Ida Cosey Wylie v. Joseph C. Peltier, Jr.

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

10-332

IDA COSEY WYLIE, ET AL.

VERSUS

JOSEPH C. PELTIER, JR.

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APPEAL FROM THE
TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF NATCHITOCHES, NO. 81549
HONORABLE ERIC ROGER HARRINGTON, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks, and
Elizabeth A. Pickett, Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Steven D. Crews
Corkern, Crews & Guillett, L.L.C.
P. O. Box 1036
Natchitoches, LA 71458-1036
(318) 352-2302
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
Joseph C. Peltier, Jr.

William Daniel Dyess
Dyess Law Firm, LLC
P.O. Box 967
Natchitoches, LA 71458-0967
(318) 352-5880
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants:
Ida Cosey Wylie
LaShawn Cox
Nai Emah Wylie

PICKETT, Judge.

The widow of pedestrian who was struck and killed by a vehicle and the

mother of his child appeal the dismissal of their wrongful death and survival actions

against the driver of the vehicle and his insurer. For the following reasons, we

reverse the judgment dismissing the suit and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

On June 28, 2008, at 1:32 a.m., Ronald David Wylie was walking west in the

eastbound lane of Highway 6 between Clarence and Natchitoches when he was struck

and killed by a vehicle driven by Joseph C. Peltier, Jr. Mr. Wylie was dressed in dark

clothing and was under the influence of alcohol and cocaine. He had been walking

on the highway for at least thirty minutes when he was hit. The accident occurred on

an unlit, straight section of Highway 6 approximately one-fourth mile west of its

intersection with Highway 71.

Mr. Wylie’s widow and the mother of his minor daughter filed suit against

Mr. Peltier and his insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,

asserting wrongful death and survivorship claims. The parties engaged in discovery

and deposed Mr. Peltier, witnesses to events surrounding the accident, and State

Police troopers involved in the investigation of the accident.

Mr. Peltier testified in his deposition that he was traveling fifty-five miles per

hour in the westbound lane of Highway 6 toward Natchitoches when he saw a vehicle

on the shoulder of the westbound lane with its flashers on and that to avoid any

person who might be outside the vehicle, he steered left approximately three feet

across the center line of the highway into the eastbound lane. After passing the

vehicle, he began returning to the westbound lane at which time he struck a

pedestrian (Mr. Wylie) who was on the left side of his vehicle. He testified that he

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diverted “some” of his attention to the car on the shoulder when he passed it to insure

“no one was there” and that as he began returning to the westbound lane, he saw

Mr. Wylie when the beam of his headlights “hit” him. Mr. Peltier explained, “it was

too late”; “it was instantaneous as I came back into my lane. [He] was there[,] and

I hit my brakes[,] and I was right on him, I guess.”

Mr. Peltier did not know what he struck until he stopped his truck after hitting

Mr. Wylie. He testified that if the vehicle on the shoulder of the road had had its

headlights on, he possibly could have seen Mr. Wylie in the road, but he did not

believe the vehicle’s headlights were on when he got out of his truck. Mr. Peltier

further testified that it was clear that night and that he had his low-beam headlights

on because he often encountered patches of fog on this highway as he drove to his

place of business, a donut shop, at approximately the same time every morning.

Thirty minutes before Mr. Wylie was struck, Ronny McBroom saw a black

male walking in the middle of the westbound lane of Highway 6 and reported it to the

Natchitoches Parish Sheriff’s Department. Mr. McBroom testified that he saw Mr.

Wylie “when my headlights hit him . . . when I seen [sic] him and went [past] him .

. . [it was] just a momentary glimpse.” According to Mr. McBroom, he was driving

thirty to thirty-five miles per hour when he passed Mr. Wylie.

Thereafter, Chisandra Jones saw a pedestrian walking on Highway 6 as she

turned onto the highway. She explained that she was driving slowly as she made her

turn and only saw him when he flicked his cigarette. She stated that she almost hit

him because he was in the middle of the road. After seeing him, she returned to her

home to get her boyfriend, Robert Evans, and they returned to find the pedestrian.

Upon their return, Ms. Jones called 911 to report a man walking on the highway,

while Mr. Evans got out of the vehicle and asked Mr. Wylie if he needed a ride. The

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pedestrian kept walking and responded, “I got this.” According to Ms. Jones,

Mr. Evans got back into her vehicle and activated the vehicle’s emergency flashers.

Ms. Jones further testified that the pedestrian would not get in her vehicle and

that Mr. Evans pulled over onto the shoulder of the highway, leaving the flashers on.

