Wilma Young Baker v. John Burr Baker, Jr.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 09-507

WILMA YOUNG BAKER, ET AL.

VERSUS

JOHN BURR BAKER, JR., ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON DAVIS, NO. C-662-06
HONORABLE CRAIG STEVE GUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE

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SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE

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Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Michael G. Sullivan, and Shannon J.
Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

John Charles Anderson
Anderson Law Firm, LLC
P. O. Box 82982
Baton Rouge, LA 70884-2982
(225) 292-8176
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants:
John Burr Baker, Jr.
Alta Baker

Jude Christopher Bursavich
Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson
P.O. Box 3197
Baton Rouge, LA 70821-3197
(225) 387-4000
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees:
Wilma Young Baker
Succession of John Burr Baker, Sr.

Danielle M. Ross
Sessions, Fishman, Nathan & Israel, LLP
201 St. Charles Ave., # 3500
New Orleans, LA 70170-3500
(504) 582-1500
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants:
John Burr Baker, Jr.
Alta Baker

GREMILLION, Judge.

The defendants, John Burr Baker, Jr. (Johnny) and Alta Baker, appeal

the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiffs, Wilma Young Baker and the

Succession of John Burr Baker, Sr.1 For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In August 2006, Wilma, the mother of Johnny, and the Succession of

John, Sr. filed a petition for the return of $1,592,500 in loans made to her son and his

wife, Alta, prior to her husband’s death in May 2003.2 Johnny and Alta vehemently

deny that the monies were loans and instead claim that they were donations.

Extensive litigation followed, including a petition filed by Johnny to have his mother

disinherited. Shortly before the trial commenced, Johnny filed a renewed motion on

peremptory exception of prescription and for directed verdict. A four-day trial was

held over a time period from January 2008 through August 2008. In its January 2009

judgment, the trial court found that $1,492,500 were loans that had to be repaid by

Johnny and Alta. The defendants filed various exceptions following the trial, and the

plaintiffs filed a motion to strike testimony from the defendants’ post-trial

memorandum which was ruled inadmissable at trial. The defendants’ exceptions

were denied, and the plaintiffs’ motion to strike was granted. Johnny and Alta now

appeal and assign as error:

1. The trial court’s findings that the monies given were loans
as opposed to gifts or reimbursements.

2. The trial court’s finding that the total amount of money

1
Throughout this opinion we refer to John Burr Baker, Jr. as “Johnny” as this is what he was
referred to throughout the trial record.
2
On the third day of trial, the plaintiffs withdrew their claim for a $100,000 check numbered
841 from their claim against the defendants because it could not be determined if that particular
check was deposited, hence, the $100,000 reduction in the judgment.

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received was $1,492,500 because that number is an
arithmetic error.

3. The trial court’s finding that the claims had not prescribed.

4. Alternatively, if all claims had not prescribed, the trial
court’s finding that an acknowledgment only to one
creditor interrupted prescription as to the claims of all
creditors.

5. The trial court’s exclusion of defendants’ material witness
and allowance of plaintiffs’ “surprise” material witness.

6. The trial court’s refusal to consider their defense that their
alleged debts had been extinguished by specific written and
notarized renunciations of those debts.

DISCUSSION

John, Sr. was a successful rice farmer prior to his death. In 1994, John,

Sr. entered into a mineral lease in which he held a 20% royalty interest. Prior to the

commencement of drilling of the well, he donated portions of his 20% royalty as

follows: 5% to his wife, 3% to his son Dr. Tim Baker, 3% to his daughter Beryl

Baker Wade, and 3% to the defendant, Johnny, Jr. Since 1994, the well has produced

millions of dollars of mineral royalties for all members of the family. Beginning in

October 1999, and continuing through March 2003, the deceased made over forty

transfers of funds to the defendants totaling over 1.4 million dollars.

The four-day trial consisted of substantial testimony and documentary

evidence. Brent Young, a tax lawyer from Shreveport, testified that Wilma is his aunt

and John, Sr. was his uncle. He testified that he was very close with his aunt and

uncle, socializing with them quite often and even traveling with them on occasion.

He stated that he visited them at their home in Gueydan between eight and ten times

per year. He testified that he discussed business and investment matters with John,

Sr. routinely. Young went on to state that he had a close relationship with Beryl and

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Tim, but not Johnny.

