Glen Lipsey v. Jay Dardenne, La. Secretary of State

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-1487

GLENN LIPSEY

VERSUS

JAY DARDENNE, LA. SECRETARY OF STATE

**********
APPEAL FROM THE
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CONCORDIA, NO. 43042
HONORABLE SHARON I. MARCHMAN, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Billy Howard Ezell, and
James T. Genovese, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Carey T. Jones
P. O. Box 700
Denham Springs, LA 70727-0727
Phone: (225) 664-0077
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellee - Randy Maxwell

Jack H. McLemore, Jr.
P. O. Box 520
Vidalia, LA 71373
Phone: (318) 336-9189
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellee - Randy Maxwell

Brady D. King, II
McNEW, KING, MILLS, BURCH & LANDRY, L.L.P.
1904 Royal Avenue
Monroe, LA 71201
Phone: (318) 361-3140
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellant - Glenn Lipsey

Stephen D. Hawkland
8459 United Plaza Boulevard
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
Phone: (225) 287-7475
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellee - Jay Dardenne

Sheri Lynn Marcus Morris
8440 Jefferson Highway - Suite 301
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellant - Glenn Lipsey

Clinton Andrew Magoun
P. O. Box 397
Ferriday, LA 71334
Phone: (318) 757-8600
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellant - Glenn Lipsey

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant, Glenn Lipsey (Lipsey), lost the October 20, 2007,

primary election for Sheriff of Concordia Parish by twenty-one votes to the

incumbent Sheriff, Randy Maxwell. Lipsey filed a Petition to Contest Election and

a subsequent amended and supplemental petition, challenging the qualifications of

multiple voters and alleging the occurrence of various voting irregularities and fraud

in multiple precincts. He sought to nullify the October 20, 2007, election and the

scheduling of a new election. After a trial of the matter, Judge Ad Hoc, Sharon

Marchman,1 found that nine votes were improperly cast, but held that the differential

was insufficient to change the results of the election. The trial court also found that

Lipsey failed to carry his burden of proof on the remaining allegations of fraud and

voting irregularities. Lipsey’s petition was dismissed.

1
Judge Sharon I. Marchman of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Parishes of Quachita and
Morehouse, was appointed Judge Ad Hoc over this matter by the Louisiana Supreme Court because
of the recusal of the judges of the Seventh Judicial District Court.

This appeal ensued in accordance with La.R.S. 18:1409.2 For the

following reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I.

ISSUES

1. Did the trial court err in disallowing Lipsey to
amend his petition, after the nine-day filing
deadline, to add names to the list of voters whose
qualifications were being challenged?

2. Did the trial court err in ruling that Lipsey’s failure
to determine voter qualifications either prior to or
during the election constituted a lack of due
diligence, therefore waiving Lipsey’s post-election
challenges to the qualifications of all except sixteen
voters?

3. Did the trial court err in finding that the challenges
to the residency status of eight voters were
meritless?

4. Did the trial court err in finding that three nursing
home residents were properly qualified voters

2
Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:1409, relative to appeals, states:

§1409. Trial; decision; appeal

....

D. Within twenty-four hours after rendition of judgment, a
party aggrieved by the judgment may appeal by obtaining an order of
appeal and giving bond for a sum fixed by the court to secure the
payment of costs. The clerk of the trial court shall give notice of the
order of appeal to the clerk of the court of appeal and to all the parties
or their counsel of record. The trial judge shall fix the return day at
a time not to exceed three days after rendition of judgment.

E. The clerk of the trial court shall prepare the record on
appeal and transmit it to the clerk of the court of appeal on the return
day.

F. Immediately upon receipt of the record the clerk of the
court of appeal shall notify the parties and the case shall be heard no
later than forty-eight hours after the record is lodged with the court of
appeal. Judgment shall be rendered within twenty-four hours after the
case is argued. The court of appeal shall indicate the date and time
rendered on the judgment. The clerk of the court of appeal shall
immediately notify all parties or their counsel of record by telephone
and/or facsimile transmission of the judgment.

2

pursuant to the La.R.S. 18:1331, et seq., Special
Program for Handicapped Voters?

