West Cameron Port, Harbor and Terminal District v. Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal Dist.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-509

WEST CAMERON PORT, HARBOR AND TERMINAL DISTRICT

VERSUS

LAKE CHARLES HARBOR & TERMINAL DIST., ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CAMERON, NO. 10-17271
HONORABLE H. WARD FONTENOT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks, John
D. Saunders, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and Shannon J. Gremillion, Judges.

COOKS, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.

GREMILLION, J., joins in Judge Cooks’ dissent.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

Roy Clifton Cheatwood
Steven Franklin Griffith, Jr.
Aubrey Bernard Hirsch, Jr.
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC
201 St. Charles Avenue - Suite 3600
New Orleans, LA 70170
Telephone: (504) 566-5200
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal District

Michael Kenneth Dees
P. O. Box 3753
Lake Charles, LA 70602-3753
Telephone: (337) 439-3661
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal District

G. William Jarman
Linda Sarradet Akchin
Glenn Michael Farnet
Lana D. Crump
Kean Miller, Hawthorne D’ Armond, McCowan & Jarman, LLP
P. O. Box 3513
Baton Rouge, LA 70821-3513
Telephone: (225) 387-0999
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Cameron LNG, LLC

Randall Kurt Theunissen
Neil Gregory Vincent
David J. Ayo
Allen & Gooch
P. O. Box 81129
Lafayette, LA 70598-1129
Telephone: (337) 291-1240
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee - West Cameron Port, Harbor and Terminal
District

Henry L. Yelverton
820 Terry Lane
Lake Charles, LA 70605
Telephone: (337) 477-6423
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal District

Terrence D. McCay
One Lakeshore Drive - Suite 1150
Lake Charles, LA 70629
Telephone: (337) 430-0350
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Cameron LNG, LLC

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

Defendants, Lake Charles Harbor and Terminal District (LCP) and

Cameron LNG, L.L.C. (Cameron LNG), appeal the trial court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of the plaintiff, West Cameron Port, Harbor, and Terminal District

(West Cameron), and the denial of LCP’s and Cameron LNG’s motions for summary

judgment. LCP and Cameron LNG argue that the trial court erred in its interpretation

of statutory and other authorities with respect to LCP’s power to lease to Cameron

LNG certain land—outside LCP’s territorial bounds—to construct and operate a

liquified natural gas (LNG) facility. LCP and Cameron LNG further maintain that the

trial court erred by transferring the ownership of the land at issue to West Cameron.

Cameron LNG also argues that because federal law preempts West Cameron’s claim,

the trial court erred by denying its lack of subject matter jurisdiction exception.

We reverse because we find that LCP had authority as a Local Sponsor

to amend the lease subject to which it bought the land outside its territorial bounds,

given (1) that the amendment did not require LCP to conduct port, harbor, and

terminal activities in Cameron Parish, and (2) the amendment did not fundamentally

change Cameron LNG’s operations so as to, in effect, constitute a new lease. We also

find that because this case involves interpretation and construction of state law,

Cameron LNG’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction exception is without merit.

I.

ISSUE

We shall consider whether LCP, which indisputably has authority to

purchase land in Cameron Parish to maintain the condition of the Calcasieu River

Channel (the channel), may amend the lease on the land it owns in Cameron Parish

where:

(1) LCP bought the land in question subject to an existing
lease to a third party that operated a liquified petroleum gas
(LPG) facility, and

(2) the third party constructed an LNG plant pursuant to the
amended lease.

II.

FACTS

LCP is a landlocked port because the only access for ships to LCP is

through the channel that runs through West Cameron’s territory. The channel is a

navigable waterway subject to a servitude in favor of the federal government. The

Louisiana legislature gave the Governor the authority to enter into agreements with

the federal government on behalf of the State or its political subdivisions to assure

local cooperation with the federal government. La.R.S. 38:81.1 In 1961, Governor

Jimmie Davis designated LCP the Local Sponsor for the purposes of channel

improvements. This designation obligated LCP, without cost to the United States, to

provide lands, easements, rights-of-way, and spoil-disposal areas necessary for the

construction and maintenance of the channel.

1
The Governor on behalf of the state or . . . any section of the state may make and execute
with any person, including the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Engineers of the United States
Army, or any other authorized representative of the federal government, any contract, agreement,
arrangement, or undertaking, transaction, designed, or intended to carry out, effect, accomplish, or
secure the benefits and obligations of any state or federal law, now existing or hereafter enacted, with
respect to the control of flood waters, the navigation or use of the rivers flowing through this state
or . . . diversion channels for flood waters and areas, and all similar undertakings, whether
specifically mentioned herein or not.

....

The Governor may utilize to whatever extent they are empowered by law to function the
various levee boards or boards of levee commissioners of this state, the Department of Public Works,
or any other state board, commission, agency, or political subdivision. These authorities shall, to
the fullest extent of their capacity, fully cooperate and coordinate their efforts under his direction in
carrying out and accomplishing the obligations and requirements of the agreements and
undertakings.

La.R.S. 38:81.

2

The following is a brief history of LCP’s land acquisitions in Cameron

Parish. A review of exhibits submitted to this court reveals a lack of evidence that

LCP bought, acquired, or expropriated any land in Cameron Parish or anywhere else

outside its territory prior to its Local Sponsor designation in 1961. None of the deeds

to land in Cameron Parish LCP referenced are before 1961.

Exhibit # D-24a demonstrates that in 1948, LCP’s board adopted a

resolution in which it relied on its “plenary jurisdiciton [sic] over the Lake Charles

Harbor, Calcasieu River and all terminal facilities therein within the said Parish of

Calcasieu . . . .” (Emphasis added). LCP board resolved that it would give

assurances of local cooperation to the Secretary of the Army for “that portion of the

said work of improvement within the territorial area of the City of Lake Charles and

the Parish of Calcasieu, Louisiana, [which] is within the jurisdiction of the [LCP]

. . . .” (Emphasis added). From this, it is clear that LCP started to act on behalf of the

United States to maintain the channel around 1948 but only within Calcasieu Parish.

Attached to the exhibit referencing the 1948 resolution is another board

resolution dated February 8, 1961—three weeks after the Governor designated LCP

the Local Sponsor on January 18, 1961. There, LCP board resolved that it would

provide to the United States assurances of local cooperation “for both Calcasieu and

Cameron Parishes, Louisiana . . . .”

Exhibit # D-74, an affidavit of Channing F. Hayden, Jr., LCP’s Director

of Navigation and Security, reveals that before 1960, the “local assurances and

obligations were supplied by a combination of the Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, the

Cameron Parish Police Jury and the LC Port.” That changed in 1960 when

Louisiana’s legislature designated the State of Louisiana to be responsible for the

assurances of local cooperation. Then, the Governor designated LCP the Local

3

Sponsor. Hayden goes on to state that “[a]s the result of its role as the ‘local

sponsor’ of the Channel, the LC Port has thus entered into a series of resolutions,

agreements and assurances over the years to the United States and the Corps in

connection with the construction, maintenance and operation of the Channel.”

(Emphasis added). Hayden then writes that “[i]n Cameron Parish alone, in order to

discharge its responsibilities as ‘local sponsor’ for the Channel Project, the LC Port

has thus been required to secure more than fifteen (15) such [dredge disposal] sites

. . . .” (Emphasis added). Furthermore, Hayden states that “[l]ikewise, the LC Port

has obtained numerous other rights of entry, servitudes, easements and/or acquisitions

in connection with property located in Cameron Parish in discharge of its

responsibilities to serve as the local sponsor of the Channel . . . .” (Emphasis added).

In 1999, LCP acquired, for dredge disposal purposes, about two hundred

acres of land along the channel in Cameron Parish for five hundred and fifty thousand

dollars. At the time of the acquisition, a portion of the land was leased to a third party

that operated an LPG facility on that land. That LCP had authority to buy this land

is not in dispute.

Both Hayden and Adam McBride, LCP’s Director, swore that LCP

bought the property in question under the port’s Local Sponsor authority. In his

affidavit, Hayden writes that “[i]n further discharge of its duties and responsibilities

as the ‘local sponsor’ for the Channel, the LC Port also purchased on February 1,

1999 a track [sic] of land along the Channel and near Hackberry, LA in Cameron

Parish (the ‘Cameron LNG Property’), which is currently leased to Cameron LNG .

. . .” (Emphasis added). Exhibit # D-73, McBride’s affidavit, reveals that “[t]he LC

Port purchased the Cameron LNG Property in connection with its duties to provide

4

for dredge soil disposal areas adjacent to the Channel in its role as ‘local sponsor’ for

the channel.” (Emphasis added).

In 2001, the operator of the LPG facility (Cameron LNG’s predecessor)

proposed to amend the existing lease to allow for the construction and operation of

an LNG plant. With the support of Cameron Police Jury and West Cameron, LCP

entered into the amended lease.

Prior to the construction of the LNG facility, the future operator of the

facility had to obtain permits and authorizations from various institutions, including

the United States Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Throughout this

lengthy regulatory process, West Cameron and Cameron Parish Police Jury

encouraged the development of the LNG project by writing letters of support to

FERC.

In its suit, West Cameron sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and

damages because LCP allegedly engaged in port, harbor, or terminal operations

outside its territorial limits. West Cameron requested that the property in question be

transferred from LCP to West Cameron. LCP filed a peremptory exception of

nonjoinder of Cameron LNG that the trial court granted. West Cameron then

amended its petition to name Cameron LNG as a defendant.

