Dianne Alexander, Et Ux. v. Lafayette Crime Stoppers, Inc.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-927

DIANNE ALEXANDER, ET UX.

VERSUS

LAFAYETTE CRIME STOPPERS, INC., ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. MARTIN, NO. 70296
HONORABLE JOHN E. CONERY, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

MARC T. AMY
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Marc T. Amy, and Elizabeth A. Pickett, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Cooks, J., Dissents.

Douglas C. Longman, Jr.
Longman Russo
Post Office Drawer 3408
Lafayette, LA 70502-3408
(337) 262-9000
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Lafayette Crime Stoppers, Inc.
Baton Rouge Crime Stoppers, Inc.

L. Clayton Burgess
Post Office Drawer 5250
Lafayette, LA 70502-5250
(337) 234-7573
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Dianne Alexander
Herman Alexander

AMY, Judge.

The plaintiffs brought suit for specific performance against the defendants for

failure to pay them reward money they alleged was due to them. The defendants filed

motions for summary judgment asserting there was no genuine issue of material fact

in that the plaintiffs would be unable to prove at trial that a contract ever existed

between the parties. The trial court granted the motions. For the following reasons,

we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

In the summer of 2002, after several South Louisiana women had been

murdered, the Multi Agency Homicide Task Force (Task Force) was established to

investigate these murders, believed to be committed by the same individual referred

to as the South Louisiana Serial Killer. In April 2003, the Baton Rouge Crime

Stoppers (BCS) began publicizing a reward offer in newspapers, television stations,

and billboards around the Baton Rouge area regarding the South Louisiana Serial

Killer. A short time later, Lafayette Crime Stoppers (LCS) also publicized a reward

offer. Both reward offers provided an expiration date of August 1, 2003.

According to the plaintiffs’ petition, on July 9, 2002, Dianne Alexander was

attacked in her home in St. Martin Parish. Ms. Alexander’s son, Herman Alexander,

arrived home during the attack and chased the attacker from the property. Ms.

Alexander reported the attack to local police and, later, both Ms. Alexander and her

son described the attacker to the St. Martin Sheriff’s Department.

According to his investigative report, Lieutenant Boyd, the lead investigator

on Ms. Alexander’s attack, began to suspect that Ms. Alexander’s attacker could be

the same man identified as the South Louisiana Serial Killer, after investigators

linked the death of a Lafayette woman to the suspected serial killer. In May 2003,

Lieutenant Boyd shared information regarding Ms. Alexander’s attack with the

Lafayette Sheriff’s Department, who in turn shared the information with the Task

Force.

On May 22, 2003, Ms. Alexander was interviewed by an FBI agent assisting

the Task Force. Based upon that interview, a composite sketch was drawn and

released to the public on May 23, 2003. Investigators believed the composite sketch

matched the description of a possible suspect in an investigation being handled by the

Louisiana Attorney General’s Office and the Zachary Police Department. On May

25, 2003, a photo lineup was prepared and presented to Ms. Alexander, who

identified her attacker as the same man suspected in the Zachary investigation,

Derrick Todd Lee.

On or about August 14, 2003, Ms. Alexander contacted LCS and sought to

collect the advertised award, however, LCS informed her she was ineligible to receive

the award. On February 22, 2006, Ms. Alexander and her son filed a lawsuit against

BRCS and LCS, alleging that the defendants owed them $100,000 and $50,000,

respectively, for the information they provided to the defendants. The defendants

filed motions for summary judgment asserting that a valid contract never existed

between the parties. Specifically, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs never

provided information to Crime Stoppers via the tipster hotline and thus did not

comply with the “ form, terms, or conditions required by the Crime Stoppers offers[.]”

The trial court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, finding that

the offer from Crime Stoppers was conditioned on the information being provided to

the defendant entities rather than law enforcement.

2

The plaintiffs appeal, asserting that there is a genuine issue of material fact that

the LCS and BRCS offers contained a requirement that acceptance of the reward must

be done through the Crime Stoppers’ tipline.

Discussion

Summary Judgment

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 966(B) provides, in part, that

summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Paragraph C(2) of that article sets forth the burden of

proof applicable to the motion for summary judgment, providing:

The burden of proof remains with the movant. However, if the movant
will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the
court on the motion for summary judgment, the movant’s burden on the
motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the
adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the
court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements
essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, if
the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish
that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial,
there is no genuine issue of material fact.

On appeal, a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is reviewed

pursuant to the de novo standard of review. Jones v. Estate of Santiago, 03-1424 (La.

4/14/04), 870 So.2d 1002.

