Judy Lyons v. Ann Knight

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

10-1470

JUDY LYONS

VERSUS

ANN KNIGHT, MARK KNIGHT, KELLY KNIGHT, AND KNIGHT OIL
TOOLS, INC.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 2010-0734 “L”
HONORABLE MARILYN CARR CASTLE, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Billy Howard Ezell, and J. David Painter,
Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Alan K. Breaud
Timothy W. Basden
Breaud & Meyers
P. O. Drawer 3448
Lafayette, LA 70502
(337) 266-2200
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant:
Judy Lyons

Cliffe E. Laborde III
Cliff A. Lacour
One Petroleum Center, Suite 200
1001 Pinhook Rd.
Lafayette, LA 70503
(337) 237-7000
Counsel for Defendants-Appellees:
Ann Knight
Mark Knight
Kelly Knight Sobiesk
Knight Oil Tools

PICKETT, Judge.

The appellant, Judy Lyons, appeals the judgment of the trial court dismissing

her claims against the defendants Ann Knight, Mark Knight, Kelly Knight Sobiesk,

and Knight Oil Tools, as prescribed and as an exercise of the defendants’ rights

pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art 971, and awarding attorney’s fees to the defendants.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Judy Lyons was contracted by Ann Knight and Kelly Knight Sobiesk to do

interior design work in their primary homes and other residences. This work involved

making home improvements and purchasing furnishings and accessories for their

homes. Rather than pay Ms. Lyons directly, they instructed her to submit invoices

to Knight Oil Tools, Inc., a family corporation that had previously been run by Mrs.

Knight’s late husband but was now managed by her son, Mark Knight. In order to

keep Mark Knight from knowing that personal work for Mrs. Knight and Mrs.

Sobiesk was being paid for by the Knight Oil Tools, Mrs. Knight instructed Ms.

Lyons to alter invoices so that they looked like business expenses. Ms. Lyons would

turn in invoices to the company’s accounts receivable department, and they would

give her an unsigned check for Mrs. Knight to sign. At some point, Ms. Lyons, with

or without the permission of Mrs. Knight, began signing Mrs. Knight’s name on the

checks. While there is no dispute that Ms. Lyons signed some of the checks, there is

no claim that Ms. Lyons did not do the work for which the checks were issued,

though there is some dispute about the amounts she charged. Between 2002 and

2005, Ms. Lyons submitted invoices totaling over $600,000.00 for goods and

services.

1

In 2005, Mark Knight discovered the payments made to Ms. Lyons. He

initiated a criminal complaint with the Lafayette Police Department, alleging that Ms.

Lyons had forged signatures on thirty-five checks issued by Knight Oil Tools. In

addition to the complaint from Mark Knight, Mrs. Sobiesk swore out an affidavit

stating that she had personally paid for furniture invoiced by Ms. Lyons to Knight Oil

tools. She also stated that Ms. Lyons had received payments for goods that she never

delivered. In addition, Mrs. Knight signed an affidavit stating that Ms. Lyons had

forged her signature on thirty-six checks issued by Knight Oil Tools. Based on these

allegations, the Lafayette City Police arrested Ms. Lyons on September 13, 2005, and

charged her with thirty-two counts of forgery and thirty-two counts of theft by fraud.

The criminal prosecution of Ms. Lyons went to trial on August 25, 2009. At

the close of the prosecution’s case, the trial court entered a directed verdict of

acquittal. It relied on the fact that Mrs. Knight, in her trial testimony, could not

identify any checks that she did not sign. Also, the trial court found that there was

no intent to defraud as required for a criminal conviction for forgery.

On February 2, 2010, Ms. Lyons filed a Petition for Damages against Mrs.

Knight, Mark Knight, Mrs. Sobiesk, and Knight Oil Tools, Inc., alleging malicious

prosecution and defamation. In response, the defendants filed an Exception of

Prescription and Special Motion to Strike. A hearing on the exception and the motion

to strike were held on April 26, 2010. At the hearing, the trial court indicated that it

would grant the exception of prescription as it related to the claims of defamation.

