products liability

claim must prove that the damage for which he seeks to recover was “proximately

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caused by a characteristic of the product that renders the product unreasonably

dangerous.” The supreme court held in Lawson that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur

is applicable to product liability actions; however, the doctrine must be applied

sparingly. Id. This court’s explanation of the doctrine was accepted by the supreme

court in Lawson:

A plaintiff’s burden of proof in a civil suit is generally preponderance
of the evidence. He can satisfy his burden of proof with direct or
circumstantial evidence. Sonnier v. Bayou State Mobile Homes, Inc.,
96-1458 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/2/97), 692 So.2d 698, writ denied, 97-1575
(La. 10/3/97), 701 So.2d 201. Circumstantial evidence is “evidence of
one fact, or of a set of facts, from which the existence of the fact to be
determined may reasonably be inferred.” W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser
& Keeton on the Law of Torts § 39, at 242 (5th ed.1984). When direct
evidence of a defendant’s negligence is not available, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur assists the plaintiff in presenting a prima facie case of
negligence. Cangelosi v. Our Lady of the Lake Reg’l Med. Ctr., 564
So.2d 654 (La.1989). Res ipsa loquitur is applicable when the
circumstances surrounding an accident are so unusual as to give rise to
an inference of negligence or liability on the part of the defendant and
that, under such circumstances, the only reasonable and fair conclusion
is that the accident resulted from a breach of duty or omission on the
part of the defendant. Id.

If applicable, the doctrine allows the trier of fact to infer negligence
from the circumstances of the event. Id. Generally, three criteria must
be present for the doctrine to be applicable: 1) the facts must indicate
that the plaintiff’s injuries would not have occurred in the absence of
negligence; 2) the plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s
negligence falls within his scope of duty to plaintiff; and 3) the
evidence should sufficiently exclude inference of the plaintiff’s own
responsibility or the responsibility of others besides defendant in
causing the accident. Id. Because the standard of proof is
preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the
plaintiff’s evidence need only exclude all other reasonable explanations
for his injuries; it need not “conclusively exclude all other possible
explanations for his injuries.” Id. at 664.

Id. at 49-50 (quoting Lawson v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of Am., 04-839, 04-976

(La.App. 3 Cir. 12/29/04), 896 So.2d 149, 153-54) (emphasis in original).

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The recall notice issued by Ford stated that “a defect . . . exists in certain 2000

model year F-150, Expedition, Navigator, and 2001 F-150 SuperCrew vehicles

equipped with speed control.” According to the notice, the safety recall was issued

because “an underhood speed control deactivation switch may overheat, smoke, or

burn, which could result in an underhood fire” and that the “condition may occur

either when the vehicle is parked or when it is being operated, even if the speed

control is not in use.”

Ford presented the testimony of Larry Helton, who was accepted as an expert

in fire and explosion investigation. Mr. Helton testified that he does a lot of work for

Ford but is not on retainer with the company and that he has worked on other speed

control deactivation switch1 cases and has previously found that a Ford speed control

deactivation switch caused a fire. Mr. Helton first opined that the fire was not a “hot

service fire” because of the length of time the truck had been parked before it caught

on fire. He then opined that nothing in the back portion of the engine compartment,

which is where the speed control deactivation switch is located, caused the fire

because it was evident from one of the Desotos’ photographs that the device remained

intact after the fire and that the plastic covering for the device would have melted if

the fire had started in that area. Mr. Helton also pointed to the undisturbed plastic cap

of another device in the rear of the engine compartment which remained intact after

the fire as further evidence that the fire was not caused by the speed control

deactivation switch.

1
In his testimony, Mr. Helton referred to the device at issue as the speed sensor device. For
consistency in this opinion, we use the term “speed control deactivation switch,” as the switch is
referenced in the recall notice issued by Ford.

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Mr. Helton testified that he has intentionally burned Ford vehicles to attempt

to replicate speed control deactivation switch fires and that the burn pattern depicted

in the Desotos’ photographs is totally inconsistent with burn patterns he has seen in

known speed control deactivation switch fires. He further testified that he had never

seen the wheels spinning or engine starting on any vehicle which he intentionally

burned and that wheels spinning or the engine starting have never been reported in

any case where fire was determined to be caused by the speed control deactivation

switch.

In order for res ipsa loquitor to be applicable herein, the Desotos had to

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the fire was not caused by them or

a third party. Lawson, 938 So.2d 35. The trial court determined that there was no

evidence of vandalism as initially suspected by Mr. Desoto, implying it was Ford’s

burden to prove that the fire was caused by vandalism. This was error, as it was the

Desotos’ burden to exclude all other reasonable explanations for the fire. Id.

The trial court further erred by assuming facts not in evidence to exclude

vandalism as the cause of the fire. Benjamin ex rel. Benjamin v. Hous. Auth. of New

Orleans, 04-1058 (La. 12/1/04), 893 So.2d 1. Although no evidence was presented

on the issue of vandalism, the trial court reasoned:

Vandalism isn’t [the cause] because again the way the fire certainly
smoldered under the hood or around that left (INAUDIBLE)
compartment for a while . . . vandalism just does not seem to be at all
since it was making that noise with the starter when the plaintiffs walked
out with no keys in it. I’m assuming that I would have been told and I
think I can assume [there was no] evidence of some hot wiring activity
as that occurred inside. But you know, if you think about it, it just
wouldn’t make a sense for a grown up to start the fire under the hood,
close the hood quietly and then get in it and tamper with it and drive it
to the home. It’s just not logical. I mean even with vandals today, meth
addicts and what not it just, it just doesn’t make sense and it’s just
nothing.

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The Desotos did not carry their burden of proof because they did not exclude

all reasonable explanations, other than the speed control deactivation switch, for the

fire. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court must be reversed.

Disposition

The judgment of the trial court is reversed. All costs of this appeal are assessed

to the Desotos.

REVERSED.

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