At one point, Ms. Jones testified that Mr. Evans also left the headlights on, but on

further questioning, she testified that she did not remember whether or not he left the

headlights on. Ms. Jones agreed with defense counsel that Mr. Peltier could not

“miss” Mr. Wylie, explaining that no one could have “missed” Mr. Wylie because her

vehicle was on the side of the road with the flashers on and a passing driver would

look to insure he was past her vehicle before moving back into his lane of travel.1

Ms. Jones further testified that she did not see Mr. Peltier do anything “out of the

ordinary,” “inappropriate,” or “wrong.”

Mr. Evans testified that Ms. Jones came to get him because a pedestrian was

walking in the road in Clarence. He explained that he rode with her back to where

the pedestrian was and asked him if he needed a ride and that the pedestrian

responded something he could not understand. The pedestrian was then hit by a

truck. Mr. Evans stated that Ms. Jones’s vehicle was stopped on the shoulder of the

road with its emergency flashers on and that the pedestrian “was in the middle of the

road” or “a little bit off the middle” of the road. Mr. Evans testified that he was

standing on the side of Ms. Jones’s vehicle when the accident occurred; he explained,

“9 times out of 10 when a person sees somebody with their flashers on they [sic]

going to move over a little bit. When [Mr. Peltier] moved over a little bit and

probably when he saw the guy walking, he couldn’t miss him.” Mr. Evans further

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The plaintiffs argue that Ms. Jones and Mr. Evans’s use of the terms “miss” and “missed”
establish that Mr. Peltier should have seen Mr. Wylie before he struck him. However, when read
in the context of their testimony as a whole, it is clear that these witnesses’ use of these terms
indicates that in their opinion, Mr. Peltier could not avoid striking Mr. Wylie.

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explained: “[Mr. Peltier] didn’t get over much but he got over because . . . the truck

that I was in [was] on the side of the road.”

After the accident, Mr. Evans went to talk to Mr. Peltier and told him that “he

couldn’t miss [the pedestrian].” Later, Mr. Evans reiterated, “When somebody [is]

walking in the middle of the road and it’s dark, you ain’t going to see them until you

get dead up on them. How are you going to miss somebody?” He clarified his

comments, stating “it wasn’t [the driver’s] fault . . . he hit [the pedestrian] because the

guy was in the middle of the road.”

State Police Trooper Steven B. Pezant investigated the accident. He testified

to the information he had gathered at the scene and from a State Police accident

reconstructionist. Data from the sensing diagnostic module in Mr. Peltier’s truck

showed that Mr. Peltier was traveling fifty-five miles per hour when he hit Mr. Wylie,

which Trooper Pezant stated was the posted speed limit where the accident occurred.

Test results from alcohol and drug screens ordered by Trooper Pezant showed that

Mr. Peltier did not have any alcohol or drugs in his system and that Mr. Wylie had

alcohol and cocaine in his system. Trooper Pezant testified that a pair of black slip-

on shoes facing west was found on top of the center line in the middle of the road

immediately prior to where Mr. Wylie was struck.

Trooper Pezant related that Mr. Peltier told him that after observing no traffic

was coming toward him in the eastbound lane, he moved over approximately four feet

from his driving position because of the vehicle with flashers on that was parked on

the shoulder of the highway. Trooper Pezant testified that a motorist in Mr. Peltier’s

position, approaching a vehicle stopped on the shoulder with its flashers on, is

allowed to move into the opposite lane of travel if the move is made in a cautious

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manner. He concluded from his investigation that Mr. Peltier “did everything a

normal person . . . would do in that situation.”

Relying on this deposition testimony and Trooper Pezant’s investigation, the

defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the plaintiffs’

claims. At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion, the trial court took the matter

under advisement and, thereafter, issued Reasons for Judgment in which it granted

summary judgment in favor of the defendants. A judgment to that effect was signed

on June 23, 2009. The plaintiffs appealed.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Appellate courts review motions for summary judgments de novo to determine

whether any genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the mover is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B). Summary judgment will

be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. “A

genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable

persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue and

summary judgment is appropriate.” Hines v. Garrett, 04-806, p. 1 (La. 6/25/04), 876

So.2d 764, 765 (citing Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512, p. 27 (La.

7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751). “A ‘fact’ is material when its existence or nonexistence

may be essential to plaintiff’s cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery.

