Mary Margaret Alexander v. Lafayette Parish School Board

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

08-1378

MARY MARGARET ALEXANDER

VERSUS

LAFAYETTE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-20073608
HONORABLE JOHN DAMIAN TRAHAN, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, J. David Painter, and
Shannon J. Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

J. Isaac Funderburk
Funderburk & Herpin
P. O. Drawer 1030
Abbeville, LA 70511-1030
Telephone: (337) 893-8140
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellant - Mary Margaret Alexander

Jonathan C. Augustine
The Augustine Firm, APLC
8322 One Calais Drive
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
Telephone: (225) 715-7112
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellant - Mary Margaret Alexander

Dawn L. Morris
Law Office of Dawn L. Morris
1106 Coolidge Blvd. - Suite A
Lafayette, LA 70503
Telephone: (337) 704-2094
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellee - Lafayette Parish School Board

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant, Mary Margaret Alexander, filed suit against her

former employer, the Lafayette Parish School Board, which fired her for making

threatening comments about doing physical harm to co-workers. She sought a

declaratory judgment that the school board acted in violation of its polices and

procedures in terminating her employment and sought reinstatement of her

employment and reimbursement of lost salary and benefits. The trial court denied the

claims and dismissed her petition. It reasoned that the school board substantially

complied with applicable policy and procedures prior to terminating her employment.

We affirm.

I.

ISSUES

1. Did the trial court correctly determine that the
“Allegations of Misconduct Policy” (File: GAEB)
set forth the procedure to be applied during the
school board’s investigation of the alleged
threatening comments made by the untenured high
school computer proctor, Ms. Alexander?

2. Did the school board substantially comply with the
correct policy and afford Ms. Alexander due process
during its investigation of her alleged comments
prior to her termination?

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2007, Ms. Alexander was a teacher’s assistant employed as the

computer proctor at Lafayette Charter High School. On or about January 11, 2007,

Ms. Alexander was reprimanded by Mr. Lawrence Lilly, the school’s principal, for

looking at a newspaper and engaging in casual conversation with another instructor

during student class time and in the presence of the students. After the students were

dismissed from the class, the principal spoke with Ms. Alexander in the counselor’s

office, which was located nearby. During Principal Lilly’s conversation with Ms.

Alexander, he advised her that the students should have been working and asked that

the conduct not happen again.

Later that day, Ms. Alexander angrily told another teacher, Ms. Marilyn

Doucet, about the principal’s reprimand. About two weeks later, Ms. Doucet reported

the conversation to Principal Lilly, stating that Ms. Alexander had made comments

to her about doing harm to Principal Lilly and the counselor who had been present

during the reprimand. The contents of the written statement she provided to Principal

Lilly are as follows:

Mr. Lilly,

I would like to preface my statement with the following:

It is a common occurrence for Ms. Margaret Alexander to
come to my classroom during the dinner break to “let off a
little steam.” I simply listen patiently as she rants and
raves about something that has happened recently at
Charter. In so doing, it is my hope that I am helping Ms.
Alexander to resolve some of the problems involving her
that so very often arise. Additionally, by providing a sort
of release for her, it is my hope that I am helping Charter
High to operate more efficiently. However, the incident
that is described below has frightened me and is certainly
beyond my ability to deal with; therefore, after much
thought, I have concluded that I must report the episode to
you for the safety of all concerned.

01/22/07

To Whom It May Concern:

On or about January 12, 2007, Margaret Alexander came
into my classroom (Room 103) at Lafayette Charter High
School during the dinner break to tell me about an incident
which had occurred earlier. She had been reprimanded and
was upset. In her ranting, she said, “I should bring a gun
and shoot off their fucking heads. I’d rather not have to do
that. What I’m saying is if they made me mad enough, I
would.”

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/s/ Marilyn R. Doucet
Marilyn R. Doucet

On the day he received the written statement, Principal Lilly immediately

reported the incident to Thomas H. Brown, an Area Director for the Lafayette Parish

School System. Mr. Brown was the immediate supervisor for twelve principals at the

time, including Principal Lilly. His job description included conducting

investigations of misconduct. Mr. Brown requested that he and Principal Lilly meet

with Ms. Alexander immediately.

The meeting occurred in Principal Lilly’s office. Ms. Alexander was

presented with Ms. Doucet’s statement, and according to Principal Lilly and Mr.

