The Lemoine Company, LLC v. Lafayette Airport Commission

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

10-0833

THE LEMOINE COMPANY, L.L.C.

VERSUS

LAFAYETTE AIRPORT COMMISSION

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 2010-0308
HONORABLE JULES D. EDWARDS, III, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JIMMIE C. PETERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, James T. Genovese, and David E.Chatelain,*
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Murphy J. Foster, III
Yvonne R. Olinde
Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, L.L.P.
P. O. Box 3197
Baton Rouge, LA 70821-3197
(225) 387-4000
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
The Lemoine Company, L.L.C.

*Honorable David E. Chatelain participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana
Supreme Court as Judge Pro Tempore.

Rickey W. Miniex
Clyde R. Simien
Todd M. Swartzendruber
Erica R. Mayon
Simien & Miniex, APLC
104 Rue Iberville
Lafayette, LA 70508
(337) 269-0222
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Lafayette Airport Commission

H. Bruce Shreves
Denise C. Puente
Simon, Peragine, Smith & Redfearn, L.L.P.
1100 Poydras Street, 30th Floor
New Orleans, LA 70163-3000
(504) 569-2030
COUNSEL FOR INTERVENOR/APPELLEE:
The Harper Company of Ohio

PETERS, J.

This litigation involves a dispute over the award of a contract for a public

works project at the Lafayette, Louisiana airport. The plaintiff, The Lemoine

Company, L.L.C. (Lemoine), brought suit against the Lafayette Airport Commission

(Airport Commission) seeking to have the bid of The Harper Company of Ohio

(Harper) rejected and seeking to be awarded the contract as the next lowest bidder.

Lemoine now appeals the trial court’s judgment dismissing all of its requests for

relief. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE LITIGATION

In late 2009, the Airport Commission sought bids for a public works project

designed to upgrade its cargo apron and connector taxiways at the Lafayette Regional

Airport. When the bids were opened on December 23, 2009, Harper’s $7,890,511.03

bid was the lowest of the seven bids submitted and was followed closely by

Lemoine’s $7,960,946.54 bid.

On January 6, 2010, Lemoine submitted a formal bid protest to the Airport

Commission, asserting that Harper’s bid should be rejected and its bid should be

accepted. Specifically, Lemoine asserted that Harper’s failure to satisfactorily

complete and sign the required bid form rendered its bid unacceptable. The next day,

January 7, 2009, the Airport Commission rejected Lemoine’s protest.

Lemoine responded to this rejection on January 15, 2010, by filing suit against

the Airport Commission. In its suit, Lemoine sought a preliminary and permanent

injunction prohibiting the Airport Commission from awarding the contract to Harper,

an order of mandamus compelling the Airport Commission to award the contract to

its company, and a declaratory judgment to the effect that any contract entered into

between Harper and the Airport Commission was null and void. Alternatively,

Lemoine sought a monetary damage award. On January 26, 2010, Harper intervened

in the lawsuit, asserting that its bid complied with the public bid law.

The trial court entertained and rejected Lemoine’s request for a preliminary

injunction at a hearing held on January 29, 2010. Thereafter, the parties stipulated

that all of Lemoine’s claims would be considered on the merits by the submission of

the pleadings and evidence presented at the hearing on the preliminary injunction.1

Based on this stipulation, the trial court executed a judgment on April 14, 2010,

dismissing all of Lemoine’s claims for relief.2

In its appeal to this court, Lemoine asserts three assignments of error:

1) The District Court erred in failing to conclude that the bid
submitted by Harper should have been disqualified as non-responsive
and non-conforming for its failure to fill in all of the blanks on the bid
form as required in the bidding documents.

2) The District Court erred in failing to conclude that the bid
submitted by Harper should have been disqualified as non-responsive
and non-conforming because the signature on the bid did not conform
with the records of the Secretary of State, nor was any evidence of
agency, corporate, or partnership authority attached to the submission
of the bid.

3) The District Court erred in failing to determine the validity of the
bid by examining only the bid, and instead referring to evidence beyond
the bid documents submitted.

