Peter Norman Broussard, Jr. v. Theta Charles Compton

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-1292

PETER NORMAN BROUSSARD, JR.
AND PATSY COMPTON BROUSSARD

VERSUS

THETA CHARLES COMPTON,
WOODROW MAYS COMPTON,
AND ELVA FAY COMPTON

************

APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. MARTIN, NO. 72825-E
HONORABLE KEITH R. J. COMEAUX, DISTRICT JUDGE

************

JAMES T. GENOVESE
JUDGE

************

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, James T. Genovese, and David E. Chatelain,*
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

William A. Repaske
Landry, Watkins, Repaske & Breaux
211 E. Main Street
Post Office Drawer 12040
New Iberia, Louisiana 70562-2040
(337) 364-7626
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS:
Theta Charles Compton, Woodrow Mays Compton,
and Elva Fay Compton

_____________________
*Honorable David E. Chatelain participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana
Supreme Court as Judge Pro Tempore.

Burton E. Cestia, Jr.
Burke and Cestia
223 East Main Street
Post Office Box 10337
New Iberia, Louisiana 70562-0337
(337) 365-6628
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES:
Peter Norman Broussard, Jr. and
Patsy Compton Broussard

GENOVESE, Judge.

In this contentious family feud over the ownership of a home and the property

upon which it was built, the Defendants/Appellants, Theta Charles Compton,

Woodrow Mays Compton, and Elva Fay Compton, appeal the trial court’s judgment

in favor of the Plaintiffs/Appellees, Peter Norman Broussard, Jr. and Patsy Compton

Broussard. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Peter Norman Broussard, Jr. (Peter Broussard) and Patsy Compton Broussard

(Patsy Broussard) filed a Petition for Breach of Contract and Revocation of Donation

against Theta Charles Compton (Theta Compton),1 Woodrow Mays Compton

(Woodrow Compton),2 and Elva Fay Compton (Elva Compton).3 The Plaintiffs

sought to revoke Theta Compton’s donation to Woodrow Compton and Elva

Compton of the property upon which the Plaintiffs built a home. The Plaintiffs

asserted that they built the home on Theta Compton’s property with her permission

and with the understanding that she would donate to them the property upon which

they built the home upon its completion.

The record indicates that in the early 1990s, Theta Compton owned a home

located on Cemetery Road in St. Martin Parish, Louisiana, which she acquired from

her mother, Violetta Drake Charles (Violetta Charles).4 According to the Plaintiffs,

they voluntarily assumed the responsibility of caring for Violetta Charles and

maintaining her property. Theta Compton allegedly “offered to give the home and

immovable property” to the Plaintiffs in consideration for the care and assistance

1
Theta Compton is Patsy Broussard’s mother.
2
Woodrow Compton is Patsy Broussard’s brother.
3
Elva Compton is Patsy Broussard’s sister.
4
Violetta Charles lived in the home until her death in May of 1993.

which they gave to her mother, Violetta Charles. Tragically, in May of 1993, the

house burned down, and Violetta Charles perished in the fire. Thereafter, the

Plaintiffs allege that even though the home they were to receive was destroyed by

fire, Theta Compton proposed an alternative to them. According to their petition,

Plaintiffs allege:

Theta Charles Compton offered to provide [money from the insurance
proceeds] for the purchase of materials only for the construction of a
house to be owned by [the Plaintiffs] in exchange for Peter Norman
Broussard, Jr. clearing the immovable property owned by Theta Charles
Compton of a burned out home previously occupied by Theta Charles
Compton’s mother, as well as other dilapidated buildings, junk
vehicles[,] and overgrown trees and shrubs[,] and providing all of the
labor and additional materials needed for the construction of a home to
be owned by [the Plaintiffs], the said home to include a bedroom for
Theta Charles Compton to reside in for the remainder of her life should
she so desire. Theta Charles Compton also provided the immovable
property where the home was to be built. As part of the contract and
prior to the construction of the home[,] Theta Charles Compton had
promised that she would donate the immovable property on which the
home was constructed to [the Plaintiffs] upon completion of the home.