Young testified that he prepared tax returns and various legal

instruments for many years for his aunt and uncle. He also began the succession

proceedings upon John, Sr.’s death. Young next examined some checks that were

admitted into evidence. Young said that the checks were issued by either John or

Wilma to Johnny individually or Johnny and his wife. He said the total of the checks

issued to Johnny and/or Alta was $1,592,500. Young testified that Wilma and John,

Sr. indicated that the funds represented loans, and that this information was

subsequently confirmed in conversations with Beryl, Tim, and Johnny. Young

testified that he had multiple conversations over the years with John, Sr. and Wilma

in which the loans were discussed. He even advised the Bakers to use a pad of hand

notes in order to have some documentation of the loans.

Young then went on to describe situations in which Johnny

acknowledged the nature of the loans. Young said that over lunch Johnny

commented on how successful his businesses were and John, Sr. commented that they

would not be without his “help.” Young said that Johnny stated that “he was going

to care of it,” and would either pay Beryl and Tim directly to even them out or issue

stock to them in his business ventures.

Young then discussed the handwritten ledger prepared by John, Sr.

listing all of the individual loans made to Johnny and/or Alta. At the point in the

ledger in which the total had reached $834,000, John, Sr. placed a handwritten

notation stating, “I hope this is all.” Young testified that seven checks were missing

from the ledger as they had been issued shortly before John, Sr.’s death. Young then

discussed a document he prepared in January 2004 that he sent to Wilma, Johnny,

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Tim, and Beryl following John, Sr.’s death. The document extensively discusses the

tax implications involved in the “cash advances” and “loans” made to Johnny and/or

Alta and various scenarios that could occur regarding repayment of the loans. The

first scenario addresses “what the final distribution [of John, Sr.’s estate] will look

like if Johnny and Beryl repay their loans in full.” The second, if neither repays their

loans and the taxes are paid out of the assets of the estate, and the third, a partial

repayment. The document addresses a separate loan made to Beryl in the amount of

$500,000. Young then discusses the attached Estate Tax Return that he prepared for

the federal government which lists the advances totaling $1,592,500 given to Johnny

and Alta. Further, the loan made to Beryl was also listed as a “demand loan” or debt

due to the decedent. Shortly thereafter, Young received notice that any

correspondence should be sent to a CPA, Glenn Thibodeaux, rather than Johnny and

Alta. In a letter to Young from Thibodeaux dated February 4, 2004, Thibodeaux

stated, in reference to the letter Young sent to him:

The letter did not address the loans made to Beryl and Johnnie. Your
recent letter INCORRECTLY refers to the interest accruing on those
loans. Since no promissory notes exist, at best, these are non-interest
bearing loans. The gift loan provisions are an IRS device only, and do
not apply to the actual balance of the loans. The IRS rules impute the
interest income as phantom income to the recipient and phantom
expense to the payer. The resulting phantom gift to the payer is subject
to gift tax, paid by the donor. Perhaps you need to also advise your
clients about the unpaid gift taxes that are outstanding, and you should
also reduce the value of the gross estate by the amount of interest you
incorrectly claim is an asset of the estate.

Young testified that a letter that he composed and dated July 15, 2004, along with

the succession proceedings, continued to refer to the indebtedness owed by Johnny

and Beryl.3 He stated that he had not “learned anything from anyone” that would give

3
This was the second time Young sent out the documentation to be signed. The first time was
seven months prior.

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him an indication that the monies were to be treated as gifts rather than loans. This

document was forwarded to Johnny, requesting his signature so that the succession

proceedings could be finalized. However, correspondence dated August 16, 2004

sent to Young from Donald A. Capretz, an attorney, indicated that Johnny did not

agree that there is any indebtedness owed by him to his mother and father.

Young composed a letter to Capretz dated August 19, 2004, in which he

related that he was “repeatedly and consistently” told by John, Sr. and Wilma that the

advances to Johnny would be repaid and that he had “several conversations” with

Johnny in which he acknowledged that the loans would be repaid.

Young went on to testify that if the monies advanced to Johnny had been

gifts, the Bakers would have been required to pay gift taxes and file gift tax returns,

but that this was not done because he was always informed that they were loans.

Wilma, who was eighty-six at the time of trial, testified that the monies

given to Johnny were loans and that he promised to pay them back. Wilma said that

she and John, Sr. expected Johnny to pay back the loans. She said that she and John,

Sr. advised Young to treat the cash advances as loans, not gifts.