The court found that the statements Ms. Lyons claimed were defamatory were made

in 2005, and the one-year prescriptive period had clearly run. The trial court took the

issue of the special motion to strike under La.Code Civ.P. art. 971 under advisement.

2

On May11, 2010, the court issued written reasons granting the motion to strike. In

a judgment rendered on August 23, 2010, the trial court signed a judgment dismissing

Ms. Lyons’ claims of defamation on the basis of prescription; striking the claims for

malicious prosecution pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 971; and awarding attorneys’

fees pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 971(B) in the amount of $10,000.00.

Ms. Lyons appeals this judgment.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Ms. Lyons asserts two assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in granting the Special Motion to Strike, dismissing
the claim for malicious prosecution, and awarding attorneys’ fees and
costs to the defendants.

2. The trial court erred in granting the Exception of Prescription and
dismissing the defamation claims.

DISCUSSION

Are the Defamation Claims Prescribed?

In her second assignment of error, Ms. Lyons argues that the trial court erred

in granting the peremptory exception of prescription. An exception of prescription

is a peremptory exception. La.Code Civ.P. art. 927. Defamation is a delictual action

subject to a one-year liberative prescription. La.Civ.Code art. 3492. Here, the claims

for defamation were based on the information provided by Mark Knight to the

Lafayette Police Department in August and September 2005, an affidavit executed

by Mrs. Sobiesk on September 7, 2005, and an affidavit executed by Mrs. Knight on

September 8, 2005. Mrs. Lyons filed her petition for damages on February 2, 2010.

Thus, on the face of the pleadings, the claims for defamation have prescribed. The

supreme court discussed the burden of proof for prescription claims in Carter v.

Haygood, 04-646, pp. 8-9 (La. 1/19/05), 892 So.2d 1261, 1267:

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Ordinarily, the exceptor bears the burden of proof at the trial of the
peremptory exception. Campo v. Correa, 01-2707, p. 7 (La.6/21/02),
828 So.2d 502, 508. However, if prescription is evident on the face of
the pleadings, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the action has not
prescribed. Campo, 01-2702 at p. 7, 828 So.2d at 508; Williams v.
Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 611 So.2d 1383, 1386
(La.1993). If evidence is introduced at the hearing on the peremptory
exception of prescription, the district court’s findings of fact are
reviewed under the manifest error-clearly wrong standard of review.
Stobart v. State, Through DOTD, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993). If the
findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, an
appellate court may not reverse even though convinced that had it been
sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence
differently. Id. at 882-83.

As Ms. Lyons’ claim for defamation was prescribed on the face of her petition,

the burden shifted to her to show that her defamation claims did not prescribe. To

satisfy this burden, Ms. Lyons argued in the trial court that the prescriptive period

was suspended during the pendency of the criminal action initiated by the defamatory

statements made by the defendants. The trial court found that the criminal action

against Ms. Lyons did not suspend prescription, and dismissed her defamation claims.

Louisiana courts have consistently held that an action for defamation
arising out of allegations made in judicial proceedings and against a
party to those proceedings cannot be brought until those proceedings are
terminated. Loew’s, Inc. v. Don George, Inc., 237 La. 132, 110 So.2d
553, 561 (1959); Nolan v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No 2.,
01-0175, p. 8 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/27/01), 790 So.2d 725, 730; Ballex v.
Naccari, 95-0057, p. 2 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/7/95), 657 So.2d 511, 512;
Grant v. Politz, 575 So.2d 915, 917 (La.App. 2 Cir.1991); Thomas v.
Mobley, 118 So.2d 476, 483 (La.App. 1 Cir.1960). See also Justice
Watson's concurrence in Union Serv. & Maint. Co., Inc. v. Powell, 393
So.2d 94, 99 (La.1980). This rule allows the underlying litigation to
proceed in an orderly manner, without the issue of defamation present.
Ortiz v. Barriffe, 523 So.2d 896, 898 (La.App. 4 Cir.),writ denied, 531
So.2d 273 (La.1988); Calvert v. Simon, 311 So.2d 13, 17 (La.App. 4
Cir.1975).

