Augusta J. Williams v. Natchitoches Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.

DO NOT PUBLISH

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

08-1167

AUGUSTA J. WILLIAMS

VERSUS

NATCHITOCHES FORD-LINCOLN-MERCURY

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APPEAL FROM THE
TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF NATCHITOCHES, NO. C-79899
HONORABLE ERIC R. HARRINGTON, DISTRICT JUDGE

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J. DAVID PAINTER
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, J. David Painter, and Shannon J. Gremillion,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

C. R. Whitehead, Jr.
P.O. Box 697
Natchitoches, LA 71458
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant:
Augusta J. Williams

Mark A. Begnaud
300 St. Denis St.
Natchitoches, LA 71457
Counsel for Defendant-Appellee:
Natchitoches Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc.

PAINTER, Judge.

Plaintiff, Augusta J. Williams, appeals the judgment of the trial court

dismissing her suit for damages for unlawful seizure and sale of her vehicle against

Natchitoches Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc. (NFLM).

FACTS

Mrs. Williams bought a new Ford Taurus in 1994. At some point thereafter,

she left it with her grandson for his use. In November 2004, the car began having

problems, and he took the car to NFLM for service. The grandson, Broderick

Williams, did not testify. However, the testimony and documents introduced at trial

indicate that Derrick was told that a diagnostic test showed that the vehicle had low

compression in one of the cylinders and that the mechanic would have to take off the

head and intake assembly to see what was causing the problem. He was allegedly

told that since this would involve labor, it would not be free. It is not clear from the

record whether this work was approved immediately or whether the car was returned

for service later. However, the work was done, and the mechanic found a broken

piston. Dennis Pang, general manager of NFLM, testified that when Mrs. Williams

came to get the vehicle she did not want to take it without it being repaired but would

neither approve the installation of a new motor nor pay the bill for the labor required

to find the problem. The vehicle sat on the lot for several months, and after notices

were sent to the address on the vehicle’s registration, it was sold to cover the storage

fee.

Mrs. Williams brought this suit alleging that the vehicle was wrongfully sold

and asking for damages for unlawful repossession, loss of use, the value of the

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vehicle, and attorney’s fees. After a trial on the merits, the court dismissed Mrs.

Williams’ claims at her cost. Mrs. Williams appeals.

DISCUSSION

Mrs. Williams asserts that the court erred in finding that she had entered into

an agreement with NFLM to store her vehicle.

We first note that the trial court made no finding as to an agreement to put the

vehicle in storage because no such agreement was necessary. Louisiana Revised

Statutes 32:1726 requires only that a vehicle be left with a repairman for repair and

not claimed after being placed in storage.

The statute provides that:

A. Whenever any vehicle of a type subject to registration in this
state has been stored or left in possession of a motor vehicle dealer or
repairman for repair or otherwise and the same has not been claimed
after a vehicle has been placed in storage as a result of nonpayment, the
repair shop shall make the notifications required in R.S. 32:1719 and
R.S. 32:1720.

B. After a period of forty-five days from the notice required in
R.S. 32:1720 and no payment of the cost of storage or repair has been
made for that period, the motor vehicle dealer or repairman with whom
the vehicle has been left for storage or repair may dispose of it and
collect the charges and cost of storage and cost of repair in the manner
set forth in R.S. 32:1728. The charges and cost for storage shall not
exceed any maximum charge set by the Public Service Commission for
storage services pursuant to its legal authority under R.S. 45:180.1, or
as otherwise provided by law.

The record herein supports the conclusion that the vehicle was left with NFLM

for repair, that the repairs were not paid, and that the vehicle was placed in storage

as a result of the non-payment of charges.

Mrs. Williams next argues that the trial court erred in finding that she was not

entitled to a hearing under the provisions of La.R.S. 32:1720(B)(8). The trial court

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correctly noted in its oral reasons for judgment that La.R.S. 32:1720(B) provides in

pertinent part that:

B. The notice required in Subsection A of this Section shall include the
following information:

....

(8) Notice of the right of the owner and holder of any lien on the
vehicle to an administrative hearing as required in R.S. 32:1727. The
notice shall contain the deadline for requesting an administrative hearing
and shall also contain information regarding the date by which the
request for an administrative hearing must be mailed by certified letter,
return receipt requested.

As the trial judge correctly noted, this provision does not give all owners of

vehicles sought to be sold for repair and/or storage charges the right to a hearing. The

hearing is only required as set out in La.R.S. 32:1727 (emphasis added) which states

that:

A. The owner of any vehicle that was stored by a public agency
shall have the right to an administrative hearing to determine if towing
and storage of said vehicle was proper. The owner of the vehicle must
make a request for a hearing within ten days of the date that the owner
notification is mailed as described in R.S. 32:1720 to the agency that
had the vehicle towed.

B. The hearing shall be conducted by the public agency
authorizing the tow or other body authorized to do so within three
business days after receipt of the request for a hearing.

Since Mrs. Williams’ vehicle was stored by a private company, she was not

entitled to a hearing. Further, as noted by the trial court in its reasons for judgment,

Mrs. Williams received repeated notices of the intention to dispose of the vehicle and

she had an opportunity to oppose the disposal process if she wished.

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CONCLUSION

Finding no error in the actions of the trial court, we affirm the judgment. Costs

of this appeal are to be paid by Plaintiff-Appellant, Augusta J. Williams.

AFFIRMED.

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