Colleen Wood v. American National Property & Casualty Ins. Co.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 07-1589

COLLEEN WOOD

VERSUS

AMERICAN NATIONAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INS. CO., ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2003-867
HONORABLE DAVID ALEXANDER RITCHIE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JOHN D. SAUNDERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, John D. Saunders, and
Marc T. Amy, Judges.

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, dissents in part and assigns written reasons.

AFFIRMED.

Roger G. Burgess
Erin McCall Alley
Baggett, McCall, Burgess, Watson & Gaughan
3006 Country Club Road
P.O. Drawer 7820
Lake Charles, LA 70606
(337) 478-8888
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
Colleen Wood

John Michael Veron
Bice, Palermo & Veron
P. O. Box 2125
Lake Charles, LA 70602-2125
(337) 310-1600
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Chuc Th Song Tran

James Ray Morris
Fraser, Morris & Wheeler, L.L.P.
P. O. Box 4886
Lake Charles, LA 70605
(337) 478-8595
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants:
American National Property & Casualty Ins. Co.
Chuc Th Song Tran

H. Bradford Calvit
Provosty, Sadler, Delaunay, Fiorenza, & Sobel
P. O. Drawer 1971
Alexandria, LA 71309
(318) 445-3631
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
American National Property &Casualty Ins. Co.

Russell Joseph Stutes, Jr.
P. Jody Lavergne
Stutes, Fontenot, Lavergne & Lutz.
713 Kirby St.
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 433-0022
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Chuc Th Song Tran

David Laine Morgan
John J. Simpson
Stockwell, Sievert, Viccellio, Clement & Shaddock
P.O. Box 2900
Lake Charles, LA 70602
(337) 436-9491
Counsel for Intervenor/Appellee:
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co.

SAUNDERS, Judge.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

The plaintiff, Ms. Colleen Wood (hereinafter “Ms. Wood”), was injured in an

automobile accident on March 5, 2002. Ms. Wood argued that the accident caused

her to suffer a herniated disc, which was abutting her spinal cord. Ms. Wood’s

neurosurgeon testified that if Ms. Wood’s spondylolisthesis exceeded a certain

amount, she would need to undergo a second surgery. An economist, Dr. Kenneth

McCoin, testified that the present day cost of the surgery was $76,883 and that Ms.

Wood would incur $13,200/year in medical expenses in the years leading up to the

second surgery. Furthermore, two different experts testified that Ms. Wood would

suffer a loss in future earning capacity of either $450,262 or $586,063.

Dr. Wolf, Ms. Wood’s neurosurgeon, testified that he expected Ms. Wood to

make an 80% to 100% recovery following the second surgery. However, Dr. Wolf

went on to state that, even with a full recovery, Ms. Wood would continue to suffer

from the following limitations: 1) standing and/or walking less than 2 hours in an 8

hour period; 2) lifting of 20 pounds or less either frequently or occasionally; 3) sitting

for less than 6 hours in an 8 hour period; 4) climbing, crawling or stooping were

never allowed; 5) pushing and pulling limited in the upper extremities; 6) reaching,

handling and fingering were limited to occasional; 7) she had environmental

limitations regarding temperature extremes, humidity/wetness and hazards

(machinery, heights. . .). Dr. Lopez, on the other hand, testified that, should Ms.

Wood make an 80% to 100% recovery from the second surgery, as expected by her

neurosurgeon, she should be able to return to work.

Ms. Wood brought suit in the Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of

Calcasieu, against defendant American National Property and Casualty Co.

(hereinafter “ANPC”), among others. There was no issue regarding liability, as

liability was stipulated prior to trial.

Prior to trial, ANPC’s counsel, Mr. Jim Morris (hereinafter “Mr. Morris”),

engaged in an ex parte meeting with one of Ms. Wood’s treating physicians, Dr.

Kevin Cox (hereinafter “Dr. Cox”), purportedly to gain clarification on the doctor’s

handwriting. This ex parte communication took place at Dr. Cox’s home, outside the

presence and without prior knowledge of opposing counsel. Although Mr. Morris

claims that he attempted to notify Ms. Wood’s counsel of the meeting, no such notice

was received prior to the meeting. During this meeting, Dr. Cox redacted his notes

and a modified copy was later hand delivered to opposing counsel.