The Plaintiffs5 began constructing a house on the property in 1993.

Construction was completed in 1995, and the Plaintiffs have lived in the home since

before its completion. The Plaintiffs assert that “the home was built on the

immovable property with the full permission and knowledge of Theta Charles

Compton.” However, the Plaintiffs contend that Theta Compton did not fulfill her

promise to donate to them the property upon which the house was built. Specifically,

the Plaintiffs assert that:

At the beginning of 2001[,] Theta Charles Compton refused to
honor her part of the contract and execute a donation of the immovable
property to [the Plaintiffs] but[,] instead[,] wanted to donate the home
which she did not own and the immovable property to Patsy Compton
Broussard, Elva Fay Compton Bourda and Woodrow Mays Compton.
[The Plaintiffs] refused to accept a one[-]third interest and demanded

5
Peter Broussard is a carpenter/builder.

2

that Theta Charles Compton fulfill her contractual agreement to donate
the immovable property to [the Plaintiffs].

Nevertheless, Theta Compton did subsequently effectuate a donation of the

property at issue herein to Patsy Broussard’s siblings, Woodrow Compton and Elva

Compton, in February of 2001. The Plaintiffs claim that they “were unaware of

the . . . donation . . . until March of 2007[,] when they received correspondence from

Woodrow May[s] Compton.” It was this correspondence which the Plaintiffs assert

prompted their filing of the instant action in December of 2007.

The Plaintiffs’ petition requests that the donation from Theta Compton to

Woodrow Compton and Elva Compton be “revoked in so far as it includes the home

and improvements made by [the Plaintiffs] and the immovable property for which

they had contracted.” It further declares:

[The Plaintiffs] are entitled to . . . enforcement of the contract
between them and Theta Charles Compton declaring [the Plaintiffs] to
be the owners of the immovable property on which the home stands and
the home built by them to be theirs with the right of Theta Charles
Compton to live in the private bedroom and bath for the rest of her life.

[]

Alternatively, in accordance with Louisiana Civil Code Article
[6]
496 [the Plaintiffs] are entitled to the cost of the materials and
workmanship, or current value or enhanced value of the immovable
property.

[]

Alternatively, in accordance with Louisiana Civil Code Article

6
Louisiana Civil Code Article 496 provides:

When constructions, plantings, or works are made by a possessor in good
faith, the owner of the immovable may not demand their demolition and removal.
He is bound to keep them and at his option to pay to the possessor either the cost of
the materials and of the workmanship, or their current value, or the enhanced value
of the immovable.

3

529[7] [the Plaintiffs] are entitled to remain in possession of their home
until [they receive] reimbursements for the expenses and improvements
to which they are entitled.

The Defendants countered with an Exception of No Cause of Action,8 Answer,

and Reconventional Demand. In their answer and reconventional demand, the

Defendants “admit that Theta Charles Compton permitted [the] Plaintiffs to reside on

the property”; however, the Defendants denied ever acknowledging that the home

was to belong to the Plaintiffs. The Defendants asserted their entitlement “to a

reasonable credit for the value of [the] Plaintiffs’ use and occupancy of the property

in question.” The Defendants also sought “an order . . . recognizing their ownership

of the subject property and ordering [the Plaintiffs] to immediately surrender

possession of the subject property to [them].”

On June 27, 2008, the Plaintiffs filed a First Supplemental and Amending

Petition on Petition for Breach of Contract and Revocation of a Donation. In it, the

Plaintiffs supplemented their demand against the Defendants, asserting:

Alternatively[, the Plaintiffs] are entitled to be reimbursed for the
improvements made to the property in excess of the $32,000.00
expended by Theta Charles Compton on the grounds of unjust
enrichment in an amount to be determined at the time of trial because the
improvements were made based upon the promises made by Theta
Charles Compton that the immovable property would be donated to
petitioners in the future.

Trial in this matter was held on September 25, 2008, and November 12, 2008,

after which, the trial court took the matter under advisement. The trial court wrote

Reasons for Judgment, dated December 17, 2008, wherein it ruled, in pertinent part:

7
Louisiana Civil Code Article 529 provides: “The possessor, whether in good or in bad faith,
may retain possession of the thing until he is reimbursed for expenses and improvements which he
is entitled to claim.”
8
The minutes of the trial court reflect that the Defendant’s Exception of No Cause of Action
was heard and denied on August 14, 2008.

