Levi Rodriguez v. Chrysler Group, LLC

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-524

LEVI RODRIGUEZ

VERSUS

CHRYSLER GROUP LLC

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-2008-3702, Div. E
HONORABLE HERMAN C. CLAUSE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JAMES T. GENOVESE
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, James T. Genovese, and Phyllis M. Keaty,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Fred A. Pharis
Pharis Law Offices
831 DeSoto Street
Alexandria, Louisiana 71301
(318) 445-8266
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant:
Levi Rodriguez

William F. Bologna
Dwight L. Acomb
1515 Poydras Street, Suite 2323
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112-3723
(504) 524-2323
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
Chrysler Group, LLC

GENOVESE, Judge.

Plaintiff, Levi Rodriguez, appeals a judgment in favor of Defendant,

Chrysler Group, LLC, dismissing his Suit for Redhibition and Damages. For the

following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 7, 2006, Plaintiff purchased a 2006 Dodge 3500 Quad Cab pickup

truck from Acadiana Dodge in Lafayette, Louisiana. The new truck had six miles

on the odometer at the time of purchase. The truck had a ―Basic Limited

Warranty‖ which lasted ―for [thirty-six] months . . . or for 36,000 miles on the

odometer,‖ and the truck’s motor ―was covered by the Cummins Diesel Engine

Limited Warranty for up to [five] years or 100,000 miles on the odometer,

whichever comes first.‖ Plaintiff began using the truck in his welding business.

On June 27, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Suit for Redhibition and Damages against

Defendant claiming that the truck contained redhibitory defects and that he was

entitled to the return of the purchase price, damages, and attorney fees. According

to Plaintiff’s petition, the truck ―was returned on May 19, 2008, to Gainesville

Dodge in Gainesville, Florida, with complaints of a knocking noise within the

express warranty period[. D]espite the failure of the motor to operate in the

intended manner during normal use, [Defendant] refused to repair the vehicle[.]‖

The truck had 69,064 miles on the odometer at the time it was towed to Gainesville

Dodge.

Defendant answered the suit, alleging that Plaintiff was ―not entitled to

recovery in this cause because the problems about which he complains were the

result of [his] misuse, abuse, improper maintenance, and/or violation of the

instructions set forth in the owners’ manual provided to [him] at the time of sale.‖

Defendant further asserted that ―[a]ny defects alleged to exist in the vehicle

occurred not through any fault of [itself], but solely as a result of the [fault] of

[Plaintiff], including abuse, misuse, improper maintenance, and other intentional or

negligent acts while the vehicle was in [Plaintiff’s] sole and exclusive possession

and control.‖

After a bench trial held on November 22, 2010, judgment was rendered in

favor of Defendant, finding the evidence did not establish the presence of

redhibitory defects. Plaintiff appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, Plaintiff alleges:

1. The trial court erred in failing to properly apply the provisions of
the Magnuson[-]Moss Warranty Act[] in that it found that by using
performance enhancing equipment and not having a diagnosis
made by a certified Chrysler technician, the [P]laintiff ―voided‖ the
warranty[.]

2. The trial court thus erred in failing to find a violation of the
[Magnuson-Moss Warranty] Act.

3. The trial court erred in failing to find the engine failure was caused
by ―a defect, malfunction, or failure to conform with such written
warranty‖ within the meaning of the Magnuson[-]Moss Warranty
Act.

4. The trial court erred by failing to enter judgment in favor of
[P]laintiff, including reasonable attorney[] fees.

Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2310)

Much of Plaintiff’s appellate brief focuses upon his contention that the trial

court erred by not applying the provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act to

his claim. Defendant counters, arguing that Plaintiff ―did not plead the Magnuson-

Moss Warranty Act at any time in this proceeding[.]‖

The record reveals that at the start of trial, Plaintiff sought to have the trial

court consider his claims under both Louisiana’s redhibition statute, La.Civ.Code

art. 2520, and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2310.

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Plaintiff argued to the trial court that Defendant filed into the record of these

proceedings a stipulation wherein Plaintiff’s claim under the Magnuson-Moss

Warranty Act was recognized.

Defendant countered that the stipulation on which Plaintiff was relying,

entitled Notice Regarding Treatment of Lemon Law Claims in Connection with

Chrysler LLC Bankruptcy Cases and Sale of Assets to Chrysler Group LLC, was

filed into the court’s record on September 28, 2009, after, and as a consequence of,

the originally-named Defendant in this matter, Chrysler, LLC, entering into

bankruptcy. When the present Defendant, Chrysler Group, LLC, was formed, it

stipulated that if there were any claims filed under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty

Act, then Chrysler Group, LLC, would defend those claims. However, Defendant

argued that Plaintiff’s pleadings only urged claims under Louisiana’s redhibition

statute, La.Civ.Code art. 2520. Plaintiff never amended his pleadings to include a

Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act cause of action in his claims. Further, Defendant

argued that if Plaintiff had done so, it would have sought to have this matter

removed to federal court. Finally, Defendant asserts, in its appellate brief, that

Plaintiff’s ―current argument, in brief, regarding relief under the Magnuson-Moss

Warranty Act is not properly before this [c]ourt because counsel failed to even

proffer evidence regarding what he believes to be a violation of [the Magnuson-

Moss Warranty] Act.‖

After hearing the argument of the parties prior to the start of trial, the trial

court ruled, ―there is no pending Magnuson-Moss claim in this matter[.]‖ The trial

then proceeded with evidence relative to Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant for

redhibition.