LCP answered the petition and filed a reconventional demand. LCP

sought declaratory relief that it may maintain the Channel as a Local Sponsor, that the

ownership and the lease of the property in question was lawful, and that West

Cameron did not have an exclusive authority to operate port, harbor, and terminal

facilities within Cameron Parish.

Cameron LNG answered West Cameron’s petition and asserted a cross-

claim against LCP for breach of warranty of peaceful possession. Cameron LNG

5

argued that by filing the peremptory exception of nonjoinder of Cameron LNG, LCP

breached its obligation to keep Cameron LNG in peaceful possession of the property.

Cameron LNG also filed an exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction arguing

that Congress, by enacting the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717, intended to occupy

the field of natural gas regulation. Cameron LNG maintained that West Cameron’s

claims impermissibly interfered with the implementation of the FERC order

approving the sitting of the Cameron LNG facility, making West Cameron’s claim

preempted by the federal law. Agreeing that there were no material facts in dispute,

all parties moved for summary judgment.

The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of West Cameron

and denied LCP and Cameron LNG’s motions and exception. The trial court found

that LCP legally bought and owned the land. Yet, the trial court held that by

amending the lease, LCP engaged in port, harbor, and terminal activity outside its

territorial jurisdiction, thereby making the lease illegal. The trial court then enjoined

LCP from owning or operating port, harbor, and terminal facilities through its lease

of the property and transferred the ownership of the property to West Cameron, along

with its effects, i.e., the amended lease and the past revenue from it. This transfer was

subject to the repayment to LCP of the original purchase price and the legal interest.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appellate court reviews summary judgment de novo. Guilbeaux v.

Times of Acadiana, Inc., 96-360 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/26/97), 693 So.2d 1183, writ

denied, 97-1840 (La. 10/17/97), 701 So.2d 1327.

6

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

This is a case of first impression. It is clear that LCP purchased the land

in question under its Local Sponsor authority. We first determine whether LCP,

nonetheless, has, under its enabling statutes, the power to acquire land outside its

territorial bounds. This is important because land acquisitions under the Local

Sponsor authority are limited to those properties that are necessary for the

maintenance of the channel. If LCP has authority to acquire land in Cameron Parish

under its enabling statutes, the consideration as to whether LCP exceeded its Local

Sponsor authority would become unnecessary. This is because LCP’s enabling

statutes allow LCP to acquire and lease land for a much broader variety of purposes

than does the Local Sponsor designation.

After a careful examination below, we conclude that under its enabling

statutes, LCP has no power to acquire land outside its territorial bounds. Therefore,

we shall have to consider next whether LCP exceeded its Local Sponsor authority by

amending the lease subject to which it legally bought the land. We shall then address

the residual issues the parties raised.

(1) LCP’s Authority to Acquire Land Outside its Territorial Limits

We first consider and apply our rules of statutory construction. We then

examine the impact of the attempted amendment to LCP’s enabling statutes. We

conclude by considering the contemporaneous construction doctrine in the context

of LCP’s extraterritorial land acquisitions.

7

(a) The Effect of Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant2 Principle
of Statutory Construction

There is no question that LCP bought the property at issue under its

Local Sponsor authority. The brief overview of LCP’s land acquisitions in Cameron

Parish discussed above leaves no doubt. These acquisitions were under the authority

of the designation supplied by the Governor and not under the authority the

legislature granted to LCP in its enabling statutes. Hayden and McBride’s affidavits

erase any uncertainty as to which source gave LCP the authority to buy the property

in question.

After a careful review of LCP’s enabling statutes in pari materia, this

court concludes that LCP has no authority under its enabling statutes to buy land

outside its territorial bounds listed in La.R.S. 34:201. Louisiana Revised Statutes

34:203, titled “Powers of board; title to structures and facilities,” 34:215, titled

“Powers and authority of district,” and 34:206, titled “Acquisition of lands,” contain

provisions regarding LCP’s land acquisition authority. Thus, LCP “may acquire land

necessary for the business of the district . . . .” La.R.S. 34:203(A)(2)(c)(iii).

Moreover, LCP has the authority “to acquire, by right of eminent domain, purchase,

lease, or otherwise, the land that may be necessary for the business of the district,

including industrial plant sites and necessary property or appurtenances thereto. . . .”

La.R.S. 34:215(3). Finally, LCP’s enabling statute our legislature specifically titled

“Acquisitions of land” states that

[t]he board may acquire by purchase, donation,
expropriation, lease or otherwise, any and all lands in the
district needed for railways, warehouses, docks, wharves,
sheds, buildings, canals, channels, slips, basins and other
facilities to be owned and operated by the board or to lease

2
“[Latin clause meaning ‘general things do not derogate from specific things’] The doctrine
holding that general words in a later statute do not repeal an earlier statutory provision dealing with
a special subject.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 692 (7th ed. 1999).

8

to others for manufacturing, commercial and business
purposes to promote the industrial development of the
district and it may provide for the payment of such land out
of the funds under its control not otherwise specially
appropriated.

La.R.S. 34:206 (emphasis added).

In LCP’s enabling statutes, the legislature did not specifically authorize

LCP to acquire land outside its territorial bounds. Yet, only one out of the three

provisions quoted above, La.R.S. 34:206, contains language that specifically limits

LCP’s land acquisitions to LCP’s territorial limits.

Some of the other La.R.S. 34:203 and La.R.S. 34:215 sections that deal

with matters other than land acquisitions include “within the district” or similar

limiting language. For example, LCP “may acquire or construct industrial plant

buildings with necessary machinery and equipment within the district.” La.R.S.

34:203(A)(2)(c)(iv) (emphasis added). Relying on this variable presence of the

limiting language in La.R.S. 34:203 and La.R.S. 34:215, LCP argues that while some

of LCP’s activities, such as construction of industrial plant buildings, must be within

LCP’s territorial limits, other activities, such as land acquisition, need not be so

limited. We agree that there is an ambiguity with respect to land acquisitions in

La.R.S. 34:203 and in La.R.S. 34:215 because of the variable presence of the limiting

language. We do not agree with the conclusion that LCP may acquire land anywhere

in this state.

The legislature enacted the original versions of La.R.S. 34:203 and

La.R.S. 34:206 in the 1920s. The legislature did not enact La.R.S. 34:215 until 1973.

The original version of La.R.S. 34:203 did not contain any specific provisions with

respect to land acquisitions. The legislature amended La.R.S. 34:203 and La.R.S.

34:206 in 1958. Thereby, the legislature added, among other provisions, what is now

9

34:203(A)(2)(c)(iii), the provision that relates to land acquisitions upon which LCP

heavily relies in its brief. The 1958 amendment to La.R.S. 34:206 added a lease and

other provisions not relevant to this case. The legislature amended La.R.S. 34:203

in 1987 and in 1991, but those amendments are also not important to the resolution

of this case. The legislature enacted La.R.S. 34:215 in 1973 and never amended that

provision upon which LCP relies for the authority to acquire land anywhere when it

deems the land necessary for its business.

The law should be applied as written if it is clear, unambiguous and does

not lead to absurd consequences. Martin v. Safeway Ins. Co. of La., 08-1419

(La.App. 3 Cir. 4/15/09), __ So.3d __, 2009 WL 995798. “Laws on the same subject

matter must be interpreted in reference to each other.” La.Civ.Code art. 13. This

means that where statutory provisions are in conflict, laws in pari materia should be

construed together and harmonized, if possible. Killeen v. Jenkins, 98-2675 (La.

11/5/99), 752 So.2d 146.

“[W]hen two acts are clearly irreconcilable and are so inconsistent that

the two cannot have concurrent operation, then the latest enactment should be

applied.” Id. at 148. Yet, it is also true that “when two statutes applicable to the

same subject appear to be in conflict, the statute that is more specifically directed to

the matter at issue must prevail . . . .” Andre v. Constr. Material Shop, 93-1212, p.

7 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/11/94), 633 So.2d 1313, 1318. Furthermore, “the title of a law

may be examined to determine its purpose . . . .” Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City

of Lafayette, 05-1478, p. 11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/5/06), 919 So.2d 844, 852.

The courts presume that the legislature “enacted the law with full

knowledge of all other laws pertaining to the same subject matter” and that “every

provision of law was intended to serve some useful purpose . . . .” Martin, __So.3d

10

at __, 2009 WL 995798, at *3 (quoting Ransome v. Ransome, 01-2361 p. 8 (La.App.

1 Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 746, 754). Courts do not presume that “the lawmaker

intended for any part of a law to be meaningless . . . .” Id. (Emphasis omitted).

Finally, “when a law is susceptible to two or more interpretations, that which affords

a reasonable and practical effect to the entire act is preferred to one that renders part

of the act nugatory.” Id.

As their respective titles indicate, La.R.S. 34:203 and La.R.S. 34:215 are

outlines of the LCP’s powers and are general in nature. On the other hand, La.R.S.

34:206 specifically deals with land acquisitions. Louisiana Revised Statutes 34:206

clearly limits LCP’s authority to acquire land to its territorial bounds. Moreover,

although our legislature enacted La.R.S. 34:215 after the legislature’s last amendment

to La.R.S. 34:206, the language relevant to the land acquisitions in La.R.S. 34:215(3)

is almost identical to the language in La.R.S. 34:203(A)(2)(c)(iii) and (iv), which is

an earlier statute. The only significant difference is the enumeration of the

acquisition modes in La.R.S. 34:215. These same acquisition modes are listed in

La.R.S. 34:206. With respect to LCP’s authority to acquire land outside its bounds,

La.R.S. 34:215 and La.R.S. 34:203 are identically silent.