4

In this case, no act translative of ownership exists to the [P]laintiffs.
Therefore, we must turn our attention to Article 497[9] of the Louisiana
Civil Code. This article provides for obligations from owner to
possessor and possessor to owner when the possessor is a bad faith
possessor. [Louisiana Civil Code Article] 497 provides that when
construction, plantings, or works are made by bad faith possessors, the
owner of the immovable may keep them or he may demand the
demolition and removal at the expense of the possessor, and, in addition,
damages for the injury that he may have sustained. If he does not
demand demolition and removal, he is bound to pay at his option either
the current value of the materials and of the workmanship of the separate
improvements that he has kept or the enhanced value of the immovable.
[La.Civ.Code art.] 497.

In the case before us, [D]efendants, Elva Compton and Woodrow
Compton, sent a letter to [the Plaintiffs], requesting that they be evicted
from the property. At no time did they request the removal of the
construction. Therefore, this is a tacit acceptance of the construction on
the property indicating that the owners of the property do not want its
removal but would be bound to pay either the current value of the
materials and of the workmanship of the separate improvements or the
enhanced value of the immovable.

This also comports with the argument being made by [the
Plaintiffs] that they are entitled to unjust enrichment.

....

Therefore, in the instant action, all of the requirements of unjust
enrichment have been met. There is an enrichment to Elva Compton and
Woodrow Compton, that being the home built on the property; there is
an impoverishment to the [Plaintiffs], that being the home they built and
for which they have not been compensated. There is a connection
between the enrichment and the impoverishment. The next requirement
is that there must be an absence of justification of cause for the
enrichment or impoverishment. In this case, the [Plaintiffs] had the
verbal commitment from Ms. Theta Compton that they should build this
home on the piece of property and it would be theirs. Therefore,
although not a legal justification or cause, there was a moral justification

9
Louisiana Civil Code Article 497 provides:

When constructions, plantings, or works are made by a bad faith possessor,
the owner of the immovable may keep them or he may demand their demolition and
removal at the expense of the possessor, and, in addition, damages for the injury that
he may have sustained. If he does not demand demolition and removal, he is bound
to pay at his option either the current value of the materials and of the workmanship
of the separable improvements that he has kept or the enhanced value of the
immovable.

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and cause for them to do so. Finally, there must be no other remedy
available to the [P]laintiffs. In this case, there is no other remedy
available to the [Plaintiffs] to compensate them for their
impoverishment. That being said, unjust enrichment is applicable to this
case.

Considering the trial testimony of the certified land appraiser, Robert Braquet, the

trial court determined that the home was valued at $220,000.00. The trial court then

deducted $32,000.00 from that amount as a credit for the amount initially paid by

Theta Compton for the construction of the home, thereby determining that the value

of the enrichment was $188,000.00. Additionally, the trial court addressed the

Defendants’ request for a credit for the Plaintiffs’ use of the home. The trial court

stated:

[N]ot only was there no evidence presented as to the rental value for all
those years, even if there were, the evidence at trial strongly indicates
that the family supported the fact that the [Plaintiffs] lived there, had a
room for Theta [Compton] to stay in when she desired, and maintained
the surrounding property. At no time from 1993 until 2007 was any
mention made that the [Plaintiffs] would owe any type of rent to the
owners. There is evidence in the record, however, that Elva Compton
and Woodrow Compton decreed in a letter to Patsy Broussard that
$250.00[10] per month would be a fair sum for the maintenance of the
home and the rental value of the home. Therefore, the Court will
consider this as the rental value requested by Elva and Woodrow
[Compton]. Therefore, the [c]ourt will award rental value to the
[D]efendants from August 6, 2007, which was the date of the letter, until
such time that the Broussards vacate the premises. The [c]ourt will
grant a credit to the [D]efendants for this amount of money against the
$188,000.00 owed by the [D]efendants to the [P]laintiffs.

