Bradley Griffith v. Resa Latiolais

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-0824

BRADLEY GRIFFITH

VERSUS

RESA LATIOLAIS

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-20055193
HONORABLE DAVID BLANCHET, DISTRICT JUDGE

************

JIMMIE C. PETERS
JUDGE

************

Court composed of John D. Saunders, Jimmie C. Peters, Marc T. Amy, Billy H. Ezell,
and David E. Chatelain,* Judges.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

Amy, J. dissents and assigns written reasons.

Chatelain, J., concurs and assigns written reasons.

* Honorable David E. Chatelain participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana
Supreme Court as judge pro tempore.

Diane A. Sorola
402 W. Convent Street
Lafayette, LA 70501
(337) 234-2355

F. Shepton Hunter
708 South St. Antoine
Lafayette, LA 70501
(337) 230-9777

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Bradley Griffith

Julie Vaughn Felder
P.O. Box 80399
Lafayette, LA 70598
(337) 856-3444

Bradford H. Felder
G. Andrew Veazey
Huval, Veazey, Felder, Aertker & Renegar, L.L.C.
2 Flagg Place
Lafayette, LA 70508
(337) 234-5350

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Resa Latiolais

PETERS, J.

The basis of this litigation is a custody dispute between Bradley Griffith

(Bradley) and Resa Latiolais (Resa), the parents of Cole Rolden Griffith (Cole). Resa

appeals the custody judgment rendered by the trial court, asserting five assignments

of error. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court judgment in all respects,

render judgment awarding Resa sole custody of the minor child, assess all costs of

this litigation to Bradley, and establish a visitation schedule consistent with the

findings of this opinion.

The record establishes that Cole is the product of an extramarital

relationship—one which did not include the element of cohabitation. Still, the

relationship must be classified as something more than casual as it lasted almost

fourteen years.

Bradley is in his mid-fifties and is a financially successful Lafayette, Louisiana

businessman. He has never married, although he has a fifteen-year-old daughter born

to another extramarital relationship. He owns a retail store, a shopping center, an

apartment complex, and rental properties from which he derives income. He has used

his success to curry favor with various public officials, elected and unelected, and has

used his influence with those officials when it met his needs. As found by the trial

court in its reasons for judgment, Bradley seems to think that his financial success

and political connections place him above the law and entitle him to do anything he

pleases to accomplish the end he desires. The trial court also concluded in its reasons

for judgment that Bradley is devious, manipulative, and retaliatory in his dealings

with others, particularly women.

Resa is in her early forties, had previously been married, but is divorced. That

marriage produced one child, Lana, and Resa maintained Lana’s custody after the

divorce.

Cole was born on November 19, 2001, and resided exclusively with Resa from

his birth until after this litigation began. During that time, Resa took care of all

Cole’s needs, and the only contact Bradley had with the child during this period was

his visits to Resa’s home in the evening.1 Although Bradley provided Resa with

$1,600.00 to $1,800.00 per month to support Cole, the payments were sporadic at

best, and often he would go weeks without paying her anything.

In the fall of 2004, Resa stopped being a stay-at-home mother and began

attending Louisiana State University at Eunice, Louisiana. She progressed in her

studies and was scheduled to receive an Associate of Science degree in Radiologic

Technology in May of 2008. Cole began staying at a day care facility two to three

days per week, and Resa still maintained full responsibility for the child’s well-being

as Bradley seemed fully satisfied with his position as an occasional visitor in his son’s

life.

At some point during 2005, the relationship between Bradley and Resa began

to dissolve. Although Resa had apparently found a new love interest, she continued

to accept Bradley as an occasional visitor for Cole’s benefit, and took no steps to

interfere with Bradley’s involvement with his son. That is to say, Bradley set the

parameters of his relationship with Cole, not Resa. It is from this background that

this litigation began.

1
Bradley testified that from the time of Cole’s birth until the beginning of this litigation, he
visited Resa’s home every evening from 7:30 or 8:00 until 9:30 or 10:00 and would feed and bathe
Cole as he got older. On the other hand, Resa testified that the visits were, at best, two or three
evenings per week from 9:00 to 11:00 and that Bradley did nothing more than watch television with
Cole. The trial court accepted Resa’s version of the facts.

2

In September of 2005, Resa, Lana, and Cole evacuated Lafayette Parish with

Resa’s new love interest, Gregory Chappell, to escape the approach of Hurricane Rita.

When they returned, Bradley picked up Cole and took him riding. A few days later,

on October 5, 2005, Bradley filed a petition seeking to establish Cole’s paternity and

to be awarded Cole’s sole custody. The single basis for his claim to custody was that

Resa had “lately not made choices which are in the child’s best interest and has been

hurtful to the child.”2 Additionally, Bradley sought the appointment of a mental

health professional to evaluate the parties. Although Bradley did not elaborate as to

the particulars of Resa’s “choices,” the interrogatories attached to the petition make

it clear that the litigation arose because of Resa’s new love interest. The

interrogatories sought the particulars of the evacuation, including the identity of all

individuals with whom Resa left Lafayette Parish on September 21, 2005; where she

and the fellow evacuees stayed from September 21 through September 24, 2005; and

the sleeping arrangements of the evacuees during that time.

On October 10, 2005, Resa answered the petition, denying any allegation of

poor choices and asserting that Bradley had failed to establish good cause for the

appointment of a mental health professional. Additionally, she reconvened against

Bradley, seeking both custody and an order of child support. Furthermore, she sought

a protective order from the court prohibiting Bradley or a third party acting on his

behalf from following and/or harassing her. She also filed interrogatories wherein

she sought particulars concerning Bradley’s allegations of poor choices and the need

for professional evaluation. Additionally, she sought financial information from

Bradley.

2
No subsequent pleadings expounded on these allegations or added new allegations.

3

After the initial filings, this simple custody dispute became what can best be

described as an extended procedural and evidentiary nightmare, based not on the

events occurring before the October 2005 filing, but on events occurring

contemporaneously therewith and thereafter. Six preliminary hearings and the

Hearing Officer process of the Fifteenth Judicial District extended the time before

trial on the merits to August 21, 2006.3 The trial began on that day, but the thirteen

days of evidence gathering were not completed until January 28, 2008.4 The trial

court then took the matter under advisement and issued written reasons for judgment

two months later, on March 27, 2008.5 Over five months later, on October 9, 2008,

the trial court executed a judgment incorporating its reasons for judgment. Thus,

what began as a simple custody proceeding took three years to resolve at the trial

level.

The judgment executed by the trial court granted the parents joint custody, but

did not designate a domiciliary parent. Instead, the judgment provided alternate

weekly physical custody modified with a non-custodial parent overnight visit on

Tuesday of each week and an alternating holiday schedule. Additionally, the

judgment basically provided that the parents would be subject to the continuing

instructions of certain professionals as to how Cole is to be raised. With regard to

this latter point, the judgment provided the following:

3
The trial court held hearings to consider preliminary matters on November 10, 2005; January
19, 2006; March 9, 2006; April 27, 2006; and May l, 2006.
4
The trial on the merits began on August 21, 2005, and was recessed first until August 23,
2006; next to December 18, 2006; next to January 8, 2007; next to January 9, 2007; next to March
5, 2007; next to March 7, 2007; next to April 30, 2007; next to July 19, 2007; next to January 23,
2008; next to January 24, 2008; next to January 25, 2008; and finally to January 28, 2008.
5
The reasons for judgment consist of sixteen pages addressing the evidentiary issues and two
additional pages attached to the reasons for judgment setting forth the trial court’s determination as
to the visitation schedule.