Simpson v. Perry, 03-116, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 7/14/04), 887 So.2d 14, 16 (footnote

omitted).

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In this case, the statements which Ms. Lyons claims are defamatory were made

by the defendants to law enforcement officers for the purpose of initiating a criminal

prosecution. These statements became the basis of a criminal prosecution filed by the

state against Ms. Lyons. While acknowledging that prescription would be suspended

if the statements were made during a civil case, the defendants argue that the

statements were not made in connection with a judicial proceeding, or that the

defendants were not a party to the criminal prosecution, and thus prescription was not

suspended or interrupted. In support of their position, they cite Doughty v.

Cummings, 44,812, (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/30/09), 28 So.3d 580, writ denied, 10-251 (La.

4/9/10), 31 So.3d 394.

In Doughty, the plaintiff, a former bank employee, sued his former employer

bank and its president for defamation and malicious prosecution. The president of

the bank had reported to an insurance adjuster and later federal authorities that the

plaintiff had colluded in a fraud scheme with a bank client’s employee in 2003. The

plaintiff was indicted in 2006, but the charges were dismissed on April 1, 2008. The

plaintiff filed his suit on June 13, 2008. The second circuit held that the claim for

defamation had prescribed, stating:

The defamation claim is prescribed on the face of the petition.
The statement to the insurance agent was made in 2003, and although
the petition does not announce precisely when applicants made federal
authorities and bank regulators aware of their accusations of fraud and
defalcation by Doughty, presumably this occurred well prior to the 2006
indictment.

Doughty contends that prescription on the defamation claims was
interrupted during the pendency of the federal criminal proceedings. An
action for defamation arising out of allegations made in judicial
proceedings and against a party to those proceedings cannot be brought
until those proceedings are terminated. Waguespack v. Judge, 04-137
(La.App. 5th Cir. 6/29/04), 877 So.2d 1090; Nolan v. Jefferson Parish
Hospital Service District No. 2, 01-175 (La.App. 5th Cir. 6/27/01), 790

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So.2d 725. However, that principle is not applicable in this matter as
the statements were not made in a judicial proceeding, but prior to any
proceeding.

The trial court found that the indictment had the effect of
republishing the defamatory statements. Even if we accept this premise,
we note that the suit was filed more than one year after the indictment
was handed down. Accordingly, Doughty's defamation claims have
prescribed, and the trial court erred in concluding otherwise.

Id. at 584.

In Union Service & Maintenance Co., Inc. v. Powell, 393 So.2d 94, 98-100

(La.1980)(footnotes omitted), Justice Watson penned a concurrence that explained

the state of the law as it relates to defamation in a judicial proceeding:

There is a conflict in the circuits on the question of whether a
party allegedly libeled in the pleadings of a lawsuit can sue for that libel
prior to termination of the suit. Marionneaux v. King, 331 So.2d 180
(La.App. 1 Cir. 1976); Coleman v. Kroger Co., 371 So.2d 1186
(La.App. 1 Cir. 1979), writ refused 372 So.2d 1041; Lees v. Smith, 363
So.2d 974 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1978); Calvert v. Simon, 311 So.2d 13
(La.App. 2 Cir. 1975); and Viera v. Kwik Home Services, Inc., 266 So.2d
732 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1972), writ refused, judgment not final, 268 So.2d
258.

