Dr. Harry Kleinman v. William Patrick Bennett

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-947

DR. HARRY KLEINMAN

VERSUS

WILLIAM PATRICK BENNETT

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2010-4075, DIVISION B
HONORABLE CLAYTON DAVIS, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JAMES T. GENOVESE
JUDGE

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Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, James T. Genovese, and Phyllis M. Keaty,
Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Scott J. Pias
522 Alamo Street
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601
(337) 436-1288
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
William Patrick Bennett

P. David Olney
921 Ryan Street
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601
(337) 436-1644
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
Dr. Harry Kleinman

GENOVESE, Judge.

Defendant, William Patrick Bennett, appeals the trial court‟s grant of

summary judgment in favor of Dr. Harry Kleinman. For the following reasons, we

reverse the trial court judgment and remand the matter to the trial court for further

proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 9, 2010, Dr. Kleinman filed a lawsuit alleging that Mr. Bennett

owed him money. According to Dr. Kleinman‟s petition, Mr. Bennett “is indebted

to [him] in the amount of . . . ($34,743.64) with ten percent (10%) interest thereon

from June 6, 2001, until paid, and for all costs of this suit[.]” Dr. Kleinman‟s

petition further alleges “[o]n June 5, 2001, [he] loaned $34,743.64 to [Mr.

Bennett], and [at] that time, [Mr. Bennett] gave [him] an „IOU‟ dated June 5, 2001,

and indicating the amount of the loan plus [ten percent] interest.” Finally,

Dr. Kleinman acknowledges that “[o]n April 5, 2005, [Mr. Bennett] paid

$15,000.00, and on April 6, 2005, [Mr. Bennett] paid an additional $5,000.00

towards the debt.” Mr. Bennett filed an answer, in proper person, on August 24,

2010, denying all allegations set forth in Dr. Kleinman‟s petition.

On January 31, 2011, Dr. Kleinman filed a Motion for Summary Judgment

asserting:

[He] is entitled to a Summary Judgment granting the relief
prayed for in his petition on the grounds that the pleadings and
documents on file herein, and the sworn Affidavits annexed hereto . . .
show that there is no real or genuine issue as to any material fact and
[that he was] entitled to [judgment] as a matter of law[.]

In support of his motion, Dr. Kleinman submitted two affidavits: his own, and an

affidavit from John S. Hood. The assertions contained in Dr. Kleinman‟s affidavit

mirror every allegation set forth in his petition, with the addition of one allegation,

namely:

Prior to [Mr. Bennett‟s] payments [made on April 5, 2005 and
April 6, 2005, Dr. Kleinman] delivered to counsel for [Mr. Bennett]
the subject “IOU” (along with some other “IOU”s) in an attempt to
get some of the debts satisfied. When the “IOU”s were copied and
returned to [him], the subject “IOU” was not returned, and [he] has
not seen it since that time.

The affidavit of Mr. Hood asserted that he is an attorney and that he was present in

a representative capacity on behalf of Dr. Kleinman during alleged settlement

negotiations which occurred prior to the instant suit being filed. According to

Mr. Hood:

On June 18, 2009, representing [Dr. Kleinman], he met with
[Mr. Bennett] and his attorney, Jay Delafield[,] at Mr. Delafield‟s
office to discuss the balance due and payment arrangements on the
original loan of $34,743.04 [sic]. Mr. [Bennett]‟s payments of
$15,000.00 and $5,000.00 were acknowledged, and payment of the
balance was discussed. At that point, there was a dispute as to the
amount of interest on the loan, and Mr. [Bennett] indicated he would
pay the principal only on the balance remaining, $15,000.00, by the
end of the year.

The record indicates that on Feburary 24, 2011, Mr. Bennett, in proper

person, filed a Reconventional Demand and a Motion and Order for Continuance.

In his Reconventional Demand, Mr. Bennett alleged that Dr. Kleinman owed him

money as a result of a “business relationship.” Mr. Bennett sought a judgment

“rejecting [Dr.] Kleinman[‟]s demands and condemning [Dr. Kleinman] to pay

[him] such damages as are reasonable[.]” Mr. Bennett‟s Motion and Order for

Continuance sought to delay the hearing set for March 4, 2011, on Dr. Kleinman‟s

Motion for Summary Judgment, in order “to allow for discovery to take place in

the [R]econventional Demand filed this day in this matter.” The trial court denied

Mr. Bennett‟s request for a continuance.

The hearing on Dr. Kleinman‟s Motion for Summary Judgment was held on

March 4, 2011. At said hearing, Mr. Bennett was represented by counsel. Counsel

for Mr. Bennett sought to enter an oral plea of prescription; however, the trial court

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declared, “you can do that on appeal. You can do that after a judgment, but I‟m

not going to on the day of a hearing on a summary judgment allow the defendant to

disrupt the orderly process of the case.” After hearing arguments by both counsel

which focused primarily on whether this matter had prescribed, the trial court

granted Dr. Kleinman‟s Motion for Summary Judgment. A judgment was signed

on March 22, 2011, in favor of Dr. Kleinman and against Mr. Bennett “in the full

sum and amount of $34,743.64, with 10% interest per annum, from June 6, 2001,

until paid, subject to a credit of $20,000.00, and for all costs of these proceedings.”

