Antonio Rogers D/B/A Custom Home Construction & Design v. Alecisa Mumford

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

08-1144

ANTONIO ROGERS D/B/A/ CUSTOM HOME
CONSTRUCTION & DESIGN

VERSUS

ALECISA MUMFORD

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2007-2586
HONORABLE WILFORD D. CARTER, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JAMES T. GENOVESE
JUDGE

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Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, J. David Painter, and James T. Genovese,
Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Peter J. Pohorelsky
John R. Pohorelsky
Scofield, Gerard, Singletary & Pohorelsky
Post Office Drawer 3028
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70602-3028
(337) 433-9436
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Antonio Rogers d/b/a Custom Home
Construction & Design

Scott J. Pias
522 Alamo Street
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601
(337) 436-1288
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Alecisa Mumford

GENOVESE, Judge.

In this breach of contract case, Defendant appeals the trial court’s grant of

Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. For the following reasons, we

reverse and remand.

FACTS

Defendant, Alecisa Mumford, hired Plaintiff, Antonio Rogers d/b/a Custom

Home Construction & Design (Rogers), in March of 2007 to perform repair work on

her home as a result of damages inflicted by Hurricane Rita. When Ms. Mumford

became dissatisfied with the work being performed, she terminated her contract with

Rogers. On May 11, 2007, Rogers instituted the present litigation, alleging that Ms.

Mumford’s failure to pay for the work done was a breach of their construction

contract. Mumford responded, alleging that Rogers had performed unsatisfactory

work.

On November 11, 2007, Rogers filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement

Agreement wherein he contended that a settlement agreement had been reached

between the parties which was evidenced by an executed settlement document signed

by Rogers and Ms. Mumford on November 8 and 15, 2007, respectively. In his

motion, Rogers requested that the trial court order Ms. Mumford to comply with the

terms of the settlement agreement. In opposition thereto, Ms. Mumford contended that

the parties, although involved in settlement negotiations, had never reached a final

agreement, and, consequently, no payments were made, and the delivery of the

settlement documents was never completed.

The Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement was heard by the trial court on

December 14, 2007. The trial court ruled that there was an “unfortunate disagreement”

between the parties, that there was an agreement as to everything except the $4,590.00

for the doors and windows, and that Rogers was to receive the amount set forth in the

settlement agreement ($22,542.70) less the $4,590.00 for the doors and windows.

However, on March 10, 2008, the trial court rendered a contrary “Ruling,” finding the

settlement agreement between the parties enforceable, thereby awarding Rogers the

full $22,542.70 and also ordering Ms. Mumford to pay for the doors and windows.1

The trial court signed a formal judgment on March 11, 2008. It is from this judgment

that Ms. Mumford appeals.

ISSUES

Ms. Mumford raises the following issues for our review:

1.

The nullity of the March 10, 20008 [sic] ruling by the [t]rial [c]ourt.

2.

The nullity of the March 11, 2008 Judgment in favor of a non-party,
Creative Doors and Windows, in the amount of $4,590[.00] against Ms.
Mumford.

3.

The actions of the trial court on March 10, 2008 [are] not supported by
the record and the amounts awarded to Plaintiff and a non-party against
Ms. Mumford should be reversed.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

In the first issue presented for our review, Ms. Mumford asserts that the ruling

of the trial court of March 10, 2008, is a nullity because the trial court “entered a final

Judgment on the record on December 14, 2007.” She contends that the trial court’s

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There was no formal judgment signed following the oral reasons for judgment rendered by
the trial court at the December 14, 2007 hearing, and the nature of the proceedings in the trial court
on March 10, 2008, is disputed by the parties. The record contains a transcript of the trial court’s
ruling on March 10, 2008, which differs from that of December 14, 2007. However, given our
findings below, we need not address the procedural deficiencies, vel non, surrounding the hearing
before the trial court on March 10, 2008.

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statement made at the March hearing that the matter had been taken “under

advisement” in December was incorrect. Ms. Mumford concludes that despite not

having been provided notice of the March hearing, the trial court “put on the record

a second Judgment” in which the trial court “attempted to substantially modify the

original final judgment against Ms. Mumford.” For the reasons explained below, we

need not address the merits of Ms. Mumford’s contentions relative to the March 10,

2008 hearing, nor her contentions relative to the substance of the judgment signed on

March 11, 2008, relative to the trial court granting a judgment in favor of a non-party

to the present litigation.

The only real issue before this court is whether Ms. Mumford and Rogers

entered into a valid and enforceable settlement agreement. If so, the trial court was

correct in granting the Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. If not, then the

matter must be remanded for a trial on the merits.

