Martin Petitjean II v. Samson Contour Energy E & P, LLC

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

10-496

MARTIN PETITJEAN II, ET AL.

VERSUS

SAMSON CONTOUR ENERGY E & P, LLC, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ACADIA, NO. 2008-10299 "E"
HONORABLE HERMAN C. CLAUSE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JOHN D. SAUNDERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, J. David Painter, and Shannon J. Gremillion,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Don Ray Beard
Attorney at Law
318 St. Charles St.
Baton Rouge, LA 70802
(225) 343-0100
Counsel for Defendant Appellee:
Samson Contour Energy E & P, LLC

Christopher Everett Janke
Dennis, Bates & Bullen, LLP
318 St. Charles St.
Batom Rouge, LA 70802
(225) 343-0100
Counsel for Defendant Appellee:
Samson Contour Energy E & P, LLC

Kenneth O'Neil Privat
Attorney at Law
P. O. Drawer 449
Crowley, LA 70527-0449
(337) 783-7142
Counsel for Plaintiff Appellant:
Martin Petitjean II
Martin Petitjean III
Desiree S. T. Petitjean Casey
Yvette S. M. Claire Petitjean
Monique d'Youville Petitj Benoit
Claudette Petitjean Germano

William Seay Strain
William S. Strain & Associates
422 w. Woodstone Court
Baton Rouge, LA 70808
(225) 769-5492
Counsel for Defendant Appellee:
Samson Contour Energy E & P, LLC
CL&F Resources, L.P.
G. Exploration, LLC
R. Bohanan & Associates, LLC
Ridge Production II, LLC
Crystal Land Management, Inc.

Robert Thomas Jorden Jr.
Gordon Arata
400 E. Kaliste Saloom, # 4200
Lafayette, LA 70508
(337) 237-0132
Counsel for Defendant Appellee:
Patricia Lynn Richard

Richard Charles Ellis
William S. Strain & Associates
422 E. Woodstone Court
Baton Rouge, LA 70808
(225) 382-3712
Counsel for Defendant Appellee:
Samson Contour Energy E & P, LLC

Julie Deshotels Jardell
Gordon, Arata, McCollam, et al
P. O. Box 81829
Lafayette, LA 70598-1829
(337) 237-0132
Counsel for Defendant Appellee:
Patricia Lynn Richard

SAUNDERS, Judge.

Herein, we address whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment

in favor of the Appellee and in finding that prescription had not been interrupted as

to the Appellants’ mineral servitude. For the following reasons, the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

The case before us addresses a mineral servitude wherein the Appellants claim

to be the owners of an undivided 1722/3042 interest in the minerals underlying Tracts

1, 2 and 5 of Sections 20 and 28, Township 10 South, Range 2 East, Acadia Parish,

Louisiana (hereinafter referred to as the “subject tracts”).

The subject tracts were initially part of a larger area of land held and

administered by W. Petitjean & Company. In 1979, an act of distribution of minerals

was executed from the company to its partners. By a judicial compromise in

November of 1993 (and corrected by an Act of Correction recorded November 2,

2001), all of the co-owners, including the Appellants, partitioned the surface land of

the property that they owned in indivision, including the subject tracts. The

compromise was amended in 2001 to provide the following regarding mineral

reservations:

All mineral interests pertaining to any properties partitioned will
remain in undivided ownership whether currently under production or
not, for the maximum allowable period of time. Each owner of the
mineral interest shall retain their executive rights over those mineral
interests.

The distributees hereby further amend the document by inserting the
foregoing paragraph.

(Emphasis added).

In August of 2000, Prize Energy (hereinafter referred to as “Prize”) entered into

a one year lease extension with the Appellants and other mineral and surface owners

on a 5.78 acre tract of land (comprising tract 8 within the Plattsmier MT RC SUA

Unit). In December of 2001, Prize obtained a new mineral lease from the Appellants

and other surface and mineral owners over a 3.73 acre tract of land (comprising tract

9 within the Plattsmier MT RC SUA Unit).

In 2006, the Plattsmier-Hulin No. 1 Well was drilled and completed. The

subject tracts are located within the exterior boundary of the Plattsmier MT RC SUA

Unit, of which Samson Contour Energy E & P, L.L.C. (hereinafter referred to as the

“Appellee”) is the operator.

It has been stipulated between the parties that no oil, gas, or other minerals

have been produced from a well located on the subject tracts for a period in excess

of ten years prior to the conduct of operations on the Plattsmier-Huilin No. 1 Well.

The Appellants made demand on the Appellee to provide reports and drilling

costs in accordance with La.R.S. 30:103.1 and La.R.S. 30:103.2. The Appellee

responded by denying that the Appellants had any mineral ownership in the subject

tracts inasmuch as any mineral servitude that they may have had an interest in had

since prescribed. Thereafter, the Appellants filed suit requesting that they be paid

their mineral interest on the subject tracts. On cross-motions for summary judgment,

the trial court denied the Appellants’ motion and granted summary judgment in favor

of the Appellee. It is from this judgment that the Appellants appeal.

APPELLANTS’ ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

The Appellants assert that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment

in favor of the Appellee and in finding that the requirements of La.R.S. 31:75 were

not satisfied by the language of the 1993 judicial compromise.

LAW AND DISCUSSION ON THE MERITS:

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Standard of Review

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria

that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is

appropriate. Schroeder v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 591 So.2d 342

(La.1991). A motion for summary judgment shall be granted “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the

mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966.

Discussion

The issue before this court is whether summary judgment granted in favor of

the Appellee was appropriate. More specifically, we are asked by the Appellants to

consider whether the language of the 1993 judicial compromise was sufficient to meet

the requirements of La.R.S. 31:75, which states that the interruption of prescription

resulting from unit operations may extend to the entirety of the tract burdened by a

mineral servitude regardless of the location of the well or whether all of the tract is

included within the unit.