On February 26, 2009, before the trial court’s ruling was signed into judgment,

the Defendants filed a Motion and Order for Reconsideration or New Trial. The

Defendants urged that the trial court misapplied the principle of unjust enrichment.

10
Though the trial court declared that the letter from Elva Compton and Woodrow Compton
requested $250.00 per month from the Plaintiffs, the record reflects that the amount requested was
actually $200.00. However, because this discrepancy was not assigned as error by either party, it is
not before this court for review.

6

Specifically, the Defendants asserted:

The house constructed on the [Defendants’] property was
constructed during the 1993 to 1995 time period. The [Plaintiffs] never
obtained a deed for the house, despite their claim that one was promised
to them if they would construct the house. It has been more than ten
years since the completion of the home, and any claim that the
[Plaintiffs] would have for unjust enrichment [has] prescribed.

The Defendants also asserted that the trial court erroneously applied La.Civ.Code art.

497 when “[u]nder the facts found by the [c]ourt, [La.Civ.Code] art. 493[11] should

have been utilized by the [c]ourt to determine the rights and obligations of the

parties.” Finally, the Defendants disputed the trial court’s calculations relative to the

value of the home and the amount of rent owed.

On April 7, 2009, the trial court signed a judgment concomitant with its written

Reasons for Judgment issued on December 17, 2008. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed

a Motion and Order for Reconsideration or New Trial on April 21, 2009. In their

motion, the Plaintiffs urged that, pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 529, they be allowed

to remain in possession of the home until they are reimbursed for the expenses and

improvements. Therefore, the Plaintiffs sought the reconsideration of that provision

11
Louisiana Civil Code Article 493 provides, in relevant part:

Buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the ground, and
plantings made on the land of another with his consent belong to him who made
them. They belong to the owner of the ground when they are made without his
consent.

When the owner of buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the
ground, or plantings no longer has the right to keep them on the land of another, he
may remove them subject to his obligation to restore the property to its former
condition. If he does not remove them within ninety days after written demand, the
owner of the land may, after the ninetieth day from the date of mailing the written
demand, appropriate ownership of the improvements by providing an additional
written notice by certified mail, and upon receipt of the certified mail by the owner
of the improvements, the owner of the land obtains ownership of the improvements
and owes nothing to the owner of the improvements. Until such time as the owner
of the land appropriates the improvements, the improvements shall remain the
property of he who made them and he shall be solely responsible for any harm caused
by the improvements.

7

of the trial court’s judgment which ordered that they vacate the home. The Plaintiffs

asserted that in accordance with their rights under La.Civ.Code art. 529, “the eviction

is premature” and, therefore, the trial court should not have ordered them to vacate

the home “until after [they] are reimbused for the expenses and improvements.”

A hearing on the parties’ motions for reconsideration was held on May 6, 2009,

after which, the trial court again took the matter under advisement. The trial court

wrote Reasons for Judgment on the motions for reconsideration, dated June 5, 2009,

wherein it ruled, in pertinent part:

Defendants argue that the [c]ourt should not have applied
[La.Civ.Code art.] 497 and the principal [sic] of unjust enrichment but
rather focused on [La.Civ.Code art.] 493. The [c]ourt has reviewed the
memorandum submitted by the parties and the relevant law on this issue.

[Louisiana Civil Code Article] 493 states that when a building is
built on the land of another with his consent, the structure belongs to the
builder. When the owner of that structure no longer has a right to keep
it on the land of another, he may remove it subject to his obligation to
restore the property to its former condition; if it is not removed, the
property owner has the right to demand by written notice that the house
owner remove the house within 90 days. Kibbe v. Lege, 604 So.2d 1366
(La.App. 3 Cir. 1992).

