Triventies Johnson v. State Farm Ins.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 08-1250

TRIVENTIES JOHNSON, ET AL.

VERSUS

STATE FARM INS., ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF NATCHITOCHES, NO. C-79239, DIV. A
HONORABLE ERIC ROGER HARRINGTON, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JOHN D. SAUNDERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Michael G. Sullivan, and James T. Genovese,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Ronald E. Corkern, Jr.
Corkern & Crews
P. O. Box 1036
Natchitoches, LA 71458-1036
(318) 352-2302
Counsel for Defendants/ Appellees:
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co.
Bobby Reliford

D. Scott Kendrick
Attorney at Law
1762 Texas St.
Natchitoches, LA 71457
(318) 354-9146
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants:
Triventies Johnson
Roy Farley, Jr.

SAUNDERS, Judge.

This case involves a single-car accident with the two guest passengers suing

the driver of the vehicle and the vehicle’s insurer. The two plaintiffs riding in the

vehicle testified that, as the vehicle was in a curve in the roadway, a motorcycle

appeared in their lane of travel causing the driver to swerve and leave the roadway,

where the vehicle struck trees. Further, the two plaintiffs testified that the driver of

the vehicle was acting in a prudent manner at all times.

The vehicle’s insurer and its driver filed a motion for summary judgment based

on the sudden emergency doctrine. The trial court granted its motion, dismissed the

plaintiffs’ case with prejudice, and assessed the costs of the proceeding to the

plaintiffs. The plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Triventies Johnson (Johnson) and Roy Farley, Jr. (Farley) filed a petition for

damages against State Farm Insurance Company (State Farm) and Bobby Reliford

(Reliford), alleging injuries sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident. Johnson

and Farley (the plaintiffs) were guest passengers in a 2001 Ford F150 pickup truck

driven by Reliford.

The single-car accident occurred on Highway 480 near Campti, Louisiana, at

approximately 12:45 A.M. on March 12, 2006. As the pickup truck entered a curve

to the left, Reliford was confronted with a motorcycle traveling in his lane of travel

at a high rate of speed. Reliford responded by leaving the roadway in order to avoid

the motorcycle and, thereafter, struck trees on the side of the roadway.

State Farm and Reliford filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground

that, under the Louisiana jurisprudentially-recognized doctrine of sudden emergency,

Reliford could not be found guilty of negligence based on the allegation that he failed

to adopt what the plaintiffs, upon reflection, considered to be a better method to avoid

the collision. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims

with prejudice. The plaintiffs have filed this appeal, alleging one assignment of error.

DISCUSSION OF THE MERITS:

The plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred when it granted the defendants’

motion for summary judgment, dismissed their demands with prejudice, and cast them

with costs of the proceeding. The plaintiffs’ claim has no merit.

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, applying
the same criteria that govern a trial court’s determination of a motion for
summary judgment. Louisiana’s Code of Civil Procedure [Article 966
(B)] states that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” We are required to construe factual inferences that are
reasonably drawn from the evidence presented in favor of the party
opposing the motion; all doubt is to be resolved in the non-moving
party’s favor.

We also are to remain cognizant of the mover’s and non-mover’s
burdens of proof. Although the burden of proof on a motion for
summary judgment remains with the moving party, the mover’s burden
changes depending upon whether he or she will bear the burden of proof
at trial on the matter that is the subject of the motion for summary
judgment:

[I]f he or she will not bear the burden of proof at trial on
the matter that is before the court on the motion for
summary judgment, the movant’s burden on the motion
does not require him to negate all essential elements of the
adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point
out to the court that there is an absence of factual support
for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s
claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party
fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that
he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at
trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact.

MaClaff, Inc. v. Arch Ins. Co., 07-1182, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 02/27/08), 978 So.2d

482, 487-88 (citations omitted).

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In the case before us, State Farm and Reliford filed the motion for summary

judgment, but the plaintiffs have the burden to prove that Reliford was negligent in

the operation of the motor vehicle that he was driving when he swerved off the

roadway, crashed, and caused injuries to his guest passengers. Thus, in order to

prevail on its motion for summary judgment, State Farm and Reliford merely have to

show “an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to [the

plaintiffs’] claim.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C)(2).

We find that State Farm and Reliford have done so via pointing out the

applicability of the sudden emergency doctrine to this case. Our Louisiana Supreme

Court, in Hickman v. Southern Pacific Transport Co., 262 La. 102, 112-13, 262 So.2d

385, 389 (1972), stated the following:

One who suddenly finds himself in a position of imminent peril,
without sufficient time to consider and weigh all the circumstances or
best means that may be adopted to avoid an impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence.

The evidence in this case is overwhelming that the sudden emergency doctrine

is applicable to insulate Reliford from liability. At the accident scene, Reliford told

the investigating officer that he was traveling westbound on Louisiana Highway 480

when he came around a curve, and there was a motorcycle in his lane of travel

causing him to swerve to avoid hitting the motorcycle. Both of the plaintiffs were

treated the same day of the accident at Natchitoches Regional Medical Center for soft

tissue injuries. The medical records indicate a history was taken from Johnson during

which he stated that he had been involved in a motor vehicle accident in which the

vehicle he was in “ran off road trying to avoid oncoming motorcycle, striking trees.”