Mr. Bennett has appealed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Mr. Bennett asserts the trial court erred: (1) “in giving weight to the

self[-]serving [a]ffidavit of [John S. Hood;]” (2) “in granting the Motion for

Summary Judgment despite the genuine issue of material fact[;]” and (3)

in granting a [j]udgment on amount owed when[,] on the face of
pleadings, the loan had prescribed and no specific evidence of any
acknowledgement of the debt to interrupt or suspend prescription.
[Mr. Bennett‟s r]econventional demand alleged amounts owed by
[Dr. Kleinman to Mr. Bennett] which offsets any amount owed by
[Mr. Bennett].

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

“Appellate courts review summary judgment de novo, using the same

criteria that govern the trial court‟s consideration of whether summary judgment is

appropriate, and in the light most favorable to the non-movant.” Yokum v. 615

Bourbon Street, L.L.C., 07-1785, p. 25 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So.2d 859, 876 (citing

Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov’t, 04-1459 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d

37). Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 966(A)(2) states “[t]he summary

judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive

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determination of every action,” and this “procedure is favored and shall be

construed to accomplish these ends.” “[I]f the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to material fact,” then judgment shall be granted as

a matter of law in favor of the mover. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B) and (C).

Dr. Kleinman, as the movant herein, bears the initial burden of proof and must

show that no genuine issue of material fact exists. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C)(2).

If he successfully meets his burden, then the burden shifts to Mr. Bennett to

present factual support adequate to establish that he will be able to satisfy his

evidentiary burden at trial. Id. If Mr. Bennett fails to produce the factual support

necessary to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof

at trial, then there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id.

A fact is material if it potentially insures or precludes recovery,
affects a litigant‟s ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the
legal dispute. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512,
p. 27 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751. A genuine issue is one as to
which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could
reach only one conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue and
summary judgment is appropriate. Id.

Hines v. Garrett, 04-806, p. 1 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So.2d 764, 765-66.

After reviewing the record, we find this suit is not ripe for disposition by

summary judgment. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor

of Dr. Kleinman. In Edwards v. Larose Scrap & Salvage, Inc., 10-596, p. 3

(La.App. 3 Cir. 12/8/10), 52 So.3d 1009, 1011-12 (quoting Brittain v. Family Care

Servs., Inc., 34,787, p. 4 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/20/01), 801 So.2d 457, 460), this court

stated the following principals by which we are guided:

Even though the summary judgment procedure is favored, it is
not a substitute for trial and is often inappropriate for judicial
determination of subjective facts such as motive, intent, good faith or
knowledge. Oaks v. Dupuy, 32,070 (La.App.2d Cir. 8/18/99), 740
So.2d 263, (citing Greer v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 98-129 (La.App.

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3d Cir. 7/1/98), 715 So.2d 1235). One reason is that these subjective
facts call for credibility evaluations and the weighing of testimony and
summary judgment is inappropriate for such determinations. Id.
Moreover, it is not a function of the trial court on a motion for
summary judgment to determine or even inquire into the merits of
issues raised or to weigh conflicting evidence on the existence of
material facts.

In the instant matter, there are questions of material fact as to how much, if

anything, is owed by Mr. Bennett to Dr. Kleinman, what amount of interest was

agreed upon by Mr. Bennett, and what amount Dr. Kleinman owes, if anything, to

Mr. Bennett for alleged storage fees as asserted in Mr. Bennett‟s reconventional

demand. The issue of Mr. Bennett‟s reconventional demand was not addressed by

the trial court. Neither the affidavit of Dr. Kleinman nor the affidavit of Mr. Hood

prove what, if anything, is owed by Mr. Bennett to Dr. Kleinman. Though the

affidavit of Mr. Hood may support the finding that Mr. Bennett did acknowledge

that he owes Dr. Kleinman money, it also clearly states that the question of how

much interest Mr. Bennett owes was not agreed upon or acknowledged.

Dr. Kleinman‟s affidavit states that Mr. Bennett agreed to ten percent interest;

however, the affidavit of Mr. Hood asserts that Mr. Bennett disputed the ten

percent interest rate in the 2009 settlement negotiations that Mr. Hood witnessed.

These disputed questions of material fact prohibit disposition by summary

judgment.

Finally, though there was an oral motion of prescription made at the

summary judgment hearing, Mr. Bennett has never filed an exception of

prescription.

The peremptory exception of prescription may only be raised by the
urging party and it must be specifically plead [sic] through a formal,
written exception. La.Code Civ.P. art. 927. Arguing the issue either
orally or in a memorandum to the court does not suffice. Box v. City
of Baton Rouge, 02-198 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1/15/03), 846 So.2d 13; dela
Vergne v. dela Vergne, 99-364 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/17/99), 745 So.2d
1271.

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Mesh v. Christus St. Patrick Hosp., 05-674, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/30/05), 918

So.2d 559, 560. Therefore, the issue of prescription is not before this court and

cannot be considered.

Based on our de novo review, we find the evidence presented by

Dr. Kleinman does not satisfy his burden of proving that no genuine issue of

material fact exists. Dr. Kleinman has not demonstrated that he is entitled to

summary judgment on his claim, and Mr. Bennett‟s reconventional demand has not

been addressed. This case must, therefore, proceed to trial on the merits. The trial

court erred in granting Dr. Kleinman‟s motion for summary judgment; therefore,

the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further

proceedings.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment granted in

favor of Dr. Harry Kleinman is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial

court for further proceedings. All costs of this appeal are assessed to

Plaintiff/Appellee, Dr. Harry Kleinman.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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