Lafayette Parish School Board v. Ratcliff Construction Co.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-762

LAFAYETTE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD

VERSUS

RATCLIFF CONSTRUCTION CO., ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-2008-4236
HONORABLE MARILYN CASTLE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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OSWALD A. DECUIR
JUDGE

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Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Jimmie C. Peters, and David E. Chatelain,*
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Ronald J. Fiorenza
Provosty, Sadler, DeLaunay,
Fiorenza & Sobel
P. O. Box 1791
Alexandria, LA 71309-1791
(318) 445-3631
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
Ratcliff Construction Company

*
Honorable David E. Chatelain participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana
Supreme Court as Judge Pro Tempore.

Paul J. McMahon, III
Attorney at Law
617 St. John Street
Lafayette, LA 70501
(337) 233-6768
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant:
Lafayette Parish School Board

Emile Joseph, Jr.
Robert A. Robertson
Allen & Gooch
2000 Kaliste Saloom Road, Suite 400
Lafayette, LA 70508
(337) 291-1440
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
Corne-Lemaire Group,
An Architectural Corporation

David Perry Salley
Michael W. Rutledge
Salley, Hite, Rivera & Mercer
365 Canal Street, Ste 1710
New Orleans, LA 70130
(504) 566-8800
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
Beaullieu & Associates, Inc.

Jonathan C. Augustine, L.C.
The Augustine Law Firm, APLC
8322 One Calais Avenue
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
(225) 715-7112
Counsel for Other:
City of Alexandria

Eugene J. Radcliff
Montgomery, Barnett, Brown, Read,
Hammond & Mintz, LLP
5353 Essen Lane, Suite 140
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
(225) 329-2800
Counsel for Other:
City of Alexandria

DECUIR, Judge.

In 2008, the Lafayette Parish School Board filed suit against Corne-Lemaire

Group, an Architectural Corporation, which designed and supervised the construction

of N.P. Moss Middle School in the late 1990s. The trial court granted Corne-

Lemaire’s exception of peremption and dismissed the suit with prejudice. The School

Board now appeals, and joining the School Board as amicus curiae is the City of

Alexandria. For the following reasons, we affirm.

This case arises from water damage discovered at N.P. Moss Middle School in

the summer of 2007, eight years after the school was constructed. A contract was

entered into on October 13, 1997 by the School Board and Corne-Lemaire whereby

Corne-Lemaire furnished architectural drawings, plans, and specifications for the

construction of a new school and provided administrative and supervisory services

during the construction of the school. The Ratcliff Construction Company, Inc. was

hired as the general contractor in June 1998, and construction began immediately

thereafter. On July 29, 1999, a Certificate of Substantial Completion was filed and

the School Board accepted the work performed.

On July 24, 2008, after investigation had begun as to the cause of the water

intrusion, the School Board filed suit against Ratcliff and Corne-Lemaire. Ratcliff

responded by filing a peremptory exception of prescription, which the trial court

granted based on the five-year peremptive period found in La.R.S. 38:2189.

Thereafter, Corne-Lemaire filed its own Peremptory Exceptions of Peremption and

No Cause of Action, urging the court to find the School Board’s suit perempted by

the language of La.R.S. 9:5607, enacted in 2003, which provides in part:

A. No action for damages against any professional engineer,
surveyor, engineer intern, surveyor intern, or licensee as defined in R.S.
37:682, or any professional architect, landscape architect, architect
intern, or agent as defined in R.S. 37:141, or professional interior

designer, or licensee as defined in R.S. 37:3171, or other similar licensee
licensed under the laws of this state, or real estate developer relative to
development plans which have been certified by a professional engineer
or professional architect, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract,
or otherwise arising out of an engagement to provide any manner of
movable or immovable planning, construction, design, or building,
which may include but is not limited to consultation, planning, designs,
drawings, specifications, investigation, evaluation, measuring, or
administration related to any building, construction, demolition, or
work, shall be brought unless filed in a court of competent jurisdiction
and proper venue at the latest within five years from:

(1) The date of registry in the mortgage office of acceptance of the
work by owner;

....

C. The five-year period of limitation provided for in Subsection
A of this Section is a peremptive period within the meaning of Civil
Code Article 3458 and in accordance with Civil Code Article 3461, may
not be renounced, interrupted, or suspended.

D. The provisions of this Section shall take precedence over and
supersede the provisions of R.S. 9:2772 and Civil Code Articles 2762
and 3545.

