Paulita Carter v. Our Lady of Lourdes Regional Medical Center, Inc.
Paulita Carter v. Our Lady of Lourdes Regional Medical Center, Inc., No. CA-0009-0133 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. June 3, 2009).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 785 So. 2d 779
- Lyons v. Dohman 958 So. 2d 771
- Bertrand v. STATE EX REL. DOTD 838 So. 2d 136
- Bertrand v. DEPT. OF TRANSP. & DEVELOPMENT 842 So. 2d 1105
- Hica Steel Foundry v. Arklatex Env. Consul. 899 So. 2d 802
- In Re Medical Review Panel of Jones 801 So. 2d 471
- In re Medical Review Panel of Jones 800 So. 2d 877
- State, Dept. of Transp. v. Cole Oil 822 So. 2d 229
- State v. Cole Oil and Tire Co., Inc. 829 So. 2d 436
Opinion text
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
09-133
PAULITA CARTER
VERSUS
OUR LADY OF LOURDES REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-20045841
HONORABLE J. BYRON HEBERT, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********
ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE
**********
Court composed of Marc T. Amy, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and J. David Painter, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
Philip E. Roberts
Leake & Andersson, LLP
P. O. Drawer Z
Lafayette, LA 70502
(337) 233-7430
Counsel for Defendant-Appellee:
Our Lady of Lourdes Regional Medical Center, Inc.
Christopher Luke Edwards
P. O. Box 3483
Lafayette, LA 70502
(337) 232-5170
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant:
Paulita Carter
PICKETT, Judge.
The plaintiff-appellant, Paulita Carter, appeals a judgment of the trial court
dismissing her petition on the grounds of abandonment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 9, 2004, Paulita Carter filed suit against Our Lady of Lourdes
Regional Medical Center, Inc. (Lourdes), alleging she suffered damages when an IV
pole fell on her while she was visiting her son. Lourdes filed an answer to the
petition on January 12, 2005. On March 11, 2005, Carter answered interrogatories
propounded by Lourdes. On June 25, 2008, Lourdes filed a Motion and Order to
Dismiss for Want of Prosecution of Three Years seeking dismissal of the action filed
by Carter pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 561. The trial court signed the Order
dismissing the suit as abandoned on June 27, 2008, and the Order was served on July
8, 2008. On August 4, 2008, Carter filed a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment,
alleging that a letter sent as “an attempt at clarification of discovery” had been sent
within the three years on January 28, 2008, thus vitiating the abandonment claim. A
hearing was set for September 22, 2008 on the Motion to Set Aside the Judgment.
Carter failed to appear at the hearing, and the trial court denied the motion in an order
dated October 2, 2008. Carter’s attorney filed a Motion to Reconsider or in the
Alternative for a New Trial, alleging he had a conflict on the date of September
hearing. The trial court heard arguments on October 27, 2008 on the Motion to
Reconsider and denied the Motion in an Order dated November 7, 2008. Carter now
appeals.
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
In her appeal, Carter asserts one assignment of error:
The District Court erred as a matter of law in failing to follow the
provisions of Clark v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
00-3010 (La. 5/15/01), 785 So.2d 779, in determining this case as being
one “clearly” intended to be abandoned and dismissing this case.
DISCUSSION
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 561 states, in pertinent part:
A. (1) An action, except as provided in Subparagraph (2) of this
Paragraph, is abandoned when the parties fail to take any step in its
prosecution or defense in the trial court for a period of three years,
unless it is a succession proceeding:
(a) Which has been opened;
(b) In which an administrator or executor has been appointed; or
(c) In which a testament has been probated.
....
(3) This provision shall be operative without formal order, but, on
ex parte motion of any party or other interested person by affidavit
which provides that no step has been timely taken in the prosecution or
defense of the action, the trial court shall enter a formal order of
dismissal as of the date of its abandonment. The sheriff shall serve the
order in the manner provided in Article 1314, and shall execute a return
pursuant to Article 1292.
(4) A motion to set aside a dismissal may be made only within
thirty days of the date of the sheriff's service of the order of dismissal.
If the trial court denies a timely motion to set aside the dismissal, the
clerk of court shall give notice of the order of denial pursuant to Article
1913(A) and shall file a certificate pursuant to Article 1913(D).
....
B. Any formal discovery as authorized by this Code and served on
all parties whether or not filed of record, including the taking of a
deposition with or without formal notice, shall be deemed to be a step
in the prosecution or defense of an action.