Application of this Civil Code Article actually bolsters [the
Plaintiffs’] position. The house was built on the [D]efendants’ property
with the consent of the [D]efendants; therefore, the house belongs to
[P]laintiffs. Plaintiffs have a right to remove the home subject to an
obligation to restore the property to its former condition. The
[P]laintiffs have made no effort to exercise this right; therefore,
[D]efendants then had the right to demand by written notice that the
[Plaintiffs] remove the house within 90 days. Defendant[s] never did
send [P]laintiffs a request for removal of the home. For these reasons,
the house built by the [Plaintiffs] belongs to them and under
[La.Civ.Code art.] 493, the result remains the same as in the reasons
rendered previously by this [c]ourt.

The trial court denied the Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial and

granted the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial. A judgment was

signed by the trial court on June 18, 2008, which amended its previous judgment

8

solely to grant the Plaintiffs “possession of the home until they are reimbursed for

expenses and improvements in the amount of one hundred eighty[-]eight thousand

($188,000.00) dollars[]” in accordance with La.Civ.Code art. 529. The Defendants

appeal.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The Defendants assert the following assignments of error:

1. If Theta Compton granted to [the Plaintiffs] permission to
construct their house on her property, as found by the [t]rial
[c]ourt, only [La.Civ.Code] art. 493 is applicable, and the
remedies available are limited to removal of the structure at
[P]laintiffs[’] cost or abandonment of the structure to the
landowners, and the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in holding otherwise.

2. The doctrines of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit are not
applicable to the claims made by the [P]laintiffs nor to the facts
as found by the [t]rial [c]ourt, and the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in
holding that these doctrines are applicable and in granting
reimbursement to the [P]laintiffs.

3. The [t]rial [c]ourt erred in granting possession of the home to [the
Plaintiffs] until they are reimbursed for expenses and
improvements in the amount of $188,000[.00].

4. The evidence presented at trial did not establish that Theta
Compton granted to [the Plaintiffs] permission for them to
construct their house on Theta Compton’s property nor that she
gifted the [Plaintiffs] with $32,000[.00] which they used to
construct their home, and the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in holding
otherwise.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Our Louisiana Supreme Court has instructed us on the standard of review

relative to our review of the trial court’s ruling in this matter as follows:

A court of appeal should not set aside the factual findings of a
trial court absent manifest error or unless clearly wrong. Arceneaux v.
Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1978). However, if a court of appeal
finds that the trial court committed a reversible error of law or manifest
error of fact, the court of appeal must ascertain the facts de novo from
the record and render a judgment on the merits. LeBlanc v. Stevenson,

9

00-0157 (La.10/17/00), 770 So.2d 766. Although appellate courts
should accord deference to the factfinder, they nonetheless have a
constitutional duty to review facts. Ambrose v. New Orleans Police
Dep’t Ambulance Serv., 93-3099, p. 8 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 216, 221.
Because appellate courts must perform this constitutional function, they
have every right to determine whether the trial court verdict was clearly
wrong based on the evidence or clearly without evidentiary support.
Ambrose at p. 8-9, 639 So.2d at 221. The reviewing court must do more
than simply review the record for some evidence which supports or
controverts the trial court’s findings; it must instead review the record
in its entirety to determine whether the trial court’s finding was clearly
wrong or manifestly erroneous. Stobart v. State of Louisiana, through
Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993). The issue to be
resolved by a reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right
or wrong, but whether the factfinder’s conclusion was reasonable.
Stobart, 617 So.2d at 882. We have previously emphasized the principle
that “if the trial court or jury’s findings are reasonable in light of the
record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse, even
if convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have
weighed the evidence differently.” Stobart, 617 So.2d at 882-83 (citing
Housley v. Cerise, 579 So.2d 973 (La.1991)(quoting Sistler v. Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 1106, 1112 (La.1990))).

Siverd v. Permanent Gen. Ins. Co., 05-973, pp. 3-4 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So.2d 497, 499-

500.

The Defendants, in brief, contend that the issues before this court are: (1)

which Louisiana Civil Code Article applies to the instant case, La.Civ.Code art. 497

or La.Civ.Code art. 493; (2) whether the doctrines of unjust enrichment and quantum

meruit are applicable to the claims and facts of this case; (3) whether La.Civ.Code art.

592 applies in order to grant to the Plaintiffs the right to retain possession of the home

until they are reimbursed; and (4) whether the evidence supports the trial court’s

conclusion that Theta Compton gave the Plaintiffs her permission and $32,000.00 to

build their home.