Because LSA-C.C.P. art. 1061 does not require connexity
between the principal and reconventional demands, Viera decided that
a libel claim can be brought by reconventional demand in the suit
containing the alleged libel. Viera is not without precedent. Sabine
Tram Co. v. Jurgens, 143 La. 1092, 79 So. 872 (1918) allowed a
reconventional demand for libel in a suit alleging fraud without
discussion of the termination requirement. There the question of fraud
was apparently decided by judgments in separate suits before the
reconventional demand was considered. See also Pelletier v. Pugh, 16
La.App. 693, 132 So. 769 (1931) and Story v. Martin, 217 So.2d 758
(La.App. 4 Cir. 1969). However, most of the Louisiana authorities state
that the suit alleged to contain the libel must be brought to a conclusion
before damages can be claimed by a party to the suit. See, for example,
Manuel v. Deshotels, 160 La. 652, 107 So.2d 478 (1926); W. B.
Thompson & Co. v. Gosserand, 128 La. 1029, 55 So. 663 (1911);
Loew's, Incorporated v. Don George, Inc., 237 La. 132, 110 So.2d 553
(1959); Marionneaux v. King, supra; Coleman v. Kroger Co., supra;
Lees v. Smith, supra; Calvert v. Simon, supra. In a per curiam denial of
rehearing, the Viera court indicated that its ruling does not discourage

6

valid claims because relevant statements in judicial proceedings “. . .
cannot form the basis of a libel action.” 266 So.2d 737.

Every other jurisdiction in the United States recognizes an
absolute privilege for relevant defamatory matter published in judicial
pleadings when the court has jurisdiction of the suit. The privilege
allows prospective litigants access to courts of justice with no fear of a
counterclaim for libel. See 38 A.L.R.3d 272, § 3; 50 Am.Jur.2d § 238;
Prosser Torts 4th Ed. pp. 777-781; and 53 C.J.S. § 104.

Some Louisiana cases indicate an absolute privilege for pertinent
matters published in a judicial proceeding by one of the parties but these
are in the minority. Gardemal v. McWilliams, 43 La.Ann. 454, 9 So.
106 (1891) is an example of the genre and shows common law
influences. This view was rejected in later cases: Lescale v. Joseph
Schwartz Co., 116 La. 293, 40 So. 708 (1906) specifically repudiated the
idea that material matters are necessarily privileged. Cotonio v.
Guglielmo, 176 La. 421, 146 So. 11 (1933) points out that: “. . . litigants
must be careful to see that they have probable cause.” 146 So. 14.

The Louisiana rule is unique. In Louisiana, alone, relevant
written allegations in judicial proceedings can form the basis for a libel
action, if false, malicious and made without probable cause. Gosserand
v. Gumbel, 154 La. 537, 97 So. 852 (1923); Oakes v. Alexander, 135
So.2d 513 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1961), writ denied; Wimbish v. Hamilton, 47
La.Ann. 246, 16 So. 856 (1895); Sunseri v. Shapiro, 138 So.2d 661
(La.App. 4 Cir. 1962); Waldo v. Morrison, 220 La. 1006, 58 So.2d 210
(1952). Allegations may be material but false and actionable. Lescale,
supra; Cotonio, supra.

The distinction drawn in Viera between suits for malicious
prosecution and those for libel is unsound. See Giordano v. Tullier, 139
So.2d 15 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1962); the comment by Professor Wex S.
Malone at 15 La.Law Rev. 314; Acme Stores, Inc. v. Better Business
Bureau, 225 La. 824, 74 So.2d 43 (1954); and 12 Stone-La. Tort
Doctrine, p. 238. Both actions are based on fault produced damage
under Civil Code art. 2315. There is little to distinguish them.

Opinions prior to Viera had noted the appeal of the arguments
favoring simultaneous trial of the merits and contingent libel issues.
Robinson Mercantile Co. v. Freeman, 172 So. 797 (La.App. 1 Cir.
1937). However, Judge Boutall's dissent in Viera states the better view:
“. . . it is an essential ingredient to the cause of action that there be a
termination of the case in which the allegedly libelous statements
appear. . .”. 266 So.2d 736.