In opposition to the exception of peremption, the School Board argued that

La.R.S. 9:5607 was not applicable, contending its right to pursue its claim against

Corne-Lemaire vested prior to the 2003 enactment of the statute. The School Board

specifically argued that its rights vested at the time the parties entered into the

contract on October 13,1997, and that since La.R.S. 9:5607 was enacted after the

contract date, it could not be applied retroactively to divest the School Board of its

vested rights. The trial court ruled against the School Board, maintained the

exception, and dismissed the suit against Corne-Lemaire. At the hearing, the trial

court probed the question of when the School Board’s rights vested and pointed out

that governing jurisprudence holds that the right to pursue a cause of action arises at

the time the damage becomes known.

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In this appeal, the School Board contends the trial court erred in failing to

apply the provisions of La.R.S. 9:2772, as it existed in 1997 when the contract

between the School Board and Corne-Lemaire was executed. At that time, Section

2772 provided for a ten-year prescriptive period for claims such as those asserted

herein. The School Board also argues the trial court erred in relying on a

subsequently enacted statute that served to retroactively divest the School Board of

its right to bring this cause of action. Both of the School Board’s arguments require

this court to find that its rights vested in 1997 when it entered into a contractual

relationship with Corne-Lemaire.

As an appellate court, we review peremptory exceptions by studying the entire

record “to determine whether the trial court was manifestly erroneous with its factual

conclusions.” Roadhouse Bar-B-Que, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds,

04-1697, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/4/05), 909 So.2d 619, 623, quoting Parker v. Buteau,

99-519, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99), 746 So.2d 127, 129. In this case, the School

Board and Corne-Lemaire were in a contractual relationship which ended in 1999,

when the school construction project was accepted. Damage appeared in the school

building eight years later in 2007. Suit was filed in 2008. The question before us is

twofold: when did the School Board acquire the right to sue Corne-Lemaire and

whether, by operation of law, that right was perempted by the passage of time.

We find no merit to the position advocated by the School Board. Applying

well-established jurisprudence to an analysis of this case, we find the School Board

did not acquire the right to sue Corne-Lemaire until it discovered damage to N.P.

Moss Middle School in 2007. By that time, the governing peremptive statute was

La.R.S. 9:5607, which provides for a five-year period from acceptance of the work

to file a claim against an architect. As more than five years passed after Corne-

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Lemaire’s work was accepted by the School Board, the suit brought in 2008 was

untimely.

As explained by the fourth circuit in Patriot American Hospitality Partnership,

LP v. Mississippi Land Holdings, Inc., 06-0601, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/13/06), 948

So.2d 249, 252, writ denied, 07-0080 (La. 3/9/07), 949 So.2d 450:

“Under Louisiana law, a cause of action accrues when a party has the
right to sue.” Landry v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 03-0719, 03-0993,
03-1002, p. 4, (La. 12/3/03), 864 So.2d 117, 122, quoting Bourgeois v.
A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 00-1528, p. 9 (La. 4/3/01), 783 So.2d 1251,
1259. Fault, causation, and damages are required for a cause of action
to exist. Owens v. Martin, 449 So.2d 448, 450-51 (La.1984).

The Patriot court concluded that the plaintiff did not acquire the right to sue the

engineering and architectural firms involved in a 1996 renovation until it discovered

the termite damage at issue in 2003. By that time, La.R.S. 9:5607 was the applicable

statute.

Likewise, in Lee v. Professional Construction Services, Inc., 07-865, p. 9

(La.App. 5 Cir. 3/11/08), 982 So.2d 837, 842, writ denied, 08-0782 (La. 6/6/08), 983

So.2d 919, a case involving engineering work in 1996 and damage in 2005 during

Hurricane Katrina, the fifth circuit relied on Patriot and held, “we find that the

plaintiffs did not acquire the right to sue until they discovered the damage in 2005.

Thus, their rights had not vested before the 2003 enactment of R.S. 9:5607.”

Finally, in Ebinger v. Venus Construction Corp., 08-379 (La.App. 3 Cir.

10/1/08), 995 So.2d 1224, this court followed Patriot and Lee and found a party’s

right to indemnification, asserted nine years after certain engineering work was

performed, was perempted by La.R.S. 9:5607. In all three cases, the courts rejected

the argument that there existed a vested, pre-existing right which is protected from

the retroactive application of the peremption statute.

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For the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

We deny Corne-Lemaire’s motion to strike the amicus curiae brief of the City of

Alexandria, although we find no merit to the position advocated therein. Costs of the

appeal in the amount of $1,161.69 are assessed to the Lafayette Parish School Board.

AFFIRMED.

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