William Boyd v. the Wackenhut Corporation

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

08-66

WILLIAM BOYD

VERSUS

THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON DAVIS, NO. 602-00
HONORABLE ANNE SIMON, DISTRICT JUDGE PRO TEMPORE

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MICHAEL G. SULLIVAN
JUDGE

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Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Michael G. Sullivan, and J. David Painter,
Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Bernard N. Marcantel
Marcantel, Marcantel, Wall, Pfeiffer & Stretcher
Post Office Box 1366
Jennings, Louisiana 70546
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant:
William Boyd

Frank S. Bruno
Bruno & Bruno
855 Baronne Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70113
(504) 525-1335
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant:
William Boyd

William B. Baggett
Roger G. Burgess
Baggett, McCall, Burgess, Watson & Gaughan
Post Office Drawer 7820
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70606-7820
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant:
William Boyd

Samuel B. Gabb
Loftin, Cain, Gabb & LeBlanc
113 South Ryan Street
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees:
American Home Assurance Company
The Wackenhut Corporation
Joseph Deville

SULLIVAN, Judge.

Plaintiff, Leona Boyd, legal successor of her deceased son, William Boyd,1

appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, the

Wackenhut Corporation (Wackenhut), American Home Assurance Company

(American Home), and Joseph Deville. For the following reasons, we reverse and

remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter arises out of a motor vehicle accident that took place on August 18,

1999, at approximately 12:10 p.m. on Louisiana Highway 14 in Jefferson Davis

Parish. William Boyd, then an inmate of the Wackenhut facility prison (Allen

Correctional Center) in Kinder, Louisiana, was assigned to a prison work detail

picking up trash along Highway 14 on the date in question.

As lunchtime approached, Boyd and the other inmates were told to load up

their tools and to get into the prison van so that they could find a place to eat their

lunch. Joseph Deville, an employee of Wackenhut, was the driver of the prison van.

Attached to the van was a sixteen-foot trailer that was used to carry tools and supplies

needed for the work detail. Immediately following the van and trailer was a dump

truck, owned by the State of Louisiana, in which the inmates would load trash bags

as they were filled. Upon finding a shady spot on the left side of Highway 14,

Mr. Deville began to slow down and exit the highway to his left. As he did so, the

left rear of the van was struck by a vehicle being driven by Rosalind Broussard as she

was attempting to pass the vehicles ahead of her.

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After filing this suit, William Boyd died of causes unrelated to the injuries he allegedly
sustained in the accident at issue. Thereafter, his mother, Leona Boyd, was substituted as plaintiff.

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Claiming to have suffered severe personal injuries as a result of the accident,

Boyd filed suit against the following defendants: Wackenhut, lessor of the van in

which Boyd was a guest passenger; American Home, the alleged automobile liability

insurer of Wackenhut; Mr. Deville; Ms. Broussard; and State Farm Mutual

Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), the alleged automobile liability insurer

of Ms. Broussard. Boyd later dismissed his claims against Ms. Broussard and State

Farm, having settled with those parties.

In July of 2007, a motion for summary judgment was filed by Wackenhut and

Mr. Deville seeking dismissal of plaintiff’s claims on the basis that the accident was

caused solely by the negligence of Ms. Broussard, the driver of the overtaking

automobile.2 Specifically, defendants submitted that because Mr. Deville had turned

on his left-turn signal, slowed down, and looked ahead of and behind his vehicle for

approaching traffic prior to beginning his left turn, he had satisfied all of the legal

duties imposed upon a left-turning motorist. They argued that because plaintiff will

be unable to prove that Mr. Deville breached a legal duty owed to Mr. Boyd, both he

and his employer, Wackenhut, were entitled to summary judgment in their favor.

In support of their motion, defendants attached excerpts from the depositions

of Mr. Deville, Ms. Broussard, and Wayland Istre, the driver of the dump truck

following the prison van. Defendants also submitted a true copy of a Minute Entry

of the Thirty-First Judicial District Court, Jefferson Davis Parish, Louisiana, dated

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American Home also sought to have summary judgment granted in its favor because
Wackenhut had rejected uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) coverage in the policy it had
procured from American Home. Plaintiff agreed to dismiss her claims against American Home for
UM coverage but filed a motion for attorney fees against American Home for its delay in informing
plaintiff that Wackenhut had rejected UM coverage. The trial court denied that motion, and plaintiff
has not appealed that ruling.

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September 18, 1999, indicating that Ms. Broussard had pled guilty to the charge of

improper passing.

Plaintiff filed an “Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment” in which she

argued that the evidence showed that Ms. Broussard had to pass an eighteen wheeler

and the dump truck before reaching Mr. Deville’s van. Plaintiff pointed to the

deposition testimony of the dump truck driver who stated that he looked in his

rearview mirror just before the accident, and he noticed Ms. Broussard’s car coming

around the curve, located approximately twenty to thirty yards behind the eighteen

wheeler. Adding that distance to the length of the eighteen wheeler, the dump truck,

and the van, along with the sixteen-foot trailer the van was pulling, plaintiff suggests

that Ms. Broussard’s vehicle was visible for about 150 feet prior to the occurrence of

the accident. Therefore, plaintiff submitted that Mr. Deville failed to see what he

should have seen, and, thus, his negligence was the sole cause of the accident.