Brown, she admitted to making the statements, although she denied any intent to

carry out the acts. Both Principal Lilly and Mr. Brown testified that she stated to

them that she was “just playing” and “didn’t mean it like that.” However, based upon

her admission of having made the comments, Mr. Brown advised her that she was

immediately suspended with pay, pending further investigation. He then escorted her

from the building. The incident was also reported to the Lafayette City Police

Department.

Principal Lilly called the superintendent, Dr. James Easton, to inform

him of the allegations that had been made against Ms. Alexander and of the decision

to suspend her with pay, pending further investigation. He also provided a written

letter to Superintendent Easton, documenting the reporting of the incident and the

action taken. According to Principal Lilly, no further investigation was conducted

due to Ms. Alexander’s admission that she had made the statements.

Approximately one week later, on January 29, 2007, Principal Lilly sent

a letter to Superintendent Easton that recommended Ms. Alexander’s termination. He

stated in that letter his recommendation was based not only on the shooting threats

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she had made but also on her history of exhibiting “hostile” and “strange, erratic

behavior,” which included “severe mood swings.” He further stated that Ms.

Alexander had previously been involved in conflicts with other staff members, which

included verbal altercations and her making threats to do harm. Principal Lilly

concluded that Ms. Alexander’s most recent threats against him and the counselor

showed that her threats were escalating in severity and constituted unacceptable

behavior at the school.

Superintendent Easton spoke with Mr. Brown about the situation and,

thereafter, accepted the recommendation to terminate Ms. Alexander. On March 4,

2007, Superintendent Easton issued a letter to Ms. Alexander briefly summarizing

Principal Lilly’s recommendation that she be terminated and Principal Lilly’s reasons

offered in support of his recommendation. Superintendent Easton stated that he

concurred and advised Ms. Alexander that he would be recommending to the school

board that she be terminated at its regularly scheduled meeting of March 21, 2007.

He also advised Ms. Alexander in that letter that she had the option of resigning prior

to the date of the school board meeting.

Ms. Alexander did not resign but appeared at the school board meeting

with legal representation. While in executive session, the school board voted to

terminate her employment. On March 28, 2007, she was informed in writing by the

school board’s Human Resources and Risk Management Director, Ramona Bernard,

that her employment was officially terminated as of March 21, 2007.

A few months later, Ms. Alexander filed a Petition for Declaratory

Judgment and Writ of Mandamus against the Lafayette Parish School Board, seeking

reinstatement of her employment and reimbursement of all salary, benefits, and

emoluments of employment that had allegedly been withheld from her. She asserted

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that she was terminated in violation of the policies and procedures set forth in “File:

GCN,” entitled “Nonprofessional Personnel Separation.” The GCN policy sets forth

the procedure to be followed when addressing alleged “deficiencies” in the

performance of nonprofessional school board employees.

This case was submitted to the trial court for decision based on the

briefs, depositions, and exhibits filed with the trial court. The trial court found that

the GCN policy did not apply because it did not address the behavior at issue,

although the trial court also found that Ms. Alexander had, nevertheless, been

afforded the basic due process rights that the GCN policy’s procedures were designed

to protect: notice; a chance to respond to charges; the opportunity to resign; a right

to have the school board vote on her termination; and notice in writing of the school

board’s decision.

The trial court found that, due to the allegations that had been made

about Ms. Alexander’s behavior, a different school board policy, as had been argued

by the school board, provided the applicable procedure to be followed. That policy

is entitled “Allegations of Misconduct Policy” and is also referenced as “File:

GAEB.” The GAEB policy addresses the procedure that must be followed when

allegations of “misconduct” have been made about any school board employee,

regardless of the employee’s professional status. After finding this policy to be

applicable, the trial court found that the school board substantially complied with its

procedures. Consequently, Ms. Alexander’s claims were dismissed at her sole cost.

Ms. Alexander has appealed, claiming that the trial court erroneously

found that the GAEB policy applied to the facts of her case and also erred in finding

that she committed “misconduct” as that term is defined by the GAEB policy. Rather,

she claims the GCN policy applied, the school board failed to substantially comply

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with the procedures set forth therein prior to her termination, and therefore, she was

wrongfully terminated.

III.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Which School Board Policy Applies?

This issue of which school board policy applies presents a question of

law, requiring this court to decide whether the trial court was legally correct or

incorrect in its determination. See Blalock v. Lord, 05-939 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/06),

927 So.2d 1142, writ denied, 06-124 (La. 9/16/06), 937 So.2d 847 (and cases cited

therein). Because these policies are contractual in nature, we are guided by the basic

principles of contract interpretation. This means that this reviewing court is bound

to interpret them in a manner such that if the words therein are clear, unambiguous,

and lead to no absurd consequences, the words must be given their obvious meaning.

