Tina Normand v. National Automotive Insurance Co.
Also decided on this docket: La. Ct. App. 3d Cir., March 25, 2009
Tina Normand v. National Automotive Insurance Co., No. CA-0008-1004 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. Feb. 4, 2009).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Duncan v. USAA Ins. Co. 950 So. 2d 544
- Carter v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 964 So. 2d 375
- Schroeder v. Board of Sup'rs 591 So. 2d 342
- Johnson v. Citizen 978 So. 2d 1087
Opinion text
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
08-1004
TINA NORMAND
VERSUS
NATIONAL AUTOMOTIVE INSURANCE CO.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE
TWELFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF AVOYELLES, NO. 2007-0481-B
HONORABLE WILLIAM BENNETT, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********
ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE
**********
Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and
Billy Howard Ezell, Judges.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Kenneth E. Pickering
Pickering & Cotogno
301 Magazine St., Suite 300
New Orleans, LA 70130
(504) 581-1222
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant:
National Automotive Insurance Co.
Brian M. Caubarreaux
Brian Caubarreaux & Associates
P. O. Box 129
Marksville, LA 71351
(318) 253-0900
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee:
Tina Normand
PICKETT, Judge.
The defendant-appellant, National Automotive Insurance Company, appeals
a judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Tina
Normand, and finding that Ms. Normand did not execute a valid waiver of
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Tina Normand purchased an automobile insurance policy on September 6,
2006, from National Automotive Insurance Company (NAIC). On the same day, she
signed an “Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury Coverage Form.” She
initialed the option rejecting UM coverage.
On December 22, 2006, Ms. Normand was involved in an automobile accident.
She settled her claim against the insurer for the other vehicle involved in the accident
for the policy limits. On April 25, 2007, Ms. Normand filed suit against NAIC
alleging that it provided UM coverage for her damages above the amount for which
she settled. She alleged that the UM rejection was invalid because the policy number
was not on the form as required by law.
NAIC filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the policy number
was not available at the time the form was signed and therefore its inclusion on the
form was not required. Ms. Normand filed a cross motion for summary judgment
alleging that the failure to include the policy number on the waiver form could not be
excused. The trial court held a hearing on the motions on October 1, 2007, and ruled
that the rejection of UM coverage was invalid under the supreme court’s holding in
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Duncan v. U.S.A.A. Insurance Co., 06-363 (La. 11/29/06), 950 So.2d 544. Thus,
NAIC did provide UM coverage to Ms. Normand under the policy. The trial court
signed a judgment on July 1, 2008, denying NAIC’s motion for summary judgment
and granting Ms. Normand’s cross motion for summary judgment.
NAIC appeals the trial court’s judgment.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The defendant-appellant, NAIC, asserts two assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred in granting Tina Normand’s Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment, where at the time the UM/Rejection Form was
executed the policy number did not exist; and
2. The trial court’s granting of Tina Normand’s Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment constitutes legal error in light of Carter v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 07-1294 (La. 10/5/07), 964 So.2d 375.
DISCUSSION
Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria
that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether a summary judgment is
appropriate. Schroeder v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 591 So.2d 342
(La.1991). The mover is entitled to judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with supporting affidavits, if any,
show there is no genuine issue as to material fact and the mover is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B).
The only issue before the court is whether the failure to include the policy
number on the UM waiver form makes the waiver invalid. Relying on Duncan, 950
So.2d 544, the trial court said that the rejection of UM coverage was invalid because
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the policy number was not included on the form. In Duncan, the supreme court found
that the failure to include the policy number on the UM waiver form prescribed by the
insurance commissioner invalidated the UM waiver.
After the hearing was held on the motions for summary judgement, but before
the judgment was signed, the supreme court issued a brief memorandum opinion in
Carter, 964 So.2d at 376, the entirety of which states:
Granted. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and
Imperial’s motion for summary judgment is granted for the reasons
assigned by the dissenting judge in the court of appeal. We also note
this case is factually distinguishable from Duncan v. USAA Ins. Co.,
06-363 (La.11/29/06), 950 So.2d 544, because the Commissioner of
Insurance’s regulations specifically allow omission of the policy number
if it does not exist at the time UM waiver form is completed.
Relying on the supreme court’s decision in Carter, this court reversed a trial
court’s grant of summary judgment in a similar case in Johnson v. Citizen, 07-1209
(La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/08), 978 So.2d 1087. We held that if the policy number does not
exist at the time the waiver form is signed, it does not need to be included on the
waiver form. Since there was an issue of whether the number was available at the
time the waiver form was signed, we found that summary judgment was
inappropriate.
Here, NAIC attached an affidavit to its motion for summary judgment which
stated that the policy number was not available at the time the UM waiver form was
signed by Ms. Normand. Ms. Normand argues that the number was available because
the number was included on the application form which was filled out the same day.
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This dispute constitutes a genuine issue of material fact which makes summary
judgment inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are
assessed to Ms. Normand.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Rule 2-16.3, Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal.
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