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In Clark v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 00-3010, p. 6
(La.5/15/01), 785 So.2d 779, the supreme court explained the actions a plaintiff must
take in order to avoid dismissal on the grounds of abandonment:
First, plaintiffs must take some “step” towards prosecution of their
lawsuit. In this context, a “step” is defined as taking formal action
before the court which is intended to hasten the suit toward judgment,
or the taking of a deposition with or without formal notice. Second, the
step must be taken in the proceeding and, with the exception of formal
discovery, must appear in the record of the suit. Third, the step must be
taken within the legislatively prescribed time period of the last step
taken by either party; sufficient action by either plaintiff or defendant
will be deemed a step.
“[W]hether a particular act, if proven, precludes abandonment is a question of law
which we review by simply determining whether the trial court’s interpretative
decision is correct.” Lyons v. Dohman, 07-53, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/30/07), 958
So.2d 771, 774.
Carter argues that a letter sent by her attorney on January 28, 2008, to the
attorney for the hospital is a sufficient step in the prosecution of the case to defeat a
claim of abandonment. The pertinent portions of that letter are reproduced here:
In your Answers to Interrogatories, several people are identified as
having knowledge of the facts surrounding the subject dispute. I need
to take the depositions of those people, particularly: Paula Jenkins, Risk
Manager for Our Lady of Lourdes, and Mary L. Porter. You have also
identified a “nurse who iced down Ms. Carter’s knee after the incident.”
I would like to take that person’s deposition as well.
Also, in your Responses to Requests for Production of
Documents, you identified an attachment in Response to Request for
Production No. 2. Please forward that document at your earliest
convenience, as it was not attached to what I received.
I would also like to set this on the trial docket as soon as possible.
Please let me know what you would like to do in order to prepare for the
trial of this matter. If there is any interest in settling this matter, please
bring that to my attention.
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At the hearing, counsel for Lourdes stipulated that he received the letter, and that
Carter would testify that she did not intend to abandon the action. Nevertheless,
Lourdes argued that the letter did not appear in the record of the suit and did not
constitute formal discovery. It is, therefore, insufficient to defeat a claim for
abandonment. We agree.
While the letter did seek a clarification of some discovery matters, it was not
formal discovery sufficient to constitute a step in the prosecution of the matter. We
find this case analogous to Bertrand v. State ex rel. Department of Transportation
and Development, 02-1163 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/03), 838 So.2d 136, writ denied, 03-
634 (La. 5/2/03), 842 So.2d 1105 (defendant’s attorney’s letter requesting
clarification of discovery is not formal discovery) and Hica Steel Foundry & Upgrade
Company v. Arklatex Environmental Consultants, Inc., 39,460 (La.App. 3 Cir.
4/6/05), 899 So.2d 802 (defendant’s letter suggesting a meeting to develop a
discovery plan insufficient to defeat abandonment claim).
Carter cites three cases to support her claim that she did not abandon the suit.
We find those cases distinguishable. In Clark, 785 So.2d 779, the defendant made
an unconditional tender to the plaintiff after the three-year abandonment period had
run. The supreme court found that the tender constituted an acknowledgment, and
therefore began the abandonment period running anew. In re Medical Review Panel
of Jones, 00-1290 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/22/01), 801 So.2d 471, writs denied, 01-2120,
01-2145 (La. 11/2/01), 800 So.2d 877, 879, involved the appointment of an attorney
chairman of a medical review panel, not abandonment under the provisions of
La.Code Civ.P. 561. Furthermore, the defendant had been involved in extensive
negotiations with the plaintiff in an effort to choose a chairman prior to the date of
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abandonment under the relevant statute. In State v. Cole Oil and Tire Company, Inc.,
36,122 (La.App. 2 Cir. 7/17/02), 822 So.2d 229, writ denied, 02-2325 (La. 11/15/02),
829 So.2d 436, the claim that Cole Oil had abandoned its reconventional demand
against the state was defeated by proof that DOTD and Cole Oil had corresponded
numerous times, including three letters from DOTD discussing interrogatories,
appraisers, and depositions. The court found that DOTD knew that Cole Oil did not
intend to abandon its claim.
We find that the letter sent on January 28, 2008, was not sufficient to overcome
the presumption that the plaintiff abandoned her claim on March 11, 2008. The
judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the
plaintiff, Paulita Carter.
AFFIRMED.
This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Rule 2-16.3, Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal.
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