Geralyn Adgia Lambert Hartman v. Wesley Wood Lambert

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 08-1055

GERALYN ADGIA LAMBERT HARTMAN

VERSUS

WESLEY WOOD LAMBERT

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 07-C-2412-C
HONORABLE ALONZO HARRIS, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JOHN D. SAUNDERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, John D. Saunders, and Jimmie C. Peters, Judges.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

Charles Sterling Lambert, Jr.
Attorney at Law
11940 Industriplex Blvd., #1
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
(225) 405-0660
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
Wesley Wood Lambert

Charles G. Fitzgerald
Cox Fitzgerald, L.L.C.
113 West Convent Street
Lafayette, LA 70501
(337) 233-9743
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant:
Geralyn Adgia Lambert Hartman

SAUNDERS, Judge.

This is a family proceeding wherein the mother of a minor child attempted to

register the support and custody order from an Orleans Parish court in a Saint Landry

Parish court. Further, after registering the order, the mother filed a rule to modify

legal and physical custody. The father of the child filed various declinatory and

dilatory objections, including an objection to jurisdiction.

The St. Landry Parish court found that it did not have jurisdiction over the

matters presented because a previous judgment reached by an Orleans Parish court

stated that it “shall retain continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of this proceeding and all

orders herein.” Accordingly, the St. Landry Parish court dismissed the mother’s

actions, with prejudice, cast her with costs of the proceedings, and, further,

transferred the matters to Orleans Parish.

The mother filed this appeal from the St. Landry Parish court’s judgment. She

assigned three assignments of error. We find that her first assignment of error,

relating to subject matter jurisdiction, has merit. Accordingly, we vacate the St.

Landry Parish court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings not

inconsistent with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Geralyn Adagia Lambert Hartman (Hartman) and Wesley Wood Lambert

(Lambert) were previously married, are now divorced, and are the parents of one

minor child, born January 8, 1997.

In 1997, Lambert commenced a civil action for divorce against Hartman in the

proceeding entitled Wesley W. Lambert v. Geralyn A. Lambert, bearing number 1997-

20811 on the docket of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of

Louisiana. By consent judgment entered into on February 23, 1998, Lambert and

Hartman were awarded joint custody of the minor child. The judgment further

established child support in favor of Hartman.

On November 15, 2005, Lambert filed a rule to modify legal and physical

custody in Orleans Parish. At the time of the filing, Lambert maintained a residence

in Orleans Parish. Hartman was then a domiciliary of St. Landry Parish. Within

months of the filing of this rule, Lambert moved from Louisiana to Nassau, Bahamas.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the parties ultimately entered into an agreement

concerning all custody issues, which was stipulated to in open court on July 25, 2006.

The transcript from the July 25th hearing evidences that the trial court granted

Lambert’s oral motion for entry of an order of continuing and exclusive jurisdiction.

On May 11, 2007, Hartman filed a petition to register foreign support orders

in the St. Landry Parish Judicial District Court. An order registering the Orleans

Parish judgment of support and custody was signed that day.

Hartman then filed a rule to modify child support and physical custody on

March 24, 2008, again in St. Landry Parish. Lambert responded on April 23, 2008,

by filing various declinatory and dilatory exceptions, and objected to the registration

of the Orleans Parish support and custody judgment.

The hearing on Lambert’s exceptions and objection was held on May 30, 2008.

After taking the matter under advisement, the St. Landry Parish court issued its

reasons for judgment on June 6, 2008. In those reasons the court concluded that the

Orleans Parish judgment divested the St. Landry Parish court of jurisdiction over the

proceedings. Accordingly, the St. Landry Parish court dismissed Hartman’s rule with

prejudice, with Hartman to pay costs for the proceedings, and transferred all other

proceedings to Orleans Parish. Hartman appealed this judgment, alleging the

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following assignments of error:

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR:

1. The trial court committed legal error in concluding that it had been divested of
jurisdiction by judgment of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans.

2. The trial court committed legal error in concluding that the judgment of the
Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans concerning jurisdiction
superseded Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 74.2.

3. The trial court committed legal error in not declaring as absolutely null the
judgment of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans concerning
jurisdiction.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 1:

Hartman contends in her first assignment that the trial court committed legal

error in concluding that it had been divested of jurisdiction by the judgment of the

Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. We find that this contention has merit.

A determination of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case

and personal jurisdiction over a party is subject to a de novo review. Southeast

Wireless Network, Inc. v. U.S. Telemetry Corp., 06-1736 (La. 4/11/07), 954 So.2d

120. Louisiana Constitution Article 5 § 16(A)(1) provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise

authorized by this constitution or except as heretofore or hereafter provided by law

for administrative agency determinations in worker’s compensation matters, a district

court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters.”

The St. Landry Parish Judicial District Court found that it did not have

jurisdiction over any of the issues in this case, “in light of the retention of continuing,

exclusive jurisdiction by the Orleans Parish Court.” Due to this finding, the St.

Landry Parish Judicial District Court ordered the matter transferred to the Civil

District Court for the Parish of Orleans and dismissed Hartman’s claims, with

prejudice, at her own cost. After a de novo review of the record, we find that the St.

