Bryan D. Scofield, Inc. v. Susan A. Daigle, Ltd.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 08-798

BRYAN D. SCOFIELD, INC., ET AL.

VERSUS

SUSAN A. DAIGLE, LTD., ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-20071345
HONORABLE JOHN DAMIAN TRAHAN, DISTRICT JUDGE

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BILLY HOWARD EZELL
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Billy Howard Ezell, and J. David Painter,
Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Edwin Gustav Preis, Jr.
Richard J. Hymel
Preis, Kraft & Roy
P. O. Drawer 94-C
Lafayette, LA 70509
(337) 237-6062
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants:
Bryan D. Scofield, Inc.
Rivera, Ltd.

Randall Kurt Theunissen
Neil Gregory Vincent
Alan Meche
Allen & Gooch
P. O. Box 81129
Lafayette, LA 70598-1129
(337) 291-1000
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees:
Susan A. Daigle, Ltd.
Daigle, Jamison & Rayburn, LLC

Ezell, Judge.

This case arises out of a dispute between three former members of a law firm

which was doing business as a limited liability company. After separating from the

firm, two of the members filed the present suit against the third member. The trial

court granted an exception of no cause of action filed by the third member.

Following a denial of a motion for a new trial, the two suing members filed the

present appeal claiming that they have stated a cause of action.

FACTS

The following facts are presented in the pleadings. Susan Daigle, Bryan

Scofield, and Jim Rivera formed the law firm of Daigle, Scofield & Rivera, LLC on

March 15, 2000. The members of the firm were identified as Susan A. Daigle, Ltd.,

Bryan D. Scofield, Inc., and Rivera, Ltd.1 Both briefs state that by oral agreement the

parties agreed that Daigle would receive fifty percent of the equity of the firm with

Scofield and Rivera dividing the remaining half.

According to the petition, it appears that the relationship between the parties

began to deteriorate in late 2004. On March 14, 2005, Daigle advised Scofield that

she no longer wanted Rivera as a member of the firm and proposed a buy out of

Rivera’s interest in the firm. Scofield did not agree with this decision. On March 16,

2005, Daigle advised Rivera that she would pay for his ownership interest over a

three-year period. She also informed him that he could remain at the firm as a non-

equity attorney under the same compensation plan as the non-equity attorneys.

Rivera had to make a decision by the following Friday at 10:00 a.m., less than forty-

eight hours from the offer. Otherwise, Daigle would send correspondence to the firm

clients advising that Rivera left the firm for unspecified reasons. Rivera requested

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Throughout the rest of the opinion, we will simply refer to the members of the firm
as Daigle, Scofield, and Rivera.

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documentation to support the offer and more time to consider it, but Daigle declined.

Rivera told her that no decision would be made by that time, which Daigle viewed as

a rejection of the proposal. Correspondence was sent to firm clients advising of

Rivera’s departure.

Based on Daigle’s actions, Scofield decided to leave the firm around April 1,

2005. Upon advising Daigle of his decision, Daigle requested that Scofield and

Daigle agree that adjusters of firm clients for which Scofield was handling files not

be advised by either of them of his decision to leave until after she returned from a

multi-day trip to Dallas, Texas. An agreement was reached between Daigle and

Scofield that neither would discuss his departure with those firm clients or adjusters

until after her return from Dallas. Scofield claims that Daigle breached this

agreement because before or very soon after she left for her trip to Dallas, she

discussed Scofield’s departure with numerous adjusters supervising files being

handled by Scofield.

On September 25, 2006, Scofield and Rivera filed a lawsuit against Susan

Daigle, individually, and against the limited liability company, called Daigle,

Crawford & Jamison, LLC at the time of the suit. The lawsuit was dismissed on an

exception of no cause of action finding that there was no cause of action against

Susan Daigle in her individual capacity, in that she was not a member or manager of

the LLC.

An exception of prematurity based on the last sentence of the operating

agreement was also filed. The last sentence read: “Calculation & financial

distribution is done after pending [plaintiff] cases are resolved.” There was still a

pending plaintiff case, so the exception of prematurity was granted, and the case

against the firm was dismissed with prejudice.