Moreover, La.R.S. 34:215(3) and La.R.S. 34:206 are not clearly

irreconcilable and are not so inconsistent that the two cannot have concurrent

operation. An example may make this conclusion clearer: if La.R.S. 34:215(3) read

specifically that LCP may acquire land outside its bounds, then the conflict between

La.R.S. 34:215(3) and La.R.S. 34:206 would have been more evident. As it is, the

variable presence of the limiting language in La.R.S. 34:215 makes the land

acquisition provision, as written in that statute, slightly ambiguous with respect to

11

the extraterritorial land acquisitions. La.R.S. 34:215(3) does not conflict with

another statute, i.e., La.R.S. 34:206.

If one reads La.R.S. 34:215(3) in conjunction with La.R.S. 34:206, it

becomes clear that the two statutes are not irreconcilable. Instead, the inevitable

conclusion is that LCP has no power to acquire land outside its territorial limits.

Therefore, even though the legislature enacted La.R.S. 34:215 after the last

amendment to La.R.S. 34:206, the later general statute did not repeal the earlier

statute dealing with the specific subject of land acquisitions. Thus, our guiding

principle of statutory construction here is that specific provisions apply over the

general ones.

The following example further aids our reasoning here. Indisputably,

LCP may not levy or collect taxes outside its territorial bounds. Yet, La.R.S.

34:203(A)(2)(c)(xiii) that deals with the levy of taxes, like La.R.S.

34:203(A)(2)(c)(iii) that deals with land acquisitions, contains no limiting language.

With respect to both powers, there are additional specific statutes that limit LCP’s

authority to its territorial limits.

Where the legislature did not enact specific statutes with respect to the

powers listed in La.R.S. 34:203 and La.R.S. 34:215, LCP’s argument that some and

not its other powers are limited to its boundaries may be true. Yet, it is not so with

the power to acquire land. This power has a specific statute, La.R.S. 34:206, and

LCP’s construction of La.R.S. 34:203 and 34:215 would render La.R.S. 34:206

nugatory and superfluous. Because our task here is: (1) to harmonize all provisions

with respect to LCP’s power to acquire land; (2) to adopt the interpretation that

affords a reasonable and practical effect and not the one that renders the statute that

specifically deals with the land acquisitions nugatory; and, (3) not to render any part

12

of the law dealing with LCP’s land acquisitions meaningless, we conclude that under

its enabling statutes, LCP has no authority to acquire land outside its territorial limits.

(b) The Effect of Contemporaneous Construction Doctrine

While Louisiana courts sharply limit the application of the

contemporaneous construction doctrine, we nonetheless may consider a port’s

interpretation of the statutes under which it operates. See Clark v. Bd. of Comm’rs,

Port of New Orleans, 422 So.2d 247, 251 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1982), which quoted

Liquidation of Canal Bank & Trust Co., 30 So.2d 841, 849 (La.1947), for the

proposition that, “the generally accepted rule [is] that the contemporaneous

construction given a statute by those charged with its execution is entitled to great

weight and should not be disregarded except for cogent reasons, [but] this rule is not

controlling, particularly if such construction is erroneous.”

Here, LCP’s actions indicate that, until very recently, it did not construe

its enabling statutes to mean that LCP had the power to acquire land in Cameron

Parish. For example, LCP’s resolution of 1948, exhibit # D-24a, demonstrates that

in 1948, LCP considered itself bound by its territorial limits with respect to land

acquisitions. Exhibits submitted to this court indicate that it was not until 1961,

approximately three weeks after the Governor designated LCP a Local Sponsor, that

LCP started to acquire property in Cameron Parish. Thus, even after the legislature

amended La.R.S. 23:203 in 1958 to include the language upon which LCP currently

relies to support its position, LCP acquired no land outside its bounds until its Local

Sponsor designation.

Furthermore, when LCP did acquire land in Cameron Parish after its

1961 Local Sponsor designation, it relied on that authority and not on the authority

of its enabling statutes to acquire the land. McBride and Hayden’s affidavits provide

13

ample support for this conclusion. Thus, since its creation until very recently, LCP

itself did not act as if it construed its enabling statutes to authorize LCP’s land

acquisition anywhere outside its territorial bounds.

These considerations buttress our conclusion that LCP has no authority

under its enabling statutes to acquire land outside its territorial bounds.

(2) LCP’s Authority to Amend the Lease on the Land in Question

Because LCP has a limited authority to acquire land in question for the

construction and subsequent maintenance of the channel, we now examine whether

LCP exceeded this authority by amending the lease subject to which it bought the

land.3

(a) Local Sponsor’s Lack of Duty to Dissolve a Pre-existing Lease with a Party
that Conducts Activities Unrelated to Channel Maintenance.

The Governor’s designation reads that the local cooperation with the

United States means to “[p]rovide without cost to the United States all lands,

3
LCP argues that under its enabling statutes, i.e., La.R.S. 34:203(A)(2)(c)(v) and La.R.S.
34:215(4), it may lease the land for processing, manufacturing, commercial, and business purposes
no matter how or where it acquired the land. Specifically, LCP maintains that even if it acquired
land under its authority as a Local Sponsor, it may lease the land according to the terms of La.R.S.
34:203(A)(2)(c)(v) and La.R.S. 34:215(4). In essence, LCP takes a position that the leasing
provision and the land acquisition provision of La.R.S. 34:203 and 34:215 are independent of each
other. In effect, LCP would “bootstrap” its Local Sponsor authority to its enabling statutes.

The question as to whether LCP may lease property it acquired under the authority other than
its enabling statutes is not before this court. Instead, the question we need to resolve is whether LCP
has authority to amend the pre-existing lease on the property it bought under its Local Sponsor
authority. Therefore, we do not address whether the lease provision and the land acquisition
provision in La.R.S. 34:203 and in 34:215 are independent of each other.

In addition, the recurrent argument in LCP’s brief is that if it has the power to sell the
property in question, it should logically follow that it has the power to lease it because the power to
sell is greater than the power to lease. While LCP cites several cases for this proposition, we note
that the greater right does not necessarily include the lesser one. See City of Shreveport v. Case, 4
So.2d 801 (La.1941) (holding that even if the city, in the protection of its water supply, had the right
to prohibit all craft upon the waters of the lake, it does not necessarily follow that the city had the
right to regulate the use of water craft by imposing muffler requirements).

In any event, as explained above, in this case, we need not address the issue of LCP’s ability
to lease the lands it acquired under its Local Sponsor authority. Our issue is a more limited one, i.e.,
whether LCP may amend a pre-existing lease.

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easements, rights-of-way, and spoil-disposal areas necessary for the construction and

for subsequent maintenance of the project . . . .” (Emphasis added). The project is

the “improvement to the Calcasieu River and Pass Navigation Channel.” The

relevant questions here is: once LCP determines that a piece of land is necessary for

its business as a Local Sponsor to maintain the channel, and that land happens to be

encumbered by a lease which does not require LCP to engage in any port, harbor, or

terminal activity unrelated to channel maintenance,4 but does allow the lessee to

conduct such activities, does LCP have an obligation to dissolve the lease once it

purchases or expropriates the land? The answer to this question is important because

if LCP does not have an obligation to dissolve such a lease, the lessee’s ownership

and operation of port facilities on the land LCP owns becomes irrelevant to the

question whether LCP engages in port activities. A related question is: would a

failure to dissolve the lease exceed LCP’s Local Sponsor authority? The answer to

both of these questions is “no.”

The designation authorizes LCP to secure all lands, easements, etc.,

necessary for the channel maintenance. It does not require LCP to secure only

unencumbered lands. Moreover, it does not require LCP to eliminate the

encumbrances once it acquires the land even if, as here, the encumbrance allows the

lessee to conduct port activities.5 Finally, if the encumbrance does not require LCP

4
We note that under LCP’s Local Sponsor designation, LCP probably has authority to
conduct certain port operations in Cameron Parish. For example, if LCP needs a dock, wharf, or pier
to unload dredge materials on the property it owns in Cameron Parish, LCP probably may construct,
own, and operate the dock, wharf, or pier for that purpose. Thus, the issue in this case is not whether
LCP may generally conduct port operations outside its territorial limits. The issue is whether it may
do so in a way so as to exceed its Local Sponsor authority, i.e., conduct port operations in Cameron
Parish unrelated to channel maintenance.
5
As stated in the “Facts” section of this opinion, prior to the amendments of the lease to
construct an LNG facility, the lessee operated an LPG facility. In connection with the LPG
operations, the lessee, before the lease amendments, owned and operated docking, terminal, and
other port facilities on the property in question.

15

to engage in port, harbor, or terminal activity unrelated to channel maintenance, it

does not conflict with any entity’s enabling statutes.

(b) LCP’s Authority to Amend the Pre-existing Lease

The next question is whether LCP exceeded its Local Sponsor authority

by amending the pre-existing lease. We find significant the following two

considerations. First, we need to decide whether the lease amendment amounted to

LCP’s engagement in port, harbor, or terminal operations unrelated to channel

maintenance outside its territorial jurisdiction. This is important because

simultaneous and unlimited port, harbor, or terminal operations by two different

authorities in the same geographical area may lead to a conflict resulting in neither

being able to effectively perform their duties, thereby impeding commerce activities.

