Timothy Hugh Queen v. O. S. Nugent

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-257

TIMOTHY HUGH QUEEN

VERSUS

O. S. NUGENT

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2010-1445
HONORABLE DAVID KENT SAVOIE, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Marc T. Amy, and
Phyllis M. Keaty, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Robert C. McCorquodale
In-House Counsel
Calcasieu Parish Sheriff’s Office
P. O. Box 2185
Lake Charles, LA 70602
Telephone: (337) 491-3622
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellee - O. S. Nugent, Asst. Warden

Timothy Hugh Queen
In Proper Person
Calcasieu Correctional Center
P. O. Box 2017
Lake Charles, LA 70602
Plaintiff/Appellant

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

A pre-trial detainee in the Calcasieu Parish Correctional Facilities

(“CPCF”), Timothy Hugh Queen (“Queen”), appeals the judgment of the trial court

granting the peremptory exception of no cause of action filed by Assistant Warden

O. S. Nugent (“Defendant”), an employee of the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff’s Office.

The exception asserted that Queen did not have a cause of action to review an

administrative disciplinary decision made by a facility that is not part of the

Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DOC”). We affirm.

I.

ISSUE

We must decide whether the trial court erred in granting the

peremptory exception of no cause of action.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Queen is housed in the CPCF awaiting trial. The CPCF is operated by

the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff (“Sheriff”). While at the CPCF, Queen was served

with a disciplinary report, alleging he participated in a telephone scam. Queen

went through an administrative proceeding and was disciplined. Queen appealed

the disciplinary board’s ruling to the Fourteenth Judicial District Court.

Defendant filed an exception of no cause of action, which was granted

by the trial court. Queen now appeals the trial court’s judgment.

III.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

We review a judgment granting a peremptory exception of no cause of

action de novo. It requires a determination of “whether the law affords a remedy

on the facts alleged in the pleading.” Ramey v. DeCaire, 03-1299, p. 7 (La.

3/19/04), 869 So.2d 114, 118. The “pertinent question is whether, in the light most

favorable to plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in plaintiff’s behalf, the

petition states any valid cause of action for relief.” Id. at 119 (citation omitted).

Discussion

Queen contends that the trial court erred in granting the exception of

no cause of action. Specifically, Queen contends the trial court erred in finding

that he was not entitled to judicial review under La.R.S. 15:1177.

Defendant argues that Queen has no cause of action to challenge the

administrative proceeding because at all relevant times, he was a parish pre-trial

inmate and not a DOC inmate. Defendant contends that La.R.S. 15:1177 provides

only for review of “an adverse decision . . . by the Department of Public Safety and

Corrections or a contractor operating a private prison facility.” La.R.S.

15:1177(A). We agree.

While La.R.S. 15:1177 mentions inmates in the custody of the sheriff,

it does not provide for judicial review of sheriffs’ procedures. Moreover, the

statute is clear that the DOC is the only proper party defendant for such actions.

La.R.S. 15:1177(A)(1)(b). Queen, however, names Assistant Warden Nugent as

the defendant. Our colleagues in the second circuit specifically addressed the issue

of the proper party defendant in Winston v. Martin, 34,195, 34,200, p. 4 (La.App. 2

Cir. 9/21/00), 764 So.2d 368, 371:

Both the title of the act, as well as the provisions of R.S.
15:1177, show that the provisions apply strictly to causes
of action against the State of Louisiana, Department of
Public Safety and Corrections, or its employees. And
while the kinds of complaints and grievances falling
under these provisions are broad in scope, the provisions
plainly do not apply to individuals who are not
employees of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety
and Corrections.

2

In further support of his position, Queen argues that La.R.S. 15:1177

defines “offender” in such a way as to bring him under the purview of the statute.

Even if this were the case, it does not mean he is entitled to judicial review under

La.R.S. 15:1177. We recognize that the first circuit reached a contrary conclusion,

stating:

[T]his interpretation, which if carried to its logical
conclusion seems to imply that some inmates housed in
parish prisons are governed by the Department of
Corrections’ administrative remedy procedure and others
in the same facility are governed by the Parish Prison’s
procedure. We believe that the statute, while clumsily
phrased, does provide for judicial review of an adverse
decision “rendered pursuant to any administrative
remedy procedure under [the CARP],” including
procedures adopted by sheriffs. LSA 15:1177(A)
(emphasis added).
Spooner v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff Dep’t, 01-2663, p. 6 (La.App. 1 Cir.

11/8/02), 835 So.2d 709, 713. We disagree with the first circuit’s reasoning.

Moreover, a complete review of the record indicates that Queen has

no valid cause of action for his underlying claim, regardless of the statute

referenced or the terminology applied. Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:1177 is

referenced on the standard form Queen used to complete his petition for judicial

review. His handwritten request for oral argument also references La.R.S. 15:1177

but indicates that Queen is challenging judicial review of Defendant’s

administrative decisions leading to Queen’s subsequent punishment.

It is clear that Queen does not have a cause of action under La.R.S.

15:1177 because the statute provides only for review of an adverse decision by the

DOC or a contractor operating a private prison facility. Nevertheless, given

Queen’s status as a pro se litigant, we consider whether he otherwise stated a valid

cause of action. “[A] pro se litigant who lacks formal training in the law and its

rules of procedure . . . should be allotted more latitude than those plaintiffs

represented by counsel.” Brooks v. Tradesmen Int’l, Inc., 03-1871, p. 5 (La.App. 4

3

Cir. 9/1/04), 883 So.2d 444, 447, writ denied, 04-2432 (La. 12/10/04), 888 So.2d

843.

In Queen v. Tete, an unpublished opinion bearing docket number 10-

1435, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/22/11), this court stated:

Review of correctional institutions’ administrative and
disciplinary decisions are governed by Title 15, Part XV,
Chapter 7 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. Review of
sheriffs’ administrative decisions are governed by
La.R.S. 15:1171. Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:1171
allows a sheriff to adopt an administrative remedy
procedure for receiving, hearing, and disposing of any
and all complaints and grievances by adult or juvenile
offenders against a sheriff or a sheriff’s staff. It further
provides that the administrative procedures are the
exclusive remedy available to the offender for all
complaints and grievances, except in tort actions. See
Pope v. State, 99-2559 (La. 6/29/01), 792 So.2d 713.

Because Queen does not assert a tort-based claim, his sole remedy,

pursuant to La.R.S. 15:1171, is to follow the administrative proceedings set forth

by the Sheriff for the CPCF. 1 He is barred from seeking judicial review of

Defendant’s administrative proceedings in district court.

Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s judgment granting

the exception of no cause of action in favor of Defendant.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons articulated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

AFFIRMED.

1
We entertain serious concerns about the frivolous nature of Queen’s appeal given that he
has stubbornly pursued nearly identical claims on two previous occasions. Defendant, however,
failed to answer and seek damages against Queen.
4