Beryl testified that Young has always been close with the family and has

taken care of all of her parents’ accounting and legal needs. Beryl testified that there

was “never a question” that the monies advanced to Johnny and Alta were loans, not

gifts. She said that Johnny told her on several occasions after her father’s death that

he would pay back the loans either by paying her and Tim directly or by issuing stock

in his company. She said these conversations took place following John, Sr.’s death

in May 2003 through November 2003, at which point Johnny and Alta abruptly

stopped talking to the rest of the family. She said that Johnny and Alta talked about

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their business “nonstop” and how well it was doing financially and that they were

going to pay back the loans. Beryl testified that her father discussed with her that the

monies he gave Johnny were loans. She said that her father repeatedly requested that

Johnny sign promissory notes, but that Johnny refused to sign the notes. Beryl

further said that her mother has consistently acknowledged the monies given as loans,

not gifts. She said that Young was present at some of the conversations in which the

loans were discussed. Beryl went on to testify that her parents have paid for her

children’s school tuition since they were in high school and gave her thirty acres of

land twenty-five years ago. She described how she has been the primary caretaker

of her parents and the various houses she and her husband have purchased to

accommodate her parents. Beryl testified that her father was “very angry” with

Johnny at the time he was in the hospital dying because Johnny was not paying back

the money as he said he would. Beryl testified that, before Johnny and Alta abruptly

stopped speaking to the rest of the family, she would have dinner at her house every

night and it was common knowledge and commonly discussed among all the family

members that Johnny was to repay the loans. She testified that “you couldn’t be

around Johnny and Alta without them discussing their business ad nauseam and how

they were going to make a lot of money and pay the money back. It happened all the

time.”

Tim, an anesthesiologist, testified regarding conversations he had with

his father regarding the money lent to Johnny. Tim testified that in 2001 or 2002, he

informed his dad that he believed Johnny had “gotten himself in trouble” and that he

needed to “loan him some more money.” He testified that the advances made to

Johnny were “frequently” discussed amongst the family members and in Johnny and

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Alta’s presence. He said that both his mom and dad considered the advances loans.

Tim further testified that he lent Johnny $50,000 and had to ask three times before the

money was returned to him. Tim testified that in his family loans were made without

promissory notes. He further testified that his dad was disappointed that Johnny

could not live within his budget and that he was afraid Johnny would lose his home

if his dad did not lend him some money. Tim testified that he preferred to stay out of

this situation as much as possible, but that it was common knowledge amongst

everyone that the monies advanced were loans, not gifts.

Johnny testified that prior to his father’s death he stayed at the hospital

with him on two or three occasions. Johnny testified that his father was not angry

with him and told him that he was giving him the money. Johnny testified that he

would shop for his father buying things like diamond bracelets and Rolexes and that

his father would issue him checks to reimburse him for the shopping trips. He further

testified that his father never asked him to sign a promissory note. Johnny testified

that only one of the checks was a loan and that was the one in which his father wrote

“loan to Johnny and Alta” in the memo area of the check. Johnny denied ever sitting

around the family table making promises to repay loans. He claimed he was out of

the country for many months in the middle east performing classified governmental

work of a nature he could not discuss. He testified that his father repeatedly told him

that he was giving him the money and not to let “anyone shame him about it.”

When questioned about why his CPA, Capretz, referred to the monies

as loans three times in his letter to Young, Johnny had no explanation. He further

testified that he did not ask that an amended letter be sent out referring to the

advances as gifts. He further claimed to have never seen Young’s response letter in

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which he stated that it was common knowledge that the advances were loans. Johnny

admitted he had no documentation to support his claim that some of the monies were

reimbursements, nor could he testify as to certain amounts being reimbursements.

Johnny stated that he went to Beryl’s house on the day of the funeral and never

returned. He denied regular visits up until late October 2003. Johnny testified that

Wilma, Beryl, Tim, and Young were all lying.

Glenn Thibodeaux testified that his letter was not intended to

acknowledge the advances as loans, but to point out an error in calculation if they

were loans. He admits that his letter does not indicate that the advances might not be

loans, but he stated that he was only addressing the tax implications of what was in

the returns prepared by Young. Nevertheless, Thibodeaux stated he did speak with

his client, Johnny, before sending out the letter and that Johnny informed him the

advances were not loans, but he did not mention that in the letter. Thibodeaux further

testified that in January 2004, when he hand-delivered his letter to Beryl’s house,

both Beryl and Wilma considered the advances loans. He admitted that Johnny and

Alta have never disputed the receipt of the funds, just the nature of the funds as gifts

rather than loans. Thibodeaux testified that Johnny hired Capretz as an expert to

determine if the advances were loans or gifts, but that he never gave an opinion and

was not present to testify at trial.