Facts are ‘material’ if they potentially insure or preclude recovery, affect a litigant’s

ultimate success, or determine the outcome of the legal dispute.” Penalber v. Blount,

550 So.2d 557, 583 (La.1989).

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While the initial burden of proof is on the mover to show that no genuine issue

of material fact exists, if he will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issues

presented by the motion for summary judgment, he is not required “to negate all

essential elements” of his opponent’s claim and needs only to show that there is “an

absence of factual support for one or more elements essential” to his opponent’s

claim. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C)(2). If the opponent “fails to produce factual

support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of

proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Id.

DISCUSSION

We begin with two observations pertinent herein. First, duty is generally “the

obligation to conform to the standard of conduct [of] a reasonable man in like

circumstances.” Fox v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ., 576 So.2d 978, 981

(La.1991). Second, “issues that require the determination of reasonableness of acts

and conduct of parties under all facts and circumstances of the case can not ordinarily

be disposed of by summary judgment.” Granda v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 04-1722,

pp. 4-5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/10/06), 935 So.2d 703, 707, writ denied, 06-589 (La.

5/5/06), 927 So.2d 326 (quoting Matthews v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 703 F.2d 921,

925-26 (5th Cir.1983)).

Keeping these general rules in mind, we review the law and jurisprudence

concerning motorist/pedestrian accidents, which was outlined by this court in Uriegas

v. Gainsco, 94-1400, pp. 15-18 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/13/95), 663 So.2d 162, 171-72, writ

denied, 95-2485 (La. 12/15/95), 664 So.2d 458 (case citations omitted):

Louisiana law does not impose absolute or strict liability upon a
motorist involved in a collision with a pedestrian. Motorists are not the
insurers of pedestrians’ safety. However, a motorist is statutorily
obligated to exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian
upon the roadway and must give warning to the pedestrian by sounding
the horn when necessary. [La.R.S. 32:214] Furthermore, a motorist

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must exercise proper precaution upon observing any child or any
confused or incapacitated person upon a highway. La.R.S. 32:214.
The fact that an accident occurs does not create a presumption of
negligence in favor of either the pedestrian or motorist. Accidents
occurring between a pedestrian and a motorist are governed by the
principles of comparative fault. La.Civ.Code art. 2323[.] Therefore, a
determination of negligence in motorist/pedestrian accidents rests upon
the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
The driver of a vehicle bears a greater responsibility to avoid
pedestrian/motorist accidents because the consequences of his fault
present the potential for causing the greater havoc. . . . As stated by the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Baumgartner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 356 So.2d 400, 406 (La.1978):

The operator of a motor vehicle, a dangerous
instrumentality, has the constant duty to watch out for the
possible negligent acts of pedestrians and avoid injuring
them. A higher standard of care than that required of
pedestrians is imposed upon the motorist commensurate
with the hazards his conduct inflicts upon the public
safety. . . . It must be noted, however, that a motorist who
exercises all reasonable care to protect a pedestrian, who
nonetheless suffers injury, is not at fault.

Likewise, a pedestrian is charged with a duty to exercise
reasonable care when entering the roadway or a crosswalk. . . . [W]hen
a pedestrian crosses a roadway at any point other than within a marked
cross walk or within an unmarked cross walk at an intersection, the
pedestrian must yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway.
La. R.S. 32:213(A). Therefore, responsibility for travel free from undue
peril on the streets and highways of this state is shared by both the
motorist and pedestrian. The countervailing duties that motorists and
pedestrians owe to each other ensure that both pedestrians and motorists
may safely coexist on roadways traversed by both.

Although a motorist commands a greater instrumentality of harm,
a pedestrian still bears the burden of proving that the motorist was
negligent before he can recover damages. A motorist has no special
duty to anticipate the presence of a pedestrian in a roadway where there
is no crosswalk. Moreover, a motorist is not held to the highest standard
of care in guarding against unexpected or unusual obstructions in the
road. A motorist has a right to assume that a pedestrian will remain in
a position of safety and will not attempt to enter the path of a moving
vehicle. However, a motorist may not blindly rely upon this assumption
when he sees, should have seen, or anticipates that the pedestrian is
going to cross the path of his vehicle. When a motorist sees, should
have seen, or anticipates that the pedestrian is going to cross the path of
his vehicle, the motorist must exercise reasonable care to protect the
pedestrian.