4

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED the
parties shall continue co-parenting counseling sessions with Dr.
Kenneth Bouillion at such intervals and for such period of time as Dr.
Bouillion recommends.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED
that the parties shall follow the recommendations of the mental health
professionals in this case and they shall follow Dr. Kenneth Bouillion’s
recommendations with regard to co-parenting Cole and to assist them in
communication problems.
....

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED
that since RESA LATIOLAIS and Greg Chappell are now married, Mr.
Chappell shall be brought into the co-parenting sessions, at his costs, so
that relations can be improved between Mr. Chappell and BRADLEY
GRIFFITH for the sake of the minor child.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED
that it is in the best interest of the minor child that BRADLEY
GRIFFITH engage in counseling with Dr. Lynn Aurich, Ph.D., to
address the issues set forth in the Court’s “Reasons for Ruling” signed
on March 27, 2008, at such intervals and for such period of time as
recommended by Dr. Aurich.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED
that it is in the best interest of the minor child that RESA LATIOLAIS
continue to engage in counseling with Margo Hasha to address the
issues set forth in the Court’s “Reasons for Ruling” signed on March 27,
2008, as well as the report of Dr. Lyle LeCorgne, Ph.D., at such intervals
and for such period of time as recommended by Ms. Hasha.
....

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED
that Dr. Lyle LeCorgne shall remain involved in the case on an as-
needed basis.

(Emphasis added.)

The judgment further provided that the cost of co-parenting sessions was to be shared

equally between Resa and Bradley, while, at the same time, all counseling costs were

to be borne by the party subject to the counseling.6 Allocation of costs is an issue on

6
The judgment does not address how the costs associated with Resa’s husband, a non-party
who cannot be assessed with costs, will be divided, nor does it address who will be responsible for
Cole’s counseling expenses.

5

appeal as is the provision in the judgment “that neither party shall engage in any form

of corporal punishment of the minor child whatsoever.”

In her appeal, Resa asserts five assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in failing to award custody to Resa, or
alternatively, to appoint Resa the domiciliary parent and in
awarding custody on 50/50 basis rather than a schedule of
visitation with the child spending time primarily with Resa and
with the father having alternating weekends, one day in the off
week, and alternating holiday periods.

2. The trial court erred when it ordered Resa to continue co-
parenting sessions with Dr. Kenneth Bouillion, when it ordered
the parties to follow Dr. Kenneth Bouillion’s recommendations
with regard to co-parenting Cole, when it ordered Resa to pay
one-half of the cost of co-parenting sessions, when it ordered
Greg Chappell [Resa’s husband] to attend co-parenting sessions
at his cost, when it ordered Resa to continue counseling with
Margo Hasha at her cost, and when it ordered that Dr. Lyle
LeCorgne remain involved in this case.

3. The trial court erred in failing to require Brad to undergo further
mental health evaluations to address the sociopathic qualities,
character disorder, and possible sociopathic personality disorder
that Owen Scott, Ph.D. stated would be demonstrated if the
allegations that were ultimately proved to be true in this case were
true.

4. The trial court erred when it ordered that “neither party shall
engage in any form of corporal punishment of the minor child
whatsoever.”

5. The trial court erred in assessing costs equally between the
parties.

OPINION

It is well settled that an appellate court cannot set aside a trial court’s findings

of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless those findings are clearly wrong.

Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). If the findings are reasonable in light of

the record reviewed in its entirety, an appellate court may not reverse those findings

even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have

6

weighed the evidence differently. Id. Each child custody case must be viewed in

light of its own particular set of facts and circumstances with the paramount goal of

reaching a decision that is in the best interest of the child. Barberousse v.

Barberousse, 556 So.2d 930 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1990). The best interest evaluation is

fact-intensive and requires the weighing and balancing of factors favoring or

opposing custody of the competing parties on the basis of the evidence presented in

each case. Romanowski v. Romanowski, 03-124 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/23/04), 873 So.2d

656. The trial court is vested with broad discretion in deciding child custody cases

and its decision will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Bagents v.

Bagents, 419 So.2d 460 (La.1982); Stephens v. Stephens, 02-402 (La.App. 1 Cir.

6/21/02), 822 So.2d 770. However, as recognized by our supreme court, “[a]n award

of custody is not a tool to regulate human behavior.” Everett v. Everett, 433 So.2d

705, 708 (La.1983). In this case, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s factual

findings. We do find, however, that the trial court abused its discretion in effecting

its joint custody judgment.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

In its reasons for judgment, the trial court properly cited the law to be applied

in considering a child custody dispute. It first recognized that La.Civ.Code art. 131

requires that the award of custody be based on the best interest of the child. The trial

court also recognized that when parents cannot agree as to a custody arrangement, La.

Civ.Code art. 134 provides twelve relevant factors the court “shall” consider in

determining the best interest of the child. Those factors are as follows:

(1) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each
party and the child.

7

(2) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child
love, affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and
rearing of the child.

(3) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the
child with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.

(4) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate
environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that
environment.

(5) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home or homes.

(6) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the
welfare of the child.

(7) The mental and physical health of each party.

(8) The home, school, and community history of the child.

(9) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the
child to be of sufficient age to express a preference.

(10) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the
other party.

(11) The distance between the respective residences of the
parties.

(12) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child
previously exercised by each party.

In considering these factors, the trial court stated the following in its reasons for

judgment:

Up until the time BRAD instituted these proceedings, RESA was
clearly the primary caretaker of the minor child. She saw to his day-to-
day care, including medical and dental appointments. The child was
virtually in her care at all times, with the exception of daycare twice
weekly, which commenced in the fall of 2004. BRAD admittedly only
visited the child at RESA’s home approximately three (3) times per
week, during which time he would eat supper, and/or lie on the sofa and
watch television with Cole. BRAD never took the minor child to any
medical or dental appointments and the child only spent the night with
him on one (1) occasion at the time this matter was instituted.

8

While the Court finds that the parties are fairly even on the
remaining factors, they have both fallen woefully short in encouraging
a close and continuing relationship between the minor child and the
other parent. Though BRAD has claimed to want a good working
relationship with RESA, and even paid for co-parenting therapy, he has
engaged in an intentional pattern of conduct designed to place her under
severe stress and destabilize her life. Also, BRAD has appeared to
follow this Court’s suggestions throughout this litigation while
surreptitiously setting his own agenda. Further, BRAD has shown a
propensity to manipulate people, especially females, to fulfill his agenda
of winning custody, while at the same time crushing RESA
psychologically, financially and criminally.

