In Re: Appeal of Jason Galatas

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

08-29

IN RE: APPEAL OF JASON GALATAS

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 20070165
HONORABLE KRISTIAN EARLES, DISTRICT JUDGE

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J. DAVID PAINTER

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Court composed of Marc T. Amy, Billy Howard Ezell, and J. David Painter, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Floyd J. Falcon, Jr.
Charles L. Dirks, III
P.O. Box 2667
Baton Rouge, LA 70821
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant:
Jason Galatas

M. Candace Hattan
P.O. Drawer 91850
Lafayette, LA 70509
Counsel for Defendant-Appellee:
Lafayette Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board

Michael P. Corry
Brandon O. Wallace
P.O. Drawer 51367
Lafayette, LA 70505
Counsel for Defendant-Appellee:
Lafayette Consolidated Government

PAINTER, Judge.

This case is before us for a review of the district court’s ruling on the appeal

of a decision of the Lafayette Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board (the

Board) affirming the termination of Jason Galatas.

FACTS

In June 2005, Galatas was employed as a Lafayette City Policeman. He also

worked as security for Club 410, a bar/nightclub located in downtown Lafayette.

Also employed at Club 410 were John Keith Richard, another Lafayette City

Policeman, and Jason Segal. Segal allegedly told Galatas that his roommate, Marc

Cormier, had a large amount of marijuana in the apartment he shared with Segal on

Meaux Avenue in Lafayette and that Galatas and Richard should stay away from the

apartment. Galatas called Agent Jason Herpin of the Lafayette Metro Narcotics

Squad and reported the information about the marijuana. He told Herpin that he did

not want to be involved. Herpin passed the information on to Major Brian

Baumgardner, Sergeant Gabriel Thompson, and Corporal Kane Marceaux. After

obtaining a search warrant, the officers searched Cormier’s apartment and found

between twenty and twenty-five pounds of marijuana, a number of bottles of steroids,

and drug paraphernalia.

On June 16, 2005, the Department of Internal Affairs of the Lafayette Police

Department (Internal Affairs) sent Galatas a memorandum notifying him that he had

“become the subject of an Internal Affairs Investigation alleging: Conduct

Unbecoming of an Officer/Violation of Substance Abuse Policy.” In connection with

the investigation, Galatas was twice interviewed by Internal Affairs. At the second

interview on July 26, 2005, Galatas’ attorney was present. On August 5, 2005, a pre-

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determination hearing was held; again, Galatas’ attorney was present. A follow-up

investigation was held. On September 8, 2005, a letter was sent to Galatas informing

him that his employment with the Lafayette Police Department had been terminated

and listing six allegations made against him as well as the conclusions reached with

regard thereto. Galatas appealed the termination to the Municipal Fire and Police

Civil Service Board (the Board). The Board upheld the termination. Galatas

appealed that ruling to the Lafayette Parish District Court, which also upheld the

termination.

DISCUSSION

Due Process

Galatas asserts that the disciplinary procedure afforded him was insufficient to

fulfill due process requirements. In support of this assertion, Galatas cites Cleveland

Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487 (1985). The Supreme Court

in Loudermill held that where the state law provides that an employee can only be

terminated for cause, the employee has a property right in his or her job. Since

La.R.S. 33:2500 provides that persons who have been inducted into permanent

positions of classified service are to be subjected to corrective and disciplinary action

only for cause, those employees have a property right in their jobs. The court in

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542 (footnote omitted), noted that:

An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life,
liberty, or property “be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 ,70 S.Ct. 652, 656, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).
We have described “the root requirement” of the Due Process Clause as
being “that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before
he is deprived of any significant property interest.” Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 , 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 113
(1971) (emphasis in original); see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 , 91
S.Ct. 1586, 1591, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). This principle requires “some

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kind of a hearing” prior to the discharge of an employee who has a
constitutionally protected property interest in his employment. Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S., at 569-570 , 92 S.Ct., at 2705; Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2698, 33 L.Ed.2d 570
(1972).

Galatas argues that under La.R.S. 33:2500(D), he was entitled to receive

written notice of the reasons for his dismissal prior to termination of employment.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:2500(D) provides that :

In every case of corrective or disciplinary action taken against a
regular employee of the classified service, the appointing authority shall
furnish the employee and the board a statement in writing of the action
and the complete reasons therefor.

Like the court inBaton Rouge Police Dep’t. v. Morrison, 04-57 (La.App. 1 Cir.

2/18/05), 906 So.2d 610, we find no such temporal requirement. Galatas further

asserts that he was entitled to a full evidentiary hearing under the holding of

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532. However, the Supreme Court in Loudermill did not so

hold. In that case, the court held that: “Some opportunity for the employee to present

his side of the case is recurringly of obvious value in reaching an accurate decision.”

Id. at 543. The court further stated that:

The foregoing considerations indicate that the pretermination
“hearing,” though necessary, need not be elaborate. We have pointed
out that “[t]he formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can
vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the
nature of the subsequent proceedings.” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.,
at 378, 91 S.Ct., at 786. See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 894-895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 L.Ed. 1230 (1961). In general,
“something less” than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to
adverse administrative action. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S., at 343,
96 S.Ct. , at 907.

Id. at 545.

The court in Loudermill explained the extent of the employee’s due process

rights as follows:

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The essential requirements of due process, and all that
respondents seek or the Court of Appeals required, are notice and an
opportunity to respond. The opportunity to present reasons, either in
person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a
fundamental due process requirement. See Friendly, "Some Kind of
Hearing," 123 U. Pa.L.Rev. 1267, 1281 (1975). The tenured public
employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him,
an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present
his side of the story. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S., at 170-171, 94
S.Ct., at 1664-1665 (opinion of POWELL, J.); id., at 195-196 (opinion
of WHITE, J.); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S., at 581, 95 S.Ct., at 740.
To require more than this prior to termination would intrude to an
unwarranted extent on the government's interest in quickly removing an
unsatisfactory employee.

Id. at 546.

In this case, Galatas received the benefit of everything required to afford him

due process. He was first sent a letter notifying him that he was under investigation

and the general reasons therefor. At his first interview, the reasons were more fully

explained. At a second interview, his attorney was present. A pre-determination

hearing was held at which Galatas was given an opportunity to explain himself.

Finally, Galatas was sent a letter explaining the allegations which had been

investigated, the conclusions reached including a brief explanation of the factual basis

therefor, and that his employment with the Lafayette Police Department was

terminated. The letter included quotations from the Lafayette Police Department

General Orders and the State of Louisiana Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service

rules which Galatas was found to have violated. Having reviewed the entire record,

we find no failure to afford Galatas his right to due process. Accordingly, we affirm

the district court’s denial of Galatas’ petition to overturn the decision of the Lafayette

Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board. Having so found, we need not

consider the argument that Galatas is due attorney’s fees under La.R.S. 33:2501.1.

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DECREE

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are to be

paid by the Plaintiff-Appellant, Galatas.

AFFIRMED.

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