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Furthermore, as a general rule, “a motorist may assume that the road is safe for

travel even at night.” Vowell v. Mfrs. Cas. Ins. Co., 229 La. 798, 809, 86 So.2d 909,

913 (La.1956). This general rule is subject to the exception that when driving after

dark or in circumstances of limited or impaired visibility, a motorist must observe and

control his vehicle in order “to avoid discernable objects in his path of travel; that is,

in adverse conditions, a greater degree of care must be exercised.” Jackson v. Scott

Truck & Tractor, Inc., 31,933, p. 6 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/5/99), 736 So.2d 987, 992.

However, a “motorist driving at night is not charged with the duty of guarding against

striking an unexpected or unusual obstruction which is difficult to see and which the

driver had no reason to anticipate he would encounter on the highway.” Foster v.

Clarendon Nat’l Ins., 32,646, p. 14 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/1/00), 753 So.2d 968, 976.

Accordingly, “[a] driver is liable for striking a pedestrian only when there is an

opportunity to appreciate the pedestrian’s peril in time to avoid the accident.” Id.

Both Mr. Peltier and Mr. Wylie had a duty to act reasonably under the

circumstances. Our review of the record shows that genuine issues of material fact

exist as to whether Mr. Peltier acted reasonably under the circumstances he

encountered June 28, 2008, which preclude summary judgment.

Trooper Pezant testified that Mr. Peltier acted reasonably when he diverted his

attention to Ms. Jones’s vehicle to insure that no one was in his path as he passed the

vehicle and that there was no reason for him to anticipate the presence of a pedestrian

in the middle of the road. He also testified that Mr. Peltier “did everything a normal

person . . . would have in that situation.” Trooper Pezant made it clear, however, that

he did not know Mr. Wylie’s exact location in relation to Ms. Jones’s vehicle when

he was struck, testifying he noted the drawing in his accident report was not drawn

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to scale for that reason. Without knowing Mr. Wylie’s exact location when he was

struck, Trooper Pezant’s opinion is unsubstantiated.

This is also true of Ms. Jones’s and Mr. Evans’s opinions that Mr. Peltier

“could not miss” Mr. Wylie, i.e., the accident was inevitable. This is better

understood when one considers that Ms. Jones’s and Mr. Evans’s view of Mr. Wylie

was from a different perspective than Mr. Peltier’s potential view of Mr. Wylie.

Trooper Pezant testified that the evidence showed Mr. Wylie was one foot from the

center line in the eastbound lane when he was struck. Ms. Jones and Mr. Evans

testified only that Mr. Wylie was “in front” of her vehicle. This testimony indicates

that Mr. Wylie was in the eastbound lane near the center line further west than

Ms. Jones’s vehicle but does not establish his distance in front of Ms. Jones’s vehicle.

Accordingly, the defendants have not established that Mr. Peltier’s failure to see

Mr. Wylie sooner and avoid him or warn him of his being in danger was reasonable.

The importance of Mr. Wylie’s location is emphasized by the fact that

Mr. Peltier testified that he did not have his high-beam headlights on because he often

encountered fog as he traveled to his donut shop early every morning. Yet, he also

testified that the night was clear and did not mention having encountered fog before

seeing Ms. Jones’s vehicle. Pursuant to Louisiana law, if Mr. Peltier had his high-

beam headlights on, the dark highway would have been illuminated a minimum of

500 feet,2 and Mr. Wylie may also have been illuminated as he stood in the highway.

In Finley v. North Assurance Co. of America, 476 So.2d 837 (La.App. 2 Cir.

1985), the court found a driver comparatively negligent for driving out of a patch of

fog and striking an inebriated couple that was in the driver’s lane of travel. It

2
Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:321(1) requires that vehicle headlights must include “an
uppermost distribution of light . . . to reveal persons and vehicles at a distance of at least 150 feet
ahead for all conditions.”

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determined that if the driver could not see the couple due to fog, he was driving too

fast for the weather conditions and that if fog did not impair the driver’s vision, he

should have had his headlights on high beam for maximum visibility.

Without establishing Mr. Wylie’s exact location, the defendants have not

proved Mr. Peltier’s failure to avoid Mr. Wylie was reasonable nor have they proved

that Mr. Peltier is free from fault with regard to Mr. Wylie’s death. Furthermore, the

defendants have not shown that Mr. Peltier’s failure to use his high beams was

reasonable. These are genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary

judgment.

CONCLUSION

Close consideration of the evidence illustrates that the defendants have not

proved that summary judgment is appropriate herein, as they have failed to establish

that Mr. Peltier’s failure to see Mr. Wylie and his failure to use his high beams was

reasonable. Therefore, the judgment granting summary judgment in favor of the

defendants, Joseph C. Peltier, Jr. and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

Company, is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further

proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules–Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–16.3.

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