Second, we need to decide whether the amendment changed the lease so

fundamentally as to, in effect, constitute a new lease. This is important because then

the question becomes not whether LCP may merely amend an existing lease but

whether LCP may lease property it acquired under its authority as a Local Sponsor.

We conclude that this amendment of the pre-existing lease did not

amount to an engagement in port operations. West Cameron strenuously argues that

McBride, LCP’s Director, admitted that the operations of Cameron LNG necessarily

involve LCP’s port activity. Yet, this is not what McBride stated. West Cameron’s

attorney specifically asked McBride: “[i]s the Cameron LNG facility a port, harbor,

and terminal service that gets activity of the Lake Charles Port . . .?” McBride did not

answer in the affirmative but, instead, replied that “[t]he lease is a – an activity of the

Port.” We note that an activity of the port is not necessarily a port activity. For

example, when LCP expropriates property in Cameron Parish as a Local Sponsor, it

acts as a port, the Lake Charles Port, because this entity cannot act as something other

16

than the Lake Charles Port. Nevertheless, LCP, thereby, does not necessarily engage

in a port activity. Similarly, the act of lease amendment can be an activity of the port,

the Lake Charles Port, without being a port activity.

Moreover, whether LCP engaged in port, harbor, or terminal activities

is, in our view, a legal conclusion. Thus, even if McBride conceded that LCP

conducted port activities, this court is in no way bound by his opinion.

Admittedly, Cameron LNG engages in port activities by virtue of

loading, unloading, and docking of vessels. Yet, LCP conducts none of those

activities. Nor does it own any docks, wharves, slips, and other facilities necessary

for port, harbor, or terminal operations on the land in question. Instead, Cameron

LNG owns, operates, and maintains all of those facilities. LCP simply receives lease

payments.

We also conclude that the amendment of the original lease did not

change operations of the parties subject to the lease so drastically as to constitute, in

effect, a new lease. While the size and the cost of the facilities on the leased land

increased dramatically, as well as the lease payments LCP collects, the nature of the

operations changed from handling liquified petroleum gas to handling liquified

natural gas. In other words, the lessee did not, for example, change its business to a

retail store or a theme park. The essence of the operations is still limited to

transporting, handling, processing, etc. of petroleum products.

Having the above two determinations in mind, we do not conclude that

LCP exceeded its Local Sponsor authority by amending the pre-existing lease. True,

the Governor did not specifically authorize LCP to lease anything under its Local

Sponsor designation. It is also true that the designation document did not expressly

prohibit the leasing activity. The question then becomes: whether the language

17

“necessary for the maintenance” of the channel encompasses LCP’s ability to amend

encumbrances subject to which the Local Sponsor acquired the property where (1) the

amendment did not require LCP to engage in port, harbor, or terminal activities

unrelated to channel maintenance, and (2) did not fundamentally change the nature

of the lessee’s operations so as to, in effect, constitute a new lease. We conclude that

it does.

The phrase “necessary for subsequent maintenance” is broader than

something like, “necessary for dredging and disposal of dredging materials” but not

as broad as something like, “necessary for the business.” “Necessary for subsequent

maintenance” may or may not encompass leasing activities and may encompass some

leasing activities and not others.6 We need not resolve these questions now. This is

because we hold that this language is broad enough to include amendments to the

lease subject to which LCP acquired the property where (1) the amendments to the

lease did not require LCP to engage in port, harbor, or terminal activities unrelated

to channel maintenance in Cameron Parish, and (2) the amendment did not

fundamentally change the nature of the lessee’s operations.

Based on the considerations above, LCP’s failure to dissolve the pre-

existing lease and LCP’s subsequent amendment of that lease were within LCP’s

authority and are, therefore, valid. Thus, we need not address the impropriety or

propriety of the trial court’s transfer of the property in question to West Cameron.

Similarly, our decision renders moot Cameron LNG’s arguments with respect to

warranty breach.

6
For example, we do not reach the question as to whether LCP could lease to a dredging
subcontractor a portion of the land it acquired as a Local Sponsor for that subcontractor to dispose
of the dredge materials in the course of channel maintenance.

18

Finally, this case involves interpretation and construction of the state

statutes and the Governor’s order pursuant to a state legislature’s delegation of

authority. It has nothing to do with natural gas or energy regulation. Therefore,

Cameron LNG’s assertions that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

because of the federal preemption are without merit.

V.

CONCLUSION

The trial court’s judgment in favor of West Cameron Port, Harbor and

Terminal District is reversed. This court finds that the Lake Charles Harbor and

Terminal District’s failure to dissolve a pre-existing lease and the subsequent

amendment of that lease were legal and, therefore, valid exercises of Lake Charles

Harbor and Terminal District’s Local Sponsor authority.

Costs of this appeal are assessed to West Cameron Port, Harbor and

Terminal District.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

19

COURT OF APPEAL

THIRD CIRCUIT

STATE OF LOUISIANA

09-509

WEST CAMERON PORT, HARBOR AND TERMINAL DISTRICT
VERSUS
LAKE CHARLES HARBOR & TERMINAL DISTRICT

COOKS, J., Dissent.

The Lake Charles Harbor and Terminal District (LCP) purchased a 215 acre

tract of land in 1999 located within the jurisdictional boundaries of the West Cameron

Port, Harbor and Terminal District (West Cameron). Both entities are political

subdivisions of the State of Louisiana created by specific enabling legislation, and the

boundaries of each are statutorily fixed. It is undisputed that the land at issue is

wholly within the legislatively defined territorial boundaries of West Cameron.

This land was purchased by Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., the predecessor to

Amoco, in 1935. Beginning in 1938, the property owner granted various rights-of-

way and spoil dumping privileges to the USA, State of Louisiana, and LCP–the last

entered in 1998 and effective through April 15, 1999. All but one of these

servitudes/easements were provided to all of the noted governmental entities free of

charge.

Sometime between April 28, 1998 and February 1, 1999, Amoco sold the

subject property to Deep Sea, LLC. On February 1, 1999, Deep Sea, LLC, through

its managing partner David Reinauer, sold the subject property to LCP for the sum

of $550,000.00, without warranty of title, and with an assignment to LCP of an

existing surface lease in favor of Deep Sea, LLC and Dyengy Midstream, Inc.

Hackberry LNG Terminal, LLC (Hackberry) acquired all right, title, and interest in

1

the surface lease from its parent company, Dynegy Midstream Services, Ltd.

Partnership, sometime before December 31, 2002. On the same date, Hackberry and

LCP entered into an agreement entitled “Second Amendment To Surface Lease”

which dramatically changed the original surface lease agreement and by its own

recitations changed “the use of the premises” leased.1

The new lease agreement provided for the construction and operation of a new

facility with the capacity to deliver liquified natural gas by marine vessels and via a

new 35 mile pipeline to be constructed on the subject property passing through

neighboring parishes. Additional acreage was added in this “amended lease,” and the

duration of the lease was changed to 30 years, plus six five-year options at the

lessee’s discretion. The annual rental was changed from $25,000.00 to $356,040.00

with provisions for additional increases using the CPI Index. This “Second Amended

Lease” further provided that wharfage fees are to be paid to LCP in addition to the

new base rent, with a requirement of a minimum wharfage fee, and various other

charges. When all is said and done, these fees combined with the rental payments

will net an estimated Sixty-Five Million Dollars ($65,000,000.00) over the life of the

lease to LCP’s coffers. West Cameron Port will net zero, and Cameron Parish will

receive no revenue–only “the bill for police and fire protection.” The property is not

subject to ad valorem taxation because it is owned by a political subdivision of the

state as a local sponsor, namely LCP, and it has been specially exempted. See

La.Const. art. VII, §21(A), and Slay v. Louisiana Energy & Power Auth., 473 So. 2d

51, 53 (La. 1985).

Additionally, the “Second Amended Lease” included the following provisions

1
The original surface lease was between Amoco Production Company and Cities Services
Company executed in 1978. The lease was first amended in 1984 to add additional footage to a
right-of way for ingress and egress.

2

(emphasis added):

Lessee acknowledges that vessels calling at the LNG facilities may also
be subject to a channel user fee should the District impose such a fee
at a future date in accordance with a general channel user fee plan
authorized by and in accordance with applicable law to be implemented
by the District on all commercial vessels subject to the requirements
of pilotage. Lessee, however, shall not be responsible for such
channel usage fees or for arranging or requiring calling vessel
owners and charterers regarding such channel user fees.

Additional Charges Legally Accessible by the District. Lessee hereby
acknowledges that the base rent and the wharfage fees are not
intended, and will not include, reduce or abate, any charges legally
accessible by the District against vessels calling on the LNG
Terminal or using any other facilities or waterways or otherwise
subject to the District’s jurisdiction to assess fees and such fees and
charges will be separately assessed, charged and paid by the vessel’s
owners or charterers in accordance with the District’s assessments
of same, all in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.

Additional Rights-of Way. The District will provide any rights-of-way
across the Additional District Property (as defined in Paragraph 14
below), located north of the Amended Leased Premises, required to
allow construction and operation of the LNG Facilities; including
primarily, but without limitation, access rights-of way and pipeline for
the related natural gas pipeline.

Channel Access and Usage. Lessee and the District agree and
acknowledge that nothing in this Lease amendment is intended to, or
shall be construed as, granting vessels calling at Lessee’s facilities any
greater or lesser priority with regard to channel access and usage than
existing users of the channel and vessels calling at Lessee’s facilities are
subject to the same vessel traffic controls and management as the
District may, in accordance with applicable laws, impose on other
vessels using the Calcasieu River Ship Channel.