OPINION

This litigation is governed by Louisiana’s Public Bid Law, La.R.S. 38:2212,

et seq., a law which “was enacted in the interest of the taxpaying citizens and has for

1
The evidence included a copy of the bids submitted by Lemoine and Harper; the records of
the Louisiana Secretary of State concerning the status of Harper’s organization in Louisiana; the
Airport Authority’s instructions to bidders and amendments thereto; Lemoine’s January 6, 2010
protest letter; an affidavit by Paul Segura, Jr., the Airport Authority chairperson; and an affidavit by
Harper’s vice-president, James R. Thomas. Lemoine timely objected to the introduction of Mr.
Thomas’ affidavit.
2
Even before the judgment was signed, on March 22, 2010, the Airport Commission had
awarded the contract to Harper.

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its purpose their protection against contracts of public officials entered into because

of favoritism and involving exorbitant and extortionate prices.” Haughton Elevator

Div. v. State Div. of Admin., 367 So.2d 1161, 1164 (La.1979). In enacting the public

bid law, the legislature has specifically prescribed the conditions under which the

state will permit public work to be done on its behalf or on behalf of its political

subdivisions. Hamp’s Constr, L.L.C. v. The City of New Orleans, 05-489 (La.

2/22/06), 924 So.2d 104; Broadmoor, L.L.C. v. Ernest N. Morial New Orleans

Exhibition Hall Auth., 04-211 (La. 3/18/04), 867 So.2d 651. In the words of our

supreme court, it is “a prohibitory law founded on public policy.” Broadmoor,

L.L.C., 867 So.2d at 656.

Given the nature of the legislative mandate, a political entity such as the

Airport Commission has no authority to take any action that is inconsistent with the

public bid law. Broadmoor, L.L.C., 867 So.2d 651. Specifically, the public entity

may not waive any requirements of the public bid law, any requirements stated in the

advertisement for bid, nor any requirements stated on the bid form. La.R.S. 38:2212

A(1)(b); Hamp’s Constr., L.L.C., 924 So.2d 104.

As a further effort to specify the prescribed conditions relating to the letting of

public works projects, a Louisiana Uniform Public Work Bid Form was developed

by the Louisiana Division of Administration pursuant to the mandate of La.R.S.

38:2212, which provides that the form so developed

shall require only the information necessary to determine the lowest
bidder and the following sections and information: Bid Security or Bid
Bond, Acknowledgment of Addenda, Base Bid, Alternates, Bid Total,
Signature of Bidder, Name, Title and Address of Bidder, name of Firm
or Joint Venture, Corporate Resolution and Louisiana Contractors
License Number, and on public works projects where unit prices are
utilized, a section on the bid form where the unit price utilized in the bid
shall be set forth.

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La.R.S. 38:2212(A)(1)(b)(ii)(aa) (emphasis added).

Any other documentation of information not required to be included on the public bid

form itself “shall be furnished by all bidders at a later date and time, in accordance

with the Bidding Documents.” La.R.S. 38:2212(A)(1)(b)(ii)(bb).

The content, or lack of content, of Harper’s submitted bid form is the basis of

all three of Lemoine’s assignments of error.

Assignment of Error Number One

In its instructions to the bidders, the Airport Commission stated in Section 2

that “[a]ll blank spaces in the proposal form shall be properly filled in.” Additionally,

in Section 3, as amended by the Airport Commission, the following language appears:

The Bidder is required to fill in all blank spaces and to furnish all
information required by the Louisiana Uniform Public Work Bid Form
with Bid Bond. Only the Louisiana Uniform Public Work Bid Form
with Bid Bond is required at the time of bid submission. Any other
information or certifications required by the contract documents can be
submitted following conditional notice of award.

The section of the public bid form at issue in this assignment of error reads as

follows:

ALTERNATES: For any and all work required by the Bidding Documents
for Alternates including any and all unit prices designated as alternates
in the unit price description.

Alternate No. 1 (Owner to provide description of alternate and state
whether add or deduct) for the lump sum of :
______________________________Dollars ($__________________)

Alternate No. 1 (Owner to provide description of alternate and state
whether add or deduct) for the lump sum of :
______________________________Dollars ($__________________)

Alternate No. 1 (Owner to provide description of alternate and state
whether add or deduct) for the lump sum of :
_______________________________Dollars ($__________________)

Despite the inclusion of this language in the bid form furnished to Harper, the bidding

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documents provided by the Airport Commission contained no provision for alternates

applicable to the proposed project. That being the case, rather than placing a “not

applicable” or similar notation in this section, Harper left this section completely

blank. Lemoine asserts in this assignment of error that Harper’s failure to fill in the

blank spaces of this section is fatal to the sufficiency of its bid and that its bid should

be rejected.