Well summarized in Calvert v. Simon, supra, is the reason for the
rule:

7

“Louisiana law permits recovery by a party damaged by
libelous statements made without probable cause and with
malice by another party in a judicial proceeding, but
consistent with orderly procedure and the concept of
unhampered expression in the course of litigation, requires
the party claiming such damage to await the determination
of the original proceeding. Although the outcome of the
original proceeding may not necessarily determine the
issue of whether a party thereto can subsequently recover
for libelous statement made therein, in most cases the
outcome of the original suit will have a strong bearing on
determination of that issue.” 311 So.2d 17.

Allegations of fraud may be proven at trial, incidentally deciding
the question of defamation. See, for example, Russo v. Kelly, 228 So.2d
736 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1969), writ denied, 255 La. 472, 231 So.2d 392.
Compare Dunn v. Southern Ins. Co., 116 La. 431, 40 So. 786 (1906).
Premature trial of such thorny issues should be avoided. It may develop
that trial is never necessary. The truth of defamatory statements is a
statutory defense. LSA-R.S. 13:3602.

The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 guarantees redress for
defamation injury in Art. 1, § 22:

“All courts shall be open, and every person shall have an
adequate remedy by due process of law and justice,
administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable
delay, for injury to him in his person, property, reputation,
or other rights.”

Louisiana has an exceptional approach to defamation in judicial
pleadings. The protection extended to a libeled party is broader than
that in any other jurisdiction. The only limitation is termination of the
suit containing the libel, and this requirement only prevails when the
injured person is also a party to the suit. Monier v. Fontenot, 165 So.
481 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1936); Lescale v. Joseph Schwartz Co., 116 La. 293,
40 So. 708 (1906). A party to a suit can insist that it be brought to trial,
move for summary judgment or otherwise protect himself against delay.
It is only when the complainant is a party to the proceeding and has “.
. . a voice in bringing it to its termination,” that a defamation action must
await that termination. Monier v. Fontenot, 165 So. 481 at 483.

Viera erred not in allowing the demand by reconvention but in
allowing it at all prior to termination of the suit. The purpose of
requiring an end to the initial litigation is obvious. A trier of fact who
is trying to resolve conflicting claims should not have the further burden
of deciding at the same time whether defamation is involved in the
pleadings of one party or the other.

8

Those who labor daily in the law often do not realize the impact
of a suit on the average layman. John Citizen when named a defendant
usually reacts with a desire to sue for the insult. However, by the
conclusion of trial, his temper has generally cooled and he is happy to
be free of the court system. Encouraging a countersuit for defamation
in each and every lawsuit discourages legitimate claims and burdens the
courts unnecessarily.

We note that defamation is only actionable if it is made in affidavits or in

pleadings before the court. Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:50(2) affords a witness in

a judicial proceeding absolute immunity from prosecution for defamation where the

statement is “reasonably believed by the witness to be relevant to the matter in

controversy.” In the instant case, though, the testimony of the defendants at trial,

especially Mrs. Knight, conflicted in part with her original affidavit. These

inconsistencies led, in part, to Ms. Lyons’ acquittal. Ms. Lyons is suing for the

alleged libel contained in the affidavits of the defendants which were confected for

the purpose of initiating a criminal prosecution.

We find that prescription was suspended during the pendency of the criminal

trial against Ms. Lyons. The defendants published the allegedly defamatory

statements in affidavits directed to the Lafayette Police Department, which affidavits

resulted in Ms. Lyons’ criminal prosecution. To the extent that the second circuit in

Doughty relied on the fact that the statements made to an insurance adjuster outside

of the context of a judicial proceeding, we find that case distinguishable. The trial

court erred as a matter of law in finding the claims for defamation prescribed, and the

defamation claims against the defendants are reinstated.

Are the provisions of La.Code Civ.P. art. 971 applicable?

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 971 states:

A. (1) A cause of action against a person arising from any act of
that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech

9

under the United States or Louisiana Constitution in connection with a
public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the
court determines that the plaintiff has established a probability of
success on the claim.

(2) In making its determination, the court shall consider the
pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon
which the liability or defense is based.

(3) If the court determines that the plaintiff has established a
probability of success on the claim, that determination shall be
admissible in evidence at any later stage of the proceeding.