Ms. Wood’s counsel thereafter filed a motion in limine seeking to prevent

ANPC from introducing evidence of Dr. Cox’s prior treatment of Ms. Wood—aside

from the purpose of impeaching Ms. Wood—which was granted. The jury ultimately

found for Ms. Wood, awarding her: $123,760.96 in past medical expenses,

$150,000.00 in future medical expenses, $75,000 in physical pain and suffering (past

and future), $75,000 in mental pain and suffering (past and future), $100,000.00 in

disability, $52,000.00 in household services, $100,000.00 in loss of enjoyment of life

(past and future), $52,981.00 in past lost wages, and $125,000.00 in loss of future

wages. From the aforementioned judgment, the following three awards are contested:

$150,000.00 in future medical expenses, $100,000.00 in disability, and $125,000.00

in loss of future earning capacity.

ANPC now appeals, charging two assignments of error.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR:

1. Did the jury abuse its discretion by limiting ANPC’s use of evidence redacted

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during ex parte communications between ANPC’s counsel and opposing

witness, Dr. Cox?

2. Did the jury abuse its discretion in awarding Ms. Wood $150,000.00 in future

medical expenses, $100,000.00 in disability, and $125,000.00 in lost future

earning capacity?

ISSUE #1:

ANPC first argues that the trial court committed error in forbidding ANPC

from mentioning at trial the previous medical treatment of Dr. Cox. We disagree.

“The trial court is accorded vast discretion concerning the admission of

evidence, and its decision will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that

discretion.” McIntosh v . McElveen, 04-1041, p. 9-10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/2/05), pp. 9-

10, 893 So.2d 986, 994, writ denied, 05-528 (La. 4/29/05), 901 So.2d 1069; see also

Maddox v. Omni Drilling Corp., 96-01673 (La. App. 3 Cir. 8/6/97), 698 So.2d 1022,

writ denied, 97-2766, (La. 1/30/98), 709 So.2d 706.

Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 510 provides in pertinent part:

B. (1) General rule of privilege in civil proceedings. In a non-
criminal proceeding, a patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent another person from disclosing a confidential communication made for
the purpose of advice, diagnosis or treatment of his health condition between
or among himself or his representative, his health care provider, or their
representatives.
(2) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this Article in a
noncriminal proceeding as to a communication:
(a) When the communication relates to the health condition of a
patient who brings or asserts a personal injury claim in a judicial or worker’s
compensation proceeding.
....
(c) When the communication is relevant to an issue of the health
condition of the patient in any proceeding in which the patient is a party and
relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense or, after the
patient’s death, in any proceeding in which a party deriving his right from the
patient relies on the patient’s health condition as an element of his claim or
defense.

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....
E. Waiver. The exceptions to the privilege set forth in Paragraph
B(2) shall constitute a waiver of the privilege only as to testimony at trial or to
discovery of the privileged communication by one of the discovery methods
authorized by Code of Civil Procedure Article 1421 et seq., or pursuant to R.S.
40:1299.96 or R.S. 13:3715.1.

Further, La.Code Civ.P. art. 1421 provides:

Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following methods:
depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories;
production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other
property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental examinations;
request for release of medical records; and requests for admission. Unless the
court orders otherwise under Article 1426, the frequency of use of these
methods is not limited.

This court was previously faced with a similar scenario in Coutee v. Global

Marine Drilling Co., 04-1293 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/16/05), 895 So.2d 631, rev’d on other

grounds, 05-0756 (La. 2/22/06), 924 So.2d 112.1 There, in evaluating a doctor’s ex

parte communication regarding a patient’s privileged medical information, we

reasoned that, “the exception to the privilege can only be effectuated through

testimony at trial or by the use of proper discovery methods.” Id. at 641. Thus, Ms.

Wood only waived her patient’s privilege as to her medical records with Dr. Cox in

the limited context of “testimony at trial or [through] the use of proper discovery

methods.” Id. Notably, ex parte communications, such as Mr. Morris’, are “clearly

not ‘testimony at trial’ and [were] not...[obtained] through proper discovery

methods,” as defined in La.Code Civ.P. art. 1421. Id. at 642.

