City of Alexandria v. Alexandria Civil Service Commission

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-484

CITY OF ALEXANDRIA, ET AL.

VERSUS

ALEXANDRIA CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

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APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 233,453
HONORABLE DONALD T. JOHNSON, DISTRICT JUDGE

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MICHAEL G. SULLIVAN
JUDGE

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Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Michael G. Sullivan, and Shannon J.
Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

W. Alan Pesnell
The Pesnell Law Firm
Post Office Box 1794
Shreveport, Louisiana 71166-1794
(318) 226-5577
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Alexandria Civil Service Commission

Howard N. Nugent, Jr.
Nugent Law Firm
Post Office Box 1309
Alexandria, Louisiana 71309-1309
(318) 445-3696
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Alexandria Civil Service Commission

Thomas D. Davenport, Jr.
The Davenport Firm
1628 Metro Drive
Alexandria, Louisiana 71301
(318) 445-9696
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Alexandria Civil Service Commission

Misty Shannon Antoon
Steven Oxenhandler
Gold, Weems, Bruser, Sues & Rundell
Post Office Box 6118
Alexandria, Louisiana 71307
(318) 445-6471
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees:
City of Alexandria
Mike Marcotte

Alainna Renee Mire
Assistant City Attorney
915 3rd Street
Alexandria, Louisiana 71301
(318) 449-5015
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
City of Alexandria

SULLIVAN, Judge.

The Alexandria Civil Service Commission (the Commission) appeals a

judgment rendered by the Ninth Judicial District Court reversing its decision to

reprimand Michael Marcotte (Marcotte) for violating a civil service rule forbidding

political activity by classified employees of the City of Alexandria (the City). For the

following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

The trial court outlined the following facts in its Written Reasons for Judgment,

which we adopt as our own:

This case arises out of a dispute about whether a political
candidate for city council resided in the district from which he sought
office. Michael Marcotte, an electrical engineer, is the Acting Assistant
Director of Utilities for the City of Alexandria (hereinafter, the City).
He is classified as a civil servant in his employment with the City. As
Acting Assistant Director of Utilities, Marcotte’s duties included
transmission and distribution, customer complaints, preparing work
orders, looking at new developments, dealing with easements, and some
litigation. Marcotte’s responsibilities also included evaluating city
utility customers’ bills and comparing them with utility consumption.

On July 21, 2008, Marcotte was informed that he was going to be
served with a subpoena to testify about utility consumption in a home.
Marcotte was later served with a subpoena to attend court on July 22,
2008 in the matter of Charles F. Smith, Jr. vs. Jonathan D. Goins, et al.
The subpoena stated he was compelled to remain in attendance from day
to day until discharged and that if Marcotte failed to appear in court as
summoned, his failure to appear would be under penalty of law.

As required by City rules, Marcotte notified the City Attorney
Charles Johnson, Chief of Staff Kay Michaels and the Mayor Jacques
Roy. After inquiring about whether he could testify as to utility
consumption and conduct a house inspection related to utility
consumption in the City of Alexandria, all three persons advised
Marcotte to attend court and testify.

Marcotte appeared in court on July 22, 2008 and testified. At the
trial, presiding judge, Judge Rae Swent deemed Marcotte qualified to
offer testimony on utility consumption and ordered Marcotte to go to the
Goins’ house to evaluate the appliances. Marcotte complied with Judge

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Swent’s order and completed the evaluation. He returned and testified
as to his findings on the utility records. As a result, the Court ruled in
favor of Jonathan Goins.

Subsequently, the attorney sharing office space with Jonathan
Goins’ attorney, Thomas Davenport, filed a citizen’s complaint against
Marcotte with the Commission pertaining to Marcotte’s actions in Smith
v. Goins, claiming that Marcotte had volunteered or been hired to testify
on behalf of Mr. Smith. The complaint also stated that Marcotte
accessed “private utility records” of Jonathan Goins and that Marcotte
testified for the benefit of Smith.