B. In any action subject to Paragraph A of this Article, a
prevailing party on a special motion to strike shall be awarded
reasonable attorney fees and costs.

C. The special motion may be filed within sixty days of service of
the petition, or in the court’s discretion, at any later time upon terms the
court deems proper. The motion shall be noticed for hearing not more
than thirty days after service unless the docket conditions of the court
require a later hearing.

D. All discovery proceedings in the action shall be stayed upon
the filing of a notice of motion made pursuant to this Article. The stay
of discovery shall remain in effect until notice of entry of the order
ruling on the motion. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Paragraph,
the court, on noticed motion and for good cause shown, may order that
specified discovery be conducted.

E. This Article shall not apply to any enforcement action brought
on behalf of the state of Louisiana by the attorney general, district
attorney, or city attorney acting as a public prosecutor.

F. As used in this Article, the following terms shall have the
meanings ascribed to them below, unless the context clearly indicates
otherwise:

(1) “Act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free
speech under the United States or Louisiana Constitution in connection
with a public issue” includes but is not limited to:

(a) Any written or oral statement or writing made before a
legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law.

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(b) Any written or oral statement or writing made in connection
with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive,
or judicial body, or any other official body authorized by law.

(c) Any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open
to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public
interest.

(d) Any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the
constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech
in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.

(2) "Petition" includes either a petition or a reconventional
demand.

(3) "Plaintiff" includes either a plaintiff or petitioner in a principal
action or a plaintiff or petitioner in reconvention.

(4) "Defendant" includes either a defendant or respondent in a
principal action or a defendant or respondent in reconvention.

“Because the granting of a special Motion to Strike Pursuant to La.Code Civ.P.

art. 971 involves issues of law, we will conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s

application of the law.” Aymond v. Dupree, 05-1248, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/12/06),

928 So.2d 721, 726, writ denied, 06-1729 (La.10/6/06), 938 So.2d 85.

The language of the article clearly states that the special motion to strike is

applicable only to a petition or reconventional demand against a person “arising from

any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech

. . . . in connection with a public issue[.]” The article further clarifies the issue by

defining an “[a]ct in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under

the United States or Louisiana Constitution in connection with a public issue” in

subsection F(1). We note that the speech must be on a matter of “public concern.”

As noted by our supreme court in footnote six in Kennedy v. Sheriff of East Baton

Rouge, 05-1418, p. 9 (La. 7/10/06), 935 So.2d 669, 677:

11

The Supreme Court has described speech on matters of public
concern as speech “relating to any matter of political, social, or other
concern to the community.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 103
S.Ct. 1684, 1690, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). Whether speech addresses a
matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and
context of a given statement, as revealed by the entire record. Id., 461
U.S. at 147-148, 103 S.Ct. at 1690.

This case is not about any issue of public concern. It involves a person with whom

a private corporation and private citizens had a business relationship allegedly failing

to perform work or provide services in exchange for the money she received. In

Kennedy, the employees of a fast food restaurant believed that a patron tried to pay

with counterfeit currency, and the supreme court held that “the suspected distribution

of counterfeit currency in the community is a matter of public concern, as it is an

issue about which information is appropriate and needed, and in which the public, and

particularly the business community, may reasonably be expected to have a legitimate

interest.” There is no similar public interest involved in this case. It is a private

matter between private interests that does not implicate the public.

Similarly, Darden v. Smith, 03-1144 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/30/04), 879 So.2d 390,

writ denied, 04-1955 (La. 11/15/04), 887 So.2d 480, is distinguishable. In that case,

the plaintiff alleging defamation was a public official, a police juror, and the

statements at issue in the plaintiff’s suit related to the decision-making process of the

police jury.

We find that there is no public issue in this case as required for the special

motion to strike under Article 971 to be applicable. We therefore reverse the

judgment of the trial court striking Ms. Lyons’ claims for malicious prosecution and

awarding attorney’s fees and costs.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. The case

is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs are assessed

to the defendants-appellees.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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