Thus, in one sentence, the trial court balanced the factors of La.Civ.Code art. 134

equally between the parties, finding that both parents had “fallen woefully short” of

their parental obligations toward each other. Yet, in the remainder of the paragraph,

the trial court recognized that this uncooperative atmosphere arose from Bradley’s

unilateral actions and that his actions made cooperation next to impossible.

In her first assignment of error, Resa asserts that the trial court erred in not

awarding her sole custody. We agree. In reaching this conclusion, we find that this

litigation evolved into two separate lawsuits, one of which is not even supported by

any pleadings, but that when both factual scenarios are considered, the result is the

same—the trial court abused its discretion in effecting the equal sharing, joint custody

judgment based on the facts before it.

Evidence Addressing Pleadings’ Issues

In order to institute a lawsuit against a defendant, the plaintiff who files a

petition must identify the parties and set forth the basis for the lawsuit. La.Code

Civ.P. art. 891. The basis of any lawsuit consists of “a short, clear, and concise

statement of all causes of action arising out of, and of the material facts of, the

transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation.” La.Code Civ.P.

9

art. 891(A). The problem with this litigation is that the original custody issue became

intertwined with the events that followed, and resolution of the original issue became

a secondary goal. The only issues that should have been before the trial court by

virtue of the pleadings are Bradley’s complaints of Resa’s pre-litigation behavior—

because those issues are the only ones addressed in the pleadings.7 In addressing

these two issues, the trial court reached the same conclusion as has been previously

stated in the opinion—that in reality, Bradley’s true complaint was jealousy over

Resa’s new romantic interest, and his custody request was a way of punishing Resa.

When the background of his vague allegations finally came to light at trial, his initial

complaints were twofold:

1. While in Mississippi escaping from Hurricane Rita, Resa engaged in sexual
relations with Gregory Chappell in Cole’s presence, and;

2. Resa had physically abused Cole.

The trial court factually concluded that neither allegation was supported by the

evidence. With regard to the sexual issue, the trial court noted that none of the mental

health professionals involved in the litigation concluded that Cole witnessed any

sexual conduct between his mother and anyone else, and that Resa specifically denied

the allegation. With regard to the physical abuse issue, Bradley complained at trial

that Resa and her father had spanked Cole at his third birthday party. The trial court

found Bradley’s testimony on this point to not be credible given the fact that any such

event would have occurred eleven months before Bradley instituted his action. Thus,

the trial court concluded that the abuse claim was nothing more than an afterthought

to support Bradley’s suit.

7
As previously indicated, even those issues are vaguely presented.

10

Applying these factual findings to the factors set out in La.Civ.Code art. 134,

the factors balance overwhelmingly in Resa’s favor. Louisiana Civil Code Article

134(1) balances in her favor because Bradley’s commitment was a passing interest

in Cole while Resa’s was that of a true parent, and the more significant emotional tie

was between the child and his mother. With regard to La.Civ.Code art. 134(2),

Bradley played no part in Cole’s education and rearing and, although he later

professed to have found religion, spiritual guidance at the time these issues were

raised was provided exclusively by Resa. While Bradley, through his superior

financial position, was providing sporadic support to Cole, Resa was the party

actually providing food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs. Therefore,

Bradley has no advantage through the application of La.Civ.Code art. 134(3). Clearly

La.Civ.Code art. 134(4) also balances in Resa’s favor in that Cole had lived with her

his entire life in a stable, adequate environment and, as pointed out by the trial court

in its reasons for judgment, Bradley’s contribution was to visit in the evening and

enjoy the easy part of raising a child. Furthermore, while Bradley could provide a

custodial home for Cole, the permanency factor of La.Civ.Code art. 134(5) also

balances in Resa’s favor. With regard to the moral fitness issue found in La.Civ.Code

art. 134(6), Bradley and Resa maintained an extramarital relationship for years

without considering marriage. In fact, Bradley’s complaint as to Resa’s moral

decisions is a rather strange position given the fact that he had maintained a similar

extramarital relationship with Resa for such a long period of time. At the time this

matter was filed, La.Civ.Code arts. 134 (7), (8), (9), and (11) would have played no

part in the trial court decision. Both parents were in good physical health, and there

was no evidence of either having mental issues; Cole was not of school age, and his

11

school, home, and community history revolved around his mother; Cole was not of

the age that he could have offered a reasonable preference; and the distance between

the respective residences of the parties was not significant. With regard to

La.Civ.Code art. 134(10), the trial court factually found that before this litigation

began, Resa made Cole available to Bradley at all times, even allowing Bradley to

come to her home on the average of two to three evenings per week to eat, relax, and

visit with Cole. Finally, La.Civ.Code art. 134(12) clearly balances in Resa’s favor

as she previously bore the full responsibility of caring for Cole. Bradley’s testimony

at the trial clearly demonstrates that he delegated this responsibility to Resa:

Q. Okay. Isn’t it true that prior to that time the child had only spent
one night at your house from his entire birth?

A. He was still a very small child.

Q. Well, you left him with her, didn’t you?

A. She was the mother - -

Q. She was the primary caretaker, correct?

A. She was his mother, yeah.

Thus, had the trial on the merits addressed only the issues raised by the pleadings,

judgment would have been rendered in Resa’s favor.

Evidence Addressing Issues Arising after Issue was Joined

Unfortunately, the trial continued for well over a year. Instead of focusing on

the issues presented by the pleadings, and despite the fact that no facts pointed to the

need for their involvement, the litigation became entangled with continuous

evaluations by and recommendations of mental health professionals. Although Resa

concurred in some of this involvement, the experts’ contributions were basically at

Bradley’s insistence. Concurrent with the experts’ involvement, Bradley accelerated

12

an already mean-spirited, underhanded, and dishonest campaign to improperly

influence the outcome of the litigation. The most telling aspect of this entire record

is that, from beginning to end, it has never seemed to bother him that most of what

he has accomplished is totally counterproductive to any claim he may have to being

a good role model for his son. In fact, it establishes a record that reflects a parent

with few socially redeeming characteristics to pass on to his son.

We must now evaluate the trial court judgment in light of subsequent events

that improperly expanded the issues and impacted the ultimate result. In doing so, we

conclude that consideration of the remainder of the evidentiary record further

establishes that Resa should have been awarded Cole’s sole custody.

Most of the trial court’s sixteen-page reasons for judgment are dedicated to

documenting Bradley’s numerous attempts to improperly influence the outcome of

the litigation. Just some of the activities highlighted in the trial court’s reasons for

judgment include Bradley reporting Resa to the State of Louisiana on October 6,

2005, (the day after he filed this suit) for allegedly having improperly obtained a

medical card and food stamps to support Cole during those times when Bradley’s

support checks were not forthcoming; using two female acquaintances, Jan Huffman

and Jessica Harbin,8 to involve themselves with Resa’s sixteen-year-old daughter in

an effort to turn the daughter against her mother;9 using the same two women to

otherwise cause Resa severe emotional stress and anxiety;10 having a private

8
Jan Huffman is Jessica Harbin’s mother.
9
This intervention in the mother/daughter relationship resulted in Lana being interviewed by
law enforcement officials, making and recanting statements about her mother’s activities, and
ultimately moving to her father’s home because of the strain placed on the relationship with her
mother.
10
Bradley engaged in this subterfuge after being specifically admonished by the trial court to
distance himself from these two women. However, the trial court factually concluded that at

13

detective, Robert Williamson, accompany him to Cole’s day care facility on a number

of occasions, where they made insinuating inquiries concerning the owners of the

facility, resulting in the owners refusing to accept Cole at the facility; attempting to

pressure a juvenile officer, directly and through the personal intervention of a

Louisiana State Senator, to file a child abuse charge against Resa despite the officer’s

finding that no evidence supported the charge; staging confrontations with Resa and

enlisting the improper assistance of law enforcement personnel during those

confrontations to try to discredit Resa; and by joining Resa’s church with the intent

to harass her, drive her from the church, and curry favor with the trial judge.