As a result of the complaint, the Commission investigated the
allegations. An investigational interview was called by Pam Saurage,
Director of Civil Service, and Howard Nugent, attorney for the
Commission, to interview the City Attorney Charles Johnson and
Marcotte. Charles Johnson requested a copy of the complaint but was
not given a copy. At which time, Mr. Johnson informed Saurage and
Nugent that Marcotte engaged in no wrongdoing by accessing the utility
records because utility records are public record and that Marcotte
testified in his capacity as Assistant Director of Utilities for the City and
did not speak [to] or see Mr. Smith until the hearing.

On September 29, 2008, the Commission held a hearing
pertaining to the allegations. The members of the Commission
admonished Marcotte for not seeking instruction from Pam Saurage.
More specifically, Marcotte was admonished for seeking legal
instruction from the City legal department before going to Saurage. On
November 25, 2008, the Commission held that Marcotte violated Civil
Service Rule XIV, 1.7[.]

[The] City of Alexandria and Michael Marcotte appealed the
decision of the Alexandria Civil Service Commission.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Upon receiving the appeal, the trial court set the matter for hearing on

February 9, 2009, and issued a briefing schedule. Marcotte and the City were ordered

to file a memorandum by January 26, 2009; the Commission was ordered to file a

memorandum ten days later, or by February 5, 2009. Three days before the hearing,

the Commission fax-filed a pleading entitled “Exceptions and Motion to Strike,”

along with a “Brief in Support of Exceptions” to the trial court. Marcotte and the City

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timely filed their memorandum in support of appeal. The hearing took place as

scheduled on February 9, 2009. At the start of the hearing, the trial court noted that

he had not received the Commission’s memorandum until that morning. After some

discussion on the record, the trial court ruled that it would not accept the untimely-

filed memorandum, but that it would allow the Commission’s attorney to participate

in the hearing. The trial court then entertained argument on the merits and took the

matter under advisement. In extensive Written Reasons for Judgment rendered on

February 19, 2009, the trial court denied the Commission’s exceptions and motion to

strike and reversed the Commission’s decision against Marcotte and the City. Written

judgment was rendered on March 11, 2009.

The Commission now appeals, assigning four errors. First, it claims that the

trial court erred in failing to accept and consider the memorandum filed by the

Commission. Second, the Commission contends that the trial court erred in failing

to adhere to the appropriate standard of review and in replacing the factual findings

of the Commission with its own conclusions. Next, the Commission asserts that the

trial court erred in holding that Marcotte and the City were denied due process of law.

Finally, the Commission contends that it was denied due process when the trial court

abdicated its duty of review and wholly deferred to the position set forth in

Marcotte’s brief.

LAW

“State constitutional provisions relative to civil service and [civil service

commission] rules are designed to secure adequate protection to career public

servants from political discrimination and favoritism. In promoting the merit system,

the intent of these laws is to guarantee the security and welfare of public service.”

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Banks v. New Orleans Aviation Bd., 08-65, p. 11 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/9/08), 989 So.2d

819, 825. Article 10, Section 8(A) of the Louisiana Constitution, governing

disciplinary actions as to classified civil servants, provides that “[n]o person who has

gained permanent status in the classified state or city service shall be subjected to

disciplinary action except for cause expressed in writing.”

“The decision of a [civil service] commission shall be subject to review on any

question of law or fact . . . .” La.Const. Art. 10, § 12(B). In Newman v. Department

of Fire, 425 So.2d 753, 754 (La.1983) (citations omitted), the Louisiana Supreme

Court stated:

The appropriate standard of appellate review of actions by the
Civil Service Commission is to determine whether the conclusion
reached by the Commission was arbitrary or capricious. Disciplinary
action against a civil service employee will be deemed arbitrary and
capricious unless there is a real and substantial relationship between the
improper conduct and the “efficient operation” of the public service.
The appointing authority . . . must demonstrate, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the conduct did in fact impair the efficiency and
orderly operation of the public service. As in other civil matters,
deference should be given on appellate review to the factual conclusions
of the Commission.

DISCUSSION

In order to evaluate the Commission’s assignments of error, we must examine

the relevant portions of the trial court’s Written Reasons for Judgment.1 Those

reasons provide as follows:

This Court now turns to the issues on appeal. To decide these
issues, the Court must use the standard of review designated by the
Louisiana Supreme Court.