This court ruled that a trial court should not admit, “the ill-gotten gains of

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Whereas the supreme court reversed our affirmation of the trial court’s awarding the plaintiff in
Coutee v. Beurlot 06-2943 (La. 9/5/07), 964 So.2d 304 damages for the ex parte disclosure of
privileged medical information in question there, it did so for lack of evidence regarding causation:
“We find that the damages that Coutee complains of were not caused by the ex parte communication
. . . .” Coutee, 964 So.2d at 309 (emphasis added). Because our supreme court did not discuss the
waiver analysis contained in our discussion of that case, the validity of such analysis remains
unimpeached.

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defense counsel’s illicit ex parte communication[.]” Boutte v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana,

Inc., 95-1123, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/17/96), 674 So.2d 299, 301. Furthermore, we

ruled that, “violations of La.Code Evid. Art. 510 can result not only in sanctions

against the attorney violator, but also. . .the elimination of testimonial evidence if the

violation rises to the level of tainting the integrity of the trial.” Coutee 943 So.2d 637

at 642 - 643. Therefore, it was proper for the trial court, in its vast discretion

concerning the admission of evidence, to limit the use of such evidence tainted by

illicit ex parte communication.

ISSUE #2:

ANPC next argues that the trial court erred by awarding Ms. Wood

$150,000.00 in future medical expenses, $100,000 in disability, and $125,000 in lost

future earning capacity, asserting that these damages are “speculative” and “grossly

excessive.” We disagree.

It is well established that when rendering a judgment on quantum based on the

merits, this court has a constitutional duty to review the law and facts and determine

whether the trier of fact abused the “much discretion” that the law accords it in

awarding damages. La.Const. art. 5, § 10(B); La.Civ.Code art. 1999; ; Ard v.

Samedan Oil Corp., 483 So.2d 925 (La.1986); Carollo v. Wilson, 353 So.2d 249

(La.1977); Temple v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 So.2d 891 (La.1976); Williams v.

Exxon Corporation, 541 So.2d 910, 918 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1989). In the absence of

manifest error, a court of appeal may not set aside a trial court’s finding of fact. Ryan

v. Zurich American Ins. Co., et. al. 07-2312 (La.7/1/08), 988 So.2d 214.

“The jury’s determination of the amount, if any, of an award of damages. . .is

a finding of fact.” Ryan, 988 So.2d 219. In analyzing the jury’s findings of fact, an

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appellate court must review the record in its entirety and determine (1) whether a

reasonable factual basis exists for the finding, and (2) whether, based on the record,

the fact finder is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Id; See e.g. Basco v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 05-0143 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/17/05), 909 So.2d 660; Cormier v. Colston,

05-507 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/30/05), 918 So.2d 541; Rosell v. ESCO 549 So.2d 840

(La.1989). Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the court of appeal

may not reverse and substitute its own discretion, even though convinced that had it

been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Rosell,

549 So.2d 840.. Thus, we will review the record for each category of contested

damages to determine whether a reasonable factual basis exists and whether the jury

was manifestly erroneous.

FUTURE MEDICAL EXPENSES:

This court previously addressed the issue of future medical expenses in

Cormier, 918 So.2d 541. There, we explained:

Medical expenses are a component of special damages. Thibeaux
v. Trotter, 04-482 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/29/04), 883 So.2d 1128, writ denied,
04-2692 (La.2/18/05), 896 So.2d 31. The plaintiff bears the burden of
proving special damages by a preponderance of the evidence. Iwamoto
v. Wilcox, 04-1592 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/05), 900 So.2d 1047. In meeting
her burden of proof on the issue of future medical expenses, the plaintiff
must show that, more probably than not, these expenses will be incurred
and must present medical testimony that they are indicated and the
probable cost of these expenses. Veazey v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.,
587 So.2d 5 (La.App. 3 Cir.1991).

Id. at 547. Furthermore, an award of future medical expenses will not be made absent

testimony that they are indicated and setting out their probable cost. McGraw v.

Orleans Parish School Bd. 519 So.2d 847,850 (La.App. 4 Cir.1988), writ denied 520

So.2d 754. Thus, unless the record indicates that the trial court abused its discretion

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in finding that the $150,000.00 award will more probably than not be incurred by Ms.

Wood, the award must stand.

Here, we find that the record evidence justifies the reasonable conclusion that

the $150,000.00 expense will more likely than not be incurred, and thus we find this

argument to be without merit. Indeed, as ANPC points out in its own brief, Ms.

Wood’s treating neurosurgeon, Dr. Eric Wolf, testified that it is more probable than

not that Ms. Wood would require another surgery, with an estimated cost of $76,883

plus $13,200/year in medical expenses for the years leading up to the surgery. Ms.