Alta testified that the monies were never a loan but were either a gift or

to repay her and Johnny for different things. She stated that the money was always

given by check and there was never an agreement to pay it back. She said the only

exception was for the check that John, Sr. indicated was a loan and that John, Sr. told

her the check was for something he asked Johnny to do. She stated that John, Sr. was

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a very generous man and would often give her and Johnny money to give to others.

Alta relayed a story in which John, Sr. gifted substantial sums to a seminary student.

She further testified that some of the checks were reimbursement for insurance

expenses, farm equipment, construction, jewelry, and various personal services.

However, Alta admitted she had no documentary evidence to support her

reimbursement claims.

Alta claimed Wilma was present at the meeting in which John, Sr. told

her that the money was a gift or reimbursement except for the check indicating

“loan.” Alta was questioned about the ledger John, Sr. kept in which he wrote “dept”

next to the sum owed by Johnny and Alta, which at the time amounted to $1,237,000.

Alta said it was not referring to “debt” but “department” as John, Sr. liked to separate

his money out into “departments.” She testified that “everything he did was

departmentalized so that he knew where the money went[.]”

Rose Mouton, Johnny and Alta’s housekeeper, testified that she began

working for them in 2000, and generally cleaned their home three to five times per

week. She stated that she witnessed John, Sr. give a check to Johnny on one

occasion and that he indicated it was a gift. However, on cross-examination she

admitted that she did not remember John, Sr. indicating that it was a gift in her

deposition taken in December 2007. In fact, she testified at that time that she was not

privy to any conversations and that she “walked away” while the check was being

handed over on two occasions.

Regan Wade, Beryl’s daughter, testified that she was a student at

Centenary College studying elementary education. She testified that Johnny and Alta

maintained contact with the family through the fall of 2003 and she saw them quite

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regularly usually two to three times per week.

The trial court, in its oral reasons, found:

The Court has listened to the testimony of these witnesses, very lengthy
testimony, where [sic] that these advances were addressed as loans, and
the discussion of how they were going to be paid were discussed among
the whole family members over numerous times. This has been verified
by the testimony of the family’s attorney, Mr. Young, concerning how
these were going to be done, and – and what impresses the Court most
is after the death of the decedent the discussion of how these advances
were going to be dealt with were loans. At no time did the estate know
or become aware that these advances were not loans until Mr. Capretz’
letter specifically stating that his client did not consider them loans.

DONATIONS OR LOANS

We will not set aside a trial court's finding of fact in the absence of

manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840

(La.1989).

The appellate review of fact is not completed by reading only so much
of the record as will reveal a reasonable factual basis for the finding in
the trial court, but if the trial court or jury findings are reasonable in
light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not
reverse even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact,
it would have weighed the evidence differently.

Id. at 844.

Though an appellate court may feel its own evaluations and inferences

are more reasonable than the factfinder's, reasonable inferences of fact should not be

disturbed upon review where conflict exists in the testimony. Id. “[W]here two

permissible views of the evidence exist, the factfinder's choice between them cannot

be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.” Stobart v. State Through DOTD, 617

So.2d 880, 883 (La.1993). “[T]he issue to be resolved by a reviewing court is not

whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the factfinder's conclusion

was a reasonable one.” Id. at 882.

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The issue of whether the monies advanced were a donation or loan is a

factual one. A gift may be made to another person “by delivery of the thing to the

donee without any other formality.” La.Civ.Code art. 1543. The donee bears the

burden of proving, by strong and convincing evidence, that he was the recipient of

a gift rather than a loan. See Funderburk v. Funderburk, 214 La. 717, 38 So.2d 502

(La.1949), Succession of Serio, 597 So.2d 91 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ denied, 600 So.2d

677 (La.1992). We find no error in the trial court’s finding that Johnny and Alta

failed to prove that the monies advanced were gifts rather than loans. There was

substantial, nearly overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Apart from the testimony,

the documentary evidence of the ledger of the decedent and the correspondence from

Thibodeaux to Young confirm that everyone considered the advances loans. Johnny

and Alta failed to prove that the advances made within three years of John, Sr.’s death

were partially gifts and partially reimbursements for various performances by Johnny

and Alta over a thirty-year period. Additionally, the testimony of Johnny’s own

mother (with whom he maintained a very close relationship through the fall 2003)

that the advances were well known amongst the family as loans, is telling.