1
Because the Commission did not appeal the trial court’s denial of its exceptions of no cause
of action and no right of action or the trial court’s finding that the Commission erred in censuring
and admonishing non-civil service members of the City, the portions of the Written Reasons for
Judgment addressing those issues have been omitted.

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The law provides that in deciding whether to affirm the Commission’s
factual findings, a reviewing court should apply the clearly wrong or manifest
error rule prescribed generally for appellate review. Bannister v. Department
of Streets, 95-0404, 666 So.2d 641 (La. 1996)[.]

Second, in evaluating the Commission’s determination as to
whether the disciplinary action is both based on legal cause and
commensurate with the infraction, the court should not modify the
Commission’s order unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by
abuse of discretion. “Arbitrary or capricious” means the absence of a
rational basis for the action taken.

Employees with permanent status in the classified state or city
service may be disciplined only for cause expressed in writing. A
classified employee subjected to such disciplinary action shall have the
right of appeal to the appropriate commission pursuant to Section 12 of
this Part. The burden of proof on appeal, as to the facts, shall be on the
appointing authority. La. Const. art. X, § 8(A). “Cause” for the
dismissal of such a person includes conduct prejudicial to the public
service involved or detrimental to its efficient operation. Disciplinary
action against a civil service employee will be deemed arbitrary and
capricious unless there is a real and substantial relationship between the
improper conduct and the “efficient operation” of the public service.

1. Whether a civil servant engaged in “the management or affairs
of a political faction or party in any political campaign,” by
responding to a court-issued subpoena to testify as to facts.

The Alexandria Civil Service Commission reprimanded Mike
Marcotte stating that he violated Rule XIV, Section 1.7 of the Civil
Service Rules by providing testimony in dispute involving candidates
for political office.

Rule XIV, Section 1.7 provides:

No employee in the classified service of the City, and no
member of the City Civil Service Commission shall be a
member of any national, state, or local committee of a
political party, or an officer or member of any factional,
political club or organization or a candidate for nomination
or election to any public office, or shall make any political
speech or public political statement in [sic] behalf of any
candidate, faction, or party, as a part of any political
campaign, for the nomination or election of public officers,
or shall take any part in management or affairs of any
political faction or party or in any political campaign,
except to exercise his right as a citizen to express his
opinion privately, to serve as a commissioner or official

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watcher at the polls in any election, and to cast his vote for
who he pleases.

Rule I, #45 of the Alexandria Civil Service Commission Rules defines
political activity as “an overt act or public effort, other than voting, to
support or oppose the election of a candidate for political office or
support or oppose a particular party in an election.”

In the case at hand, Michael Marcotte was issued a subpoena by
the court to appear and testify to facts related to utilities. He was also
ordered by the Court to participate in a home inspection. Mr. Marcotte
complied with the Court’s orders. He testified to the facts that appeared
in the utility records. As Assistant Director of Utilities, Marcotte’s
duties included but were not limited to transmission and distribution,
customer complaints, preparing work orders, looking at new
developments, dealing with easements, and some litigation. Marcotte’s
responsibilities also included evaluating city utility customers’ bills and
comparing them with utility consumption.

It is the determination of this Court that Marcotte was exercising
his function as assistant director when he participated in the home
inspection and testified to utility consumption in the home. He was not
participating in the management or affairs of a political faction, party,
or political campaign. He was compelled by the Court to testify to facts
related to his job and gave that testimony based on those facts. He did
not volunteer to testify nor was he hired by one side to testify. The
Alexandria Civil Service Commission erred in censuring and
admonishing Mike Marcotte. It was unreasonable to discipline Mike
Marcotte for obeying the Court’s orders[.] The Commission’s decision
that Marcotte violated Rule XIV, Section 1.7 for testifying before the
Court was arbitrary and capricious, and is therefore overruled.

....

3. Whether the Alexandria Civil Service Commission, attorney for
the Commission, and civil service director denied Mike Marcotte
and the City of Alexandria due process.