Although the noted future channel activities, like the previously mentioned

ones, are all earmarked to occur wholly within the jurisdictional limits of West

Cameron Port, no efforts were made by LCP to secure a valid intergovernmental

agreement with West Cameron Port to jointly engage in the venture. The lease was

subsequently amended three more times. The last and fifth amendment to the lease

is dated September 20, 2006.

The majority opinion first reviews the pertinent statutes relating to the

3

territorial jurisdiction of the two port districts and correctly concludes neither district

has any authority to engage in port activity outside its territorial boundaries. Turning

its sights specifically on LCP, the majority rejects LCP’s argument, steadfastly

advanced below and on appeal, that it has co-existing authority with West Cameron

Port under its enabling statute to acquire land for port activity outside its territorial

jurisdiction. I join the majority in this finding because the law is well settled on this

issue and has been since the inception of the two ports.2

Nonetheless, LCP argues its grant of authority as Local Sponsor for the channel

effectively expands its territorial limits and sanctions its continued port operations in

Cameron Parish. Again, the majority finds LCP’s reliance on the local sponsorship

provision for authority to conduct port activity in Cameron Parish is not well placed

because that authority, likewise, was limited in scope and encompassed “channel

maintenance” operations. This finding is also well rooted in the law, and I, too, join

the majority in repeating what the legislature has already declared.

Our difference lies in the majority’s ultimate finding that LCP, though adrift

at sea on all of its arguments, is saved by the facts of the case as the majority sees

them. The majority states that no one disputes this property was acquired by LCP for

dredge disposal under its Local Sponsor authority, and that, having so acquired the

property encumbered with a lease, it may then “amend” that lease, if in so doing,

LCP does not engage in port activity within WCP’s jurisdiction. The majority then

finds LCP is not engaging in port activity in Cameron Parish, and the amendments did

2
In 2006, after West Cameron filed this suit, House Bill H.R. 292, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La.
2006) was proposed to specifically authorize LCP to exercise powers granted to it in its enabling
statutes “within or without the territorial limits of the district.” This Bill also proposed to amend
La.R.S. 34:206 to grant LCP authority to acquire all lands “and improvements thereon as necessary
to accomplish the purposes for which the district is created regardless of where such lands or
improvements are located.” The Bill additionally proposed a provision which would ratify and
affirm any actions taken by LCP’s board outside the district’s territorial limits prior to July 1, 2006.
This bill never became law.

4

not “fundamentally change the nature of the lessee’s operations so as to, in effect,

constitute a new lease.” According to the majority, the question of whether LCP is

engaging in port activity is a “legal question.” In truth, this question is a factual one,

which compels an inescapable legal result.

There is no genuine dispute that LCP is engaged in port activity in Cameron

Parish–it said so below and insisted it had the unfettered right to do so. And there is

absolutely no basis in law or fact to find that the multiple amendments to the lease did

not change the nature of Cameron LNG’s and LCP’s operations at the site and in

Cameron Parish.

The evidence in the record filed on appeal demonstrates from the very

beginning LCP contemplated purchasing the property in Cameron Parish with the

intent to operate and develop the property for port business, an activity

authorized only by its enabling legislation and expressly limited to its territorial

jurisdiction. See La.R.S. 34:206. The record squarely places at issue the majority’s

finding that LCP acquired the property for dredge disposal and the purchase was

necessary for channel maintenance. The record shows this land was used since 1938

for spoil disposal. The record also reflects, and LCP admitted below, that this land

was no longer being used for spoil disposal at the time it decided to purchase the

property and has not been used for spoil disposal since its acquisition in 1999. At the

time LCP purchased the property there was a servitude in place for potential spoil

disposal that was granted to LCP at no cost. It simply defies all logic to believe that

LCP decided to pay $550,000.00 to acquire a right it already possessed to dispose

spoil–an activity it stopped doing on the subject land years before and has not done

since.

LCP’s own official minutes and resolutions, entered into evidence below,

5

memorialized its underlying purpose for purchasing the property. At a special

meeting held on January 18, 1999, LCP’s minutes reflect the following (emphasis

added):

This property has improvements–the dock and a slip. The slip is
approximately 900 feet deep and 1200 feet wide. It could easily be
dredged to 40 feet. There are spoil areas on each side that could be
used. A vicinity map showing the general location, a site data sheet, and
information describing improvements located on the property were
before the Board.

Dynergy had approximately 90.03 acres under lease. The lease has six
(6) five-year options. The option will come up in approximately one
year. If the lease is renewed and the options are exercised, the lease
currently would pay the District about a ten percent (10%) return on the
$550,000.00. If the lease is not extended, the District would have to
look for another use of the property. In Mr. Wiseman and he’s
judgment, the property is extremely valuable to the potential use of
the Port. There are 1700 feet that front on deep water. Part of the
property has been built up to an approximate 15-foot elevation as a
result of the spoil disposal areas. It would serve as a very good site for
potential development by the Port. Mr. Dees showed a photograph of
the property to the Board and pointed out the improvements, the leased
acreage, and the boundaries of the property.

Deep water property is not being created. When the Port has a chance
to purchase this type of property, Staff feels it is a good investment and
something that fits in the mission of the Port for long-range planning.

Mr. Watts pointed out that this property was in Cameron Parish. He
looked forward to some benefits filtering down to Cameron.

Additionally, LCP’s official Resolution No. 99-001, which formally approved

the purchase, does not contain a single mention of spoil disposal, dredging, Local

Sponsor authority, or channel maintenance. In fact, the three recited official reasons

for acquiring the subject property stated in LCP’s Resolution No. 99-001 are:

WHEREAS, the property contains a slip that is approximately 900 feet
deep and 1200 feet wide and a 300–foot dock; and

WHEREAS, presently there is a tenant on the property; and

WHEREAS, if tenant does not renew lease options, the property is
extremely valuable to the potential use of the District.

6

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS OF THE LAKE CHARLES HARBOR AND
TERMINAL DISTRICT IN SPECIAL SESSION CONVENED THAT:

SECTION 1: All of the foregoing introductory provisions are hereby
made a part of this Resolution and the Board of Commissioners of the
Lake Charles Harbor and Terminal District does hereby approve
purchase of approximately 218 acres of property located on the
Calcasieu Ship Channel, as described in Exhibit”A” attached hereto and
made a part thereof, from Deep Sea, L.L.C. for the purchase price of
$550,000.00...

The record overwhelmingly demonstrates that LCP intended from the outset

to purchase this property for “development” of its port and intended fully to conduct

port activities, including specifically regulating marine traffic of all ships using the

channel traveling to and from the site located in Cameron Parish.3 The minutes of

LCP’s meeting on October 14, 2002, reflect LCP was adamant that it, not Dynegy,

had the authority, and would in fact “regulate” the marine traffic in this part of the

channel in Cameron Parish, and the new lease had to contain a provision granting it

full authority to do so. The minutes of LCP dated October 14,2002, state (emphasis

added):

This new LNG facility would generate 175 new LNG ships a year on
the channel.[text deleted] If Dynegy had all these additional ships, Staff
felt it was very important that a clear statement was included in the lease
agreement that Dynegy recognized the authority of the District to, in
effect, act as a traffic cop. The District believed it had the authority
for the whole channel to regulate the traffic and how it flowed in
and out of the ship channel. Staff wanted an expressed provision in
the lease that acknowledged that by Dynegy. Dyengy agreed to that
on the telephone, but then after their attorney finished with it, it was
deleted and they basically inserted No. 11, which stated that Dynegy
would determine what commercially reasonable measures needed to be

3
As the majority acknowledges, LCP’s enabling statute, La.R.S. 34:206, does not authorize
LCP to purchase property for any purpose outside its territorial jurisdiction. Under the authority
granted by the governor designating LCP as local sponsor, its activities as such are limited to channel
maintenance for navigation. Indeed, the governor’s authority to designate any port commission as
local sponsor under La.R.S. 38:81 is limited to control of flood waters, navigation or use of rivers
flowing through the state, and diversion channels for flood waters or similar undertakings. The
governor’s grant of authority to any port commission is also expressly limited in La.R.S. 38:81to the
“extent they are empowered by law to function.” LCP is not empowered by law to acquire property
outside its territorial jurisdiction for port development or investment.

7

taken by them so that the traffic flowed through the channel like it was
suppose to. Mr Dees stated he could not recommend it to the Board and
Mr. Jordan had the same problem with it. Staff was requesting that the
Board approve the revised proposed lease terms and conditions except
for Dynegy’s No. 11 and authorize Staff to reinstate the provision,
Item 9, the District regulate the traffic. [text deleted] Mr. Dees replied
they were putting that back in. Dr. DeRouen clarified that the District’s
verbiage was being put back in No.9 and Dynegy’s No. 11 would be
eliminated. [text deleted] Mr. Williams asked if the District could
regulate the channel to give Dynegy the full 175 ships a year. Mr.
Dees stated that had been the main issue the whole time. CMS was
proposing 175 ships and Dynegy was proposing 210. Between the
expansion at CMS and Dynegy were 400 ships. [text deleted] Dynegy
had come to the table and agreed paying the District on a per unit basis.
The more they utilized the facility, the more revenue the District had. [
text deleted]

There were so many more companies and industries that this affected
that the District needed to be very careful what it did at this location.
Dr. DeRouen stated that since Dynegy was way up the channel, the
District could not let them have control of the channel for them to
determine what was economically feasible with their ships and
involve Conoco, CITGO, everyone else and the District for ships
being shut out. Mr. Dees stated that Conoco and CITGO were the two
largest users.