The extent of Bradley’s disregard for the court itself is evidenced by the fact

that the trial court had directed him to not interfere with Cole’s stay at this particular

day care facility and had directed him to distance himself from Jan Huffman and

Jessica Harbin. Bradley disregarded these directives. As summarized by the trial

court in its reasons for judgment, Bradley and his private investigator “sabotaged the

situation” at the day care center. Additionally, the trial court found factually that

Bradley continuously manipulated and controlled the two women to do his bidding

in efforts to discredit Resa.

Bradley’s arrogance toward all who opposed him and his disdain for the justice

system in general is evidenced by his attempt to pressure Juvenile Officer Alex

Montgomery, III, to make a finding of child abuse against Resa despite the total lack

of evidence of abuse. The trial court factually found that Bradley even used his

personal influence with a Louisiana State Senator and had the Senator personally

contact Officer Montgomery and encourage him to file a bogus criminal charge

Bradley’s instruction, the two women stalked Resa, made harassing telephone calls to her, and filed
false criminal charges against her.

14

against Resa. The one individual who remained above the fray was Officer

Montgomery, who completed his investigation, concluded that charges were not

warranted, and closed the investigation. It obviously did not bother Bradley that his

false allegations subjected his own child to interviews with police officers and

representatives of the State of Louisiana, Office of Community Services.

As pointed out by the trial court, even something as deeply personal as the

practice of one’s religion was not exempt from Bradley’s manipulative ways. Before

this litigation began, Bradley apparently had no religious affiliation, but Resa and

Cole regularly attended the First Baptist Church in Lafayette, Louisiana. After filing

suit, Bradley began attending Resa’s church. The trial court found factually that

attending this particular church was less about a religious experience and more about

an effort to “garner favor with [the trial court] and to sully RESA’s reputation.” In

support of that conclusion, the trial court made the following factual findings:

Once he joined the church, BRAD set about to ingratiate himself with
the pastor, Perry Sanders, by personally handing him donations
comprised of cash and checks. Also, BRAD wore a yellow [royal blue]
bracelet to church which he explained to church members was a
demonstration of support for victims of child abuse, which included
Cole at the hands of RESA. BRAD chose to sit in close proximity to
RESA in the church sanctuary to place pressure on her during the church
services, eventually resulting in her leaving the church and joining
another local Baptist church. The Court also finds the statement made
by the mother of BRAD’s other child, Cindy Hebert, in a telephone
conversation with attorney Julie Vaughn Felder which occurred on
August 15, 2006, to be credible. In that conversation, Ms. Hebert
indicated that the reason BRAD became involved with First Baptist
Church and Reverend Perry Sanders was he believed that this Court
would be “crazy” to go against a minister of a church of 10,000 people
in this community.

[Footnote omitted.]

15

The trial court also found that on November 30, 2005, Bradley orchestrated an

incident between Resa and Cindy Hebert11 at the Opelousas General Hospital with the

help of Officer Roylis Brent Gallow of the Opelousas Police Department.12 In its

reasons for judgment, the trial court described what occurred that day:

That morning BRAD was bringing the minor child to Opelousas General
Hospital for some lab tests associated with a urinary tract infection and
was to meet RESA at the hospital. Because of their past acrimony, the
Court believes BRAD was confident that if he brought Cindy Hebert
with him, that RESA would become upset and lose control. Further, he
wanted to document RESA’s conduct by having Officer Gallow present
as a witness. Again, this was a manipulation by BRAD to bait RESA
into acting inappropriately in a public place and to document her
actions. Sadly, RESA predictably took the bait and actually battered
Cindy Hebert in the process by shoving her with her elbows as RESA
held Cole in her arms. Again, all of this occurred in the presence of the
minor child, and was yet another traumatic experience for him involving
parental conflict and police officers.

In its reasons for judgment, the trial court also found that Bradley attempted to

coach Cole before the child was interviewed by the mental health professionals and

that on more than one occasion, he “has spoken negatively about RESA and Mr.

Chappell in the child’s presence.” The record also establishes that the involvement

of many of Bradley’s witnesses was encouraged by gifts that can only be described

as out-and-out bribes.13

All these efforts by Bradley were continuous from the time the initial pleading

was filed until the end of trial. Bradley used the recess periods during the year and

four month trial to create new issues. His antics resulted in a multitude of reciprocal

11
Ms. Hebert is the mother of Bradley’s fifteen-year-old daughter.
12
Officer Gallow is the brother of Opelousas Police Chief Perry Gallow. The Police Chief
is described at trial as Bradley’s political friend.
13
The record establishes at a minimum that Robert Williamson’s daughter received a free
dress for his help; Lana received two pair of jeans and two shirts; and Jessica received $40.00 and
gasoline for her efforts in harassing Resa.

16

protective filings generated by not only the litigants, but also the participants in

Bradley’s various schemes. They included temporary restraining orders, criminal

charges both bogus and real, and numerous altercations between the parties and the

players in this drama. The trial court factually found little or no merit in any of

Bradley’s assertions and allegations and voiced dismay at Bradley’s continuing

improper antics. Despite the trial court’s frustration, Bradley suffered no penalty for

his activities or for disregarding the trial court’s specific instructions.

After dedicating most of the sixteen pages of its reasons for judgment to

document Bradley’s activities, the trial court found little basis on which to criticize

Resa. At worst, the trial court concluded that Resa’s attempt to better herself by

enrolling in college affected her parenting skills and that her reaction to Bradley’s

antics after the filing of the original petition were “extremely troubling.”

Specifically, the trial court concluded that while her efforts to better herself through

education were “laudable,” her misuse of the food stamp and medical benefit system

was inappropriate and her emphasis on gaining her degree “severely diminished” her

ability to manage and care for Cole. The trial court also found that Resa’s removal

of Bradley’s name from a day care sheet and replacing it with Gregory Chappell’s,

her instruction to Cole’s pediatrician not to provide Bradley with medical records or

information about Cole, and her efforts to place her new husband “in the role of her

protector in situations with BRAD” were counterproductive.