5. Did the trial court incorrectly find that voter, Kay
Hawkes, was not a full interdict and was, therefore,
qualified to vote?

6. Did Lipsey prove the occurrence of voting
irregularities and offenses at the precincts that made
it impossible to determine the outcome of the
election?

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In accordance with La.R.S. 18:1405(B), within nine days of the election

contest, Lipsey filed a timely Petition to Contest Election against defendant-appellee,

Secretary of State Jay Dardenne. He challenged the qualifications of more than

eighty voters and alleged irregularities and fraud in the conduct of the election due

to: the payment of money and/or consideration to certain voters; the prevention of

qualified voters from casting absentee ballots or ballots at the polls; and voting

machine malfunctions resulting in errors in counting the number of ballots cast.

Intervenor, Sheriff Maxwell, filed exceptions of vagueness, no cause of action,

peremption, and a motion to strike. A First Amended, Supplemental, and Restated

Petition to Contest Election and accompanying motion was filed by Lipsey. Sheriff

Maxwell filed an Exception of Peremption.

At the commencement of the trial, the trial court granted Lipsey’s motion

to amend the petition only to the extent that the amendments and supplementation

narrowed the issues and claims presented. The court denied any amendments

expanding the original claims and, consequently, disallowed the listing of nine

additional voters whose qualifications were being challenged and the listing of seven

additional precincts. The remaining exceptions were overruled.

3

After three days of testimony, the trial court rendered a judgment,

dismissing Lipsey’s Petition to Contest Election. In its Written Reasons for

Judgment, the trial court thoroughly addressed each of Lipsey’s claims. Lipsey now

seeks a reversal of the trial court’s judgment, the nullification of the October 20,

2007, election, and the calling of a new election.

III.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

Amendment of Petition

Lipsey contends that the trial court erred in not granting in entirety his

motion to amend the Petition to Contest Election. He contends that the trial court

erred in disallowing his amended petition to the extent that it contested new and

different voters who were not named in the original petition. Applying the abuse of

discretion standard of review, we find no error in the ruling of the trial court.

The record reveals that the motion to amend and First Amended,

Supplemental, and Restated Petition to Contest Election was filed on November 9,

2007, a week after the statutory deadline for filing a petition to contest an election.3

The amendments sought to delete several voter-qualification challenges and also to

add names to the list of voters being challenged and precincts to the list of locations

where alleged voting irregularities took place.

3
Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:1405(B) states:

§ 1405. Time for commencement of action

....

B. An action contesting any election involving election to
office shall be instituted on or before 4:30 p.m. of the ninth day after
the date of the election, and no such contest shall be declared moot
because of the performance or nonperformance of a ministerial
function including but not limited to matters relating to the printing
of ballots for the general election.

4

Relying on La.R.S. 18:1405(B) and jurisprudence holding that this

statute sets forth a nine-day peremptive period for filing such an election challenge,

the trial court declined to allow the expansion of the pleadings. See Small v. Desselle,

520 So.2d 1167 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1987). Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:1406(B)

provides that “[t]he trial judge may allow the filing of amended pleadings for good

cause shown and in the interest of justice.” (Emphasis added). The trial court

possessed the discretion to determine whether any such amendments would be

allowed outside the nine-day peremptive period and based upon our review of the

record, we cannot say that the trial court’s ruling was an abuse of that discretion.

Due Diligence

Lipsey claims that the trial court erred in finding that he failed to

exercise due diligence to determine the qualifications of voters prior to or during the

election and, consequently, erred in dismissing his challenges to the qualifications of

all but sixteen voters. We find no manifest error in the trial court’s ruling.

The trial court correctly recognized that the Election Code requires that

challenges to voter qualifications or to irregularities in the conduct of an election be

made either before or during an election. See La.R.S. 18:1434.4 The only exception

to this is for objections to voters who should have been removed from the voter

registration rolls due to death. Id.; La.R.S. 18:173. The burden is on the candidate

to challenge possibly unqualified voters prior to votes being cast if due diligence

4
Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:1434 states:

§ 1434. Waiver of objections to voter qualifications when voter is not challenged at the
election.