The final lease amendment, indeed, contains the provision insisted upon by

LCP making it expressly clear that it, not its tenant Dynegy, has the authority to

“regulate” all marine traffic in this part of the channel located entirely within WCP’s

territorial jurisdiction, and to exercise full control and authority including

assessment and collection of fees from Dynegy’s ships and all ships using this

portion of the channel and all ships calling upon this port. The minutes of LCP

dated October 14, 2002, and later the lease provision, went so far as to expressly point

out that:

Dynegy would pay any general channel users fees in addition to that. If
the District in a couple of months levied a general user fee, which they
had been talking about and having notices, etc., they would pay that on
top of this unit charge.

Further, as clearly evidenced in LCP’s minutes, the Port Director of the Lake

Charles Harbor and Terminal District, Mr. Robert Adam McBride (McBride),

8

testified he performs the same functions of Port Director both over the properties

owned by LCP in Calcasieu Parish and in Cameron Parish. He admitted LCP, “act[s]

as a port” (emphasis added) in West Cameron’s port district. McBride also testified

he controlled what actions take place on the property located in Cameron’s district

owned by LCP and he gives permission in his capacity as Port Director for what

activities and actions are authorized on the property located in West Cameron’s

territory. Moreover, McBride, when asked whether the services and facilities which

would be taking place on the Sempra development would be “port facilities”

responded, “There will be dock and port facilities as part of the overall project

under development” (emphasis added) and he admitted that compensation for such

dock and port facilities conducted in Cameron Parish will be paid to LCP. When

asked about the provisions of the contract between LCP and the Sempra project,

McBride testified:

A. (McBride) They outline the rental payments and other terms and

conditions associated with the property. Yes.

Q. One of which is encaptioned “Wharfage” correct?

A. It’s encaptioned “Wharfage,” yes.

Q. And it deals with decathons (ph.) to be received by the Lake Charles Port

for a certain flow through or pass through vessel, correct?

A. That’s correct.

Q. For vessels–for docking there, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. (Mr. Dees) And in regard to Mr. Theunissen’s question that there are going

to be port activities at the Sempra site, that is correct. There are going to be but

there are not as of today; is that right?

9

A. There are not– there are no current port activities at the site. There is

construction activity underway there at present.

Q. (Mr. Thuenissen) In followup to that specific question, the lease is for that

very purpose in your receiving rentals upon that lease now and have been for

a time frame?

A. The lease is for the purpose of receiving vessels with cargo. To that

extent, its port authority as well as the rental of the site and the property

adjacent to it for that purpose. (emphasis added)

Q. And the construction, you said y’all don’t do activity out there. Have you

visited the site physically?

A. I have visited the site. Yes.

Q. For what purpose?

A. To observe.

Q. And to make sure that things are consistent with the lease?

A. Just to observe the activity that’s underway?

Q. And have any of your port board members gone?

A. To the best of my knowledge, there have been port board members.

Q. For what purpose?

A. To observe the activity of the site.

Clearly, the stipulated facts and other submissions in the record support the

trial court’s finding that LCP’s arrangement with Cameron LNG constitutes port

activities outside of its territorial jurisdiction. When the case was heard below LCP

did not contest that the lease and all the activities it encompassed constituted “port

activities.” In its Answer to the suit at Paragraph 20, LCP, in fact, admitted it was

engaging in “port services and activities,” including the leasing of its properties in

10

Cameron Parish (emphasis added):

The LC Port, under its powers and authorities found at La.R.S. 34: 201,
et seq., has, for over eighty (80) years, managed, maintained, regulated,
and operated extensive port facilities and the Calcasieu River Ship
Channel (the “Channel”) in both Calcasieu and Cameron Parishes;
acquired in both parishes, voluntarily and by way of expropriation,
numerous pieces of property either in full ownership or by way of
easements or rights of way; acted in accordance with the prior
designations of the governor and the attorney general as the “Local
Sponsor” for the entire Channel; and otherwise provided and performed,
in accordance with its stated powers, port services and activities,
including the leasing of its properties in both Cameron and Calcasieu
Parishes.”

The entire discussion below, at the hearings on the exceptions and on the

motions for summary judgment, all of which were submitted as part of the record,

involved the fees to be collected by LCP as part of the “lease arrangement” with

LNG, which included wharfage. The majority makes no mention of the wharfage fees

and other fees assessed by LCP against vessels operating in Cameron Parish and

being collected by LCP. Even Cameron LNG’s attorney discussed wharfage in his

brief remarks to the court. When the fees for wharfage and other traditional port

activities were discussed, LCP’s response was the same as it admitted in answering

the suit–it possesses concurrent jurisdiction and can conduct port activities in

Cameron Parish. The lease itself, and the specific language addressing wharfage and

other traditional port activities, were all discussed and were central to the trial court’s

ultimate determination in the case. In at least two or three instances the trial court

asked if there were any disputed facts in the case and each time LCP responded “No.”

Mr. Dees, LCP’s trial attorney arguing in the trial court said (emphasis added):

[A] piece of property that’s on there, that is facilitating the development
of a billion dollar LNG facility with deep-draft ships back and forth,
is – is not even, I don’t think, in question, as to whether that is a
legitimate Port activity.

And, Mr. McBride in his testimony specifically testified:

11

Q. (Mr. Theunissen) Is the Cameron LNG facility a port, harbor and
terminal service that gets activity of the Lake Charles Port: yes or no?

A. (McBride) The lease is a– an activity of the Port.

Q. And the money that ya’ll get for the lease involves a surface lease and so
much money for vessels being offloaded – put through–

A. Yes.

Q. –crew boats

A. That’s correct.

Regulating marine vessels calling on an inland port, imposing and collecting

wharfage fees on marine vessels calling on an inland port, imposing and collecting

channel user fees on marine vessels calling on an inland port, and policing marine

vessel traffic are undisputably port, harbor, and terminal activity. A port may engage

in “port activities” in more than one way–it is not necessary for it to own the

buildings, the boats, or even the docks, or to hire employees to work at the plant.

Leasing property it owns to third parties for the purpose of charging fees on their

operations on the site is what many ports do, including LCP. This is what LCP is

doing in Cameron at the LNG site and this is precisely what it “amended” the lease

to do. When LCP acquired the subject property, it was burdened by an existing lease

that incidentally affected port activities within Cameron Parish. The power to

regulate this port activity, however, remains with West Cameron Port. LCP

“amended” the lease multiple times making significant material changes so as to

thereafter engage in port, harbor and terminal activity within WCP’s jurisdiction.

LCP cannot expand its jurisdiction and authority by such means.

The Louisiana Supreme Court long ago addressed this argument in Board of

Com’rs for the Port of New Orleans v. New Orleans & S.F. R. Co., et al., 36 So. 837

(La.1904). In that case, the City of New Orleans authorized construction and

12

maintenance of a belt railroad, which at certain points passed over and through public

wharves, that were being used as public landings by the Port of New Orleans. By

specific legislation the Port of New Orleans had exclusive authority for the control

and administration of the harbor, port, wharves, and landings of the port of New

Orleans. The court, relying on the legislative grant of authority to the Port, stated

(emphasis added):

[T]he state, an incorporeal being, charged with the administration of the
corporate property in question, must necessarily act through an agent,
and that whereas, until 1896, it acted through the city of New Orleans,
it then appointed as its agent for the purposes of such administration the
board of port commissioners, withdrew from the city all authority that
had ever been granted to it in that behalf, ‘save,’ as this court has
decided, ‘in connection with private wharves,’ and, in language at once
more specific and more comprehensive, conferred that authority upon
the agent so appointed, and that the constitutionality of the statute by
which this change of agents was affected has not been attacked by any
of the pleadings in this case.

The court continued in its reasoning (emphasis added):

In conclusion, it may be remarked that, whilst the city of New Orleans
has no present jurisdiction over the wharves and landings of the port of
New Orleans, as such, it is quite likely that she has jurisdiction in other
directions, the exercise of which may incidentally affect that
property, just as the exercise by the states of the power to enforce
quarantine and inspection laws may incidentally affect commerce, the
power of which is vested in Congress. Such jurisdiction does not,
however, extend to matters relating merely to the control and
administration of the property, and hence does not authorize the
interference therewith which is threatened and complained of in this
case.

The Supreme Court made it clear, the jurisdiction expressly granted to the Port

of New Orleans could not be impinged upon by the City of New Orleans just because

the City of New Orleans may have other jurisdictional authority that may incidentally

affect the same property. Likewise, just because LCP has authority to use or acquire

the present property for spoil disposal and maintenance of the channel under its local

sponsor authority, and the property was burdened by a prior lease which incidentally

13

involved the use of the shipping channel, the power to collect fees “as a port

commission” for wharfage and other port activities was vested in Cameron and none

other. The sponsorship authority granted LCP does not extend to matters relating to

“wharfage fees,” and “fees against vessels calling on the LNG terminal or using any

other facilities or waterways or otherwise subject to the District’s jurisdiction to

assess fees and such fees and charges will be separately assessed, charged, and paid

by the vessel’s owners or charterers in accordance with the District’s assessments of

same.” (Second amendment to lease). Such fees and charges are exclusively

reserved for WCP to assess and collect within Cameron Parish. These are not

incidental matters.