Contract

Louisiana Civil Code Article 1927 provides:

A contract is formed by the consent of the parties established
through offer and acceptance.

3

Unless the law prescribes a certain formality for the intended
contract, offer and acceptance may be made orally, in writing, or by
action or inaction that under the circumstances is clearly indicative of
consent.

Unless otherwise specified in the offer, there need not be
conformity between the manner in which the offer is made and the
manner in which the acceptance is made.

“Louisiana jurisprudence has recognized that an advertisement may constitute an

offer susceptible of giving rise to a binding contract upon acceptance in instances

where a prize is offered or where the terms of a contest are announced.” Woods v.

Morgan City Lions Club, 588 So.2d 1196, 1200 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1991). Once a

plaintiff performs all of the requirements of the offer in accordance with the

published terms, it creates a valid and binding contract, under which one is entitled

to the promised rewards. Id.; Schreiner v. Weil Furniture Co., 68 So.2d 149 (Orl.Ct.

of App.1953).

The offer made by LCS in a May 14, 2003 press release, reads as follows:

The Greater Lafayette Chamber of Commerce has joined with Lafayette
Crime Stoppers to offer a reward of $50,000 for information relating to
the murders of five south Louisiana women. A $25,000 reward offer by
Lafayette Crime Stoppers has been matched through commitments from
Chamber members

In order to qualify for the reward, the tipster must p[r]ovide information
which leads to the ar[r]est, DNA match, and the formal filing of charges
against a suspect through grand jury indictment or Bill of Information.
In addition, the qualifying tip must be received prior to midnight,
August 1, 2003. Investigators with the Serial Killer Task Force have
expressed optimism that a large enough reward might provide the
impetus for someone with knowledge of the killings to come forward.
By stipulating a deadline, investigators hope to expedite receipt of the
information.

All callers to the Crime Stoppers Tipsline remain anonymous. A code
number is issued as the only means of identification. Tips can be
submitted 24 hours a day at 232-TIPS or toll free at 1-800-805-TIPS.

The offer from BRCS, as published in the Morning Advocate, reads as follows:

4

Crime Stoppers, Inc. $100,000 reward for information on the South
Louisiana Serial Killer. A $100,000 reward will be given for
information leading to the arrest and indictment of the South Louisiana
Serial Killer. Call today and help make Baton Rouge a safer place for
you and your family. All calls remain anonymous. 334-STOP or 1-877-
723-7867. Reward expires August 1, 2003.

Both LCS and BRCS offers were irrevocable offers because they specified a

period of time for acceptance. See La.Code Civ. art. 1928. Louisiana Civil Code

Article 1934 provides that “acceptance of an irrevocable offer is effective when

received by the offeror.” Acceptance is received when it comes into the possession

of a person authorized by the offeror to receive it, or when it is deposited in a place

the offeror has indicated as the place where communications of that kind are to be

deposited for him. See La.Civ. Code art. 1938; Kent v. Hogan, 03-2424 (La.App. 1

Cir. 10/29/04), 897 So.2d 68.

The plaintiffs argue that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

they accepted the Crime Stoppers’ reward offers; however, the plaintiffs admit that

they did not contact either Crime Stopper organization before August 1, 2003. The

plaintiffs argue that they accepted the offers by performance when they provided

information about the serial killer to law enforcement. Further, the plaintiffs contend

that this performance is a customary manner of accepting reward offers from Crime

Stopper organization.

In the present matter, the plaintiffs’ acceptance of the reward offers must have

been received by the defendants (offerors) by the time prescribed in the offer (August

1, 2003) in the place where communications of that kind were to be deposited (the

phone number cited in the offers). The record contains no evidence indicating the

defendants were notified by the plaintiffs in the time and manner indicated in the

offer. While the plaintiffs may have provided information related to the arrest or

5

indictment of Derrick Todd Lee to local law enforcement and the Task Force, there

is no indication in the offer that either of those parties were the offerors of the reward

or persons authorized to receive acceptance on their behalf.

The plaintiffs argue that they accepted the offers by performance when they

provided information about the serial killer to law enforcement. Further, the plaintiffs

contend that this performance is a customary manner of accepting reward offers from

Crime Stopper organization. While acceptance may be valid if customary in similar

transactions, according to La.Civ.Code art. 1936, it must be “customary in similar

transactions at the time and place the offer is received.” (Emphasis added.) As

indicated above, there is no evidence in the record that the defendants received any

acceptance of the offer. Accordingly, no contract was formed between the parties.

La.Civ.Code art. 1927.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment granting the defendants’ motions

for summary judgment is affirmed. All costs of these proceedings are assessed

against the plaintiffs-appellants.

AFFIRMED.

6