We find no manifest error in the trial court’s factual findings. We do, however,

find error in the trial court’s equal balancing of Resa’s actions against Bradley’s

transgressions. While Resa may not have always made the best choices, it is difficult

for this court to criticize a woman who wants to better herself through education

17

rather than living off the charity of a manipulative and controlling former lover. In

fact, there is evidence that Bradley acquiesced in her seeking food stamps and a

medical card.14 The other activities for which she was criticized all arose after

Bradley enlisted the assistance of his two female friends, various police officers, a

Louisiana State Senator, Resa’s own daughter, a Baptist preacher, and a whole host

of mental health experts, all with the singular purpose of discrediting her without

regard for the truth. Viewed in the context of Bradley’s activities, one can understand

her negative response to her surroundings.

The involvement of the various mental health experts in this litigation does not

change our opinion that the trial court abused its discretion in the balancing process.

The experts’ involvement came very early in the litigation as the trial court signed an

order on November 28, 2005,15 appointing Dr. Lyle LeCorgne, Ph.D., a Lafayette,

Louisiana clinical psychologist, to evaluate Bradley, Resa, Cole, and Lana. The trial

court later expanded this order of evaluation to include Gregory Chappell and Cindy

Hebert. Dr. LeCorgne issued a written report of his findings and recommendations

on April 27, 2006. In his report, Dr. LeCorgne recommended that Cole undergo

counseling and that Resa’s visitation be supervised until Dr. LeCorgne concluded that

she had progressed sufficiently in individual therapy to lift the supervision. Almost

one year later, at a March 7, 2007 hearing, Bradley and Resa agreed to participate in

co-parenting counseling with Dr. Kenneth Bouillion, Ph.D., a Lafayette, Louisiana

psychiatrist.

14
We recognize that the trial court factually found no evidence of that involvement, but given
Bradley’s credibility, it is difficult to believe otherwise.
15
This order came less than two months after the initial petition was filed and long before the
basic issues were addressed by the trial court.

18

At the May 1, 2006 hearing, Bradley also agreed to undergo psychological

evaluation by a professional of Resa’s choosing, and the evaluation was ultimately

performed by Drs. Owen Scott, Ph.D., and Mary Lou Kelly, Ph.D., both clinical

psychologists from Baton Rouge, Louisiana. These professionals issued a written

report on August 17, 2006, in which they found that “both parents are adequately

competent and motivated,” but strongly recommended “that both parents, and

especially Mr. Griffith stop creating a climate of conflict and accusation.” Their

recommendation was that Cole spend alternating weeks with each parent, suggesting

that “this arrangement will equalize the power between the parents and require them

to cooperatively and collaboratively parent Cole.” However, they also recommended

that should the court choose to have one parent be the domiciliary parent, it should

be Resa “given her history of being the primary caretaker and her willingness to have

a balanced attitude towards Mr. Griffith,” then stated that, by contrast, Bradley

appeared to be “dedicated toward vilifying” Resa. While we question the need of

these experts given the basic allegations of Bradley’s pleadings, even they recognized

Bradley’s true character and motivation.

In summary, the trial court found factually that Bradley is devious,

manipulative, and retaliatory, and that these base characteristics particularly come to

the surface in his dealings with women; that he had little or no involvement in Cole’s

life prior to filing this suit; that not only was the initial suit without merit, but

Bradley’s motivation for filing the suit was not Cole’s best interest, but jealousy; and

that Bradley was engaged in a continuing campaign to discredit Resa and influence

the trial court decision without regard to the dishonesty of his tactics or the falsity of

his assertions. On the other hand, the trial court found that Resa bore the singular

19

responsibility for raising Cole from his birth until after this litigation began; that

during that time, she allowed and encouraged Bradley’s involvement in Cole’s life;

that she began an attempt to better educate herself to become more independent of her

manipulative former lover and to better care for her son; and that her retaliatory

actions between the filing of suit and judgment were directly in response to Bradley’s

antics.

Despite the overwhelming evidentiary findings in Resa’s favor, the trial court

still awarded Bradley an equal-sharing custody arrangement—a judgment that is

inconsistent when compared to the factual findings. In the same paragraph of its

reasons for judgment, the trial court points out that Resa was “clearly” Cole’s primary

caretaker; then criticized her for having “a problem with dependency on men”; and

at the same time, criticized her for attempting to become independent from Bradley

by pursuing an education. In another paragraph, the trial court criticized Resa’s

unwillingingness to “facilitate a close and continuing relationship between Cole and

his father” without mentioning the background giving rise to Resa’s reluctance to

deal with Bradley on any level. In still another paragraph, the trial court criticized

Resa for allowing her new husband, Gregory Chappell, to assume the role of her

protector from Bradley.16 While placing much emphasis on Resa’s after-the-fact

attempt to protect herself from Bradley’s constant assault, the trial court also

concluded that it was concerned with Resa’s difficulty in dealing with “her issues of

passivity, dependency, approval seeking, people pleasing and her tendency to be

manipulated by others.”

16
There are many who would argue that protecting one’s wife is one of the marriage vows.
That vow is particularly significant in this particular case, since many of those who are given the
societal obligation to protect Resa appeared to be working hand-in-glove with Bradley.

20

With regard to Bradley’s development, the trial concluded only that Bradley

had “improved over the course of the litigation.” At the same time, the trial court

expressed that it was “extremely concerned that unless BRAD acknowledges his

manipulative behavior that he will not change.”17 (Emphasis added.)

We recognize that La.R.S. 9:335(A)(2)(b) provides that to the extent it is

feasible and in the best interest of a child, physical custody of a child should be

shared equally between the parents. However, that mandate is tempered by

La.Civ.Code art. 132, which provides that “if custody in one parent is shown by clear

and convincing evidence to serve the best interest of the child, the court shall award

custody to that parent.” (Emphasis added.) The discussion in this opinion to this

point, and the primary discussion in the trial court’s reasons for judgment, has

centered primarily on the parents and their character strengths and faults. While those

facts must play a part in the ultimate decision on custody, Cole’s best interest is the

paramount consideration. The facts concerning his situation also balance in favor of

Resa.

The record establishes that for the first four years of his life, Cole was a well-

adjusted, happy child. Unfortunately, Cole then became his father’s pawn in these

proceedings—first as a weapon to express his father’s jealousy toward his mother,

and finally as a prize to be gained in a no-holds-barred attack on his mother and the

integrity of our judicial system. Clearly, Cole suffered from this litigation, and giving

his father equal access without a clear showing that Bradley has changed (not just a

hope for the future) is a guarantee of future difficulties. In fact, the trial court

17
The record contains no evidence that Bradley has ever recognized his character defects that
clearly came to the surface in this litigation.

21

concluded as much when it expressed its concerns over Bradley’s refusal to recognize

the error of his manipulative ways:

The Court finds it troubling that Cole, who has been described as a very
intelligent young man, will learn how to manipulate people, especially
women, and use political connections and favors as a means of getting
ahead in life. The Court has concerns that this manipulative and
exploitive behavior on the part of BRAD is a long-standing pattern.

However, instead of recognizing that this concern alone justifies denying Bradley

equal access to Cole, the trial court attempted to preclude this problem by ordering

continuing counseling. Cole’s best interest is not served by the hope that Bradley will

change his character in the future.

Application of the factors set out in La.Civ.Code art. 134 to the factual findings

on the issues raised and litigated outside the pleadings causes us to reach the same

result as before—the factors balance overwhelmingly in Resa’s favor.