We find no merit to Plaintiff’s contention that the trial court erred by not

applying the provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act to his claim. At no

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time since the institution of his suit in June of 2008 has Plaintiff pled that he is

entitled to recovery under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Even after

Defendant’s filing of the Notice Regarding Treatment of Lemon Law Claims in

Connection with Chrysler LLC Bankruptcy Cases and Sale of Assets to Chrysler

Group LLC in September of 2008, Plaintiff did not plead that he was entitled to

recovery under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. We find no merit in Plaintiff’s

contention that Defendant consented by stipulation to defend a federal claim.

Redhibition

The standard of appellate review to which this court is bound is set forth in

Hearod v. Select Motor, Co., Inc., 07-1502, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/2/08), 980 So.2d

830, 833-34, writ denied, 08-931 (La. 6/20/08), 983 So.2d 1283, as follows:

In redhibition cases, ―[t]he ultimate question of the existence of
a redhibitory vice . . . [is a question] of fact for the trial court, which
should not be disturbed in the absence of manifest error or abuse of its
wide discretion.‖ Pardue v. Ryan Chevrolet, Inc., 31-52, p. 6
(La.App. 2 Cir. 9/28/98), 719 So.2d 623, 626-27, writ denied, 98-2714
(La.12/18/98), 734 So.2d 639 (citations omitted). Consequently, ―[a]n
appellate court may not set aside a trial court’s finding of fact in the
absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong.‖ Blackman v.
Brookshire Grocery Co., 07-348, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/07), 966
So.2d 1185, 1187 (citing Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989)).
―In applying the manifest error-clearly wrong standard, the appellate
court must determine not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong,
but whether the factfinder’s conclusion was a reasonable one.‖
Tidwell v. Premier Staffing, Inc., 05-500, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/06),
921 So.2d 1194, 1196 (citations omitted). Accordingly, we will
review the record in its entirety to determine whether the trial court’s
factual findings were reasonable in light of the record evidence.

Plaintiff’s final assignment of error addresses whether the trial court erred in

ruling that Plaintiff failed to prove the existence of a redhibitory defect. Louisiana

Civil Code Article 2520 provides:

The seller warrants the buyer against redhibitory defects, or
vices, in the thing sold.

A defect is redhibitory when it renders the thing useless, or its
use so inconvenient that it must be presumed that a buyer would not

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have bought the thing had he known of the defect. The existence of
such a defect gives a buyer the right to obtain rescission of the sale.
A defect is redhibitory also when, without rendering the thing
totally useless, it diminishes its usefulness or its value so that it must
be presumed that a buyer would still have bought it but for a lesser
price. The existence of such a defect limits the right of a buyer to a
reduction of the price.

Plaintiff claims the truck that he purchased from Acadiana Dodge contained

a defective motor. Plaintiff sought rescission of the sale after repair was denied

under the motor’s warranty due to an allegation that he had installed a

performance-enhancing device. At trial, Plaintiff called two witnesses to testify:

Tony Borman, Acadiana Dodge’s service manager; and his father, Kent Rodriguez,

a diesel mechanic with over thirty-four years of experience. Plaintiff offered

Mr. Kent Rodriguez, and he was accepted by the trial court, as an expert in ―diesel

engine repair.‖

Mr. Borman was questioned regarding all of the repairs performed on

Plaintiff’s truck at Acadiana Dodge between July 7, 2006 and May of 2008—when

Plaintiff’s engine failed in Gainesville, Florida. Mr. Borman testified he had no

direct knowledge that Plaintiff had used a performance-enhancing device on his

truck. However, on cross-examination, when it was revealed to Mr. Borman that

Gainsville Dodge had discovered evidence of Plaintiff’s use of a performance-

enhancing device, and that Plaintiff was not denying the use thereof, only that the

use was the cause of the engine failure, Mr. Borman opined that such a device

could adversely affect and could have caused the engine failure which Plaintiff

encountered with his truck.

Plaintiff’s expert, Kent Rodriguez, testified that he personally repaired

Plaintiff’s truck after Defendant refused. It was his opinion that the truck’s engine

did not fail because of the performance-enhancing device. According to Plaintiff’s

expert, the truck’s engine was defective.

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Defendant presented the testimony of two individuals, both of whom were

accepted by the trial court accepted as experts: Stephen J. Harris, an ASE Certified

Master Mechanic in diesel engines; and, Steve Huen, an expert in Cummins diesel

engines and a Chrysler Technical Representative. Mr. Harris was the mechanic at

Gainesville Dodge who first inspected Plaintiff’s truck after it experienced engine

failure in May of 2008. According to Mr. Harris, he observed evidence of the use

of a performance-enhancing device. Mr. Harris opined that the engine failed due

to the use of a performance-enhancing device.

Similarly, Mr. Huen explained that he concluded that the use of a

performance-enhancing device caused the engine failure in Plaintiff’s truck. He

testified that the performance-enhancing device caused the turbocharger to

malfunction. He, like Mr. Harris, opined that the engine over-fueled, resulting in

its failure, because of the performance-enhancing device.

Given the totality of the evidence, the trial court was free to accept the

version of events presented by Defendant and discount Plaintiff’s evidence. The

trial court made determinations of credibility and chose between competing views

of what led to the engine malfunction at issue herein—whether it was a defect in

the engine or the use of a performance enhancing device which led to the engine’s

failure. ―Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s

choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.‖ Rosell,

549 So.2d at 844. From our thorough review of the record, we find that the

evidence supports the trial court’s judgment. The judgment is neither manifestly

erroneous nor clearly wrong. Plaintiff failed to establish that a redhibitory defect

pertaining to the engine existed at the time of sale.

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DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error by the trial court in not applying

the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act to Plaintiff’s claim, and we find no manifest

error in the trial court’s ruling that Mr. Rodriguez failed to prove all of the factors

needed to establish that a redhibitory defect in the engine existed at the time of

sale. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are

assessed to Plaintiff/Appellant, Levi Rodriguez.

AFFIRMED.

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