An objection to the qualifications of a voter, except for an
objection to a voter who should have been removed from the voter
registration rolls pursuant to R.S. 18:173, or to an irregularity in the
conduct of the election, which with the exercise of due diligence
could have been raised by a challenge of the voter or objections at the
polls to the procedure, is deemed waived.

5

would have allowed for the discovery of this information. See Dawsey v. Boone, 94-

2388 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/1/94), 647 So.2d 1188, writ granted, 94-2938 (La. 12/9/94);

Davis v. McGlothin, 524 So.2d 1320 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 525 So.2d 1046

(La.1988). A candidate is not allowed to await the outcome of an election and, if

unsuccessful, then object to voter qualifications. Dawsey, 647 So.2d 1188.

Based on the testimony and evidence presented at trial, Lipsey acquired

knowledge of voter qualification issues as early as 2003, following his first run for

Sheriff, yet took no action to investigate those voters prior to the 2007 election. We

agree with the trial court that this prior experience of running for office, the voter

qualification issues that were raised subsequent to that election, in addition to his

status as a retired, fifteen-year resident Louisiana State Trooper with knowledge of

the parish, should have put Lipsey on notice that voter qualifications should be

investigated prior to the election. His challenges were to the qualifications of less

than 100 voters, the majority of whom were purported employees, or relatives of

employees, of the incumbent Sheriff’s Department. None of his challenges was to

registered voters who should have been removed from the voter rolls due to death.

Lipsey also testified at trial that he had approximately forty volunteers who assisted

him in his investigation of questionably-qualified voters after the election.

We, accordingly, find no error in the trial court’s ruling, which found

that Lipsey failed to exercise due diligence as to those challenges raised in paragraph

9(a) of his petition, except for the sixteen who were challenged prior to the election

or at the polls. We further adopt the trial court’s written reasons for judgment on this

issue, in support of our finding.

6

Proof of Residency

Lipsey asserts that the trial court erred in finding that eight of the sixteen

challenged voters were residents of the parish and were qualified to vote. Voter

registration in Louisiana is determined by a citizen’s residency status. La.R.S.

18:101(A)(B).5 The burden rested with Lipsey to prove the lack of residency of the

voters at issue. See Davis, 524 So.2d 1320.

We adopt the reasoning of the trial court in regard to the findings that the

following persons were qualified voters of Concordia Parish for the October 2007

Sheriff’s election: Lee and Lucy Ford; Deborah P. Gee; Amy Ivy; Gregory and

Katrina N. Jackson; Anthony B. Nettles; and Vernon E. White. We find no error in

the trial court’s application of the law regarding the determination of residency status

5
Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:101(A) and (B), state:

§ 101. Registration to vote; qualifications; more than one
residence; presidential elections

A. (1) Every citizen of Louisiana who is at least eighteen
years of age or will attain that age on or before the next election, is an
actual bona fide resident of this state, and the parish, municipality, if
any, and precinct in which he offers to register as a voter, is not
disfranchised, and who complies with the provisions of this Chapter
shall be eligible to register to vote in local, state and national
elections held in this state.

(2) Any person age seventeen and who is otherwise qualified
to vote may register to vote at any time prior to the first election at
which he shall have attained the age of eighteen years. However, no
one, under the age of eighteen years shall be permitted to vote in any
election.

B. For purposes of the laws governing voter registration and
voting, “resident” means a citizen who resides in this state and in the
parish, municipality, if any, and precinct in which he offers to register
and vote, with an intention to reside there indefinitely. If a citizen
resides at more than one place in the state with an intention to reside
there indefinitely, he may register and vote only at one of the places
at which he resides. However, if a person claims a homestead
exemption, pursuant to Article VII, Section 20 of the Constitution of
Louisiana, on one of the residences, he shall register and vote in the
precinct in which that residence is located. For purposes of voter
registration and voting, the residence of a married woman shall be
determined in the same manner as is required for any other citizen.
A citizen of this state shall not be or remain registered or vote in more
than one place of residence at any one time.