While Cole is no longer a passing interest in Bradley’s life, the custody

awarded to Bradley is nothing more than a victory over his former lover, and, despite

the overwhelming disruption of the mother/child relationship, Resa has shown herself

to be the true parent with a more significant emotional tie to Cole. Therefore,

La.Civ.Code art. 134(1) still balances in her favor. With regard to La.Civ.Code art.

134(2), Bradley attempted to purchase his religious status and then used it to spread

falsehoods about Resa. Additionally, his manipulation of the day care situation

reflects a desire to control, not enhance, Cole’s education opportunities. Thus, his

religious and educational interest in Cole is shallow at best and nonexistent at worst.

Bradley’s superior financial situation still exists, but he has shown that he is more

willing to use that situation to get his way rather than to financially support his child.

Therefore, Bradley still has no advantage under the application of La.Civ.Code art.

22

134(3). Clearly La.Civ.Code art. 134(4) continues to fall in Resa’s favor. Before this

litigation began, Cole lived with her his entire life in a stable, adequate environment.

The responsibility for the disruption of that environment and Cole’s emotional

problems that arose thereafter lies totally with Bradley. Despite being confronted

with a conspiracy of Bradley’s underlings, public officials, law enforcement, and even

her own minister, Resa continued to persevere—continuing her educational program,

attending all sorts of mandated psychological evaluations and counseling sessions,

and still offering Cole stability when he was with her. Bradley’s approach was to

involve Cole with bogus claims and use him in every way possible as reflected by the

“child abuse” wrist band he so openly wore to the church services. Furthermore,

while Bradley can still provide a custodial home for Cole, his antics have destroyed

the permanency factor, which most would consider important for the rearing of a

child. Thus, La.Civ.Code art. 134(5) continues to balance in Resa’s favor. The moral

fitness factor found in La.Civ.Code art. 134(6) now balances overwhelmingly in favor

of Resa. Bradley’s antics, as clearly articulated by the trial court, make it abundantly

clear that the trial court’s description of him as devious, manipulative, and retaliatory

in his dealings with others is directly on point. Additionally, the trial court’s

conclusion that, during the litigation, Bradley had “shown a propensity to manipulate

people, especially females, to fulfill his agenda of winning custody, while at the same

time crushing RESA psychologically, financially and criminally” is also an accurate

description. Little has changed concerning the application of La.Civ.Code arts. 134

(7), (8), (9), and (11) although, given Bradley’s obsession with gaining custody, some

may question his mental balance. Still, both are in good physical health and, although

Cole is now of school age, the distance between the households makes transportation

23

a minimal problem. However, Cole is still not of the age that he could have offered

a reasonable preference. With regard to La.Civ.Code art. 134(10), availability of

Cole to either parent had been dictated by the trial court since the litigation began in

earnest. Finally, La.Civ.Code art. 134(12) balances in Resa’s favor as she previously

bore the full responsibility of caring for Cole.

As we read the trial court’s reasons for judgment, its intent is less a resolution

of the issues presented and more of an attempt to regulate the behavior of the

parties—primarily Bradley. This intent is supported by the trial court’s “sincere hope

that both parties will heed the testimony of Dr. Bouillion” and follow the seven

factors the doctor suggests are the keys to resolving their differences. This approach

substitutes resolution of the parents’ problems for Cole’s best interest. Placing the

emphasis on Cole and not the parents mandates that Resa be awarded sole custody.18

The clear and convincing evidence in this matter is that Bradley has not

changed. While it is commendable to attempt to effect a solution for what may

happen in the future, this matter must be decided on the facts now before the court.

That being the case, and considering the factors found in La.Civ.Code art. 134, we

find that the trial court abused its discretion in rewarding Bradley with a favorable

judgment when his sole goal has been to subvert the very system of justice to which

we adhere. Although Resa did not plead it as a defense,19 the matter before us is

much like the hornbook law “clean hands doctrine.” That doctrine, which is alive and

well in Louisiana, provides that “[a] person cannot maintain an action if, in order to

establish his cause of action, he must rely in whole or in part, on any illegal or

18
We also recognize that in Resa’s initial pleading, she asked only for joint custody.
However, given the record as a whole, we find that the “best interest” requirement of La.Civ.Code
art. 132 mandates an award of sole custody.
19
The pleadings by both parties leave much to be desired in every respect.

24

immoral act or transaction to which he is a part.” Allvend, Inc. v. Payphone Comm’ns

Co., Inc., 00-661, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/23/01), 804 So.2d 27, 30. If there ever was

a case of an individual who was totally immersed in illegal or immoral activity to

establish a cause of action, it is Bradley. We reverse the joint custody award and

award sole custody to Resa.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBERS TWO AND THREE

Resa’s second assignment of addresses the trial court’s orders requiring

continuing post-trial participation with the mental health experts who became

involved in the litigation. Specifically, she asserts that it was error to require

continuing co-parenting sessions with Dr. Bouillion, that it was error to require the

parents to follow his recommendations in raising Cole, that it was error to require her

to pay one half of the cost of counseling, that it was error to order her husband to

attend co-parenting sessions, that it was error to require her to continue counseling

with Margo Hasha, and that it was error to order that Dr. LeCorgne remain involved

in the matter. In her third assignment of error, Resa asserts that the trial court erred

in not requiring Bradley to undergo further evaluations in order to determine whether

he suffers from sociopathic personality disorder. We agree that the second

assignment of error has some merit, and, based on the relief we grant, the other issues

raised in these assignments of error are rendered moot.

In custody matters, the trial court has the inherent power to tailor a custody

decree in such a manner that it both accords with the child’s best interest and

minimizes any risk of harm to the child. Beene v. Beene, 43,845 (La.App. 2 Cir.

10/22/08), 997 So.2d 169. Therefore, it follows that a trial court’s determination in

regard to custody matters is entitled to great weight on review and will not be

25

reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Gremillion v. Gremillion, 07-492

(La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/07), 966 So.2d 1228. However, as previously stated, “[a]n

award of custody is not a tool to regulate human behavior.” Everett, 433 So.2d at

708.

The use of expert witnesses is governed by La.Code Evid. art. 701, et.seq.

With regard to the relationship between the trial court and the expert witness,

La.Code Evid. art. 702 provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.

In custody matters, La.R.S. 9:331 gives the trial court authority to “order an

evaluation of a party or the child in a custody or visitation proceeding for good cause

shown. The evaluation shall be made by a mental health professional selected by the

parties or by the court.” Still, the involvement of the expert testimony in a custody

case must be limited to assisting the trier of fact as allowed by La.Code Evid. art. 702.

In our review of expert testimony, we note that “[t]he effect and weight to be

given expert testimony is within the broad discretion of the trial judge.” Pendleton

v. Barrett, 97-570, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/23/97), 706 So.2d 498, 501. Furthermore,

a trial court is not bound by expert testimony; the court has the power to substitute

its own judgment and common sense for the conclusion of an expert witness where

the evidence as a whole warrants doing so. Ryan v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 07-2312 (La.

7/1/08), 988 So.2d 214.