Neither is the language “necessary for subsequent maintenance” of the channel

broad enough to expand LCP’s authority in Cameron Parish, allowing it to amend the

original surface lease to collect fees based on port operations at the site. This

argument was firmly rejected long ago by this court in an opinion authored by Judge

Saunders. In Twin Parish Port Com’n v. Berry Bros., Inc., 95-425 (La.App. 3 Cir.

10/4/95), 663 So.2d 257, writ denied, 95-2665 (La. 1/5/96), 666 So.2d 288, we

addressed the question of whether the Twin Parish Port Commission, a political

subdivision of the state, possessed any inherent powers to enact regulations in fields

where it lacks an affirmative grant of statutory or constitutional authority. This court

concluded the port commission did not possess any “inherent powers” beyond those

expressly granted by statute or the constitution. Finding the port commission had no

authority to enact an ordinance such as Ordinance No.3, prohibiting the discharge of

oil, grease, and refuse into Lake Peigneur, Judge Saunders wrote (emphasis added):

By analogy, we conclude that the trial court acted correctly with regard
to Ordinance No. 3. In accord, Desormeaux Enterprises, Inc. v. Village
of Mermentau, 568 So.2d 213 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1990). Its decision is
supported not only by legislation granting the state broad powers to

14

regulate the environment, but by the absence of statutory authority
granting the Twin Parish Port Commission concurrent jurisdiction.

Id. at 260.

This court clearly held the port commission in that case had no more authority

than that which is statutorily or constitutionally granted it by express provisions.

The court recognized that the local citizens and local authorities certainly have an

interest in “vigilantly safeguarding” the environment. Id. at 261. Nevertheless, it is

the state which has “exclusive” jurisdiction to safeguard the water quality of Lake

Peigneur as such authority is “ordained by the laws of this state and its people.” Id.

As the court explained: “The Commission is not permitted to issue regulations in its

own right, however, absent constitutional or statutory authority which it currently

lacks.” Id.

Likewise, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal, in Lake Providence

Port Commission v. Bunge Corporation, 193 So.2d 363 (La.App. 2 Cir., 1967), writ

refused, 195 So.2d 147 (La.1967), held that absent a positive grant of power to the

port commission by the Louisiana Constitution, the commission did not have the

authority to prohibit the defendant landowner from constructing facilities on its land

merely because the facility would be situated entirely on the bank of the Mississippi

River within the port commission’s district.

[T]he constitutional grant to regulate commerce and traffic within the
port area did not necessarily bestow upon the commission the authority
to Prohibit defendant from constructing the proposed facilities on its
own land merely because such construction was to be situated entirely
on the bank of the Mississippi. We are in accord with this conclusion.
To construe plaintiff’s authority to be extensive enough to prohibit
defendant from building on its own land, although located on the river
side of the Mississippi River levee and falling within the broad
definition of ‘river banks’ would require a positive grant of power to the
prot commission by the Louisiana Constitution.

Id. at 367.

15

Article 14, Section 31, of the Louisiana Constitution pertains to the creation of

port districts and empowers the legislature to create port, harbor, and terminal

districts as political subdivisions of the State. It empowers the legislature to “fix their

territorial limits” and to define their duties, powers, “and jurisdiction.” The second

circuit was unpersuaded by the port commission’s argument that it objected to the

defendant’s construction based on its duty to protect and increase the commission’s

income and thereby relieve the burden of the taxpayers. Though the court noted such

a concern was “admirable and noble,” it was “incompatible with the type of use

reserved for the public by Louisiana Civil Code Article 455” and nothing in the grant

of authority to the port commission could be construed as a positive grant of authority

to infringe upon this express right. Id.

LCP attempts to make the same argument here, asserting that the revenue it

receives from Cameron LNG is necessary for its port operations, meaning that

because LCP needs money to conduct its operations including spoil disposal and

channel maintenance, the receipt of these funds constitutes activity “necessary for the

maintenance” of the channel as authorized in the sponsorship legislation. The

majority acknowledges “[t]he Governor did not specifically authorize LCP to lease

anything under its Local Sponsor designation.” LCP has no “positive” grant of

authority to collect fees based on port activities in Cameron Parish. As the court

stated in Lake Providence Port Commission v. Bunge, 193 So.2d at 367, such an

argument is incompatible with the exclusive jurisdiction and authority specifically

bestowed upon WCP, which expressly reserves authority and jurisdiction to it to

collect fees for wharfage, and to regulate marine vessel traffic and other port activities

on property wholly situated in Cameron Parish for the benefit of the people of this

state.

16

Further, the record establishes beyond genuine dispute that the “amendments”

to the original “surface lease” significantly changed the use of the premises, a fact

clearly stated in both the “Second Amendment To Surface Lease” and the “Fifth

Amendment To Surface Lease,” which contain the following (emphasis added):

WHEREAS, Lessee is proposing to construct and operate an liquified
natural gas (“LNG”) marine delivery, storage and regasification
terminal, including two unloading docks, three storage tanks and
associated equipment to vaporize the LNG into natural gas and to
process the LNG to extract volumes of natural gas liquids (and to store
and transport such natural gas liquids) and a related gas pipeline to
transport revaporized LNG from the leased premises, all to be located
on the premises subject to the Lease (the “LNG Facilities”), but such
efforts require additional acreage and a change in the use of the
premises subject to the Lease.”

The new facility includes a marine delivery shipping terminal providing open

access to tankers as well as a new 35-mile pipeline. As noted above, the “Second

Amended Lease” added a provision basing payments to LCP on wharfage on a per-

marine-vessel basis and acknowledged LCP’s authority to impose wharfage fees and

other fees upon all vessels calling on this port including LNG’s ships as well as

all other marine “vessels calling at the LNG facilities.” Likewise, in its “Notice of

Application” filed with the United States Of America Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission, dated June 26, 2002, Hackberry LNG Terminal, LLC, predecessor to

Cameron LNG, states (emphasis added):

Take notice that on May 30, 2002; [as revised on June 24, 2002],
Hackberry LNG Terminal, L.L.C. (Hackberry LNG), 1000 Louisiana,
Suite 5800, Houston, Texas 77002, filed an application seeking
authorization to site, construct and operate a liquified natural gas
(LNG) terminal located at Hackberry, Louisiana, and a new 35 mile
natural gas pipeline in Cameron, Calcasieu, and Beauregard Parishes,
Louisiana. The purpose of the LNG terminal is to provide open access
LNG tanker services to shippers importing LNG. Hackberry LNG
is requesting authorization to offer open access terminalling services
at market-based rates; open access transportation service on the
proposed pipeline will be separately charged, and calculated on a cost-
of-service basis.

17

“...”

Hackberry LNG also requests approval of the Hackberry LNG terminal
as the place of entry for the imported LNG supplies under Section
3(a) of the Natural Gas Act and Part 153 of the Commission’s
regulations (Docket No. CP02-378-000). Hackberry LNG also requests
authorization in Docket No. CP02-376-000 to provide the LNG
terminalling services on a firm and interruptible basis pursuant to
Section 7( c ) of the NGA and Part 284 of the Commission’s
Regulations. In addition, Hackberry LNG seeks authorization, pursuant
to Section 7 (c) of the NGA and Part 157, Subpart A of the
Commission’s Regulations, to construct and operate a 35 mile
pipeline and related facilities to transport natural gas on an open
access basis under Part 284.

According to the majority, the five lease “amendments” are without

consequence because they did not change the operations of the lessee or the parties

so drastically as to constitute a new lease. And, as such, LCP’s sponsorship authority

to do what is “necessary for maintenance of the channel” was broad enough to allow

it to “amend” the lease. These “amendments” amounted to the construction of a

billion dollar plant and $65,000,000.00 in potential payments to LCP. Prior to the

changes, LCP was not receiving any rentals based on the lessee’s operations on the

property. It was simply an owner possessing property burdened by an existing lease,

from which it was entitled to collect an annual rental of $25,000.00 per year for

surface use, subject only to an annual cost of living adjustment.

The real question in this case has not changed from the one argued below by

all the parties and addressed by the trial court–that is whether LCP’s port operations

in Cameron Parish exceeds its authority. The answer is inescapably, “yes,” because

the legislature has not elected to expand LCP’s jurisdiction beyond that statutorily

granted to it. The jurisprudence likewise is well settled that its authority is special

and defined territorially.

The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal has addressed the question of

whether political subdivisions of the state granted specific territorial jurisdiction may

18

own land and perform functions outside of their own territorial limits and within the

territorial limits of another political subdivision. In City of Baker School Board v.

East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 99-2505 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/18/2000), 754

So.2d 291, the First Circuit rendered a well-reasoned opinion as to why such intrusion

upon the territorial jurisdiction of neighboring political subdivisions cannot be

allowed. In that case, the First Circuit explained that public education is a function

of the state as the sovereign. Each school board in performing its function acts as the

sovereign administering public education within its territorial jurisdiction much as

each port district is a political subdivision of the state performing its designated

functions within its territorial limits.

The ownership, management and control of property within a school
board’s district is vested in the district, in the manner of a statutory
trustee, for the accomplishment of its duty. See Orleans Parish School
Board v. City of New Orleans 56 So. 2d 280, 284 (La.App. Orleans
1952). The general rule of ownership of property of school districts was
stated in 68 Am. Jur. Schools Sect. 74 (1993), as follows:

The ownership of school property is generally in the local district or
school board as trustee for the public at large. School property is thus
considered public property and is not to be regarded as the private
property of the school district by which it is held or in which it is
located. The Baker Board, as successor to the Parish Board for the
accomplishment of the duty to educate, became the successor of the
property through which the duty is to be accomplished. While actual
ownership remains with the public at large, title follows the agency
obligated to carry out the responsibility. Title to the school property
at issue transfers to the Baker Board.