7

for purposes of voter registration and find that much of the trial court’s conclusions

were based on credibility determinations regarding witness testimony. The trial

court’s reasonable fact determinations cannot be overturned by this court:

[T]he reviewing court must give great weight to factual
conclusions of the trier of fact; where there is conflict in
the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and
reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon
review, even though the appellate court may feel that its
own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. The
reason for this well-settled principle of review is based not
only upon the trial court’s better capacity to evaluate live
witnesses (as compared with the appellate court’s access
only to a cold record), but also upon the proper allocation
of trial and appellate functions between the respective
courts.

....

. . . Recognizing that great deference should be
accorded to the fact finder, the court of appeal and this
Court have a constitutional duty to review facts. Id. To
perform its constitutional duty properly, an appellate court
must determine whether the trial court’s conclusions were
clearly wrong based on the evidence or clearly without
evidentiary support. Id. That being said, we reiterate that
when two permissible views of the evidence exist, the fact
finder’s choice between them cannot be manifestly
erroneous or clearly wrong.

Bonin v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 03-3024, p. 7 (La. 7/2/04), 877 So.2d 89, 94 (citations
omitted).

Lipsey also argues on appeal that the trial court erroneously found that

three of those found to be qualified voters—Lee and Lucy Ford and Anthony B.

Nettles—were not qualified because they all claimed homestead exemptions on

domiciles in Mississippi. Louisiana’s Election Code provides the qualifications for

registering to vote in this state only and in doing so sets forth a limitation regarding

homestead exemptions claimed in Louisiana only. Specifically, La.R.S. 18:101(B)

states that a citizen claiming a homestead exemption in Louisiana pursuant to Article

7, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution, must register and vote in the precinct in which

8

that residence is located. La.R.S. 18:101(B). Consequently, we find that the trial

court’s findings of residency status as to these voters, as referenced earlier, are

otherwise reasonably supported by the record. Accordingly, we find no merit to this

argument.

Nursing Home Resident Voters

Lipsey contends that it was error for the trial court to find that three

nursing home residents,6 Margaret Nessmith Arthur, Maidie L. Ezell Dawson, and

Mary Etta Hill, were properly qualified to vote pursuant to the state Special Program

for Handicapped Voters (La.R.S. §§ 18:1331-33). The program allows otherwise

qualified voters who, because of a physical disability are unable to vote at the polls

on election day or during early voting, to vote absentee by mail and for an extended

time period prior to the election. See La.R.S. 18:1333(B).

Lipsey asserts on appeal that these three voters were not properly

qualified to vote through this program because they were never approved for the

program by the Parish Board of Election Supervisors as is required by La.R.S.

18:1332(B)(3).7 Lipsey contends that they were unlawfully approved for the program

6
In his appeal, Mr. Lipsey includes a fourth nursing home resident, Billy Ray Vinson, in his
list of voters who were improperly allowed to vote via the state’s Special Program for Handicapped
Voters. However, the trial court noted that Billy Ray Vinson’s qualifications were not timely
challenged prior to the election and as a result, Mr. Lipsey had waived his right to challenge this
voter at trial.
7
Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:1332(B)(3) states:

§ 1332. Disabled voters; physical disability rendering voter incapable of voting
in person, voting absentee by mail; requirements

....

(3) The parish board of election supervisors may examine all
or any part of the evidence and shall make the final determination in
the matter. If the board approves the eligibility of the voter for
participation, it shall direct the registrar to place the voter in the
special program and notify him thereof. The parish board of election
supervisors may direct the registrar to remove for cause a voter from
participation in the program if the board determines after a hearing on

9

by the Registrar of Voters, Golda Ensminger (Registrar Ensminger), only. In

addition, he claims that their votes are invalid because there were no executed

acknowledgments provided by the persons who gave voting assistance to these

persons as is required by La.R.S. 13:1333(G)(4)(c).8

The record indicates that Registrar Ensminger testified that the Board of

Election Supervisors delegated the authority to approve voters for this program to her

in March of 2007. However, due to complaints made by Board Member Justin

Connor, Registrar Ensminger testified that she presented the files containing

documentation necessary for the approval of the six participants in the program

(including those persons at issue in this case) to the Board of Election Supervisors at

a special meeting, held on April 4, 2007. Registrar Ensminger testified that the files

were reviewed by the Board of Supervisors and that all members of the board

indicated their approval of the six voters. The trial court found that Registrar

Ensminger’s testimony concerning the April 4, 2007, approval of these voters to the

program by the board was credible and unrefuted at trial and was sufficient to meet

the matter that the voter has failed to vote on at least two occasions
despite assistance. If removal is ordered as a result of such hearing,
the voter shall be notified immediately by the parish board of election
supervisors.
8
Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:1333(G)(4)(c) states:

§ 1333. Voting by persons confined to a nursing home

....