In considering Lemoine’s argument, we first note that the supreme court in

Hamp’s Construction, L.L.C., 924 So.2d at 110, addressed this form completion issue

in general:

According to the basic rules of statutory construction, when the
written law is clear and unambiguous, and its application leads to no
absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written. Rosenbush
Claims Service, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 94-2223 (La.4/10/95), 653
So.2d 538, 544. Further, the legislature is presumed to have enacted a
statute in light of the preceding statutes involving the same subject
matter and court decisions construing those statutes, and where the new
statute is worded differently from the preceding statute, the legislature
is presumed to have intended to change the law. Id. There is nothing
ambiguous about La. R.S. 38:2212A(A)(b); the requirements of the
Public Bid Law, the advertisement for bids and the bid form shall not be
waived by any public entity. The legislature changed the wording of this
statute several times in an attempt to change the law, and to make clear
that the requirements of the advertisement for bids and the bid form, as
well as the Public Bid Law, shall not be waived. The most recent
amendment to the statute serves to emphasize that these requirements
cannot be waived under any circumstances, regardless of whether they
could be considered as informalities. Accordingly, the public entity
should not include any requirements in its advertisement for bids or bid
form that it considers insignificant or waivable, because once included,
these requirements are non-waivable as a matter of law.

In that decision, the supreme court concluded that the public entity did not have the

authority to waive the bidder’s failure to attach a copy of its invitation to bid to its

public bid form, a requirement of the public entity’s bid form. See also Roof Tech.,

Inc. v. State, Div. of Admin, Office of Facility Planning and Control, 09-925 (La.App.

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1 Cir. 10/28/09), 29 So.3d 621 (where the court held that when the instructions to

bidders required that “[a]ny interlineations, alteration or erasure must be initialed by

the Signer of the bid or his authorized representative,” the public entity was required

to reject a bid on a public works project where the bidder failed to initial typing errors

that were corrected using the typewriter’s “word-out” function); Beverly Constr. Co.,

L.L.C. v. Parish of Jefferson, 07-847, p. 3 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/6/08), 979 So.2d 551,

552, (where the bidder submitted its own corporate resolution form and did not

complete and return the blank corporate resolution form that was in the bid package,

the public entity properly rejected the bid because the advertisements for bids stated

that “this bid package must be returned in its entirety” and “bid package, including

instructions and specifications, must be returned in its entirety for bid to be valid.”

(capitalization in original removed)). Both of these appellate court decisions relied

on the supreme court decision in Hamp’s Construction, L.L.C., 924 So.2d 104.

In this appeal, Harper and the Airport Commission argue that the Airport

Commission’s acceptance of Harper’s bid was not a waiver of any requirement under

the bid documents. Instead, they argue that because there were no alternate proposals

to respond to, Harper was not required to complete this section of the public bid form.

We agree.

As previously stated, the public bid law was enacted to protect Louisiana

taxpayers from public contracts “entered into because of favoritism and involving

exorbitant and extortionate prices.” Haughton Elevator Div., 367 So.2d at 1164.

Also, as previously stated, we apply the law as written when it is “clear and

unambiguous, and its application leads to no absurd consequences.” Hamp’s Constr.,

L.L.C., 924 So.2d at 110 (emphasis added). Requiring a bidder to fill in blanks

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having no bearing on its bid simply for the sake of making a notation on the

document would lead to an absurd consequence in that it would require a bidder to

perform a vain and useless act. As pointed out by Harper and the Airport

Commission in argument, there was no information available for Harper to “properly”

fill in the blanks. In fact, the language immediately following the title in the

“ALTERNATES” section provides that the section is “[f]or any and all work required

by the Bidding Documents for Alternates including any and all unit prices designated

as alternates in the unit price description.” Thus, absent “work required by the

Bidding Documents for Alternates,” nothing was required of the prospective bidder,

and, unlike the situation in Hamp’s Constr., L.L.C., 924 So.2d 104, the Airport

Commission did not “waive” any requirement imposed by the Louisiana Public Bid

Law, the advertisement for bids, or the bid form package.