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Landry court made an error of law.

Article 5 § 16(A)(1) expressly provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise authorized

by this constitution or except as heretofore or hereafter provided by law. . . a district

court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters.” The petition

to register support orders and the rule to modify child support and physical custody

filed by Hartman clearly are civil matters. Thus, absent some circumstance “otherwise

authorized by” the Louisiana Constitution or absent provision “by law,” the St.

Landry court does have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter.

Lambert argues that because both parties are subject to the final judgment

reached by the Orleans Parish court stating that it “shall retain continuing, exclusive

jurisdiction of this proceeding and all orders herein,” Hartman cannot deviate from

this judgment because it became the law of the case and is binding on the parties. This

argument has no merit.

Our Legislature has determined that district courts generally have original

jurisdiction over civil matters, noting that some exceptions arise when the legislature

deems it necessary. One such exception that grants a district court with general

subject matter jurisdiction to retain “continuing and exclusive jurisdiction” over

matters of custody and support is La.R.S. 13:1814(A)1. It forms part of the Uniform

Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (La.R.S. 13:1801-1842) and

1 A. Except as otherwise provided in R.S. 13:1816, a court of this state which has made a child
custody determination consistent with R.S. 13:1813 or 1815 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction
over the determination until:

(1) A court of this state determines that neither the child, nor the child and one parent, nor
the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant connection with this state and that
substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child’s care,
protection, training, and personal relationships; or

(2) A court of this state or a court of another state determines that the child, the child’s
parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state.

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provides for continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in interstate custody disputes. Here,

we do not have such a dispute as the case before us is an intrastate dispute. Therefore,

La.R.S. 13:1814 does not apply.

A second piece of legislation that provides for a court to have continuing,

exclusive jurisdiction is La.R.S. 9:355.17, which provides, “[i]f the court grants

authorization to relocate, the court may retain continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the

case after relocation of the child as long as the non-relocating parent remains in the

state.” The case before us does not implicate relocation of the child as defined in

La.R.S. 355.1(4),2 because Hartman neither moved the child to another state nor

established the legal residence of the child at a distance of more than one hundred and

fifty miles from her original domicile.

This court’s reading of the trial court decision convinces us that the court

below felt the cited provisions were applicable to the present case. They are not. This

court further reads the judgment of the Orleans Parish District Court to be an effort

to maintain jurisdiction to the extent allowed by La.R.S. 355.17. We do not read it as

an attempt to expand its jurisdiction beyond that granted by our legislature nor an

attempt to limit jurisdiction granted to its sister court by our legislature.

Therefore, we find that the St. Landry Judicial District Court made an error of

2 Louisiana Revised Statutes 355.1(4) states: “Relocation” means:

(a) Intent to establish legal residence with the child at any location outside of the state.

(b) If there is no court order awarding custody, an intent to establish legal residence with the
child at any location within the state that is at a distance of more than one hundred fifty miles
from the other parent. If there is a court order awarding custody, then an intent to establish
legal residence with the child at a distance of more than one hundred fifty miles from the
domicile of the primary custodian at the time the custody decree was rendered.

(c) A change in the principal residence of a child for a period of sixty days or more, but does
not include a temporary absence from the principal residence.

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law in granting Lamberts’ exceptions to jurisdiction. The court does have subject

matter jurisdiction over Hartman’s Petition to Register Support Orders and the Rule

to Modify Child Support and Physical Custody. Accordingly, we vacate its judgment

and remand the case for further proceedings regarding the merits of the other

exceptions Lambert has raised.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 2:

Hartman alleges that the trial court committed legal error in concluding that the

judgment of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans concerning jurisdiction

superseded Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 74.2. This assignment is

pretermitted by our finding in Assignment of Error Number 1.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 3:

Hartman asserts that the trial court committed legal error in not declaring as

absolutely null the judgment of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans

concerning jurisdiction. We do not agree.

“When a judgment is absolutely null based on a jurisdictional ground, it has no

legal existence, and its nullity may be shown in collateral proceedings at any time and

before any court.” Taylor v. Hixon Autoplex of Alexandria, Inc., 00-1096, pp. 6-7

(La.App. 3 Cir. 3/28/01), 781 So.2d 1282, 1286.

As we discussed in Assignment of Error Number 1, there are two instances

where our legislature has granted a district court the power to retain continuing,

exclusive jurisdiction. We read the Orleans Parish judgment to have been made for

such situations, should they arise in this case. Thus, the judgment is not absolutely

null on its face. Should the intent of the judgment be read to be an exercise of power

greater than that granted by our legislature, such as the interpretation made by the St.

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Landry Parish Court, we would not hesitate to declare it null and void per the Taylor

case cited above and La.Code Civ.P. art. 2002.

CONCLUSION:

Lambert filed this appeal in regards to the St. Landry Parish court’s judgment,

assigning three assignments of error. We find that her first assignment of error

relating to jurisdiction has merit. Accordingly, for the reasons expressed above, we

vacate the St. Landry Parish court’s judgment and remand the case for further

proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Costs of these proceedings are to be

paid by Wesley Wood Lambert.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

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