The issue before us, however, is not the effect and weight given the experts’

testimony, but the trial court’s mandate that the parties delegate their right to make

26

parental decisions to the mental health care professionals on a continuing basis. We

find no statutory authority for continued mandatory professional involvement after

judgment, as set forth in the trial court judgment, and reverse those portions of the

trial court judgment. In reaching this decision to reverse the order of continued

professional involvement in this litigation, we do acknowledge that La.R.S.

9:358.1(A) provides that a parenting coordinator may be appointed by the trial court

upon its own motion or that of a party if proof of good cause is shown for the

appointment. The term of the appointment is one year, but may be extended for good

cause. La.R.S. 9:358.1(B). The statutory parenting coordinator’s duties consist of

“assist[ing] the parties in resolving disputes and in reaching agreements regarding

children in their care” on a variety of issues. La.R.S. 9:358.4. However, a parenting

coordinator may only be appointed “if the court has previously entered a judgment

establishing child custody, other than an ex parte order.” La.R.S. 9:358.1(A). The

comments to this statute note that “[t]he purpose of this limitation is to prevent the

court from using the parenting coordinator process as a means of abdicating its

responsibility to make the initial custody determination.” La.R.S. 9:3581.1

Comments - 2007(b). The effect of the trial court’s continued co-parenting

counseling and the requirement that the parents implement the instructions of the

various mental health professionals in this matter has the effect of appointing a

parenting coordinator without having first entered a judgment establishing the

custody of Cole and with more authority than statutorily authorized. Furthermore, it

has the effect of the trial court improperly abdicating its obligation to make the initial

custody determination to Dr. Bouillion and the other mental health professionals.

27

Our reversal of those provisions of the judgment render moot the other issues

raised by these assignments of error.20 Therefore, we need not consider them.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FOUR

Bradley has tried to make this issue a cornerstone of his claim for custody since

the beginning of this litigation. As previously stated, one of his two initial claims was

that Resa and her father had physically abused Cole by spanking him some eleven

months before he filed suit. As also previously stated, the trial court found no merit

in this assertion. When that approach was not successful, Bradley began to use his

fellow conspirators to make a case for child abuse. Despite his best efforts to entice

and bribe individuals to conjure up child abuse allegations,21 the best he was able to

produce was evidence that, on occasion, Resa used corporal punishment on Cole that

left small bruises. Based solely on the opinions of the mental health experts, the trial

court prohibited corporal punishment as a means of discipline in all respects. In

doing so, the trial court stated the following:

All of the mental health professionals in this matter found RESA’s
methods of corporal punishment to be inappropriate and ineffective in
disciplining Cole. Dr. LeCorgne opined that a time-out is a two-fold
punishment which allows a child to experience being in control of his
behavior so that he can be encouraged, rewarded and praised. Dr.
Bouillion indicated, the next step is to remove privileges, and finally, to
ground the child. As Dr. LeCorgne stated, for RESA to use corporal
punishment by striking the child with a spoon to enforce time-out, is
incompatible with the theory of time-out. Dr. LeCorgne found RESA’s
use of the spoon to be in indicator that she was angry, and no longer
disciplining the child, but merely letting off steam. Corporal
punishment should only be used as an attention getter when the child is
engaging in behavior that is harmful or unsafe. While RESA’s actions
do not rise to the level of child abuse, the Court finds that they constitute
excessive and inappropriate discipline.

20
We recognize that Resa may have incurred counseling expenses since rendition of the trial
court judgment, but the nature of the devolutive appeal prohibits relief for those expenses.
21
All of these allegations of child abuse were found to be totally without merit.

28

Regardless of the experts’ opinion on this issue, we cannot agree with the trial

court’s complete rejection of corporal punishment. In fact, the first circuit, in Mason

v. Hadnot, 08-2015 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/13/09), 6 So.3d 256, noted that corporal

punishment is permitted in Louisiana when used by a parent to punish a minor child

and the punishment used is reasonable. In reaching this conclusion, the first circuit

relied on La.R.S. 14:18(4), which provides that “reasonable discipline of minors by

their parents, tutors or teachers” is “justifiable, although otherwise criminal,” and

La.Civ.Code art. 218, which provides that the parents of an unemancipated minor

“have the right to correct him, provided it be done in a reasonable manner.”

When an expert’s opinion conflicts with Louisiana law, the court is obligated

to apply the law regardless of its personal views.22 To do otherwise would leave

parents, tutors, teachers, and even law enforcement and prosecutors in a quandary

concerning the issue. Again, as pointed out in Everett, 433 So.2d 705, we must be

careful not to use the custody proceedings as a means of regulating human behavior.

We reverse that portion of the judgment prohibiting corporal punishment.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FIVE

In her final assignment of error, Resa argues that the trial court erred in

assessing costs equally between the parties. While we note that La.Code Civ.P. art.

1920 allows the trial court to assess costs against any party and in any manner it

considers equitable, except as otherwise provided by law, the assessment in this

matter was based on the judgment awarding equal custody. Given our decision to

22
Many books have been written with various theories of punishment for children. In fact,
the most widely read Book of all time is in direct conflict with the opinions of the professionals in
this litigation. See Proverbs 13:24, 22:15, 23:13, 23:14, and 29:15. It is sufficient to say that each
child brings into this world his or her own challenges when it comes to discipline, and that no single
method is right (or wrong) for all.

29

reverse the trial court judgment in full, we also reverse the assessment of cost and

assess all costs of these proceedings to Bradley.

VISITATION SCHEDULE

Having determined that Resa is entitled to sole custody, and thereby having set

aside the joint custody plan instituted by the trial court, we turn to Bradley’s visitation

schedule. In its reasons for judgment, the trial court set forth a visitation schedule

which, when coupled with the joint custody judgment, set forth all the days of

visitation by the non-custodial parent. We modify the original sharing arrangement

to provide that Resa shall have sole custody, and Bradley shall have visitation on the

first and third weekends of each month from 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 8:00 p.m. on

Sunday of each weekend. The first weekend of each month shall be defined as the

weekend beginning with the first Friday of each month. As to holiday visitation, we

maintain the trial court’s holiday periods and allow Bradley visitation in even

numbered years for the first half of the Mardi Gras Holiday, the first half of the

Easter/Spring Break, the first half of Thanksgiving, and the Christmas Holiday. In

odd numbered years, Bradley shall have visitation on the second half of the Mardi

Gras Holiday, the second half of the Easter/Spring Break, the second half of

Thanksgiving, and the New Year’s Holiday. Additionally, Cole shall spend every

Father’s Day weekend with his father on the same time periods set for weekly

visitation, and in the event Mother’s Day falls on Bradley’s visitation weekend, he

shall forfeit that weekend and Cole shall spend Mother’s Day weekend with his

mother. Finally, we award Bradley visitation for three weeks in the summer vacation

period, beginning at 6:00 p.m. on the first Friday of July and ending at 6:00 p.m. on

the third Sunday of the said month.

