Claude Joseph Sanchez, Jr., Et Ux. v. Jon Phillip Bladel

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-788

CLAUDE JOSEPH SANCHEZ, JR., ET UX.

VERSUS

JON PHILLIP BLADEL, ET AL.

**********
APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 233,954
HONORABLE GEORGE CLARENCE METOYER, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Jimmie C. Peters, and
Billy Howard Ezell, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Ricky L. Sooter
Provosty, Sadler, deLaunay, Fiorenza & Sobel
P. O. Box 1791
Alexandria, LA 71309-1791
Telephone: (318) 445-3631
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiffs/Appellees - Claude Joseph Sanchez, Jr. and Jane Ellen
Moreno Sanchez

Thomas D. Davenport, Jr.
The Davenport Firm, APLC
1628 Metro Drive
Alexandria, LA 71301
Telephone: (318) 445-9696
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendants/Appellants - Bladel Enterprises, L.L.C., Bladel Homes,
L.L.C., and Jon Phillip Bladel

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

Claude Joseph Sanchez, Jr. and Jane Ellen Moreno Sanchez sued Jon

Phillip Bladel and his corporations, Bladel Homes, L.L.C. and Bladel Enterprises,

L.L.C. (collectively “Bladel”), 1 for damages, return of unlawful real estate

commissions, and attorney fees. Specifically, the Sanchezes argued that by

marketing their home for sale and by selling them another home, Bladel engaged in

real estate activity without a license and unlawfully received commissions as a

result of those transactions. They also alleged that Bladel’s actions violated the

Louisiana Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Law (“UTPL”).

The trial court agreed with the Sanchezes and awarded them

$17,500.00 in damages and $4,500.00 in attorney fees. Bladel now appeals and

asserts four assignments of error: (1) the trial court committed legal error by

ignoring the ownership interest held by Bladel in the form of an Option to

Purchase; (2) the trial court committed legal error by concluding a party to an

Option to Purchase cannot sell his ownership interest without a real estate license;

(3) the trial court committed legal error when he ordered Bladel to return the

proceeds from selling and leasing their ownership interest; and, (4) the trial court

committed legal error by awarding attorney fees when the evidence established the

Sanchezes have not paid attorney fees and there was no legal basis to award those

fees. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I.

ISSUES

We must decide whether:

1
The record indicates that, in all transactions relevant to this matter, Jon Bladel acted as
either the agent and/or the alter ego of Bladel Homes, L.L.C. and Bladel Enterprises, L.L.C.
Thus, we refer to Appellants collectively as “Bladel.”

(1) Bladel’s Option to Purchase resulted in an ownership interest in
the Sanchezes’ property;

(2) Bladel engaged in real estate activity without a license;

(3) the trial court erred in awarding damages; and,

(4) the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Sanchez and her son, Michael Jason Hall, owned a home in

Glenmora, Louisiana. While driving to work, Mr. Hall noticed a “for sale” sign at

a home located in Oberlin, Louisiana. The Oberlin property was offered for sale

by Bladel. The Sanchezes contacted Bladel about their desire to sell the Glenmora

property and purchase the Oberlin property.

In anticipation of selling the Glenmora property, Bladel photographed

the Glenmora property and placed the photographs on the company’s website as a

property “for sale.” Shortly thereafter, Bladel presented Ms. Sanchez with several

documents for signature. Specifically, Bladel drafted, and requested Ms. Sanchez

sign, an “Option to Purchase” the Glenmora property for $65,000.00. Bladel

informed Ms. Sanchez that the “Option to Purchase” was a standard form he used

when he surveyed potential properties. At Bladel’s request, Ms. Sanchez also

completed a form entitled “Title Search Info,” and she disclosed to Bladel that Mr.

Hall possessed an ownership interest in the property. Ms. Sanchez signed a

document entitled “Home Information Sheet” as well as a “Contract to Buy and

Sell.” Ms. Sanchez testified that the “Contract to Buy and Sell” was blank when

she signed it, and Bladel filled in the blanks later. 2 The completed Buy/Sell

Contract listed the purchase price of the Glenmora property as $97,000.00. Ms.