“A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, through concessions made by

one or more of them, settle a dispute or an uncertainty concerning an obligation or

other legal relationship.” La.Civ. Code art. 3071. “Such a compromise is valid only

if the parties share a meeting of the minds as to their intent.” Amy v. Schlumberger

Technology Corp., 00-175, p.4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/14/00), 771 So.2d 669, 672 (citing

Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Hannie, 568 So.2d 216 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1990), writ denied,

572 So.2d 64 (La.1991)). After reviewing the evidence in the record of these

proceedings, we find that the documents establish that there was never a meeting of

the minds between the parties. Accordingly, there was no valid and enforceable

settlement agreement between Rogers and Ms. Mumford.

The correspondence exchanged between counsel for the parties clearly

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establishes that although the parties were discussing possible settlement, both before

and after the execution of the settlement documents, there existed a dispute regarding

payment of $4,590.00 for the doors and windows. This figure constitutes an amount

owed to a third-party supplier, Creative Door and Window, for custom doors and

windows which were to be installed in Ms. Mumford’s home. There is no dispute

between the parties that this amount remained unpaid. What was disputed was

whether Rogers or Ms. Mumford was to be responsible for the payment to Creative

Door and Window.

On May 18, 2007, Ms. Mumford communicated through her counsel an “offer

to pay [Rogers] $22,542.70 in settlement of all of his claims.” Notably, this same

correspondence reflects that there existed an outstanding payment yet to be made to

Creative Door and Window despite “a billing for $4,500.00 for windows and doors

and a check accompanying that, purporting to suggest that the invoice for those doors

have been paid.” On October 12, 2007, counsel for Rogers responded, stating that Mr.

Rogers “would be willing to accept [the] initial offer of $22,542.70 in settlement” and

that he hoped that they could “settle this matter in the coming days” without any

mention of the amount owed to Creative Door and Window. On October 29, 2007,

counsel for Rogers forwarded to counsel for Ms. Mumford a Settlement and Release

of Claims Agreement. On October 30, 2007, counsel for Ms. Mumford returned the

proposed settlement documents with revisions. It was again noted in this

correspondence, which predated the execution of the settlement documents, that “the

man who supplied the windows and doors had not been paid.” What transpired next

was the signing of the settlement documents by Ms. Mumford on November 8, 2007,

and by Rogers on November 15, 2007.

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The parties continued to discuss the payment yet to be made to Creative Door

and Window even after the settlement documents were signed. This is evidenced by

the correspondence of November 16, 2007, which advised counsel for Rogers that Ms.

Mumford “is willing to enter into the agreement to settle the case upon payment of the

amount that she has tendered, but out of that, Mr. Rogers will have to pay for the doors

and windows.” Rogers filed his Motion to Enforce Settlement on November 21, 2007.

The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s factual findings
is well settled and has long been established in this state. A court of
appeal may not set aside a trial court’s or a jury’s finding of fact in the
absence of “manifest error” or unless it is “clearly wrong.” Our supreme
court set forth a two-part test for the reversal of a factfinder’s
determinations: (1) The appellate court must find from the record that a
reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court,
and (2) the appellate court must further determine that the record
establishes that the finding is clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous).
Earls v. McDowell, 07-17 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/15/07), 960 So.2d 242, citing
Stobart v. State through Dep’t of Transp. and Dev., 617 So.2d 880, 882
(La.1993).

Cole v. Allstate Ins. Co., 07-1046, p.2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/5/08), 987 So.2d 310, 312,

writ denied, 08-1463 (La. 10/31/08), 994 So.2d 535.

In the case at bar, we find that the evidence fails to establish a reasonable factual

basis to support the judgment of the trial court enforcing the settlement agreement.

There clearly was never a meeting of the minds between the parties before and after

the signing of the settlement documents as to who was going to be responsible for the

$4,590.00 payment due to Creative Door and Window. The series of correspondence

between counsel was clear and explicit that this issue needed to be resolved and was

never resolved; consequently, it must be resolved by a trial on the merits. As

characterized by the trial court in the December 14, 2007 transcript, what remains is

“an unfortunate disagreement.” Therefore, we find that there was an absence of a

meeting of the minds between the parties as to the issue of payment for the doors and

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windows and that the trial court committed manifest reversible error in granting the

Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the March 11, 2008 judgment of the trial court

granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is reversed, and the

matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent herewith. Costs

of this appeal are assessed to Antonio Rogers d/b/a Custom Home Construction &

Design.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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