We find no merit in Lemoine’s first assignment of error.3

Assignment of Error Number Two

This assignment of error relates to the manner in which Harper’s corporate

officer executed its bid form. The Airport Commission’s written instructions to

potential bidders provided that relative to corporations, the bid form “shall be signed

by the name of the corporation, followed by the signature of the officer authorized to

sign, and the printed designation of the office he holds in the corporation.”

Additionally, the bid form itself contains a footnote that reads as follows:

If someone other than a corporate officer signs for the
Bidder/Contractor, a copy of a corporate resolution or other signature
authorization shall be required for submission of bid. Failure to include

3
Harper also asserts that Lemoine’s interpretation of the bid instructions is inconsistent given
the fact that Lemoine failed to complete all the blank spaces on its own bid. However, the question
of whether Lemoine’s bid meets the requirements of the public bid law is not before us, and we will
not consider this argument.

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a copy of the appropriate signature authorization, if required, may result
in the rejection of the bid unless bidder has complied with La.R.S.
38:2212(A)(1)(c) or RS [sic] 38:2212(O).[4]

Harper’s bid form contains the signature of Jim Thomas, whom the bid form

identifies as Harper’s vice president. Attached to the bid form is a notarized affidavit

signed by Jim Thomas wherein he asserts, among other things, that he is the vice

president of the Harper corporation.

In arguing that the signature on Harper’s bid form is not sufficient, Lemoine

points to the facts that Mr. Thomas’ affidavit is not in the form of a corporate

resolution and that the current annual report on file with the Louisiana Secretary of

State identifies “James R. Thomas,” not “Jim Thomas,” as a vice president of the

corporation. While not seriously disputing that “Jim Thomas” and “James R.

Thomas” are the same person, Lemoine asserts that because Mr. Thomas signed the

bid form as “Jim Thomas” and not as “James R. Thomas,” the bid should have been

rejected as not conforming with the bid requirements.

We find no merit in this argument. Nothing in the Airport Commission’s

instructions to bidders requires proof of corporate authority. These instructions

merely require that the corporate office of the individual signing the bid form be

identified. The footnote on the bid form requires proof of corporate authority only

when the individual signing on behalf of the corporation is not a corporate officer.

Nothing in the instructions requires that the corporate officer’s name and signature

be exactly the same as the name which appears on the secretary of state’s records.

4
Louisiana Revised Statutes 38:2212(A)(1)(c)(i) relates to bids submitted to the division of
administration while La.R.S. 38:2212(O) relates to bids submitted to a public entity. Both provide
conditions that, if met, would establish the authority of the individual signing the bid submission.
However, neither are applicable to the matter before us because Jim Thomas signed as a corporate
officer of Harper.

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Thus, the question is not whether “Jim Thomas” is listed with the secretary of state

as one of Harper’s corporate officers, but rather whether the signature of “Jim

Thomas” on the bid form is that of one of Harper’s corporate officers. Lemoine bears

the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to establish that the Airport

Commission violated the public bid law in accepting Harper’s bid. Broadmoor,

L.L.C., 867 So.2d 651. Lemoine offered no evidence to establish that Jim Thomas

was not a officer in the Harper corporation. We, therefore, hold the trial court did not

err in finding that Harper’s bid was properly signed by a corporate officer.

Assignment of Error Number Three

In this final assignment of error, Lemoine argues that the trial court erred in

considering a January 23, 2010 affidavit executed by Mr. Thomas wherein he again

asserted that his nickname is “Jim,” that he is the same “Jim Thomas” who signed the

bid, and that he is also the same person listed as “James R. Thomas” in the records

of the secretary of state. Specifically, Lemoine argues that it was improper for the

trial court to look beyond the “four corners” of the bid document, to “parole

evidence,” to confirm the validity of Harper’s bid. Because of our disposition of the

second assignment of error, we need not consider this assignment.

DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing all

of the claims of The Lemoine Company, L.L.C., against the Lafayette Airport

Commission. We assess all costs of this appeal to The Lemoine Company, L.L.C.

AFFIRMED.

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