2
At no time did Bladel possess a power of attorney on behalf of the Sanchezes. Thus,
Bladel had no authority to complete the contract.
2

Sanchez testified that Bladel never informed her that he had located a buyer for the

Glenmora property or that the sales price for the property was $97,000.00.

Moreover, she testified that she only learned about the closing on the Glenmora

property when an agent from New Directions Mortgage called and informed her of

the closing date.

Prior to the closing, Ms. Sanchez understood that part of the proceeds

of the sale of the Glenmora property would be applied to the purchase price of the

Oberlin property. To that end, she signed a document entitled “Allocation of Sale

Proceeds.”

While negotiating the sale of the Glenmora property, Bladel also

negotiated the sale of the Oberlin property. Bladel presented, and the Sanchezes

signed, a “Lease Agreement with Option to Purchase” the Oberlin property. Ms.

Sanchez testified that she understood that she and her husband would rent the

Oberlin property for one year with an option to purchase the property at the end of

the one-year term. The sales price for the Oberlin property was $180,000.00. The

Sanchezes gave Bladel a down payment of $9,000.00, and they gave him six post-

dated rent checks, each in the amount of $1,600.11. Shortly after signing the

“Lease Agreement with Option to Purchase,” the Sanchezes began residing at the

Oberlin property. Two months later, the sale of the Glenmora property was

finalized.

Following the sale of the Glenmora property, Ms. Sanchez gave

Bladel her portion of the proceeds of the sale, $8,554.25.3 Despite the fact that Ms.

Sanchez signed the “Allocation of Sale Proceeds” document, Bladel later informed

her that none of the proceeds from the sale of the Glenmora property would be

applied to the purchase of the Oberlin property. At that point, the Sanchezes

vacated the Oberlin property and retained counsel.
3
Mr. Hall, who had a 50% ownership of the Glenmora property, retained the remainder of
the proceeds, $8,554.25.
3

The Sanchezes then filed the underlying action, seeking damages,

return of unlawful real estate commissions, and attorney fees. The trial court ruled

in favor of the Sanchezes and awarded them $17,500.00 in damages and $4,500.00

in attorney fees. Bladel appeals.

III.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides that the appellate

jurisdiction of the courts of appeal extends to both law and facts. La.Const., art. 5,

§ 10(B). A court of appeal may not overturn a judgment of a trial court absent an

error of law or a factual finding that is manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.

Stobart v. State, Dep’t of Transp. and Dev., 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993). The two-

part test for appellate review of a factual finding is: (1) whether there is a

reasonable factual basis in the record for the finding of the trial court and (2)

whether the record further establishes that the finding is not manifestly erroneous.

Id. “This test dictates that a reviewing court must do more than simply review the

record for some evidence that supports or controverts the trial court’s finding. The

reviewing court must review the record in its entirety to determine whether the trial

court’s finding was clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous.” Id. at 882 (citation

omitted).

Nevertheless, the issue to be resolved by a reviewing court is not

whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the fact finder’s

conclusion was a reasonable one. Even though an appellate court may feel its own

evaluations and inferences are more reasonable than the fact finder’s, reasonable

evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed

upon review where conflict exists in the testimony. However, where documents or

4

objective evidence so contradict the witness’s story, or the story itself is so

internally inconsistent or implausible on its face that a reasonable fact finder would

not credit the witness’s story, the court of appeal may find manifest error or clear

wrongness even in a finding purportedly based on a credibility determination. Id.

Option to Purchase the Glenmora Property

Bladel argues that the trial court erred by refusing to acknowledge that

Bladel held a property interest in the Glenmora property. It asserts that because it

had a property interest, it was free to market and sell the property without holding

a real estate license.4 Bladel bases its ownership interest in the Glenmora property

on the Option to Purchase executed by Ms. Sanchez. In support of this argument,

Bladel relies on State, Dep’t of Transp. and Dev. v. Jacob, 483 So.2d 592

(La.1986) and Cleremont Terrace Homeowner’s Ass’n v. United States, 146

Cal.App. 3d 398 (1983). Neither of these cases supports Bladel’s position before

this court.