Accordingly, plaintiff argued that defendants’ motion for summary judgment should

be denied and that a jury should be allowed to determine the fault of defendants.

Plaintiff attached to her opposition the complete depositions of Mr. Deville,

Ms. Broussard, and Mr. Istre.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary

judgment and dismissed all of plaintiff’s claims against them with prejudice, at

plaintiff’s cost.

Plaintiff now appeals, asserting two assignments of error. First, plaintiff claims

that the trial court erred in granting a summary judgment to defendants because there

is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the negligence of Wackenhut’s driver in

making a left turn off a public highway onto private property. Second, plaintiff

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claims that the trial court was clearly wrong in granting a summary judgment in a

situation where there is a serious factual dispute concerning the fault of the two

drivers, a left-turning motorist and a motorist attempting to overtake other vehicles,

although plaintiff was a guest passenger who was without fault.

LAW

It is well settled that appellate courts review summary judgments de novo,

using the same criteria applied by the trial courts to determine whether summary

judgment is appropriate. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512 (La.

7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730. A motion for summary judgment will be granted if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that

the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B).

Summary judgment is favored and shall be construed “to secure the just, speedy, and

inexpensive determination of every action . . . .” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(2).

Louisiana has enacted laws that set forth the duties imposed on a left-turning

driver as well as a passing driver. Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:104, entitled

“Turning movements and required signals,” provides in pertinent part:

A. No person shall . . . turn a vehicle to enter a private road or
driveway, or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right
or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can be made
with reasonable safety.

B. Whenever a person intends to make a right or left turn which
will take his vehicle from the highway it is then traveling, he shall give
a signal of such intention in the manner described hereafter and such
signal shall be given continuously during not less than the last one
hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.

The law with regard to a vehicle passing on the left is found in La.R.S. 32:75,

entitled “Limitations on passing on the left,” which provides in pertinent part:

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No vehicle shall be driven to the left side of the center of the
highway in overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the
same direction unless such left side is clearly visible and is free of
oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such
overtaking and passing to be completely made without interfering with
the safe operation of any vehicle approaching from the opposite
direction or any vehicle overtaken. In every event the overtaking
vehicle must return to the right-hand side of the roadway before coming
within one hundred feet of any vehicle approaching from the opposite
direction.

La.R.S. 32:73 provides in pertinent part:

The following rules shall govern the overtaking and passing of
vehicles proceeding in the same direction, subject to those limitations,
exceptions, and special rules hereinafter stated:

(1) Except when overtaking and passing on the right is permitted,
the driver of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceeding in the
same direction shall pass to the left thereof at a safe distance, and shall
not again drive to the right side of the roadway until safely clear of the
overtaken vehicle.

In Kilpatrick v. Alliance Casualty and Reinsurance Co., 95-17, p. 4 (La.App.

3 Cir. 7/5/95), 663 So.2d 62, 66, writ denied, 95-2018 (La. 11/17/95), 664 So.2d 406,

this court noted that the jurisprudence of this state recognizes that both “the

left-turning motorist and the overtaking and passing motorist must exercise a high

degree of care because they are engaged in dangerous maneuvers.” We stated that

“[t]he onerous burden placed upon a left-turning motorist is not discharged by the

mere signaling of an intention to turn. The giving of a signal . . . is immaterial if at

the time the driver of the turning vehicle did not have the opportunity to make the

turn in safety.” Id. at 66. On the other hand, we observed that “the driver of an

overtaking or passing vehicle has the duty to ascertain before attempting to pass a

preceding vehicle that from all the circumstances of traffic, lay of the land, and

conditions of the roadway, the passing can be completed with safety.” Id. After

applying the law to the facts of that case, we reversed the trial court’s allocation of

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fault of 70% to the overtaking motorist and 30% to the left-turning motorist. Finding

that the left-turning motorist was the only person who could have avoided the

accident, we cast him with 100% of the fault in causing the accident at issue in

Kilpatrick. Significantly, we performed this re-allocation of fault despite our having

found no manifest error in the trial court’s finding that the left-turning motorist had

signaled before beginning his left turn.

In Star Dusters, Inc. v. Lee, 311 So.2d 566 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1975), we held that

where an overtaking automobile had already moved into the left lane and passed the

two automobiles between it and left-turning vehicle, it was incumbent upon the driver

of the left-turning vehicle to ascertain that the way was clear before turning left across

the highway and into a private drive. Accordingly, we affirmed a judgment of the

trial court finding the left-turning vehicle liable for property damages incurred by the

overtaking motorist.

We have performed a de novo review of the record, including the evidence

presented in favor of and against defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and we

conclude that the trial court erred in finding that no questions of material fact

remained and that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Regardless of whether or not Mr. Deville looked into his rearview mirror and signaled

his intent to make a left turn, the fact remains that the left turn could not be safely

completed given that Ms. Broussard was already well into her overtaking maneuver.

Clearly, the accident was caused in part, if not entirely, by the fault of Mr. Deville.

Accordingly, we remand this matter to the trial court for a determination of the proper

allotment of fault between Mr. Deville and Ms. Broussard.

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CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed at defendants’

cost, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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