G. The voting by each voter shall be accomplished in the
following manner:

....

(c) Any person who assists the voter shall execute an
acknowledgment, on a form which shall be prescribed and furnished
to the registrar of voters by the secretary of state and made available
by the registrar of voters through the deputy registrar who appears at
the nursing home, verifying that he has marked the ballot in the
manner dictated by the voter.

10

the requirements of the statute. The trial court also found that the claims asserted in

the petition, that these ballots were not properly witnessed, cast, or processed, were

abandoned at trial due to Lipsey’s failure to put on any evidence to support these

contentions.

The trial court’s findings are supported by the record and are not

manifestly erroneous. The record shows that the ministerial functions required of the

Board of Election Supervisors were carried out prior to the October 20, 2007,

election. In addition, we find that the unrefuted testimony presented by Registrar

Ensminger, regarding the witnessing, casting, and processing of these votes, did not

establish any irregularity or lack of compliance with statutory guidelines.

Accordingly, we find no merit to Lipsey’s contentions.

Interdicted Voter

Lipsey asserts that the trial court erroneously found that Kay Hawkes

(Ms. Hawkes) was a qualified voter. Lipsey contends that the evidence reflects that

she was the subject of a full interdiction and, therefore, was not qualified to vote

pursuant to La.R.S. 18:102.9

9
§ 102. Ineligible persons

A. No person shall be permitted to register or vote who is:

(1) Under an order of imprisonment, as defined in R.S.
18:2(8), for conviction of a felony; or

(2) Interdicted after being judicially declared to be mentally
incompetent as a result of a full interdiction proceeding pursuant to
Civil Code Article 389. A person subject to a limited interdiction
pursuant to Civil Code Article 390 shall be permitted to register and
vote unless the court in that proceeding specifically suspends the
interdicted person’s right to vote in the judgment of interdiction. If
a person was previously subject to full interdiction, which has been
changed to a limited interdiction, that person shall be eligible to
register and vote unless the judgment of limited interdiction
specifically suspends that right.

B. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph (A)(1) of this
Section or any other provision of law to the contrary, a person who

11

The trial court’s Written Reasons for Judgment actually state that Lipsey

waived his challenge to Mrs. Hawkes’ qualifications to vote because he failed to file

his challenge prior to or on the date of the election. See La.R.S. 18:1434. The trial

court found that Ms. Hawkes had been a registered voter in the parish since 1974 and

that she had been the subject of a judgment of interdiction since 1988. With due

diligence, her qualifications to vote on this basis could have been challenged prior to

the election.

Further, the trial court wrote that the record was unclear as to whether

Ms. Hawkes had been the subject of a full or limited interdiction, which would have

been determinative of whether the interdiction precluded her from voting. In

addition, the trial court stated that the record was unclear as to whether the subject

interdiction had any true legal effect, due to the lack of any evidence therein that an

appointed curator was actually ever qualified to manage Ms. Hawkes’ affairs. We

agree and find no manifest error in the trial court’s rulings.

Voting Machine Irregularities and Alleged Election
Offenses by Incumbent Sheriff

Lipsey contends that the trial court erred in finding that he failed to meet

his burden of proof on the claims that the thirteen-vote discrepancy, totaled from six

voting machines and polling lists and various alleged election offenses committed by

the incumbent Sheriff, so impeded the election that the outcome was indeterminable.

We disagree and find the rulings of the trial court on these issues to be reasonably

supported by the record.

was convicted of a felony prior to the effective date of the 1974
Constitution of Louisiana who has fully satisfied and completed his
sentence shall not be ineligible to register to vote, nor shall he be
prohibited from voting, based upon that conviction.

