Scofield, Gerard, Singletary & Pohorelsky, LLC v. Thomas Barr, IV

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

10-1347

SCOFIELD, GERARD, SINGLETARY &
POHORELSKY, L.L.C.

VERSUS

THOMAS BARR, IV

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2009-3571
HONORABLE CLAYTON DAVIS, DISTRICT JUDGE

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J. DAVID PAINTER
JUDGE

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Court composed of Billy Howard Ezell, J. David Painter, and James T. Genovese,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Genovese, J., concurs in part, dissents in part, and assigns written reasons.

Thomas Barr, IV, Attorney at Law
3855 Noyac Road
Sag Harbor, NY 11963
(631) 725,7447
Thomas Barr, IV/Appellant Pro Se

Kevin P. Fontenot
Scofield, Gerard, Singletary & Pohorelsky, L.L.C.
901 Lakeshore Drive, Suite 900
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 433-9436
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
Scofield, Gerard, Singletary & Pohorelsky, L.L.C.

PAINTER, Judge.

Plaintiff, the law firm of Scofield, Gerard, Singletary, and Pohorelsky, L.L.C.

(The Scofield Firm), filed suit against Defendant, Thomas Barr, IV (Barr), to recover

unpaid legal fees. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and

Defendant appealed. Plaintiff filed an answer to the appeal, seeking damages for

frivolous appeal and additional attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we affirm

the trial court’s judgment and decline to award any damages for frivolous appeal or

additional attorney’s fees.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2008, Barr retained the Scofield Firm to represent him and his company,

Thomas Barr IV Louisiana Properties General, LLC, relative to several legal disputes

arising out of his business dealings in Louisiana. Barr had been a client of the

Scofield Firm since 2006. Barr, himself an attorney licensed to practice law in

Louisiana, is a resident of the State of New York. Phillip DeVilbiss, a partner in the

Scofield Firm, was the attorney primarily responsible for Barr’s files. In February

2009, Barr and DeVilbiss had a dispute over whether certain correspondence should

be sent out under Barr’s own signature. Unable to resolve the conflict, Barr signed

written consents to DeVilbiss’s withdrawal from five separate matters, and Barr was

enrolled as the sole counsel of record. While the parties dispute the circumstances

surrounding the withdrawal, with the Scofield Firm asserting that it was at the

instruction of Barr and with Barr asserting that it was unexpected, it is undisputed

that Barr signed multiple consents to withdraw.

At the time the Scofield Firm’s representation of Barr was discontinued, there

was an alleged balance of $16,665.57 in outstanding legal fees. On June 9, 2009, the

Scofield firm sent a demand letter to Barr for payment of the fees. No payment was

made. The Scofield Firm then filed suit against Barr in July 2009. In response, Barr

filed an exception of lack of personal jurisdiction which was denied by the trial court.

Barr then filed an answer in which he alleged, as affirmative defenses, that the

amount allegedly owed was erroneous since “Plaintiff failed to adequately render the

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services for which [it] had been retained” and that the Scofield Firm was not entitled

to an award of attorney’s fees because the underlying claim on open account was

invalid. The Scofield Firm then filed a motion for summary judgment supported by

the following evidence: (1) the affidavit of Phillip DeVilbiss identifying the invoices

and confirming the amount of unpaid legal fees and the amount of legal fees incurred

by the Scofield Firm in the prosecution of this matter, (2) copies of all unpaid

invoices, (3) copies of engagement letters signed by Devilbiss and Barr, (4) copies

of written consents to withdraw signed by Barr, and (5) a copy of the demand letter

sent to Barr. In opposition, Barr filed his own affidavit alleging that the withdrawal

by the Scofield Firm was unexpected, without adequate warning, and arbitrary and

capricious. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of the

Scofield Firm in the full amount of $16,665.57 and awarded attorney’s fees in the

amount of $15,000.00, plus judicial interest from the date of judgment and all costs

of the proceedings. Barr now appeals, alleging that summary judgment is improper

because the Scofield Firm “failed to meet its initial evidentiary burden of establishing

the accuracy of the underlying account in its open account claim,” that his affidavit

established the existence of genuine issues of material fact, and that the award of

attorney’s fees was improper. The Scofield Firm has answered the appeal alleging

that the appeal is frivolous and seeking additional attorney’s fees incurred in the

defense of this appeal as well as damages for frivolous appeal. For the following

reasons, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and the award of

attorney’s fees in favor of the Scofield Firm. However, we decline to find that this

appeal is frivolous and do not make any award for damages or award any additional

sums for attorney’s fees incurred in defense of this appeal.

DISCUSSION

It is well settled that we review the trial court’s grant of a motion for summary

judgment de novo under the same criteria that governed the trial court’s consideration

of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Chrysler Fin. Co., L.L.C. v. Gene

Ducote Auto., LLC, 04-1223 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/1/05), 900 So.2d 119. Moreover,

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La.Code Civ.P. art. 966 provides that a motion for summary judgment is properly

granted only if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

In Metal Coatings, LLC v. Petroquip Energy Services, LP, 06-1108, p. 4

(La.App. 3 Cir. 11/21/07), 970 So.2d 695, 698, we stated:

In order to prevail in a suit on an open account, the creditor must
first prove the account by showing that the record of the account was
kept in the course of business and by introducing evidence regarding its
accuracy. Once a prima facie case has been established by the creditor,
the burden shifts to the debtor to prove the inaccuracy of the account or
to prove the debtor is entitled to certain credits. Jacobs Chiropractic
Clinic v. Holloway, 589 So.2d 31 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991).

