CA-0010-1248 Nonprecedential Reversed and remanded Processed

Rapides Parish Police Jury v. Catahoula Boys Hunting and Social Club, Inc.

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed April 6, 2011

Also decided on this docket: La. Ct. App. 3d Cir., May 18, 2011

Authorities cited

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Opinion text

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

10-1248 consolidated with 10-1247, 10-1249

RAPIDES PARISH POLICE JURY

VERSUS

CATAHOULA BOYS HUNTING AND SOCIAL CLUB, INC.

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APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 236,506 C/W 236,507 C/W 236,508
HONORABLE GEORGE C. METOYER , JR., DISTRICT JUDGE

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ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks, and
Elizabeth A. Pickett, Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Thomas O. Wells
1254 Dorchester Drive
Alexandria, LA 71303
(318) 445-4500
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant:
Rapides Parish Police Jury

Joseph J. Bailey
Jeremy C. Cedars
Provosty, Sadler, deLaunay, Fiorenza and Sobel
P. O. Drawer 1791
Alexandria, LA 71309-1791
(318) 445-3631
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant:
Rapides Parish Police Jury

Richard E. Lee
810 Main St.
Pineville, LA 71360
(318) 448-1391
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees:
Thomas Reich, Catahoula Boys Hunting & Social Club, Inc.,
Richard E. Lee and Betty Lou Drist Dent

PICKETT, Judge.

For the reasons assigned in the companion and consolidated case, Rapides

Parish Police Jury v. Reich, 10-1247 (La.App. 3 Cir. / / ), So.3d , the

judgment of the trial court granting the defendants’ exceptions of res judicata are

reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

10-1247 consolidated with 10-1248, 10-1249

RAPIDES PARISH POLICE JURY

VERSUS

THOMAS REICH

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, concurring.

While I question the intent of the Police Jury in promulgating the two

ordinances to establish a public landing and to expropriate the property in question,

I reluctantly concur in the result. The differences in the present factual circumstances

are such that the cause of action does not arise “out of the transaction or occurrence

that was the subject matter of the first litigation.” Burguieres v. Pollingue, 02-1385,

p. 8 (La. 2/25/03), 843 So.2d 1049, 1053.