30

DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court judgment awarding

Bradley Griffith and Resa Latiolais joint custody of Cole Rolden Griffith and render

judgment awarding sole custody of the minor child to his mother, Resa Latiolais; we

reverse those portions of the trial court judgment ordering that the parties and Resa

Latiolais’s current husband continue in post-judgment counseling and follow the

recommendations of the mental health professionals in raising their son; we reverse

the trial court judgment prohibiting the use of corporal punishment in raising Cole

Rolden Griffith; we reverse the trial court judgment assessing each party with one

half of the costs of this litigation and render judgment assessing Bradley Griffith with

all costs both at the trial level and on appeal; and we modify the visitation schedule

previously rendered by the trial court to comport with the judgment of this court.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

31

NUMBER 09-0824

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

STATE OF LOUISIANA

BRADLEY GRIFFITH

VERSUS

RESA LATIOLAIS

AMY, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

The majority reverses the trial court’s award of joint custody and imposes sole

custody in favor of Resa. I respectfully dissent as I find an affirmation is appropriate.

First, I think it is important to note that Bradley instituted this matter, seeking

sole custody and, alternatively, joint custody. In her answer and reconventional

demand, Resa sought only joint custody and child support. She did not amend the

pleadings to request sole custody. In my opinion, this fact is significant in reviewing

the trial court’s award of joint custody.

Further, I point out that it was not Bradley’s burden to demonstrate that joint

custody was in the best interest of the child. Rather, the trial court was making an

initial determination of child custody pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 132, which

provides:

If the parents agree who is to have custody, the court shall award
custody in accordance with their agreement unless the best interest of
the child requires a different award.

In the absence of agreement, or if the agreement is not in the best
interest of the child; the court shall award custody to the parents jointly;
however, if custody in one parent is shown by clear and convincing
evidence to serve the best interest of the child, the court shall award
custody to the parent.

(Emphasis added.) Thus, Article 132 establishes a presumption for joint custody of

the child. Even if Resa had amended her demand to seek sole custody, she would

have been required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that sole custody in

her favor was in the child’s best interest. On review, I find that the record supports

the trial court’s award of joint custody.

In its reassessment of the custody determinations, the majority discusses

unflattering evidence regarding the parties’ conduct, particularly that of Bradley. I

certainly do not discount this behavior. Yet, the trial court was well aware of this

behavior and devoted much of the sixteen pages of its reasons for ruling to related

discussion. I do not find any of these extensive factual determinations and credibility

assessments by the trial court inconsistent with either the record or the law. Instead,

the trial court demonstrated an awareness of the parties’ circumstances and tailored

its decision accordingly. Concluding that these determinations were within the trial

court’s province, I would not disturb them on review.

Nor would I disturb the trial court’s decision to not designate a domiciliary

parent. While Resa complains of this determination, La.R.S. 9:335(B)(I) provides

that “[i]n a decree of joint custody the court shall designate a domiciliary parent

except when there is an implementation order to the contrary or for other good cause

shown.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court pointed out that both parents have

deficiencies and that both have necessary improvements to make. Therefore, the

designation of a domiciliary parent was declined. Again, I would not second-guess

the trial court’s appreciation of the circumstances in this regard.

Finally, the majority further reverses the trial court’s determinations regarding

continued counseling for the parties and a specific limitation on corporal punishment.

Considering the circumstances of this case and the fact that these were fully

considered issues at trial, I would not disturb the lower court’s judgment which was

reached after a full trial on the merits.

For these reasons, I find that an affirmation in full is warranted.

2

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-824

BRADLEY GRIFFITH

VERSUS

RESA LATIOLAIS

Chatelain, Judge Pro Tempore, concurring.

I agree with the results of the majority opinion. However, I concur to further

elaborate on two aspects of this case: the award of sole custody and the discussion

of corporal punishment.

Generally, in civil cases, a party who has the burden of proof must prove the

fact in issue by a preponderance of the evidence and “not by some artificially created

greater standard.” Lasha v. Olin Corp., 625 So.2d 1002, 1005 (La.1993); Jordan v.

Travelers Ins. Co., 257 La. 995, 1008, 245 So.2d 151, 155 (1971); 2 MCCORMICK ON

EVIDENCE § 339, at 421 (5th ed. 1999). Only in exceptional controversies is the clear

and convincing standard applied in civil cases “where there is thought to be special

danger of deception, or where the court considers that the particular type of claim

should be disfavored on policy grounds.” Succession of Lyons, 452 So.2d 1161, 1165

(La.1984) (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 340(b), p. 798 (2d ed. 1972)). “The

clear and convincing standard requires a party to prove the existence of a contested

fact is highly probable, or much more probable than its non-existence. MCCORMICK

[ON EVIDENCE § 339, at 421 (5th ed. 1999)]; Succession of Lyons, 452 So.2d at

1165.” Talbot v. Talbot, 03-814, pp. 9-10 (La. 12/12/03), 864 So.2d 590, 598.

Against that background, the Legislature provided in La.Civ.Code art. 132 that

“if custody in one parent is shown by clear and convincing evidence to serve the best

interest of the child, the court shall award custody to that parent.” (Emphasis added).

Even though there is a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in the best interest

of the child, a requisite element in any joint custody arrangement is that the spouses

be able to set aside their differences and cooperate to carry out a joint custody plan.

See Turner v. Turner, 455 So.2d 1374 (La.1984). In its thorough examination of the

best interest of this child, the majority opinion exposes a record replete with facts

which establish clear and convincing evidence that a joint custody plan would not be

workable and that the award of sole custody to Resa is mandated.

I also write separately to elaborate and underscore that although Louisiana

permits a parent to use corporal punishment to discipline a child, it must be done in

a reasonable manner. See La.Civ.Code art. 218; La.R.S. 14:18(4). In Mason v.

Hadnot, 08-2015 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/13/09), 6 So.3d 256, the case relied upon in the

majority opinion, a mother was found not to be in contempt of court for denying

scheduled visitation to the father. The basis for that finding was that the father

spanked his twelve-year-old daughter ten to fifteen times with a belt because she lied

to him about having her cell phone with her during their three previous visitations.1

In stark contrast to those facts, the trial court in the present case found no merit

to Bradley’s contention that “Resa and her father physically abused Cole by spanking

1
Moreover, as described in Mason, 6 So.3d at 259-60:

According to [the mother], [the minor child] stated, “It happened,
Mommy.” [The minor child] continued, “He beat me like he said he
would.” [The minor child] explained that during the drive to Houston
the previous night, her father had told her what was going to happen
and asked her if she was scared. [The minor child] told her mother
that she was anticipating it the entire drive, but that nothing happened
that night when they arrived at her father’s home. Rather, she
described being awakened the following morning by her father
whipping her with a belt. [The minor child] stated that “it was
hurting” and that she “kept asking him to stop.”

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Cole approximately eleven months before he filed suit.” At best, the trial court found

Bradley was able to produce evidence that, “on occasion, Resa used corporal

punishment on Cole that left small bruises.” Griffith v. Latiolais, 09-824, p. 28

(La.App. 3 Cir. / /10), So.3d , .

When I compare the nebulous nature of the alleged corporal punishment in the

present case to that proven in Mason, it is clear that the trial court did not have to

reach the issue of whether it was necessary to prohibit corporal punishment. Clearly,

the majority properly reverses that portion of the trial court judgment.

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