See id.; La.Civ.Code arts. 2046, 2047. The language at issue is not to be disregarded

in search of further interpretation or under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. Id.

The GAEB policy that was filed in evidence as a joint exhibit states, in

relevant part:

ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT POLICY

....

Upon receipt of an allegation of misconduct, the
Superintendent or his designee shall promptly:

A. Confer with the principal, administrator, or
supervisor of the school, site, or department
with which the employee is associated to
discuss matters such as the nature of the
allegation, whether the performance of the
employee has been adversely affected or is
likely to be adversely affected, whether others
in the school (site) have mentioned this

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alleged incident of misconduct, the likelihood
that the allegation has any veracity, and
whether the mere fact that the allegation has
been made impairs the abilities of the
employee to discharge the duties attendant to
his or her position; and,

B. Either personally and/or through a designee
(which may be the principal, administrator, or
supervisor of the affected employee) attempt
to resolve the matter by informal consultation
with the involved party or parties.

Based upon the preliminary findings of the
Superintendent or his designee, the Superintendent shall
decide whether the allegation is without substance or a
formal investigation into the complaints initiated and/or the
employee [sic] suspended. Should it become necessary for
an employee to be suspended during the course of the
investigation of the allegation(s) of misconduct, the
employee will be suspended with pay until a final decision
is made. It is to be noted that up to this point, the
investigation should be discreet, on a confidential basis and
investigatory, not accusatory in nature. Further, no
notations in personnel file of the employee in question
shall be made regarding the allegation of misconduct
should the Superintendent or his designee elect to discard
the charges at this juncture. The investigation shall not
become accusatory until the Superintendent or his designee
is satisfied that there is a substantial basis for the
allegation(s).

After the preliminary formal investigation, the
Superintendent or his designee shall advise the affected
employee of the Superintendent’s preliminary findings.
Further, the employee shall be afforded the opportunity to
respond to the allegations and advise the Superintendent or
his designee of any witness or evidence which may
challenge the accuracy of the allegation. Should the
Superintendent elect to proceed with punitive measures,
then the employee shall be afforded all due process rights
specified by law.

If there is a public announcement by the Board that
the employee may be disciplined, whether or not there is an
accompanying reduction in employee pay, the employee
may appear before the school board in an open session,
within thirty days after the conclusion of an investigation
and prior to Board action, and be given a reasonable time,
as determined by the Board, to comment on the

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investigation and any actions taken or proposed to be taken
involving the employee. Nothing in this paragraph shall
inhibit the Board from suspending an employee, with or
without pay, under appropriate circumstances.

At all times during the investigative procedures the
Superintendent or his designee shall strive to obtain the
specifics of the allegations of misconduct, including date,
time, location, and other details of the alleged offense. The
employee against whom the allegations have been made
shall be advised, within the parameters of each particular
case, of the specifics surrounding the alleged misconduct.
The employee may have a representative of his/her choice
to appear with him/her at any level of the investigation.

Complaints of misconduct shall be handled as
expeditiously as the circumstances surrounding each
particular case will allow. Any hearing, formal or
informal, before the Superintendent or the Board, shall be
conducted with rapidity. Evidence from the employee shall
be accepted and accorded due consideration.

For purposes of this policy, the term “misconduct”
shall include the commission of immoral offenses
involving students or others, corporal punishment, neglect
of duty, incompetency, dishonesty, insubordination,
violation of School Board policy, or any other conduct
which may call into question the employee’s ability to
discharge the duties attendant to his position.

This policy is not intended to supplant any grievance
procedures which may be in existence and available to any
employee. Further, this policy shall not supersede the
employee’s right to formal hearings specified by law
including, but not limited to, La.R.S. 17:443, et seq.

(Emphasis added).

The specific GCN policy procedures that were filed as a joint exhibit and

are at issue in this case are located in Section II, “Dismissal of other Nonprofessional

Personnel:”

The principal recommends in writing to the Director of
Human Resources that the employee appear before a
committee consisting of the principal, supervisor and the
Director of Human Resources or Assistant in Human
Resources to discuss the deficiencies.

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If improvement or change is not effected after appearing
before the committee, a recommendation to terminate the
employee shall be made jointly by the supervisor and the
principal to the Superintendent in writing.

At the request of the Superintendent, the Director of
Human Resources shall inform the employee that he/she is
to appear before a committee consisting of the principal,
the supervisor and the Director of Human Resources or
Assistant in Human Resources at which time the reason(s)
for dismissal will be discussed.