The City and Marcotte argue that they were not afforded due
process before the hearing at the Commission. The appellants state that
they were not given the proper notice of the charges or accusations
against them in order to properly prepare a defense. The appellants
assert that there was an unexpected, taped investigational interview by
the civil service director and the commission’s attorney. They were not
provided a description of the evidence against Marcotte nor were they
provided a copy of the complaint despite request. The appellants also
state that Marcotte did not have an opportunity to have a personal
attorney present at the interview nor was he given a copy of an

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exculpatory Motion and Order that justified his actions. This Motion
and Order was used at the hearing by the civil service director and the
Commission.

Due Process of law is guaranteed by both the United States
Constitution and the Louisiana Constitution. Persons whose rights may
be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that
right, they must first be noticed. The purpose of this requirement is to
protect a person’s use and possession of property from arbitrary
encroachment, to minimize substantially unfair or mistaken deprivation.
Wilson v. The City of New Orleans, 85-0712, 479 So.2d 891 (La. 1985).
The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that notice is required under the
Due Process Clause. More specifically, the Court stated “The purpose
of notice under the Due Process Clause is to apprise the affected
individual of, and permit adequate preparation for an impending
hearing.” Id[.] at 900.

Neither the City nor Marcotte were provided with a copy of the
complaint against Marcotte. Therefore, Marcotte was not apprised of
the charges against him. He could not prepare for his defense and could
not obtain a personal attorney to attend the investigational interview
with him. When a copy was provided, it did not contain an exculpatory
Motion and Order. Thus, it is the determination of this Court that
Marcotte and the City of Alexandria were denied due process as a result.

Moreover, due process requires that the accused be provided with
a neutral and impartial referee to impart fairness. The essential
guarantee of the Due Process Clause is fundamentally fair procedure for
the individual in the resolution of the factual and legal basis for
government actions which deprive him of life, liberty or property.
Therefore, there must be some type of neutral and detached decision
maker, be it judge, hearing officer or agency. This requirement applies
to agencies and government hearing officers as well as judges. An
impartial decision maker is essential to due process. Wilson v. The City
of New Orleans, 479 So.2d 891 (La. 1985)[.]

Even if an individual cannot show special prejudice in his
particular case, the situation in which an official occupies two
inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial, necessarily
involves a lack of due process. Id. at 902.

The appellants assert that Attorney Howard Nugent participated
in the hearing before the Commission both as prosecutor and
adjudicator. The appellants assert that Mr. Nugent limited the opening
statement of opposing counsel and also limited the testimony of the
witness. They assert that the Commission allowed Nugent’s behavior,
essentially allowing him to testify for the witness as well as ignoring
opposing counsel’s objections.

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The Louisiana Supreme Court held “We find the commingling of
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions violates both the letter of the
Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act and the due process goals it is
designed to further. . .The idea of the same person serving as judge and
prosecutor is anathema under our notions of due process. Such a
scenario is devoid of the appearance of fairness.” In Re Georgia Gulf
Corp. v. Bd. of Ethics, 96-1907, 694 So. 2d 173 (La. 1997)[.]

By allowing Nugent to rule on objections, limit the opening
statement of the opposing counsel and the testimony of a witness, the
Commission violated due process.

Furthermore, the appellants assert that they were denied due
process because Marcotte was not given an explanation of the evidence
the Commission used to make its decision, and was not provided all the
evidence prior to a determination hearing.

In Cleveland Bd. of Educ.[v]. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct.
1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985), the United States Supreme Court held
“The essential requirements of due process . . . are notice and an
opportunity to respond. . .The tenured public employee is entitled to oral
or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the
employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side to the
story.” See Henderson v. Sewerage and Water Bd, 752 So.2d 252, (La.
App. 4 Cir. 12/22/99); Cannon v. City of Hammond, 727 So.2d 570 (La.
App. 1 Cir 12/28/98).

This Court finds that because Marcotte and the City were not
provided with a copy of the complaint and evidence against Marcotte
prior to the determination hearing, they were denied due process.
According to the law, the Commission was required to submit such
complaint as well as any evidence against Marcotte. Additionally, the
Commission violated due process when it failed to give any weight to
the Court’s subpoena and order which Marcotte followed.

4. Whether the Commission failed to properly indentify [sic]
significant conflicts of interests which adversely affected the
outcome of the case.