The trial court heard testimony from twenty-one witnesses throughout the

course of a two-day trial. It concluded that based on the evidence presented, the

Plaintiffs had proven their case. The trial court’s finding that the Plaintiffs built their

10

home with Theta Compton’s consent was a factual determination based upon its

evaluation of the evidence and assessment of the witnesses’ credibility. In the face

of conflicting testimony on whether the Plaintiffs were building a home for

themselves at Theta Compton’s suggestion or whether Peter Broussard was

constructing a “family home” at Theta Compton’s direction, the trial court observed,

firsthand, the demeanor of the witnesses and made an assessment as to their

credibility.

Where a conflict exists in the testimony, the issue to be resolved by the
reviewing court is not whether the trier was right or wrong, but whether
the decision reached by the trier was reasonable. Stobart, 617 So.2d at
882-83. . . . Where two permissible views of the evidence exist, the
fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or
clearly wrong. Stobart, 617 So.2d at 883.

Id. at 501. We find the trial court’s acceptance of the Plaintiffs’ rendition of how and

why they built a home on the property at issue herein to be a reasonable

determination.

According to the Defendants, La.Civ.Code art. 493 applies and “[t]he only

remedies that are available under Article 493 are for the owner of the structure to

remove the structure, or he may abandon the structure to the landowner (after the

appropriate actions are taken).” Thus, they contend that the trial court’s ruling that

the Defendants’ owe the Plaintiffs $188,000.00 pursuant to the provisions of

La.Civ.Code 497 is erroneous. We disagree.

The trial court determined that the Plaintiffs were bad faith possessors of the

immovable property because they did not possess an act translative of title. Because

the Plaintiffs are bad faith possessors, La.Civ.Code art. 497 contains the remedy

available to “the owner of the immovable[.]” The trial court further concluded that

the Plaintiffs legitimately believed that upon the completion of the building of their

11

home, Theta Compton would donate the immovable property upon which it was built

to them. Yet, when the Plaintiffs received a letter from the Defendants in 2007, they

discovered that the immovable property had, instead, been donated to Woodrow

Compton and Elva Compton, and not to them.

When correspondence, dated August 6, 2007, was received by the Plaintiffs,

it contained the demand that the Plaintiffs contribute “$200.00 per month to be set

aside as your contribution to the taxes and insurance beginning 1 September 2007.”

Clearly, the Defendants chose not to demand demolition and removal of the home;

therefore, they became “bound to pay” the Plaintiffs as per La.Civ.Code art. 497.

Finally, the trial court denied the Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration or

New Trial, wherein the Defendants argued that La.Civ.Code art. 493 was applicable

in this matter, not La.Civ.Code art. 497. On appeal, the Defendants reiterate: “The

facts of this case fit squarely within the four corners of [La.Civ.Code] art. 493. The

only remedies that are available under Article 493 are for the owner of the structure

to remove the structure, or he may abandon the structure to the landowner . . . .”

Though it applied La.Civ.Code art. 497, the trial court, in its June 5, 2009 reasons,

opined that the application of La.Civ.Code art. 493 would yield the same result as the

application of La.Civ.Code art. 497. We agree.

Pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 493, the Defendants had the right to make a

written demand that the Plaintiffs remove the home. Instead, the Defendants sought

to reap the rewards of the Plaintiffs’ labor and evict them from the home they built

on property which they legitimately believed would be donated to them. We find the

trial court correctly determined that the same result would be reached if La.Civ.Code

art. 493 were applied. The home, which belongs to the Plaintiffs, “remain[s] the

12

property of he who made [it] . . .” as per La.Civ.Code art. 493.

Absent a finding that the trial court’s conclusions were unreasonable, we find

no clear error in the trial court’s judgment and, therefore, affirm the trial court’s

judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs/Appellees, Peter Norman Broussard, Jr. and Patsy

Compton Broussard.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of

this appeal are assessed against the Defendants/Appellants, Theta Charles Compton,

Woodrow Mays Compton, and Elva Fay Compton.

AFFIRMED.

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