Accordingly, the trial court’s findings are not manifestly erroneous and this portion

of the judgment is affirmed.

CALCULATION ERRORS

In this assignment of error, Johnny argues that it was erroneous for the

trial court to conclude that the total amount of money received was $1,492,500

because that number is an arithmetic error and should be $1,45,.500. Again, we find

no error in the trial court’s finding. Young testified that John, Sr. specifically

included the disputed $40,000 advance on three different ledgers. However, there is

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no representative check in the documentary evidence for that amount. Clearly, the

trial court found persuasive Young’s testimony that he believed this was a cash loan.

Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

PRESCRIPTION

In assignments of error three and four, Johnny argues that the plaintiffs’

claims have prescribed pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 935. An action for the recovery

of money lent is subject to a liberative prescriptive period of three years pursuant to

La.Civ.Code art. 3494. The supreme court recently addressed prescription in Rando

v. Anco Insualtions, Inc., 08-1169, p. 10 (La. 5/22/09), __ So.3d ___, ___:

If prescription is evident on the face of the pleadings, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show the action has not prescribed. Carter[v.
Haygood, 04-0646 (La.1/19/05),]892 So.2d at 1267. If evidence is
introduced at the hearing on the peremptory exception of prescription,
the district court's findings of fact are reviewed under the manifest error-
clearly wrong standard of review. Stobart v. State, through DOTD, 617
So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993). If the findings are reasonable in light of the
record reviewed in its entirety, an appellate court may not reverse even
though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would
have weighed the evidence differently. Id., 617 So.2d at 882-83.

“Prescription is interrupted when one acknowledges the right of the person against

whom he had commenced to prescribe.” La.Civ.Code art. 3464. Acknowledgment

may be “oral or written, formal or informal, and express or tacit.” See Comment (e)

to La.Civ.Code art. 3464 and Flowers v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,

381 So.2d 378 (La.1980). The last check was issued to Johnny on March 14, 2003.

Wilma filed suit on August 10, 2006. Thus, Johnny and Alta had to acknowledge the

debt after August 10, 2003. Again, the trial court did not err in finding that

prescription has been interrupted. Although the issue was hotly contested at trial,

clearly the trial court found the testimony of multiple witnesses established that

Johnny and Alta continued to have contact with the remainder of the family through

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late October or early November 2003, and continued to acknowledge that he and Alta

would repay the loans. Johnny further argues that acknowledgment only interrupted

prescription as to Beryl’s personal claim as a creditor. We find no merit in this

argument. There was testimonial evidence by multiple family members that Johnny

and Alta continued to visit the family. Clearly, the trial court chose not to believe

Johnny’s testimony that he never spoke to another family member again following his

father’s funeral. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

WITNESSES

Johnny argues he is entitled to a new trial because of material errors due

to the allowance and exclusion of witnesses at trial. Pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art.

1551, a trial court has discretion in the matters to be determined pre-trial including

what witnesses will be allowed to testify at trial. In this matter the trial court issued

a pre-trial order stating:

All parties are to exchange the name of any “may call” witnesses within
thirty (30) days of the date of the Pre-Trial Order. Further, all parties
are to exchange, and file into the record (in pleading form), the names
of any and all “will call” witnesses no later than fifteen (15) working
days prior to the trial date. A witness not so listed will not be permitted
to testify.

At the end of the pre-trial order, it is again reiterated: “Failure to comply with any

part of this Order will result in . . . refusal to allow the offending party to present the

evidence or witness not previously disclosed[.]” A trial court’s rulings in pre-trial

matters are given great deference in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Munster

v. Bill Watson Ford, Inc., 07-0294 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/24/07), 970 So.2d 36. It

appears that, although the defendants forwarded a copy of the may-call and will-call

lists to the plaintiffs, they failed to file a copy in the record. Moreover, the witness

in question, Steven Seigler, was not listed on either the “may-call” or “will-call” lists.

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On December 18, 2007, a few weeks before the start of trial, the defendants filed an

amended witness list in the record which listed Seigler. The trial court sustained the

plaintiffs’ objection to the introduction of the testimony as they had not had the

opportunity to depose the witness. We find no abuse of discretion in that ruling.

Simply, the defendants should have listed the witness on the original may and will-

call lists and should have filed them in the record.