The appellants contend that the Commission erred in deciding this
case because it was tainted with conflicts of interests. The appellants
assert that the complainant was entangled with the Commission and
Attorney Davenport, the attorney for Goins in Smith v. Goins. The
appellants assert that the complainant was a prior Chairman of the
Commission. The complainant also shares office space with Mr.
Davenport of which he collects rent. The appellants also state that in his
complaint, the complainant states his former position as the Chairman

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of the Commission. Because of this connection, the Commission gave
undue deference to the complaint, not considering the other evidence.
The appellants attempted to reveal the conflicts but were blocked by the
Chairman of the Commission and Mr. Nugent. This is revealed in the
record.

The appellants assert that a conflict of interest exists because Mr.
Nugent, in his capacity as attorney for the Commission acted both as
prosecutor and judge during the hearing. In Vega v. Nat’l Life Ins.
Services Inc, 188 F.3d 287, 297 (5th Cir. 1999), the Court held, “The
existence of a conflict is a factor to be considered in determining
whether the administrator abused its discretion in denying a claim. The
greater the evidence of conflict on the part of the administrator, the less
deferential our abuse of discretion standard will be.”

In In re Georgia Gulf, the Court found that the Ethics
Commission’s attorney had a stake in the factual determination of the
case. He acted as both prosecutor and judge. The Court held that the
general counsel in that case “whose input as general counsel is already
heavily weighted in favor of the Ethics Commission crossed into the
adjudicatory realm.” The Court went on to state “It is patently unfair
that a party charged with a violation should feel that he is not only
fighting the prosecutor but also the agency that is supposed to
independently determine the merit of the charges leveled against him.”
694 So.2d 173, 96-1907 (La. 1997)[.]

Based on the law and the evidence at hand, this Court finds that
the Commission failed to properly identify conflicts of interests which
adversely affected the outcome of this case. The Commission repeatedly
allowed its counsel to conduct the hearing and followed his lead. It did
not allow the appellants to properly put on their case. The Commission
blocked an attempt to reveal conflicts of interest and did not take into
account that Marcotte was compelled by the Court to testify and
participate in a home inspection of utility consumption. This Court
further finds that conflicts of interest existed to impede and/or adversely
affect the outcome of this case. The complainant in this case was a
former Chairman of the Commission and shared an office building with
and collected rent from the attorney in the underlying suit. The
Commission relied on and allowed its attorney Howard Nugent to take
on its role as adjudicator as well as the role of prosecutor, thus creating
an even greater appearance of impropriety.

Based on the above reasons, this Court finds that the Alexandria
Civil Service Commission denied the City of Alexandria and Mike
Marcotte due process of law. This Court further finds that the
Alexandria Civil Service Commission erred in its decision that Mike
Marcotte engaged in political activity when he complied with a court
issued subpoena and court order. The Alexandria Civil Service

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Commission also erred in admonishing the City of Alexandria
administration.

ANALYSIS

Did the trial court err in failing to accept the Commission’s memorandum?

Counsel for the Commission claimed to have been too busy to file his

memorandum because of another trial that took place on February 6, 2009. He

admitted to having miscalculated the date when his memorandum was due. While the

Commission complains that the trial court erred in failing to accept and consider its

untimely-filed memorandum, no jurisprudence is cited in support of its argument.

At the hearing, the trial court explained that, in preparation for the hearing, it

had gone out of its way to ascertain whether the Commission had filed a

memorandum. It noted the disadvantage of not having the opportunity to know in

advance the nature of the Commission’s opposition and to research the position

advanced in the memorandum. Marcotte and the City objected to the trial court’s

consideration of the Commission’s memorandum, arguing that they had not received

a copy of the memorandum until the morning of the hearing. They complained that

the untimely-filed memorandum contained documents not included in the record.

The Commission was able to file exceptions and a motion to strike, along with

a memorandum in support, three days before the trial. Thus, its argument that it was

too busy to timely file a memorandum in opposition to the appeal by Marcotte and the

City is unpersuasive. Given the totality of the circumstances and the fact that the

Commission was allowed to participate in oral argument, we cannot say that the trial

court abused its discretion in refusing to accept and consider the Commission’s

untimely-filed memorandum. See Higginbotham v. Rapides Found., 07-538 (La.App.

