Barbara Ewalt v. Kevin Wayne Ewalt
Barbara Ewalt v. Kevin Wayne Ewalt, No. CA-0008-1510 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. June 3, 2009).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Lamb v. Lamb 427 So. 2d 899
Opinion text
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
08-1510
BARBARA EWALT
VERSUS
KEVIN WAYNE EWALT
************
APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2008-2318
HONORABLE TODD CLEMONS, DISTRICT JUDGE
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JIMMIE C. PETERS
JUDGE
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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, John D. Saunders, and
Jimmie C. Peters, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
Michael R. Garber
Attorney at Law
1801 Ryan Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 494-5500
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Barbara Ewalt
William J. Cutrera
Attorney at Law
910 Ford Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 433-1414
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Kevin Wayne Ewalt
PETERS, J.
Barbara Ewalt (Barbara) appeals the trial court’s judgment awarding her
estranged husband, Kevin Wayne Ewalt (Kevin), the exclusive use and occupancy of
the family residence pending a partition of the community property. For the
following reasons, we affirm the trial court judgment in all respects.
DISCUSSION OF THE RECORD
Barbara and Kevin were married on October 16, 1998, and separated in March
of 2008. Both Barbara and Kevin have grown children, but no children were born of
their marriage. When the parties initially separated, Barbara remained in the family
home in Moss Bluff, Louisiana, and Kevin began living in a twenty-foot travel trailer,
which he parked behind his employer’s business. One of the issues in the divorce
proceedings that followed was the use and occupancy of the family home. This issue
came for hearing before the trial court on August 26, 2008.
Kevin testified that the travel trailer belonged to his son, and, although it was
hooked to electricity and water services, it had no sewage hookup and the air
conditioner did not work. In fact, Kevin used the bathroom and shower facilities
located in his employer’s adjacent shop. Kevin testified that three of his children
lived nearby, but none had room for him.
Kevin earned an annual income between $40,000.00 and $45,000.00, and,
when he and Barbara first separated, he agreed to pay the $923.52 monthly mortgage
note on the family home. In exchange, he asserted, Barbara agreed to make payments
on the $28,000.00 home equity line of credit. Kevin introduced evidence reflecting
his payment of the mortgage note from May through August of 2008, and testified
that in July of 2008, he had paid $140.00 on the line of credit that Barbara had agreed
to pay.
Barbara testified that, as a nurse, she earned between $55,000.00 and
$58,000.00 per year and that she spent $1,500.00 to $1,600.00 per month for
household expenses and payment of preexisting community debts, including the home
equity line of credit. She asserted that after Kevin moved out, she made repairs to the
family home costing between $6,000.00 and $7,000.00. She also testified that she too
had made a mortgage payment for July of 2008 and was willing and able to pay the
monthly mortgage note if awarded the use and occupancy of the family home.
When asked about Kevin’s suggestion that she could move in with her daughter
Jackie, Barbara testified that Jackie lived in a small three-bedroom house with her son
and a co-worker, and, therefore, there were no extra bedrooms for her to occupy.
Barbara also testified that because she gave piano lessons on the grand piano located
in the family home, having to move would be a physical and financial inconvenience.
After completion of the evidence, the trial court awarded Kevin the exclusive
use and occupancy of the matrimonial residence. In announcing its decision, the trial
court noted that it was influenced by the fact that Kevin was living in a small trailer
with no sewage, by the difference in Barbara and Kevin’s incomes, and by the fact
that Kevin had been paying the mortgage note.
In her single assignment of error, Barbara asserts that “[t]he trial court abused
its discretion in awarding Kevin Ewalt use of the family home.”
OPINION
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:374(B) governs the use of a community-owned
residence pending the partition of community property:
When the family residence is community property or the spouses
own community movables or immovables, after or in conjunction with
the filing of a petition for divorce or for separation of property in
accordance with Civil Code Article 2374, either spouse may petition for,
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and a court may award to one of the spouses, after a contradictory
hearing, the use and occupancy of the family residence and use of
community movables or immovables to either of the spouses pending
further order of the court. In these cases, the court shall inquire into the
relative economic status of the spouses, including both community and
separate property, and the needs of the children, if any, and shall award
the use and occupancy of the family residence and the use of any
community movables or immovables to the spouse in accordance with
the best interest of the family. If applicable, the court shall consider the
granting of the occupancy of the family home and the use of community
movables or immovables in awarding spousal support.
This statute gives the trial court wide discretion in deciding to which spouse it will
award the use and occupancy of the family residence. Lamb v. Lamb, 427 So.2d 899
(La.App. 3 Cir. 1983). Here, the trial court properly considered the parties’ incomes
and the fact that Kevin was living in a small travel trailer. After reviewing the record,
we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Kevin the exclusive
use and occupancy of the family residence.
DISPOSITION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court judgment awarding Kevin
Wayne Ewalt the exclusive use and occupancy of the family residence. We assess all
costs of this appeal to Barbara Ewalt.
AFFIRMED.
This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform Rules–Courts
of Appeal, Rule 2-16.3.
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