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 966 provides that the moving party

on a summary judgment bears the burden of proving that there are no genuine issues

of material fact. Once that prima facie showing is made, the burden then shifts to the

nonmoving party to rebut it. Townley v. City of Iowa, 97-493 (La.App. 3 Cir.

10/29/97), 702 So.2d 323. In support of its motion for summary judgment, the

Scofield Firm submitted: (1) the affidavit of Phillip DeVilbiss identifying the invoices

and confirming the amount of unpaid legal fees and the amount of legal fees incurred

by the Scofield Firm in the prosecution of this matter, (2) copies of all unpaid

invoices, (3) copies of engagement letters signed by Devilbiss and Barr, (4) copies

of written consents to withdraw signed by Barr, and (5) a copy of the demand letter

sent to Barr. Barr submitted only his own self-serving affidavit. We have reviewed

the record and are satisfied that Barr has raised no genuine issue of material fact

regarding the amount owed. Nor has Barr filed any reconventional demand or

asserted any affirmative defenses that raises any genuine issues of material fact that

would defeat summary judgment. Therefore, we reach the same conclusion as the

court below, that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the Scofield

Firm is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

An award of reasonable attorney fees to the successful plaintiff in a suit on an

open account is authorized by La.R.S. 9:2781. It is clear that the amount of attorney’s

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fees awarded is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. On appeal, we should

not disturb the amount of attorney’s fees awarded absent a showing of abuse of

discretion. Metro. Reporters, Inc. v. Avery, 95-504 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/28/95), 665

So.2d 547. Several factors, including the ultimate result obtained, the nature of the

case, the amount of time and skill involved and the ability of the party liable to pay,

are to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the amount of attorney’s

fees awarded. Id. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of

$15,000 in attorney fees.

Finally, we consider the Scofield Firm’s claim for frivolous appeal damages

and additional attorney’s fees. In Sigler v. Grace Offshore Co., 95-357, p. 6 (La.App.

3 Cir. 10/4/95), 663 So.2d 212, 215, this court quoted Jackson v. East Baton Rouge

Parish School Board, 348 So.2d 739, 741 (La.App. 1 Cir.1977), as follows:

[Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure] Article 2164
authorizes a claim for damages for frivolous appeal, but its
provisions are penal in nature and must be strictly
construed. Appeals are favored, and the imposition of
penalties for a frivolous appeal will not be granted unless
they are clearly due. Damages for frivolous appeal will not
lie unless it manifestly appears that the appeal was taken
solely for delay or that appealing counsel does not
seriously believe in the position he advocates, even though
the appeal lacks merit.

While Barr’s appeal lacks merit, we find that he did believe in the position he

asserted. As this was a devolutive appeal rather than a suspensive appeal, it cannot

be said that the appeal was taken solely for delay. Accordingly, we deny the Scofield

Firm’s request for damages for frivolous appeal and additional attorney’s fees.

DECREE

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of the Scofield Firm for $16,665.57 for the unpaid invoices and

$15,000.00 in attorney’s fees. We do not find that this appeal was frivolous and

therefore decline to award any damages for frivolous appeal or additional attorney’s

fees. All costs of the appeal are assessed to Defendant/Appellant, Thomas Barr IV.

AFFIRMED.

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STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

10-1347

SCOFIELD, GERARD, SINGLETARY &
POHORELSKY, L.L.C.

VERSUS

THOMAS BARR, IV

GENOVESE, J., concurs in part, dissents in part, and assigns the following
reasons.

This is a collection suit on open account wherein the trial court granted

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and awarded Plaintiff $16,665.57 plus legal

interest and costs for unpaid legal work performed by Plaintiff for its legal

representation of Defendant. The trial court also awarded $15,000.00 in attorney fees

to Plaintiff for its legal work performed in this collection suit. Defendant appealed,

and Plaintiff answered the appeal, seeking damages for frivolous appeal and also

additional attorney fees for work done on appeal. The majority affirms the trial court

in all respects and denies damages for frivolous appeal and does not award Plaintiff

attorney fees for work done on appeal.

I agree with the majority in affirming the trial court’s award of $16,665.57 plus

legal interest and costs. I also agree with the majority denying damages for frivolous

appeal.

However, I disagree with the majority in affirming the trial court award of

$15,000.00 in attorney fees on a $16,665.57 collection suit. Though I realize some

extra work was needed and performed in the prosecution of this collection suit,

including an additional court appearance to defeat Defendant’s questionable

exception of lack of personal jurisdiction, this was not an overly cumbersome, time-

consuming, and complicated legal matter. In my view, the record neither supports nor

warrants such a substantial award of attorney fees in a collection case such as this.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2781 permits an award of “reasonable attorney fees” for

the prosecution and collection of such a claim. Understanding full well that an

attorney fee award should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court and should

not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, in my view such an

award constitutes a slight abuse of discretion, and it should be reduced to $7,500.00.

I likewise disagree with the majority in not awarding any attorney fees to

Plaintiff for work done on appeal. Though I agree with the majority in denying

damages for frivolous appeal, counsel for Plaintiff on appeal unquestionably and

unequivocally had to spend time and resources (1) in reviewing the record in order

to prepare for Defendant’s appeal, (2) in preparing an answer to appeal, (3) in

preparing an appellate court brief, and (4) in appearing and orally arguing Plaintiff’s

position before this court. On the one hand, the majority affirms a $15,000.00

attorney fee in a $16,665.57 collection suit; yet, on the other hand, and quite

incongruously, it denies Plaintiff attorney fees for work done on appeal. I disagree

and would award Plaintiff $3,000.00 for work done on appeal.