At this time, the employee will be given the opportunity to
resign. If the employee chooses not to resign, the
Superintendent’s recommendation shall be presented to the
Board for action. The employee shall be informed in
writing of the Board’s final decision.

A copy of all documents pertaining to an employee’s
performance shall be placed in the appropriate official
personnel file, Human Resources Department, Lafayette
Parish School Board. A copy of the above shall also be
provided the employee.

(Emphasis added).

Ms. Alexander’s employment came under review by the principal and

Area Director solely because of her specific comments to another teacher.

Specifically, Ms. Alexander reportedly stated, “I should bring a gun and shoot off

[Principal Lilly’s and the counselors’s] fucking heads. I’d rather not have to do that.

What I’m saying is if they made me mad enough, I would.” The trial court correctly

considered whether these comments constituted “deficiencies” in performance, as

addressed by the GCN policy or “misconduct,” which is the subject of the GAEB

policy.

The portion of the GCN policy filed as an exhibit in the record does not

provide a definition of “deficiency.” However, the testimony offered by school board

personnel reasonably supports the trial court’s conclusion that the comments made

by Ms. Alexander did not constitute a deficiency in performance that was subject to

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review under the GCN policy. Superintendent Easton testified that the policy

violation committed by Ms. Alexander constituted “misconduct” as set forth in the

GAEB policy. Specifically, he testified that Ms. Alexander’s comments fit within the

“catchall” definition of “misconduct” set forth in the GAEB policy, which states:

For purposes of this policy, the term “misconduct”
shall include the commission of immoral offenses
involving students or others, corporal punishment, neglect
of duty, incompetency, dishonesty, insubordination,
violation of School Board policy, or any other conduct
which may call into question the employee’s ability to
discharge the duties attendant to his position.

(Emphasis added). Principal Lilly, who worked as Director of Human Resources for

the school board in the past, also testified that the GCN policy was not the applicable

policy to address the allegations against Ms. Alexander. He testified that the GCN

policy is intended to cover employee performance and stated, as well, that Ms.

Alexander’s comments constituted “misconduct” as defined by the “catchall” section

of the GAEB policy. Ms. Alexander offered no evidence in opposition to these

opinions.

The trial court found that the GAEB policy applied because the behavior

at issue—comments about doing serious harm to co-workers—constituted

“misconduct” as defined by the GAEB policy. We agree. After reviewing the record

and each policy, we find that the meaning of the terms “misconduct” and “deficiency”

as set forth in the relevant policies are not ambiguous. The trial court did not err in

ruling that the GAEB policy, governing employee “misconduct,” applied to the

investigation of the allegations that had been made against Ms. Alexander.

Therefore, having found that the GAEB policy applied to the facts of this case, we

must now determine whether the school board substantially complied with the

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procedures set forth therein, including affording Ms. Alexander the due process

offered by its terms, prior to terminating her.

Substantial Compliance and Due Process

Substantial Compliance

“[T]he administration of the school system is entrusted by the

constitution and the legislature to the parish school boards and not to the courts.”

Myres v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 423 So.2d 1303, 1305 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1982), writ

denied, 430 So.2d 657 (La.1983) (citing Chantlin v. Acadia Parish Sch. Bd., 100

So.2d 908 (La.App 1 Cir. 1958)); see also, Harris v. West Carroll Parish Sch. Bd.,

605 So.2d 610 (La.App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 609 So.2d 255 (La.1992). Accordingly,

the courts review school board actions for a determination of whether its actions

constituted an abuse of its discretion. Harris, 605 So.2d 610. This has been

interpreted to mean “where there is a rational basis, which is supported by substantial

evidence for the school board’s discretionary determination, the courts cannot and

should not substitute their judgment for that of the school board.” Id. at 613 (citing

Myres, 423 So.2d 1313; Chantlin, 100 So.2d 908; Baker v. St. James Parish Sch. Bd.,

584 So.2d 369 (La.App. 5 Cir.), writ denied, 588 So.2d 1118 (La.1991)).

In our review of the record, we find substantial evidence of the school

board’s compliance with the GAEB policy. The GAEB requires, first, that a report

of misconduct be made to a principal, administrator, or supervisor who is then

required to notify the Superintendent or his designee of the allegations. In this case,

it is clear that once Ms. Doucet notified Principal Lilly of the allegations of

misconduct against Ms. Alexander, he, in turn, notified Mr. Brown, the Area Director

(his supervisor), and, thereafter, Superintendent Easton via telephone and written

letter.

