Gregory Arlan Reon v. Ravenna Istre Reon

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 07-1277

GREGORY ARLAN REON

VERSUS

RAVENNA ISTRE REON

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2003-2132
HONORABLE LILYNN ANNETTE CUTRER, DISTRICT JUDGE

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BILLY HOWARD EZELL
JUDGE

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Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and Billy Howard Ezell,
Judges.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART.

William Mitchell Redd
Dean J. Manning
Liles & Redd
940 Ryan Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 433-8529
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
Gregory Arlan Reon

James Phillip Gaharan, Jr.
The Gaharan Law Firm
700 Pujo Street, Suite B
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 437-9405
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Ravenna Istre Reon

EZELL, JUDGE.

Ravenna Reon appeals the decision of the trial court in this community

property partition. Mrs. Reon claims that the trial court erred in that its judgment

does not accurately reflect the terms of an oral stipulation entered into by her and her

former husband, Gregory Reon. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of

the trial court in part and vacate in part.

Mr. and Mrs. Reon were married in 1974. Mr. Reon filed for divorce in 2003.

Mrs. Reon filed for partition of community property that same year. After several

delays and the filing of detailed descriptive lists, the partition was set for trial on

April 10, 2006. That day, Mr. and Mrs. Reon in open court entered into an oral

stipulation partitioning the community property. Mr. Reon submitted a judgment to

the trial court representing the agreement. Mrs. Reon opposed the proposed

judgment, claiming that it contained provisions that were not part of the stipulation.

Mr. Reon’s judgment was signed by the trial court on November 6, 2006. Mrs. Reon

filed a motion for new trial, which was subsequently denied. From these decisions,

Mrs. Reon appeals.

Mrs. Reon asserts two assignments of error on appeal. She claims that the trial

court erred in failing to amend the judgment to accurately reflect the oral stipulation,

and that the trial court erred in failing to grant her motion for new trial. Because we

agree with Mrs. Reon’s first assignment of error, we need not address the latter.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 3071, at the time of the proceedings, provided:

A transaction or compromise is an agreement between two or
more persons, who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust
their differences by mutual consent . . . .

This contract must be either reduced into writing or recited in
open court and capable of being transcribed from the record of the
proceeding. The agreement recited in open court confers upon each of
them the right of judicially enforcing its performance, although its

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substance may thereafter be written in a more convenient form.

The open court recitations, by which the parties agreed to the stipulations

offered by their respective attorneys, constituted a binding compromise or agreement

on the partition of their community property. Carlin v. Wallace, 00-2892 (La.App.

1 Cir. 9/28/01), 809 So.2d 1017.

At the time of the stipulations, it was orally agreed between the parties that a

judgment would be prepared in conformity with the stipulations. A comparison of

the substance of the April 10 open court stipulations to the November 6th judgment

reveals that six paragraphs of the judgment exceed the scope of the oral stipulation.

The first paragraph Mrs. Reon challenges reads:

Appearers agree that each party will keep all cash on hand in each
other’s possession, including, but not limited to, their personal salaries,
personal checking accounts, other retirement plans or Social Security.
Except any additional pension/retirement plan in favor of RAVENNA
ISTRE REON, other than the Isle of Capri Retirement Trust and Savings
Plan, shall be divided by a Qualified Domestic Relations Order.

The record shows that the oral stipulation set forth that any retirement plan

owned by Mrs. Reon other than the Isle of Capri plan was, indeed, to be subject to

division by a Qualified Domestic Relations Order. Therefore, this is correctly

reflected in the judgment. However, the first sentence of the paragraph pertaining to

cash on hand, bank accounts, etc., was never mentioned in the stipulation, exceeds

the limits of the agreement, and is hereby removed.

Moreover, the transcript of the stipulation contains no mention whatsoever

concerning the following provisions of the trial court’s judgment:

As a result hereof, the parties hereto discharge each other from
any further accounting to the community which formerly existed
between them, the same being fully liquidated as set for[th] herein
above.

The parties hereby acknowledge that neither of them has
requested nor required their respective attorney’s [sic], if any, to provide

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a title examination, title opinion or mortgage certificate with reference
to any property transferred herein. Further, neither party has requested
nor required their respective attorney’s [sic] to verify the balance of any
indebtedness assumed, or the existence or true value of any asset
transferred herein. Instead, the parties accept the representations made
by and to each other with reference to the matters as being true and
correct, and each hereby frees and holds his and/or her respective
attorney harmless for not verifying, obtaining or checking or rendering
same.

They waive any lien privilege that either may have or any of the
properties herein transferred to themselves other than as agreed to herein
and renounce the benefits of any resolutory or executory conditions
relative to any of the provisions hereof which is agreed will be
nondischargeable in bankruptcy should the same occur.

Appearers do further declare that this act constitutes the entirety
of their property settlement and agreement to terminate the community
of acquets and gains which has heretofore existed between them and to
partition the community property existing between them. Appearers do
hereby further acknowledge that they have this day accounted to each
other concerning the payment of various community obligations by each
of them and that as a result thereof the parties hereto discharge each
other from any other accounting to the community which formerly
existed between them, the same being fully liquidated as set [forth]
above.

Appearers further agree to sign any deeds, bill of sales [sic], or
other documents reasonable and necessary to accomplish the purpose
and obligations of this agreement, and specifically agree to sign and
execute any and all papers necessary to effect a transfer of any
immovable property mentioned in this settlement. Each party agrees
that this agreement may be enforced by specific performance and agrees
to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees of the party successfully [sic] in a
suit for specific performance.

Because these parts of the judgment do not accurately reflect the intent of the

parties as indicated by the record before this court, they do not constitute part of the

agreement between the Reons and must be removed to reflect the parties’ intent. See

Conrad v. Conrad, 497 So.2d 22 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1986).

While Mrs. Reon also claims that the trial court’s provision pertaining to

reimbursement for separate or community property also goes beyond the scope of the

oral stipulation, the record clearly indicates that both parties agreed to waive

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reimbursement claims. Accordingly, this assertion lacks merit.

We hereby vacate the six paragraphs of the judgment specifically mentioned

above. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The costs

related to this appeal are to be split between the parties.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART.

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