The history taken from Farley on the day of the accident simply makes
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reference to a single-car accident. However, Farley returned to the emergency room

two days later, and the history obtained from him indicates that he was involved in

a motor vehicle accident two days before in which the vehicle he was in “ran off road

avoiding motorcycle striking trees.”

In Johnson’s deposition, the following exchanges took place:

Q The - - Bobby, as I understand it, was swerving to avoid a
motorcycle?

A Yes, sir.

Q And this accident happened in a curve?

A Yes, sir.

Q And when you first saw the motorcycle, where was it in relation
to the roadway?

A It was like towards - - more towards our side, you know, coming
around the curve. He had like laid over. They used to race out
there, so, he was coming pretty fast.

Q And did it appear to you as though Bobby was faced with an
emergency situation at that time?

A Yes, sir.

Q If he had continued straight and stayed in his lane of travel, what
would have happened?

A He would have ran over the guy.

Q So, he only had - - his choice was to run over the motorcycle or
take to the ditch on the right; is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

....

Q Did Bobby appear to be driving his vehicle at a reasonable rate of
speed under the circumstances?

A Yes, sir.

....
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Q He didn’t appear to be going fast to you - - too fast for the
circumstances or conditions?

A No, sir.

The following exchanges took place during Farley’s deposition:

Q And did I understand you to say that as Mr. Reliford entered the
curve he suddenly saw a motorcycle coming towards him in his
lane of travel?

A Yes, sir.

Q And if he hadn’t taken evasive action, he would have hit the
motorcycle?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you know of anything Mr. Reliford could have done to avoid
the accident?

A No, sir.

Q Was Mr. Reliford driving at a reasonable rate of speed as far as
you could tell?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did he appear to be driving recklessly?

A No, sir.

Q It appears, though, he was faced with an emergency situation
when he saw that motorcycle?

A Yes, sir.

Q And his choice was to either run over the motorcycle or drive off
the road?

A Yes, sir.

Given the evidence cited above, it is clear that Reliford faced a sudden

emergency when he rounded the curve to find a motorcycle in his lane of travel.

However, this court, in McCann v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 483

So.2d 205, 211 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 486 So.2d 736 (La.1986), stated the
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following:

Plaintiffs can still defeat defendants’ use of the [sudden
emergency] doctrine by showing that the defendant created the
emergency through his own negligence, or that once confronted with the
emergency he did not react as a reasonably prudent person would react.
The plaintiffs in this case, not the defendants, bear these burdens of
proof.

There is no evidence in the record that Reliford caused the emergency he faced.

In fact, given the testimony of the plaintiffs, it is apparent that Reliford did not do

anything to create the emergency. The plaintiffs attempt to defeat the defendants’

motion by pointing out that Reliford may have some comparative negligence in

causing the accident. The plaintiffs claim that the following statement from the

investigating officer’s report: “I was unable to locate any evidence on the roadway

which indicated any evasive actions,” coupled with their deposition testimony that

Reliford swerved to miss the motorcycle, creates an issue of fact. While it may be true

that an issue of fact exists as to whether Reliford swerved to miss the motorcycle, or

simply drove straight off the roadway, the plaintiffs must show that this issue of fact

is material.

A fact is “material” when its existence or nonexistence may be
essential to plaintiff’s cause of action under the applicable theory of
recovery. “[F]acts are material if they potentially insure or preclude
recovery, affect a litigant’s ultimate success, or determine the outcome
of the legal dispute.” Simply put, a “material” fact is one that would
matter on the trial on the merits.

Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512, p. 27 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730,

751 (quoting S. La. Bank v. Williams, 591 So.2d 375, 377 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1991),

writs denied, 596 So.2d 211 (La. 1992) (citations omitted).

We find it immaterial whether Reliford swerved or drove straight off the

roadway to avoid the collision with the motorcycle, as either reaction is reasonably

prudent. This court cannot fathom how swerving off the roadway to miss the
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motorcycle or driving straight off the roadway to miss the motorcycle would have

changed the result of the incident. As such, a determination of this fact will not

change the result of the plaintiffs’ claim. Thus, we find this factual issue raised by the

plaintiffs is not material.

Accordingly, we find that the sudden emergency doctrine applies to the case

before us. Further, we find that the plaintiffs failed to raise any material facts

regarding whether Reliford either created the emergency or acted imprudently once

he was faced with the emergency. As a result, Reliford cannot be deemed negligent.

CONCLUSION:

The plaintiffs raised one assignment of error claiming that the trial court erred

when it granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissed their

demands with prejudice, and assessed them with costs of the proceeding. We found

that the sudden emergency doctrine served to insulate Reliford, and, thus, State Farm,

from any finding of negligence. As such, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Costs

of this proceeding are assessed to the plaintiffs.

AFFIRMED.

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