Mac Normand v. Village of Hessmer

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-61

MAC NORMAND

VERSUS

VILLAGE OF HESSMER

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWELFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF AVOYELLES, NO. 2006-9329
HONORABLE WILLIAM J. BENNETT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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OSWALD A. DECUIR
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Oswald A. Decuir, and J. David Painter, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Ricky L. Sooter
Provosty, Sadler, deLaunay,
Fiorenza & Sobel
P. O. Box 1791
Alexandria, LA 71309-1791
(318) 445-3631
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Village of Hessmer

Cory P. Roy
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 544
Marksville, LA 71351
(318) 240-7800
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Village of Hessmer

Darrel D. Ryland
J.B. Treuting
Wesley K. Elmer
Danika A. Benjamin
Danielle A. Soldani-Ryland
Law Office of Darrel D. Ryland, APLC
P.O. Box 1469
Marksville, LA 71351
(318) 253-5961
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
Mac Normand

DECUIR, Judge.

The Village of Hessmer appeals a judgment of the trial court granting an

injunction in favor of Mac Normand and awarding damages.

FACTS

Mac Normand purchased property situated on Main Street in the Village of

Hessmer. Over the years, he has attempted to develop the property through a variety

of proposals and projects. Whether a carwash, duplexes, strip mall, or attempts at sale

to third parties including officials of the Village, his efforts have been to no avail.

The property lies in between the homes of the Mayor of Hessmer, Lynn Bordelon,

and his father. In January 2006, Mac Normand, a licensed contractor, applied for and

received six building permits for construction of one story brick houses with metal

roofs on the property.

Construction on the houses started in April 2006. Upon realizing that Normand

was constructing several homes on a single piece of property without receiving the

appropriate approval for a subdivision, the Village sent a letter advising Normand to

cease construction.

On May 10, 2006, Normand applied for fifteen additional building permits

involving other property. The application was denied, and Normand was informed

that a temporary moratorium on the issuance of permits was in effect while the

Village revised the requirements. On May 15, 2006, Normand sought and received

a temporary restraining order preventing the Village from suspending the issuance of

building permits. Days later, Normand filed an amended petition seeking injunctive

relief and/or writ of mandamus alleging that the Village refused to issue the permits

and was in violation of the temporary restraining order. On June 2, 2006, the Village

answered and filed a reconventional demand and request for injunction alleging that

Normand was not in compliance with local zoning and subdivision ordinances.

Normand continued construction on the Main Street project, and on June 6,

2006, the Village revoked the building permits. The trial court ultimately issued a

preliminary injunction directed to Normand and permitting him to complete

construction on the six homes and prohibited any other construction not in

compliance with the zoning and subdivision regulations of the Village. Subsequently,

Normand completed the six homes, but the Village refused to authorize permanent

electrical service or to connect water and sewerage to the property.

On November 28, 2006, Normand filed a motion for contempt alleging that the

Village refused to comply with the terms of the preliminary injunction. Hearing on

the matter was delayed while engineers for both parties sought an amicable

resolution. The engineers submitted a proposal, but the Village refused to sign on to

the recommendation. A hearing was held, and the trial court found the Village in

contempt of court for violation of its preliminary injunction and ordered the Village

to provide water and sewer as recommended in the engineers’ recommendation and

to take the necessary action to provide permanent electrical service to the six homes.

The Village appealed to this court which reversed the trial court’s finding of contempt

in an unpublished opinion. Normand v. Village of Hessmer, 07-688 (La.App. 3 Cir.

10/31/2007).

On February 13, 2008, the case was tried on the merits. The trial court found

in favor of Normand and issued a permanent injunction against the Village enjoining

it from revoking the permits on the six already constructed dwellings and ordering it

to allow Normand to complete construction by providing utility services to the homes.

In addition, the trial court awarded Normand damages of $500.00 per month per

home from July 31, 2006. Finally, the trial court enjoined Normand from any further

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violations of ordinances on property owned by Normand in the Village. The Village

lodged this appeal.

DISCUSSION

The Village first contends that the trial court erred in ordering it to allow

Normand to complete construction and requiring it to connect utilities. We disagree.

The Village argues that in issuing its initial injunction in this case, the trial

court found that the construction of the six houses by Normand was in direct violation

of both the zoning and subdivision ordinances of the Village of Hessmer, and now

finds the exact opposite. While the trial court’s reasons for judgment do express this

opinion, “[r]easons for judgment by a trial judge are not controlling and do not

constitute the judgment of the court.” Succession of Hackney, 97-859, p. 7 (La.App.

3 Cir. 2/4/98), 707 So.2d 1302, 1307. Moreover, since the trial court’s initial

assessment, the case has continued and the record has been further developed.

After reviewing the zoning ordinance, we cannot say unequivocally that

Normand violated the letter of the ordinance. Specifically, the zoning ordinance does

not clearly enunciate that only one single family dwelling may be erected on a given

parcel. Instead, it prescribes minimum size requirements for parcels containing

dwellings. This is in stark contrast to the specific prohibition against trailer parks

provided in the ordinance. It is well established that zoning laws in derogation of

private ownership must be strictly construed in favor of the property owner. Carrere

v. Orleans Club, 214 La. 303 , 37 So.2d 715. Accordingly, the trial court could have

concluded that the zoning ordinance was ambiguous and, therefore, held that for the

purposes of the existing structures, the zoning ordinance was unenforceable, and,

therefore, the subdivision ordinance did not come into play. We cannot say that such

a conclusion is manifestly erroneous. Under these circumstances, the trial court did

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not err in enjoining the Village from interfering with completion of the six homes or

in ordering it to connect the homes to utilities.

The Village next contends that the trial court erred in ordering the Village to

connect utilities. The Village argues that the various statutes prohibit the Village

from accepting or improving any street or authorizing water mains and sewer

connections absent an approved subdivision plat. These arguments are inapplicable

as it has been established in the record that Normand has not created a subdivision,

and the driveway leading to the six homes does not meet the standards to become a

dedicated street. Likewise, the Village’s argument that the water and sewer

connections would be substandard are refuted by the previous recommendation of

its own engineers that the connections should be made. We find no merit to this

argument.

The Village next contends that the trial court erred in awarding damages to

Normand when no competent evidence established the Village’s obligation to connect

utilities or the amount of Normand’s damages. We disagree.

General damage awards are subject to the abuse of discretion standard of

review. Coco v. Winston Indus., Inc. 341 So.2d 332 (La. 1976). The trier of fact sees

evidence directly and is in a superior position to judge a witnesses credibility,

therefore, an appellate court should rarely disturb such an award. Duncan v. Kansas

City So.Ry. Co., 00-66 (La. 10/30/00), 773 So.2d 670.

In this case, the trial court found that Normand had done what was required to

have utilities connected and that such connection was recommended by the Village’s

engineers. The court also found the Village to be uncooperative with Normand and

the court. With regard to the amount of damages, Normand testified he had several

renters who wanted to rent his homes for $500.00 per unit per month and that he had

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to refund six deposits of $1,000.00 each because of the actions of the Village of

Hessmer. Normand provided a list of specific people willing to rent his homes to the

court. The Village of Hessmer did not controvert this evidence. Accordingly, we

find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of damages in the amount of

$500.00 per month per unit from July 31, 2006 until such time as the Village connects

utilities to the units as ordered by the court.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed . All costs

of these proceedings are taxed to the Village of Hessmer.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Rule 2-16.3, Uniform Rules,
Courts of Appeal.

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