Wood had testified that she intended to wait as long as she could before having the

second surgery. In light of such evidence being contained in the record, we are loath

to conclude that the trial court acted unreasonably in finding—in accordance with the

opinion of an expert witness—that such surgery would more likely than not be

required.

The jury’s award encompasses the cost of the surgery and roughly five years of

medical expenses incurred in the interim, based on Dr. McCoin’s testimony as to the

estimated costs for such services. Again, in light of such testimony, we do not find the

$150,000.00 amount arrived at by the trial court to be an abuse of its discretion in

determining damage awards. Thus, we find this assignment of error to be without

merit with respect to future medical expenses.

DISABILITY:

Disability is a component of general damages. Bowie v. Young, 01-715

(La.App. 3 Cir. 3/20/02), 813 So.2d 562, writ denied, 02-1079 (La. 6/21/02), 819

So.2d 335. The supreme court discussed general damages in Andrus v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 95-0801, p. 8 (La. 3/22/96), 670 So.2d 1206, 1210 (La.1996):

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Because discretion vested in the trial court is ‘great,’ and even
vast, an appellate court should rarely disturb an award of general
damages . . . It is only when the award is . . . beyond that which a
reasonable trier of fact could assess . . . .that the appellate court should
increase or reduce the award.

Thus, unless the record indicates that the trial court abused its vast discretion in

awarding Ms. Wood $100,000.00 in disability, the award must stand.

Here, the record does not indicate that the trial court abused its discretion in

awarding Ms. Wood $100,000.00 for her disability. At trial, Ms. Wood’s expert in

the field of vocational rehabilitation, Mr. Jeff Peterson, testified as to a litany of

activities in which Ms. Wood cannot engage as a result of the accident, including

the acts of lifting, pushing, pulling, or handling objects of a certain weight or

bulkiness; sitting or not sitting for extended periods of time; or enduring extremes

of temperature or humidity. Based on the sheer quantity of disabilities from which

Ms. Wood now suffers, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in

awarding Ms. Wood $100,000.00 for disability, and thus we find this argument to

be without merit.

LOSS OF FUTURE EARNING CAPACITY:

“Awards for loss of future income are inherently speculative, and are

intrinsically insusceptible of being calculated with mathematical certainty. Thus,

the courts must exercise sound judicial discretion in determining these awards, and

render awards which are consistent with the record and which work an injustice on

neither party.” Broussard v. Lafayette Ins. Co. 08-116 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/28/08),

984 So.2d 253, 253. The right of recovery being assumed, plaintiff in error cannot

escape liability because the damages are difficult of exact ascertainment. McCoy v.

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Arkansas Natural Gas Co. 143 So. 383, 385 (175 La. 487,496). Thus, unless the

$125,000.00 awarded by the trial court is so unreasonably inconsistent with the

record as to amount to an abuse of discretion, the award must stand.

Here, we do not find the award to be inconsistent with the record. “The rule

that questions of credibility are for the trier of fact applies to the evaluation of

expert testimony, unless the stated reasons of the expert are patently unsound.”

Sportsman Store of Lake Charles, Inc. v. Sonitrol Sec. Systems of Calcasieu, Inc.,

99-0201 (La.10/19/99), p. 6, 748 So.2d 417, 421 (citing Lirette v. State Farm Ins.

Co., 563 So.2d 850, 853 (La. 1990)). “‘A fact finder may accept or reject the

opinion expressed by an expert, in whole or in part.’” Ryan v. Zurich American

Insurance Company, et. al. 2008 WL 2695914 (La.) 2007-2312 (La.7/1/08)

(quoting Green v. K-Mart, 03-2495 (La.5/25/04), 874 So.2d 838,843). “Thus,

reduced to its essentials the inquiry is whether, based on the totality of the record,

the jury was manifestly erroneous in accepting the expert testimony presented by

defendants over that presented by plaintiff.” Miller v. Clout, 03-0091 (La.

10/21/03), 857 So.2d 458, 462.

There was conflicting testimony in this case. Dr. Wolf testified, “I would

expect that [Ms. Wood] would make a full recovery, or at least an 80% recovery on

average [following her second surgery].” However, Dr. Wolf went on to state that,

even if Ms. Wood makes a 100% recovery from her second surgery, she will

continue to have the same limitations listed above, with the exception that the

lifting limitation would go from 10 pounds to 20 pounds. On the other hand, Dr.