10

3 Cir. 10/31/07), 968 So.2d 1226. The Commission’s first assignment of error lacks

merit.

Did the trial court err by failing to adhere to the proper standard of review and by
replacing the factual findings of the Commission with its own conclusions?

The Commission asserts that the trial court failed to follow the correct standard

of review and that it improperly replaced the factual findings of the Commission with

its own factual conclusions. The position of the Commission is completely

unfounded. The trial court thoroughly discussed the appropriate standard of review

in its written reasons. The trial court concluded that the Commission’s factual finding

that Marcotte had violated Civil Service Rule XIV, Section 1.7 was arbitrary and

capricious.

We have reviewed the record in its entirety, including the transcript of the

Commission hearing, and we find that the trial court’s conclusion is supported by the

overwhelming majority of the evidence. Once the trial court determined that the

Commission’s findings of fact were clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous, it was free

to disregard those factual findings, to make its own factual findings, and to reverse

the disciplinary action taken against Marcotte by the Commission if the facts did not

support that disciplinary action. We agree with the trial court’s determination that

Marcotte was simply doing his job when he attended the home inspection and

testified in court, pursuant to a valid subpoena and order to permit inspection, in the

Smith v. Goins matter. We are convinced that the trial court properly applied the

standard of review to the matter before it. This assignment of error has no merit.

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Did the trial court err in holding that Marcotte and the City were denied due
process of law?

Initially, we note that the trial court’s recitation of the law regarding due

process was accurate and complete. The trial court concluded that Marcotte was not

given a copy of the complaint against him prior to the investigational interview

conducted by Pam Saurage, the Director of Civil Service, and that, as a result, he was

not aware of the charges against him, and he did not have a personal attorney

accompany him to the interview. The trial court also found that Marcotte was not

given a copy of the exculpatory motion and order directing him to participate in an

inspection of Goins’ house. Finally, the trial court determined that the Commission

failed to properly identify several conflicts of interest which adversely affected the

outcome of this case. The trial court concluded that each of the aforementioned

failings by the Commission resulted in violations of the due process owed to Marcotte

by the Commission.

The Commission argues that even if Marcotte received less than the full due

process owed him at the investigational interview, any defects were immaterial or

were subsequently cured at the full-blown hearing before the Commission.

Our review of the record reveals ample support for the conclusions reached by

the trial court with regard to the due process violations suffered by Marcotte as a

result of the actions of the Commission and its attorney, Nugent. Contrary to the

position of the Commission, the due process defects present at the time of Marcotte’s

investigational interview were not cured at the subsequent hearing before the

Commission. In fact, the due process violations continued and were exacerbated by

additional due process violations. In addition to the violations noted by the trial

court, we further note that neither Marcotte nor the City was given a copy of a seven-

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page report written by Ms. Saurage after she conducted the investigational interview.

The trial court did not err in holding that Marcotte and the City were denied due

process of law.

Did the trial court deny due process to the Commission by abdicating its duty of
review and wholly deferring the position set forth in Marcotte’s memorandum?

The Commission contends that the trial court “merely adopted the brief of

Marcotte as its opinion” instead of properly reviewing the record before it on appeal.

Marcotte and the City strongly disagree, noting that “it is the very function of the

court to fairly choose one side over another in litigation.”

We find the Commission’s argument in this regard to be totally devoid of merit.

The trial court’s written reasons are by no means a parroting of the memorandum

filed by the City and Marcotte. Instead, those reasons indicate that the trial court was

well-versed in the law and that it even-handedly applied that law to the facts before

it. “Courts may adopt those findings submitted by one party and reject those of the

other.” Burkett v. Crescent City Connection Marine Div., 98-1237, p. 10 (La.App.

4 Cir. 2/10/99), 730 So.2d 479, 484. The trial court did a commendable job in

reviewing the matter before it, and it clearly did not violate the due process rights of

the Commission in the performance of its review.

DECREE

For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the Ninth Judicial District Court is

affirmed in its entirety. All costs of this appeal are assessed against the Alexandria

Civil Service Commission.

AFFIRMED.

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