Next, the defendants complain the trial court abused its discretion in

allowing the rebuttal testimony of Regan and Colin Wade. Considering that the

defendants were present at the deposition of Colin Wade and did not request to

depose Regan, and, moreover, did not file a contemporaneous objection to the

introduction of this testimony, we find no merit in this argument.

Next the defendants complain it was error for the trial court to exclude

testimony of Mouton in which she stated that she overheard Beryl telling Tim that

Johnny would get nothing. As that testimony is classic hearsay, we find no abuse of

discretion in the trial court’s refusal to allow such testimony.

RENUNCIATION

In this assignment of error, Johnny argues that Wilma, Beryl, and Tim

renounced the debt that forms the basis of the lawsuit based on a package of

documents that they signed at the request of Young. This argument is without merit.

As part of the package of documents that Young sent out in order to

effectuate the closing of John, Sr.’s succession is a cover letter dated July 15, 2004.

In that letter addressed to Wilma, Johnny, Tim and Beryl, Young states in part

(emphasis added):

The Acts of Renunciation provide that no one will receive as part
of their inheritance a debt due from either Johnny or Beryl. These also

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relieve Johnny and Beryl of any liability for the portion of these
advances which are included in the estate—effectively extinguishing
that obligation. This also, therefore, passes their respective obligations
to them as a portion of their inheritance.

The particular act signed by Wilma, Tim, and Beryl with respect to Johnny states:

That they, WILMA YOUNG BAKER, TIM YOUNG BAKER,

and BERYL KATHERYNE BAKER WADE do hereby waive,

relinquish, renounce, and disclaim any and all inheritance rights, of

every nature whatsoever, including any usufructuary rights or rights as

naked owners due them under the laws of the state of Louisiana or

granted or confirmed under the Last Will and Testament of decedent,

and to that portion of the succession or estate of JOHN BURR BAKER,

SR., who died on May 17, 2003, domiciled in Vermillion Parish,

Louisiana, more particularly described below:

COMMUNITY PROPERTY

DEBTS DUE DECEDENT

Demand loans to John B. Baker, Jr., October 28, 1999
through March 14, 2003, with principal of $1,592,500,
accrued interest of $121,058.89 based on monthly Mid
Term Applicable Federal Rate.

The Petition for Possession goes on to state in part (emphasis added):

5.

As will appear from the Acts of Partial Renunciation and

Disclaimer filed herein, Petitioners have renounced usufructuary and

naked ownership interests in certain debts due decedent from Petitioners

JOHN B. BAKER, JR., and BERYL KATHERYNE BAKER WADE.

Petitioners desire that these debts due decedent be allocated to the

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respective debtor as a portion of their distributive share.

We note first that the Act of Renunciation was never signed by Johnny. Wilma,

Beryl, and Tim did sign it. It is very clear from a simple reading of this document

that the renunciation was a tool used so that both Johnny and Beryl’s inheritance

would be reduced by the amount of debt each owed to the estate.

The trial court addressed the defendants’ desire, after the trial on the

merits, to amend their answer to plead either the affirmative defense of renunciation

or no right of action based on a voluntary admission.4 The trial court denied the

introduction of the affirmative defense of renunciation stating:

I specifically addressed this issue at trial. It was raised as an affirmative
defense, and I said it had not been specifically pled in the answer, and
therefore, that it was waived.

Now, at this time, I am not going to allow the answer to be
amended after the trial of the case to allow an affirmative defense to be
bled. I’ve already ruled.

Now, to get to the peremptory exception of no cause of action or
no right of action, I know that the cases that have been cited by Mr.
Anderson deals with the extinguishment of debt, but if Look at the not
cause of action, there’s been nothing presented to me on the no cause of
action, and, therefore, I’m going to deny the no cause of action at this
time.
As to the no right of action, the —the plaintiffs [sic] have decided
not to put on any evidence, and , therefore, no witnesses will be called,
and there is no evidence presented to me. Therefore, I’m going to deny
the no right of action at this time.

We find no error in that ruling. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without

merit.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiffs, Wilma Young

4
These terms are used interchangeably. We note that the issue was raised at trial at which
time the plaintiffs objected because the affirmative defense was not in the defendants answer. The
trial court found in favor of the defendants.

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Baker and Succession of John Burr Baker, Sr., is affirmed. All costs of this appeal

are assessed against the defendants-appellants, John Burr Baker, Jr. and Alta Baker.

AFFIRMED.

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