Indeed, Jacob does not stand for the position that an option to

purchase imparts an ownership interest; rather, it asserts that a leaseholder with an

unrecorded lease has the right to intervene in an expropriation matter. Jacob, 483

So.2d 592. Moreover, Cleremont Terrace is a California case which we are neither

bound nor inclined to follow.

We are more concerned with Louisiana law, which clearly states that

“an option to purchase does not transfer title or vest the holder of the option with

rights of ownership.” E.P. Dobson, Inc. v. Perritt, 566 So.2d 657, 660 (La.App. 2

Cir. 1990). “Until the option to purchase is exercised, the grantee has no

enforceable rights as owner.” Id.

4
An individual is permitted to sell his own property without holding a real estate license.
La.R.S. 37:1438.
5

Here, nothing in the record indicates that the Option to Purchase the

Glenmora property was exercised. Because the Option was not exercised, Bladel

never gained an ownership interest in the Glenmora property. Thus, Bladel needed

a real estate license to market and sell the property. Bladel admitted that it does

not possess a real estate license.

Real Estate Activity

Louisiana’s Real Estate License Law (the “Act”) “was founded on the

strong public policy to regulate the real estate business and it cannot be set aside by

contract.” Towne Ctr., Ltd. v. Keyworth, 618 So.2d 467, 470 (La.App. 4 Cir.

1993). The Act enables state regulation of real estate activity. La.R.S. 37:1430 to

1470. It empowers the Louisiana Real Estate Commission to regulate the issuance

of real estate licenses, censure licensees, suspend or revoke licenses, and impose

certain requirements on licensees, such as professional competency. La.R.S.

37:1435.

The Act defines the relevant terms and regulated activities as follows:

(7) “Real estate activity” means any activity relating to
any portion of a real estate transaction performed for
another by any person, partnership, limited liability
company, association, or corporation, foreign or
domestic, whether pursuant to a power of attorney or
otherwise, who for a fee, commission, or other valuable
consideration or with the intention, in the expectation, or
upon the promise of receiving or collecting a fee,
commission, or other valuable consideration:

(a) Sells, exchanges, purchases, manages, rents, or leases
or negotiates the sale, exchange, purchase, rental, or
leasing of real estate.

(b) Offers or attempts or agrees to negotiate the sale,
exchange, purchase, management, rental, or leasing of
real estate.

(c) Lists or offers or attempts or agrees to list for sale or
lease any real estate or the improvement thereon.

6

(d) Buys or offers to buy, sells or offers to sell, or
otherwise deals in options on real estate or the
improvements thereon.

(e) Advertises or holds himself, itself, or themselves out
as engaged in the business of selling, exchanging,
purchasing, managing, renting, or leasing real estate.

(f) Assists or directs in the procuring of prospects or the
negotiation or closing of any transaction, other than
mortgage financing, which results or is calculated to
result in the sale, exchange, managing, leasing, or renting
of any real estate, other than a provider of information,
ideas, and materials to guide homeowners in the sale of
their own property.

(g) Is engaged in the business of charging an advance fee
or contracting for collection of a fee in connection with
any contract whereby he undertakes primarily to promote
the sale, exchange, purchase, rental, or leasing of real
estate through its listing in a publication issued primarily
for such purpose, or for referral of information
concerning such real estate to brokers, or both.

(h)(i) Sells or attempts to sell or offers or attempts to
negotiate the sale of any business whose assets include
real estate or leases of real estate.

(ii) Lists or offers or attempts or agrees to list for sale any
business whose assets include real estate or leases of real
estate.

***

(15) “Licensee” means any person who has been issued a
license by the commission to participate in any activity
described in this Section.

***

(20) “Real estate transaction” means the selling, offering
for sale, buying, offering to buy, soliciting for
prospective purchasers, managing, offering to manage,
leasing, offering to lease, renting, or offering to rent any
real estate or improvements thereon, or any business or
other entity whose assets include real estate or leases of
real estate.