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The GAEB policy then requires the Superintendent or his designee to

promptly confer with the principal or other supervisor of the accused employee to

gather pertinent information regarding the allegations so as to determine what, if any,

immediate action may need to be taken. The Superintendent or his designee is to also

informally confer with the involved parties to attempt a resolution at that time. In this

case, Mr. Brown met with Principal Lilly to discuss the report about Ms. Alexander’s

comments, and they both met with Ms. Alexander to discuss the alleged behavior.

Based on information obtained at that point, the policy authorizes the

Superintendent or his designee to decide whether a formal investigation is needed

and/or whether suspension of the employee is necessary during the investigation. The

record reveals that after meeting with Ms. Alexander, Principal Lilly and the Area

Director advised Ms. Alexander that she would be suspended with pay pending

further investigation, and she was escorted off the campus.

The next procedures address guidelines for conducting a formal

investigation, including informing the accused employee of the findings and offering

the employee a chance to respond with additional information. The accused

employee is, thereafter, to be allowed to appear before the school board in open

session if there is a public announcement by the school board that the employee may

be disciplined in any manner. The facts show that there was no formal investigation

conducted after the preliminary, informal investigation conducted by Principal Lilly

and Mr. Brown. Principal Lilly testified that no formal investigation was instituted

because of Ms. Alexander’s admission to having made the statements, his knowledge

of her prior threats made against at least one other employee, and her past

involvement in altercations with co-workers. We find no abuse of the

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Superintendent’s designees’ discretion, which determined that no formal investigation

was necessary.

The next actions taken in regard to Ms. Alexander’s employment came

from Principal Lilly, who recommended her termination in a written letter to the

Superintendent. The Superintendent accepted the recommendation and notified Ms.

Alexander in writing, via certified mail, of the recommendation that she be

terminated. In that letter, he provided her with notice of the school board meeting

during which her termination would be considered and afforded her the opportunity

to appear with a representative at that hearing. Although Ms. Alexander’s matter was

not addressed in open session, we find that she was properly afforded the notice and

opportunity to be heard, prior to her termination, as contemplated by the policy.

Consequently, we find no error in the trial court’s determination that the school board

substantially complied with the policy’s procedures in this case.

Due Process

Ms. Alexander contends that the trial court’s decision should be set aside

because she was not afforded constitutional due process of law prior to her

termination. It is important to clarify that Ms. Alexander was not a certified teacher,

but was a teacher’s assistant in the computer lab of the high school, bearing the title

of Computer Proctor. Consequently, Ms. Alexander did not possess a state or

federally-protected property interest in maintaining her employment and, therefore,

no entitlement to due process prior to being terminated. Wilhelm v. Vermilion Parish

Sch. Bd., 598 So.2d 699 (La.App 3 Cir. 1992); Harris, 605 So.2d 610.

She was, nevertheless, entitled to those rights set forth in the procedures

established by the Lafayette Parish School Board in its “Allegations of Misconduct

Policy,” also referred to as the GAEB policy. See id. Therein, the school board

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recites its recognition of its employees’ rights to privacy and due process of law and

states that its procedures for the investigation of employees accused of misconduct

were designed to address those competing interests. Consequently, Ms. Alexander

did have a reasonable expectation that she would be afforded due process before

termination under the terms of the GAEB policy.

The trial court stated during its oral recitation of its ruling that it found

the school board had procedurally afforded Ms. Alexander due process. We agree.

Due process of law constitutes, minimally, that any deprivation of life, liberty, or

property be protected by notice and an opportunity to be heard. U.S. Const. amends.

V, XIV; La.Const. art. 1, § 2. The record provides evidence that Ms. Alexander was

afforded due process. She received notice of the allegations against her when she was

presented with Ms. Doucet’s written statement during her meeting with Principal

Lilly and Mr. Brown, the Area Director. She was also allowed to comment on the

statement prior to any action being taken. Also, once a decision had been made to

terminate her, she received written notice, via certified letter from Superintendent

Easton, of the school board meeting during which his recommendation for her

termination was to be considered. Ms. Doucet was afforded an opportunity to be

heard as well. The record reflects that she attended the school board meeting and was

represented by counsel. Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s ruling stating Ms.

Alexander was afforded due process is reasonably supported by the record and is not

manifestly erroneous.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court, dismissing plaintiff-appellant, Mary

Margaret Alexander’s Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Writ of Mandamus, is

affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Mary Margaret Alexander.

AFFIRMED.

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