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Thereafter, the present suit was filed by members Bryan D. Scofield, Inc. and

Rivera, Ltd. against the third member Daigle, Ltd. on March 15, 2007. Daigle filed

exceptions, including an exception of no cause of action. A hearing on the exceptions

was held on October 29, 2007. Just prior to the hearing, the firm’s last plaintiff case

resolved. The Plaintiffs then filed a supplemental and amending petition against the

limited liability company and Daigle. However, this petition was not at issue at the

hearing on the exceptions.

The trial court granted the exception of no cause of action in favor of Susan A.

Daigle. The judgment dismissing the claims of Scofield and Rivera against Daigle

was designated a partial final judgment pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915.

Scofield and Rivera filed the present appeal arguing that the trial court erred in

granting the exception of no cause of action.

EXCEPTION OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION

Scofield and Rivera argue that they have pled causes of action on three

different basis. First, they allege a cause of action against Daigle for breach of

fiduciary duties pursuant to the laws governing limited liability companies. The

second cause of action Scofield and Rivera allege they have pled is for breach of the

operating agreement. Lastly, they argue that Scofield has stated a cause of action for

fraudulent breach of an oral agreement.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

In sustaining the exception of no cause of action, the trial court recognized that

members of a limited liability company owe reciprocal duties to one another.

However, it then ruled that an action for breach of fiduciary duty against a member

must be brought by a derivative suit. We observe that this finding by the trial court

is essentially a finding that Scofield and Rivera do not have a right of action to file

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the suit as opposed to having no cause of action. La.Code Civ.P. art. 927(5); See

Glod v. Baker, 02-988 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/6/03), 851 So.2d 1255, writ denied, 03-2482

(La. 11/26/03), 860 So.2d 1135; Roger Boc, L.L.C. v. Weigel, 99-570 (La.App. 3 Cir.

11/3/99), 744 So.2d 731, writ not considered, 00-176 (La. 3/17/00), 756 So.2d 316;

Van Meter v. Gutierrez, 04-706 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/16/05), 897 So.2d 781.

The written judgment itself stated that the exception of no cause of action was

granted and that the exception of no right of action and res judicata were now moot.

However, out of an abundance of caution, we feel it necessary to address the trial

courts remarks about the necessity of a derivative action in this case. As explained

below, we find that Scofield and Rivera have a right of action to bring individual

claims against another member under certain circumstances.

The Limited Liability Company Law specifically provides that members with

management responsibilities have fiduciary obligations, including a duty of care and

duty of loyalty, not only to the limited liability company but to the other members as

individuals also. Pursuant to La.R.S. 12:1314(A)(1)(emphasis supplied), a member

who has management responsibilities “shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary

relationship to the limited liability company and its members and shall discharge his

duties in good faith, with the diligence, care, judgment, and skill which an ordinary

prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances.”

Except for word changes to reflect terminology used in a limited liability

company context, the wording of La.R.S. 12:1314 is almost identical to La.R.S.

12:91, which establishes the fiduciary duty of officers and directors to the corporation

and its shareholders. As explained in Glenn G. Morris & Wendell H. Holmes, 8

Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Business Organizations § 44.09, at p. 508

(1999)(footnotes omitted):

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The persons who are empowered to manage an LLC owe fiduciary
duties to the LLC and to its members. If the LLC is member-managed,
the duties are owed by the members. If it is manager-managed, the
duties are owed by the managers.

The substance of the fiduciary duty rule in the LLC statutes is the
same as that in the corporation statute. It seems plain that the corporate
provision was copied into the LLC statute, with appropriate changes in
terminology and in restricting the applicability of the rule to those
persons holding managerial powers, either members in member-
managed LLCs or managers in manager-managed LLCs. Hence, we will
not repeat here the discussion provided earlier with respect to the
meaning of the statutory rule. To the extent that the rule applies, it
should mean the same thing in LLC law that it means in corporation law.

Pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 13, “[l]aws on the same subject matter must be

interpreted in reference to each other.” In explaining the meaning of former Civil

Code Article 17, the supreme court stated:

‘Statutes in pari materia are those which relate to the same person
or things, or to the same class of persons or things, or which have a
common purpose; and although an act may incidentally refer to the same
subject as another act, it is not in pari materia if its scope and aim are
distinct and unconnected. It is a well established rule that in the
construction of a particular statute, or in the interpretation of its
provisions, all statutes relating to the same subject, or having the same
general purpose, should be read in connection with it, as together
constituting one law, although they were enacted at different times, and
contain no reference to one another, The endeavor should be made, by
tracing the history of legislation on the subject, to ascertain the uniform
and consistent purpose of the legislature, or to discover how the policy
of the legislature with reference to the subject matter has been changed
or modified from time to time. In other words, in determining the
meaning of a particular statute, resort may be had to the established
policy of the legislature as disclosed by a general course of legislation.
* * *”

Malone v. Cannon, 215 La. 939, 957-58, 41 So.2d 837, 843 (1949)(quoting 59

Corpus Juris verbo Statutes, § 620).

It is obvious that the Legislature enacted the Limited Liability Company Law

with full appreciation of the existing corporate law. Not only are both statutes almost

identical but both statutes pertain to the fiduciary duties of business entities. We find

it appropriate to rely on the developed corporate case law under these circumstances.

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Corporate cases have held that a shareholder may have the right to sue the

officers and directors directly if the breach of the fiduciary duty causes direct loss to

the shareholder. Pittman v. Beebe, 95-1342 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/96), 670 So.2d 761,

writ denied, 96-882 (La. 5/10/96), 672 So.2d 931(citing Palowsky v. Premier

Bancorp, Inc., 597 So.2d 543 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1992)); Sun Drilling Products Corp.

v. Rayborn, 00-1884 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/3/01), 798 So.2d 1141, writ denied, 01-2939

(La. 1/25/02), 807 So.2d 840. We find that the same reasoning would apply to

members who suffer a direct loss caused by another member who has breached its

fiduciary duty.

The Limited Liability Company Law further provides that a member “shall not

be held personally liable to the limited liability company or the members” unless the

member “acted in a grossly negligent manner . . . or engaged in conduct which

demonstrates a greater disregard of the duty of care than gross negligence, including

but not limited to intentional tortuous conduct or intentional breach of his duty of

loyalty.” La.R.S. 12:1314(B). Gross negligence is defined “as a reckless disregard

or a carelessness amounting to indifference to the best interests of the limited liability

company or the members thereof.” La.R.S. 12:1314(C).

Therefore, a member has a direct right of action against other members

individually for a breach of fiduciary duty when such breach is grossly negligent and

the damage is to the suing member directly. We will now discuss whether Scofield’s

and Rivera’s petition has stated a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against

Daigle.

As used in the context of the peremptory exception, a “cause of
action” refers to the operative facts which give rise to the plaintiff’s
right to judicially assert the action against the defendant. The purpose
of the peremptory exception of no cause of action is to test the legal
sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the law affords a
remedy on the facts alleged in the petition. No evidence may be

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introduced to support or controvert the exception of no cause of action.
LSA-C.C.P. art. 931. The exception is triable on the face of the
pleadings, and, for purposes of resolving the issues raised by the
exception, the well-pleaded facts in the petition must be accepted as
true. The issue at the trial of the exception is whether, on the face of the
petition, the plaintiff is legally entitled to the relief sought.

Louisiana retains a system of fact pleading, and mere conclusions
of the plaintiff unsupported by facts will not set forth a cause or right of
action. The burden of demonstrating that a petition fails to state a cause
of action is upon the mover. Because the exception of no cause of
action raises a question of law and the district court’s decision is based
solely on the sufficiency of the petition, review of the district court’s
ruling on an exception of no cause of action is de novo. The pertinent
inquiry is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with
every doubt resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, the petition states any valid
cause of action for relief.

Scheffler v. Adams and Reese, LLP, 06-1774, pp. 4-5 (La. 2/22/07), 950 So.2d 641,

646-47(case citations omitted).

In seeking to establish a breach of fiduciary duty, Scofield and Rivera argue

that Daigle deliberately ignored her statutorily imposed duties of good faith, care, and

loyalty in ending her relationship with them. They argue her actions were deliberate,

at best.