Lopez testified that, “If we’re talking about eliminating 80% of the things I saw

9

when or that I interpreted when I evaluated her, yes, I think that she should be able

to resume work activities.”

It is clear that, in determining its award, the jury credited, to varying degrees,

the testimony of experts on both sides. On the basis in the record, the jury was

reasonable in awarding plaintiff $125,000, and this court finds no abuse of

discretion.

ANCILLARY ISSUE:

Appellee raises one assignment of error in her brief filed in support of her

answer, arguing that the jury committed manifest error in not awarding her at least

$450,262 for lost future earning capacity. However, we do not find that the jury

abused its discretion. We note that Dr. Lopez testified that Ms. Wood should be

able to resume work activities after her surgery, and that, if the jury had accepted

Dr. Lopez’s testimony, Ms. Wood would not have been entitled to any damages for

loss of future earning capacity. On the other hand, Dr. Wolf testified that, even if

Ms. Wood enjoyed a successful recovery from a second surgery, all of the above-

stated limitations would likely remain the same, save for a slight improvement in

Ms. Wood’s ability to lift objects. In light of the conflicting testimony of medical

doctors, it is not manifestly erroneous for the jury to conclude that Ms. Wood

would suffer some loss in future earning capacity. The jury awarded plaintiff

several items of damages, and simply found that for loss of future earning capacity,

the appropriate award was $125,000. Thus, we find this argument to be without

merit.

We note further that Appellee, both in brief and at oral argument, pointed out

that a witness for ANPC inappropriately testified as to Ms. Wood’s ability to work.

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Appellee contends that this inappropriate testimony was the basis for an error

committed by the jury in making its award of loss of future earning capacity.

However, this court also finds in the record that the trial judge instructed the jury to

disregard the inappropriate testimony. We are unable to find that this sequence of

events justifies a reversal of the finding made by the jury.. We affirm the jury based

on the conflicting testimony of Dr. Lopez and Dr. Wolf.

CONCLUSION:

For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court in all

respects. All costs are to be taxed to the appellant, American National Property &

Casualty Ins. Co..

AFFIRMED.

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STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-1589

COLLEEN WOOD

VERSUS

AMERICAN NATIONAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INS. CO., ET AL.

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, dissenting in part.

I dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the jury award of $125,000.00

for loss of future earning capacity. The majority’s reference to the testimony of Dr.

Lopez is incomplete and somewhat misleading. In response to defendant’s counsel’s

question about an 80 percent recovery from surgical intervention and the ability of

the plaintiff to perform work following her recovery, Dr. Lopez testified:

If she has -- well the first thing is to assume that the
cause of her pain now is that condition that would require
the fusion. If she’s going to have 80 percent recovery from
that, what’s the eighty percent recovery? Is it going to be
in the complaints of the neck and shoulders? Or is it going
to be in the neuralgia? I find that to be a little bit
complicated to try to extract what is it that she’s going to
be able to do. If we’re talking about eliminating 80 percent
of the things that I saw when or that I interpreted when I
evaluated her, yes, I think that she should be able to resume
work activities.

Clearly, Dr. Lopez’s opinion was, at best, ambiguous. The above quoted testimony

illustrates that even Dr. Lopez found it “a little bit complicated to try to extract what

is it that she’s going to be able to do.” In other words, Dr. Lopez could not say what

Ms. Wood would or would not be able to do following the assumption of an 80

percent successful recovery. Dr. Wolf, the plaintiff’s treating physician, was steadfast

in his response that the plaintiff would have severe physical and occupational

limitations.

Further, we must remember that Dr. Wolf was the plaintiff’s treating

physician. Dr. Lopez, on the other hand, examined the medical records supplied to

him and physically examined Ms. Wood for approximately 15 to 20 minutes,

according to his own testimony. Our jurisprudence is clear that the testimony of a

treating physician is entitled to more weight than that of a non-treating physician,

particularly one who is employed for the purposes of litigation, like Dr. Lopez.

Winch v. Double M, Inc., 99-1793 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/5/00), 764 So.2d 1055.

I would amend the jury verdict to increase the award for loss of earning

capacity to the lowest reasonable amount under the circumstances, $450,262.00.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

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