Corrina Mae Bruno v. Richard Davis

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-928

CORRINA MAE BRUNO

VERSUS

RICHARD DAVIS, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. MARTIN, NO. 72,654
HONORABLE PAUL J. DEMAHY, PRESIDING
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SYLVIA R. COOKS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Marc T. Amy, and Elizabeth A. Pickett, Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Steven Diebold
Champagne & Brumbaugh, PLC
P.O. Box 3764
Lafayette, LA 70502
(337) 233-4414
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Corrina Mae Bruno

Bridget R. Broussard
John Ortego & Associates
P.O. Box 81428
Lafayette, LA 70598-1428
(337) 988-7240
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE:
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

Jamie M. Bankston
Law Office of John W. Norwood, III
400 South Sherwood Forest Blvd., Suite 403
Baton Rouge, LA 70816
(225) 368-1494
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE:
Richard Davis

COOKS, Judge.

The Plaintiff, Corrina Mae Bruno, appeals the trial court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of State Farm. For the following reasons, we reverse the granting

of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 31, 2006, while operating his vehicle, Richard Davis lost control

and collided with several cars parked at Plaintiff’s residence. One of the vehicles hit

by Davis then struck Plaintiff’s house. Plaintiff was lying in bed at the time of the

accident, and immediately upon hearing the sound of the crash, Plaintiff jumped from

her bed and fell to the floor. As a result she suffered injuries to her back and elbow.

Plaintiff filed suit for damages against Davis and his insurer GEICO. Davis

and GEICO were dismissed from the lawsuit after paying the policy limits of

$10,000.00. Prior to the dismissal of GEICO and Davis, a supplemental petition was

filed naming State Farm, Plaintiff’s UM carrier, as a defendant.

State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment arguing Plaintiff’s injuries did

not arise out of the use of Davis’ vehicle. Thus, it was argued no UM coverage was

available for Plaintiff under her State Farm policy. Following a hearing on the

motion for summary judgment, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of State

Farm dismissing Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. Specifically, the trial court held

the “connection between the accident and Ms. Bruno’s subsequent injuries were too

remote to have arisen out of the use of the uninsured vehicle. Therefore, the use of

the uninsured vehicle cannot be considered the legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.”

This appeal followed.

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ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in the analysis it used in determining

whether her injuries arose out of the use of the vehicle. Plaintiff asserts the Louisiana

Supreme Court’s decision in Carter v. City Parish Government of East Baton Rouge,

423 So.2d 1080 (La.1982), sets forth the test for determining “use” of an automobile.

The court in Ursin v. Webb, 06-280, p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/26/06), 945 So.2d 734,

736-37, writ denied, 06-2580 (La. 1/12/07), 948 So.2d 152, discussed Carter as

follows:

In [Carter], the Supreme Court established the analysis to be used
in determining whether an accident arose out of the “use” of an
automobile. The court noted the “use” provision is designed to limit
coverage to liability resulting from conduct of the insured which
constitutes both a use of the vehicle and a legal cause of the injury.
Thus, the courts are required to answer two separate questions:

(1) Was the conduct of the insured of which the plaintiff
complains a legal cause of the injury?

(2) Was it a use of the automobile?

In order for the conduct to arise out of the use of the vehicle, the
automobile must be essential to the theory of liability. The specific duty
breached by the insured must flow from use of the automobile. If the
specific duty breached by the insured existed independently of the
automobile, then liability does not arise out of use even though the duty
could have been performed by use of the automobile. W.S. McKenzie
and H.A. Johnson, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Volume 15, Insurance
Law and Practice, § 65 (1986).

In Carter, a motorist, who was accompanied by a child, ignored placed

barricades, and negligently drove into an underpass that had been flooded by

rainwater. Both the motorist and the child drowned. The motorist’s automobile

liability insurer, which provided coverage only for liability arising from the

ownership or use of an automobile, argued that the child was not drowned in the car

or its immediate vicinity, but some distance away, and apparently some time after the

motorist’s initial negligence of driving into the flooded underpass. The Supreme

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Court held that the child’s drowning was proximately caused by the motorist’s initial

negligence of driving into the flooded underpass.

A. Legal Causation.

In deciding the first of the two issues listed above--that is, whether the policy

holder’s actions were a legal cause of the plaintiff”s damages, the court in Carter

considered whether the insured person breached a legal duty imposed to protect

against the particular risk involved. Carter, 423 So.2d at 1084. In so doing, the court

applied a lengthy and comprehensive duty/risk analysis. After detailing the policy

holder’s duty not to circumvent barricades and drive on closed roads, a duty imposed

by statutory law, the court found that the risk of the ten-year-old passenger drowning

was encompassed by that duty. Id. at 1086. In reaching that conclusion, the court

noted that the particular risk might have been unforeseeable, but nevertheless found

that it was within the ambit of the duty because it was “easily associated with the rule

relied upon and with other risks of the same type that are foreseeable and clearly

within the ambit of protection.” Id.

We find the same result is warranted in the present case. Although the exact

manner in which Plaintiff came to harm may not have been foreseeable, it was, and

is obvious that an elderly person lying quietly in bed might be suddenly confused and

disoriented by a vehicle crashing into her house. The particular harm which befell

Plaintiff, while unusual, can be reasonably said to be associated with the sudden event

caused by the chain of events that resulted from Richard Davis’ negligence in

operating his vehicle. It is certainly arguable, but for Davis’ negligence in operating

his vehicle, the injuries suffered by Plaintiff would not have occurred. Therefore, at

a minimum, genuine issues of material facts exist as to whether Davis’ actions were

a legal cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.

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B. “Use” of the Automobile.

The Carter court easily disposed of the second question in the analysis for

determining whether the “arising-out-of-use” provision of the policy covered the

plaintiffs’ damages in Carter--that is, whether the conduct of which the plaintiff

complained was a “use” of the automobile. Because the plaintiffs in Carter

complained about the insured person’s driving, the conduct was a use of the

automobile, the court held. Carter, 423 So.2d at 1087.

Similarly, in the instant case, Plaintiff’s complains of Davis’ actual operation

of the vehicle as the cause of her injuries. It was specifically alleged by Plaintiff, that

the sudden event of a car striking her home, which was undisputedly brought about

by Davis’ actions in negligently operating his vehicle, caused her to suddenly jump

from her bed and fall to the ground. Thus, it is clear a genuine issue of material fact

exists that Davis’ conduct of which Plaintiff complained was a use of the automobile.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court judgment granting the

motion for summary judgment in favor of State Farm and dismissing State Farm from

the suit. This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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