12

A discrepancy in voting machine counts and poll lists, alone, does not

constitute grounds to discount votes. See Brunet v. Evangeline Parish Sch. Bd., 379

So.2d 271 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1979); Fitzmorris v. Lambert, 382 So.2d 169 (La.App. 1

Cir.), writ refused, 384 So.2d 793 (La.1979). Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:143210

now provides the grounds for nullifying an election:

Considering this language, the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Adkins v. Huckabay, 99-3605 (La. 2/25/2000), 755 So.2d
206, stated that a party contesting an election no longer
must show that “but for” the irregularity he would have
won the election.

Although a party contesting an election is no longer
limited to the “but for” standard, we note that a party
contesting an election still must show at least that because
of fraud or irregularities, the outcome of the election is
impossible to determine. Thus, it is the effect of the
irregularity on determining the outcome, rather than the
fact of an irregularity by itself, that guides us in these
matters.

10
§ 1432. Remedies

A. If the trial judge in an action contesting an election
determines that: (1) it is impossible to determine the result of
election, or (2) the number of qualified voters who were denied the
right to vote by the election officials was sufficient to change the
result in the election, if they had been allowed to vote, or (3) the
number of unqualified voters who were allowed to vote by the
election officials was sufficient to change the result of the election if
they had not been allowed to vote, or (4) a combination of the factors
referred to in (2) and (3) in this Subsection would have been
sufficient to change the result had they not occurred, the judge may
render a final judgment declaring the election void and ordering a
new primary or first and second party primary or second party
primary or general election for all the candidates, or, if the judge
determines that the appropriate remedy is the calling of a restricted
election, the judge may render a final judgment ordering a restricted
election, specifying the date of the election, the appropriate
candidates for the election, the office or other position for which the
election shall be held, and indicating which voters will be eligible to
vote.

B. If the trial judge determines that an action contesting an
election or objecting to candidacy was filed frivolously, he may award
all costs of court, plus a reasonable attorney fee, plus damages, to the
defendant.

13

Nugent v. Phelps, 36,366, p. 13 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/23/02), 816 So.2d 349, 357, writ

denied, 02-1153 (La. 5/10/02), 815 So.2d 850.

In this case, Lipsey failed to produce any evidence establishing that the

irregularities made the outcome of the election impossible to determine. There was

no proof presented that the discrepancies were the result of illegally cast votes or

because voters were prevented from voting. Rather, the only evidence presented on

this issue was the testimony offered by John Kitchen (Mr. Kitchen), a voting machine

technician supervisor employed by the secretary of state. He essentially testified that

human error, in the actual process of casting votes and/or in the maintaining of poll

lists, would explain the differences in the votes. He also testified that he had no

record of receiving calls concerning voting machine malfunctions from any of the six

precincts at issue during the election. Lipsey offered no evidence to discount Mr.

Kitchen’s testimony. We cannot say that the trial court’s reliance on this testimony

was manifestly erroneous. Consequently, we find that Lipsey’s contention that the

trial court erred in refusing to annul the election on this basis is without merit.

Regarding the allegations of election offenses allegedly fostered by the

incumbent Sheriff’s office, we find that Lipsey failed to present sufficient proof of

such activity that would have justified disqualifying any votes or nullifying the

election as prayed for. Lipsey alleged that the “opposing candidate for Sheriff

fostered an environment of voting irregularities and errors which makes it impossible

to determine the outcome of the election. . . . [I]nclud[ing] a) Allowing uniformed

Sheriff’s Department personnel in and improperly close to polling stations; b)

Allowing uniformed Sheriff Department personnel to watch voter’s vote; and c)

Encouraging individuals, including but not limited to the Sheriff’s Department

personnel and/or their relatives, to improperly register to vote and vote in Concordia

14

Parish.” The trial court found that no evidence was offered at trial to support the

allegations and that no argument was made by counsel for Mr. Lipsey in this regard.

After a review of the record, we agree and find no manifest error in the trial court’s

ruling that Lipsey failed to carry his burden of proof as required by La.R.S.

18:1432(A) in order to nullify the election.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are

assessed to plaintiff-appellant, Glenn Lipsey.

AFFIRMED.

15