This court has discussed the duty of loyalty that a fiduciary owes and stated

that a fiduciary may not take even the slightest advantage, but must zealously,

diligently, and honestly guard and champion the rights of his principal against all

other persons and is bound not to act in antagonism, opposition, or conflict with the

interest of the principal to even the slightest extent. Sampson v. DCI of Alexandria,

07-671 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/31/07), 970 So.2d 55(citing Beckstrom v. Parnell, 97-1200

(La.App. 1 Cir. 11/6/98), 730 So.2d 942). The supreme court has also recognized that

a fiduciary obligation of loyalty owed by a participant in a co-owned business

endeavor includes the obligation of “utmost good faith, fairness, and honesty in their

dealings with each other with respect to the matters pertaining to the enterprise.”

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Scheffler, 950 So.2d at 648, fn2.

Daigle claims that none of the facts pleaded by Scofield and Rivera rise to the

level of gross negligence. On the other hand, Scofield and Rivera claim that the

petition sets forth in detail the intentional actions of Daigle representing breach of

fiduciary duties and bad faith conduct. The allegations as set forth in the petition are

that Daigle had “secret discussions with other firm clients, potential clients and/or

third parties, who had previously been beneficial in helping the firm obtain business,

regarding her scheme to terminate Rivera, Ltd.’s membership in the firm”; Daigle

advised Rivera that he was no longer a member of the firm despite Scofield’s

objection; Rivera was given less than forty-eight hours to make a decision about her

offer to purchase Rivera’s interest in the firm over a three-year period and that he

could remain as a non-equity attorney; Daigle would not provide information or

documentation to support the basis of her offer and specifically instructed the office

manager to not provide Rivera with any firm financial documents; Daigle viewed

Rivera’s failure to make a decision as a rejection of her offer; and Daigle sent

correspondence to firm clients advising that Riveria was leaving the firm for

unspecified reasons.

Accepting all of these allegations as true, we find that the petition alleges facts

that Daigle intentionally breached her duty of loyalty to Scofield and Rivera

individually. The allegations suggest that Daigle was antagonistic to Scofield’s and

Rivera’s position. The allegations also suggest that Daigle took intentional steps to

carry out her plan. Although Scofield and Rivera disagreed with Daigle’s plan, she

intentionally pursued her plan to oust Rivera. We find that Scofield and Rivera have

stated a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty.

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Breach of Operating Agreement

Scofield and Rivera argue that they have also stated a cause of action for

breach of the operating agreement. Daigle, on the other hand, argues that Scofield

and Rivera never pled the existence of an operating agreement or any facts which are

claimed to be a breach of the operating agreement. She further alleges that the

Plaintiffs are basing this claim on the supplemental and amending petition which was

not at issue at this hearing. In response, the Plaintiffs argue that the allegations of

Daigle’s breach of fiduciary duties and bad faith conduct support their claim for

breach of the operating agreement.

A review of the hearing on the exceptions held on October 29, 2007,

establishes that the trial court was informed that dissolution of the operating

agreement was raised in the supplemental and amending petition and was not at issue

at this hearing. A review of the two petitions also establishes that while there was

mention of a breach of contract or agreement in the first petition, it concerned the

breach of oral agreement which we will discuss next. The amending petition clearly

puts the issue of breach of the operating agreement at issue. Therefore, we find that

this issue is not before us.

Breach of Oral Contract

Scofield’s claim that Daigle breached an oral contract is based on his allegation

that they agreed to not contact certain adjusters until Daigle returned from Dallas. In

the petition Scofield alleges that Daigle breached this agreement by discussing

Scofield’s departure with numerous adjusters supervising files being handled by

Scofield. Scofield further alleged that he did not discuss or communicate with any

of the specified adjusters regarding his departure from the firm.

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Most of Daigle’s arguments in brief center around defenses to Scofield’s claim.

The facts as alleged in the petition do establish that Daigle and Scofield had an oral

agreement and she breached this agreement. Scofield has alleged that this act was in

bad faith. We find that the petition does establish a cause of action for the intentional

breach of an oral agreement.

We note that our opinion does not come to any conclusion as to whether the

alleged causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty or breach of oral contract have

been proven. These are the facts as alleged in the petition.

For the reasons discussed above, the judgment of the trial court granting the

exception of no cause of action is reversed. This case is remanded for further

proceedings. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Susan A. Daigle, Ltd.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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