From this court’s examination of the record, it is apparent that a mineral

servitude was created through the 1993 judicial compromise.

It is well-settled law that a mineral servitude is extinguished by prescription

resulting from non-use for ten years. La.R.S. 31:27(1). Such prescription against a

mineral servitude is interrupted by good faith operations for the discovery and

production of minerals. La.R.S. 32:29.

The parties have stipulated that no oil, gas, or other minerals have been

produced from a well located on the subject tracts for a period in excess of ten years

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prior to the conduct of operations on the Plattsmier-Huilin No. 1 Well in 2006.

Ten years of non-use alone is not necessarily enough to extinguish the

servitude on the subject tracts. If operations were conducted on land other than the

subject tracts, but within the boundaries of the well unit encompassing the subject

tracts, prescription would be interrupted as to the subject tracts.

Operations conducted on land other than that burdened by a mineral
servitude and constituting part of a conventional or compulsory unit that
includes only a part of the land burdened by the servitude will, if
otherwise sufficient to interrupt prescription according to Articles 29
through 32, interrupt prescription only as to that portion of the tract
burdened by the servitude included in the unit provided such operations
are for the discovery and production of minerals from the unitized sand
or sands.

La.R.S. 31:33.

Going further, La.R.S. 31:75 provides that land located outside of the well unit,

but still burdened by the mineral servitude, will have its prescription interrupted by

operations conducted within the well unit on land not burdened by the mineral

servitude, so long as the parties agree expressly and in writing to invoke the benefits

of the statute.

The rules of use regarding interruption of prescription on a mineral
servitude may be restricted by agreement but may not be made less
burdensome, except that parties may agree expressly and in writing,
either in the act creating a servitude or otherwise, that an interruption of
prescription resulting from unit operations or production shall extend to
the entirety of the tract burdened by the servitude tract regardless of the
location of the well or of whether all or only part of the tract is included
in the unit.

La.R.S. 31:75.

In the present matter, prescription began to run against the Appellants with the

origination of the servitude in 1993. The 2001 amendment to the compromise had no

effect on the prescriptive period. If no interruption has occurred, then the servitude

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should have extinguished in 2003—three years prior to the conduct of operations on

the Plattsmier-Huilin No. 1 Well.

The Appellants contend that their mineral rights with respect to the subject

tracts have not prescribed, and they cite La.R.S. 31:75 as the source of the

interruption. They urge that the following language of the 1993 judicial compromise

invoked, expressly and in writing, the benefits of La.R.S. 31:75: “All mineral interests

pertaining to any properties partitioned will remain in undivided ownership whether

currently under production or not, for the maximum allowable period of time.”

The Appellants’ argument that La.R.S. 31:75 is applicable to the present matter

would suggest that at some point between 1993 and 2003, there were operations

conducted on lands outside of the mineral servitude and that some portion of the

mineral servitude was encompassed within the well unit inside which the operations

were conducted.

We find that even if such operations had occurred, the language used in the

1993 judicial compromise was insufficient to invoke La.R.S. 31:75. The statute

requires that the parties agree expressly and in writing that “an interruption of

prescription resulting from unit operations or production shall extend to the entirety

of the tract burdened by the servitude tract regardless of the location of the well or of

whether all or only part of the tract is included in the unit.”

Generally, in interpreting contracts, we look to the intent of the parties.

La.Civ.Code art. 2045. Here, however, we find that a stricter analysis is necessitated

by the requirement of La.R.S. 31:75 that there be an express writing.

The Appellants’ written agreement merely states that their mineral interests will

remain in undivided ownership for the maximum allowable period of time—making

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no mention of La.R.S. 31:75 or its intention to have prescription interrupted on the

entirety of the tract regardless of well location. While it is the view of this court that

“La.R.S. 31:75” need not be specifically mentioned in the writing, the language used

must leave no question that the parties intend to invoke the benefit of having the

interruption of prescription extended to lands beyond what would occur under the

default operation of law. It is not enough that the party’s intent be discernable from

a close reading of the contract. The desire to invoke the statute must be clearly driven

home. It must be lucent enough to outside parties as to alert them that prescription

will be interrupted and mineral rights will be preserved by operations conducted on

lands not burdened by the mineral servitude.

We find that the language of the 1993 judicial compromise lacks the sufficient

clarity discussed above. Accordingly, we do not find that the language of the 1993

judicial compromise amounts to an expressly written agreement as contemplated by

the statute.

While the jurisprudential history on the interpretation of La.R.S. 31:75 is

limited, we note the case of White v. Evans, 457 So.2d 159 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1984),

writ denied, 462 So.2d 207, where the court found the following language to be in

compliance with the requirements of La.R.S. 31:75:

It is further agreed that ... production on any part of the pooled
premises shall constitute an interruption of prescription liberandi causa
then running against the ... mineral rights ... owned by any of the parties
constituting SECOND PARTY in and to all of the lands covered by this
pooling agreement and as to any and all other lands covered by any and
all of said leases and so long as there may be production of gas from any
portion of the premises pooled herein or so long as royalty in lieu of
such production shall be paid in accordance with the terms of this
agreement, the same shall constitute an interruption of the running of
prescription liberandi causa applicable under the law of the State of
Louisiana to mineral servitudes. . .

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White, 457 So.2d at 161.

For the reasons stated above, this court finds that the language used in the

Appellants’ 1993 judicial compromise was insufficient and fails to satisfy the

requirements of La.R.S. 31:75.

CONCLUSION:

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the language of the 1993 judicial

compromise was insufficient in complying with the requirements of La.R.S. 31:75.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are

to be assessed to the Appellants.

AFFIRMED.

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