***

7

(29) “Dealing in options” means a person, firm,
partnership, limited liability company, association, or
corporation directly or indirectly taking, obtaining, or
using an option to purchase, exchange, rent, or lease real
property or any interest therein with the intent or for the
purpose of buying, selling, exchanging, renting, or
leasing said real property or interests therein to another or
others, whether or not said option is in his name and
whether or not title to said property passes through the
name of said person, firm, partnership, limited liability
company, association, or corporation in connection with
the purchase, sale, exchange, rental, or lease of such real
property in interest.

***

(32) “Broker” or “real estate broker” means a licensed
real estate broker performing activities as an individual
real estate broker, a sponsoring broker or designated
qualifying broker, or a corporation, partnership, or
limited liability company which has been granted a real
estate license through a designated qualifying broker.

La.R.S. 37:1431.

The Act requires that one obtain a license before engaging in the

conduct or activities of a real estate broker. La.R.S. 37:1436. An unlicensed

person violates the Act by performing even a single act for which a license is

required. La.R.S. 37:1436(D). One of the few exemptions of the Act applies to

individuals who are selling their own property. La.R.S. 37:1438.

By agreeing to seek a prospective purchaser for the Glenmora

property—a property which Bladel did not own 5 —and actively pursuing the

transaction to conclusion, Bladel was clearly in the business of real estate salesmen

under La.R.S. 37:1436.6 Further, this activity constituted a single act as described

5
At the risk of unadorned repetition, an option to purchase property does not give an
option holder an ownership interest in the property until that option is exercised.
6
Indeed, Mrs. Sanchez testified that she never would have executed the documents Bladel
presented to her if she had known that Bladel was not licensed as a real estate broker by the State
of Louisiana.
8

in La.R.S. 37:1436(D). Bladel’s conduct was egregious and was a scam. It is

exactly the kind of conduct the Act was enacted to regulate.

Damages

Bladel argues that its “ownership interest” in the Glenmora property

permitted its retention of the proceeds from the sale of that property and that the

trial court erred in ordering the return of those proceeds to the Sanchezes. We

disagree. Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:1459 prohibits any person who has

engaged in real estate activity without a valid license from receiving any

compensation.

Bladel received compensation from both the sale of the Glenmora

property and the sale of the Oberlin property. We are unable to precisely discern

the specific root of the $17,500.00 damages award, but we surmise that the

damages include the $9,000.00 down payment for the Oberlin property and one-

half of the sales proceeds ($8,554.25) from the sale of the Glenmora property. We

conclude that the record clearly supports the award of $17,500.00 in damages even

though the trial court does not give us the benefit of its precise rationale for the

award.7

Attorney Fees

Bladel appeals the trial court’s award of $4,500.00 in attorney fees.

We find no merit in this contention. The record clearly supports an award of

attorney fees pursuant to the UTPL. The UTPL provides in pertinent part:

Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money
or movable property, corporeal or incorporeal, as a result
of the use or employment by another person of an unfair
or deceptive method, act, or practice declared unlawful
by R.S. 51:1405, may bring an action individually but not

7
While it appears that a slight discrepancy exists in the actual amount of damages, we
find no abuse of discretion by the trial court. Moreover, the Sanchezes failed to file an Answer
seeking the additional $54.25.
9

in a representative capacity to recover actual damages. If
the court finds the unfair or deceptive method, act, or
practice was knowingly used, after being put on notice by
the attorney general, the court shall award three times the
actual damages sustained. In the event that damages are
awarded under this Section, the court shall award to the
person bringing such action reasonable attorney fees and
costs.

La.R.S. 51:1409(A).

Bladel’s actions fall squarely within the conduct the UTPL prohibits.

Bladel admits it is not, and never has been, a licensed real estate broker in this

state. Bladel’s flagrant engagement in real estate activity without a license is

repugnant and disturbing. Bladel took advantage of vulnerable consumers to

propagate a real estate scam. Here, the Sanchezes fell victim to Bladel’s illegal

activity, and they deserve compensation. Thus, we find no error in the trial court’s

award of attorney fees.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons articulated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court. Costs of this appeal are assessed against Appellants, Jon Phillip Bladel,

Bladel Homes, L.L.C., and Bladel Enterprises, L.L.C.

AFFIRMED.

THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
RULE 2-16.3, UNIFORM RULES—COURTS OF APPEAL.

10