Concerning the issue of compensation, we find none due the Parish
Board. There has been no taking. The transfer of legal title from the
Parish Board to the Baker Board is merely the transfer from one trustee
to another. As stated above, the public owns the school property.
(Emphasis added)

City of Baker School Board v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 754 So.2d at

292.

We cited Baker School Board as the basis of our decision in Ebey v. Avoyelles

19

Parish School Board, 03-765 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/17/2003), 861 So.2d 910, writ

denied, 04-0196 (La. 3/26/2004), 871 So.2d 349, and held that the ownership of

school board property is “generally in the local district or school board as trustee for

the public at large.” Id. at 915. Based upon this proposition, we held that local school

boards have the right to administer and manage Section 16 lands within their district.

Our courts have treated hospital districts in the same manner. In Hospital

Service District Number 2 Of The Parish Of LaFourche v. Hospital Service District

No. 1 OF The Parish Of Terrebonne, 97-1792 (La.App. 1 Cir 6/29/1998), 716 So.2d

168, writ denied,98-2039 (La. 11/13/98), 730 So.2d 450, the First Circuit addressed

the question of whether Terrebonne HSD could own and operate a medical facility

located inside the territorial jurisdiction of Lafourche HSD. Terrebonne HSD argued

that the provisions of specific articles regarding the conduct of the hospital districts’

business (allowing for enhanced competition) should be placed on an equal footing

with the enabling legislation which created the districts and defined their territorial

boundaries. The First Circuit rejected that argument. The appellate court examined

the enabling statutes, and the enhanced competition statutes, which contained general

language such as “notwithstanding any other law to the contrary.” The appellate

court reasoned that the enhanced competition statutes must be interpreted and applied

“within the overall statutory scheme governing the hospital service districts.” Id. at

170. The court expressly held (emphasis added):

The topic specific competition articles do not and cannot, by
inference, re-write or supersede the enabling statute; and, thereby,
extend the authority of the hospital service districts beyond that
granted by the legislature. Thus, the competition articles provide that
the hospital service districts’ ability to compete, with the ‘market for
health care services’ within its authorized district boundaries, is
enhanced,‘notwithstanding any other law to the contrary’ that would
impede such competition. La.R.S. 46:1077; see also La.R.S. 46: 1074.

To allow the districts’ authority to be unilaterally extended into

20

another parish would result in the evisceration of smaller, poorer, or
more rural hospital service districts created to provide services to all the
residents of the particular district. The more affluent outside district
would willingly serve the areas of needs of the local district or parish
that presented a picture of profit, but might not want to provide general
unprofitable services for all the residents of the local district or parish.

If consolidation or cooperation is beneficial to the public, the
hospital service districts may cooperate and may share inter-parish
services, if the requisite parties agree. La.R.S. 46: 1051. However, by
allowing a public hospital service district to compete with, and
possibly cannibalize or destroy, a public district in another parish,
many areas of the less affluent, smaller, or rural district could be
left without the very medical services that the legislature hoped to
promote.”

Id.

Likewise in this case, as candidly acknowledged by LCP in oral argument,

West Cameron has no office, no money, no nothing. West Cameron’s authority could

indeed be “cannibalized, destroyed and eviscerated” by the actions of LCP in

conducting the present port activities within its territorial jurisdiction.

Further, LCP’s attempt to bootstrap its port activities in Cameron Parish with

its authority as a landowner of the property does not change the illegal nature of its

operations. Our courts have answered the question of a mixed use of property subject

to one political subdivision’s jurisdiction by another political subdivision exercising

a specifically authorized activity, such as use for spoil disposal. The Louisiana

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, in River Marine Contractors, Inc. v. Board of Com’rs

for St. Bernard Port, Harbor and Terminal Dist., 605 So.2d 654 (La.App. 4 Cir.,

1992), writ denied, 607 So.2d 568 (La. 1992), reviewed a declaratory judgment

determining which of two port authorities had jurisdiction over a facility within the

jurisdiction of the Port of St. Bernard upon which a tenant would be engaging in a

mixed use of the facility, i.e. by handling both domestic and international cargo. In

that case, the Port of St. Bernard purchased certain tracts of land within its

21

jurisdiction in St. Bernard Parish. River Marine entered into a preliminary lease

agreement with the Port of St. Bernard under which the port allowed River Marine

to conduct a feasability study for using the location for construction and operation of

a marine cargo facility by River Marine which would handle both domestic and

international cargo. The port agreed it would lease the property to River Marine if

the results of the study were favorable. Both the Port of St. Bernard and Port of New

Orleans claimed regulatory jurisdiction over the proposed facility. The applicable

legislation provided the Port of St. Bernard with regulatory authority over any tenant

on the subject property as to domestic cargo but expressly excluded international

cargo. Other legislation vested express authority to the Port of New Orleans over any

tenant on the subject property for international cargo. River Marine sought a

declaratory judgment to determine which port had authority to issue the permits and

regulate operation of River Marine’s mixed-use facility. The court looked to the

express language in the enabling legislation concerning the Port of St. Bernard and

the Port of New Orleans. The legislation spelled out the territorial jurisdiction of the

Port of St. Bernard and specifically included language limiting its authority over a

tenant owned facility to those “whose origin and destination is wholly within the

continental United States, including coastal waters.” The court held that, as the

statutory language clearly gave exclusive authority over international cargo to the

Port of New Orleans, it had authority over the project regardless of the mixed use of

the facility. WCP is the only legal entity in this case with the authority to collect the

fees at issue within its jurisdiction.

The law provides for intergovernmental agreements, as mentioned in Hospital

Service District Number 2, 716 So.2d 168, as the sole vehicle for two political

subdivisions to cooperate on projects that may benefit both while protecting and

22

respecting the authority and jurisdiction of both political entities like LCP and WCP.

LCP’s insistence that it alone is entitled to revenues generated from this port facility,

including all wharfage, shipping, and channel user fees, located wholly within WCP’s

jurisdiction, no doubt left the trial court with no alternative but to transfer ownership

of the land to WCP.4

Despite LCP’s failure to seek an intergovernmental agreement with WCP, the

majority attempts to ratify LCP’s unilateral actions by asserting it was done with the

support of the Cameron Parish Police Jury and WCP. The record, however,

demonstrates that while Cameron Parish Police Jury’s Administrator wrote a letter

expressing support for the development and operation of an LNG plant in Cameron

Parish, the letter was not followed by any resolution from the Parish or Port

abandoning their respective authority over the site and channel activities within their

jurisdiction. In fact, the record shows WCP was willing to discuss entering an

intergovernmental agreement concerning the property but apparently LCP was not

4
This insistence by LCP, and its complete lack of respect for the jurisdictional authority of
WCP was made evident in this case. The defense argued that WCP is attempting to receive
something for nothing. The record belies this assertion. WCP passed local bond measures of
$3,500,000.00 to be spent on maintaining the channel in Cameron Parish.
At a board meeting on October 14, 2002, LCP board member (Mr. Langley), perhaps
prophetically, read “The Flying V” which explains the scientific discovery of why geese fly in a
“V”formation. According to this report, flocks of geese fly in “V” formation because that formation
acts aerodynamically as a single wing distributing wind drag equally across all birds. According to
the Cal Tech research, twenty-five geese flying in a “V” formation can travel seventy-five percent
farther than one goose flying alone. As Mr. Langley’s report puts it “From geese, we can learn that
although we live in a society that promotes individualism and self-reliance, we function more
effectively in a community. Like the geese, we were created by God to work together, serve together
and encourage (and) support each other. When we cooperate and help each other to succeed, we not
only accomplish much but we do it with less stress and difficulty.” Perhaps that is exactly what the
legislature had in mind when it provided statutory guidance for inter-governmental agreements.
Such an agreement between LCP and WCP would have provided the only legitimate basis for LCP
to operate within WCP’s territorial jurisdiction. Unfortunately, LCP, chose to be the lone goose in
hopes of having the ultimate reward all for itself. This exemplifies the precise danger of allowing
neighboring political subdivisions like port districts, hospital districts, and school districts to
cannibalize, destroy and eviscerate their neighbors for their own financial gain. The people of
Cameron Parish deserve better.

23

interested.5

As the trial court correctly ruled, and as this court and our sister courts have

ruled, title to this land belongs to the State (the public) and must be transferred to

West Cameron as only it has the statutory authority to administer this property for the

State and to conduct port, harbor, and terminal activities within Cameron Parish. This

transfer of title to the people’s property will not impede in anyway LCP’s right or

authority, as a subdivision of the State, to engage in dredging and spoil operations on

the property–a servitude of use it had at the time it purchased the property, and a right

the trial court’s judgment does not deny it today.

5
The record of proceedings before the West Cameron Port Harbor & Terminal District dated
October 14, 2004 states the following:

The board discussed the Sempra Project, the issuance of their permit and the future
development of the Calcasieu Ship Channel. They did not want the permit to set the
precedence over their authority. Mr. Romero, Mr. Savoie, and Mr. Wilkerson
informed the board members on the outcome of the informal meeting between the
Police Jury, the Lake Charles Port Harbor & Terminal District and the West Cameron
Port Commission Group.

On the motion of Mr. Hebert, seconded by Mr. Constance and carried the board
agreed to have the same group to serve to negotiate with the Port of Lake Charles in
reference to the Sempra Permit.

24