City of Lafayette v. Sam B. Wofford, III

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-988

CITY OF LAFAYETTE

VERSUS

SAM B. WOFFORD, III

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APPEAL FROM THE
LAFAYETTE CITY COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 2011-00814
HONORABLE DOUGLAS J. SALOOM, CITY COURT JUDGE

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MARC T. AMY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Marc T. Amy, and Shannon J. Gremillion,
Judges.

REVERSED; JUDGMENT VACATED.

Harrietta J. Bridges
Post Office Box 66614, Drawer B-4
Baton Rouge, LA 70896-6614
(225) 922-0788
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS:
State of Louisiana,
Department of Public Safety and Corrections,
Office of State Police

Gary J. Haynes
1013 W. University Avenue
Lafayette, LA 70506
(337) 235-8640
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
City of Lafayette
Sam B. Wofford, III
105 Cabana Row
Lafayette, LA 70508
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
In Proper Person

AMY, Judge.

The defendant, Sam B. Wofford, III, was arrested for operating a vehicle

while intoxicated. Thereafter, the defendant entered into a pretrial diversion

program and sought to have the records related to his arrest expunged. After the

trial court granted the defendant’s request, the State of Louisiana, Department of

Public Safety and Corrections (DPS) objected, arguing that it was statutorily

obligated to maintain a public record of the defendant’s arrest. The defendant filed

a motion to enforce the expungement order and, after a hearing, the trial court

ordered DPS to expunge the defendant’s records, finding that only the prosecuting

authority is authorized to maintain a public record of the defendant’s name, date of

arrest, and a description of the pretrial intervention or diversion program into

which the defendant was placed. DPS appeals. For the following reasons, we

reverse and vacate the judgment of the trial court.

Factual and Procedural Background

On June 26, 2009, the defendant was arrested for the offense of operating a

vehicle while intoxicated–1st offense (OWI), a violation of La.R.S. 14:98. At some

point, the defendant entered into the district attorney’s pretrial diversion program.1

According to a letter from the Chief City Prosecutor dated August 9, 2010, charges

were refused by the Lafayette City Prosecutor’s Office on July 26, 2009.

On August 9, 2010, the defendant filed a motion in the City Court of

Lafayette seeking to have the records related to his June 26, 2009, arrest expunged.

The trial court granted the motion on August 25, 2010, ordering that, except for a

list maintained by the prosecutor’s office pursuant to La.R.S. 15:242, all agencies

1
The record contains a letter from the Fifteenth Judicial District Attorney’s Office, dated
March 16, 2011 and file marked July 27, 2011, indicating that the defendant completed his
pretrial diversion program successfully on March 3, 2011 and that the “pending charges against
you will not be prosecuted and your record will show no conviction on these charges.”
(Emphasis in original.)

and law enforcement officers expunge and seal any record of the defendant’s OWI

arrest. After it received the trial court’s order, DPS notified the defendant and the

clerk of court, via letter, that it could not comply with the order because the

defendant’s OWI arrest records were ineligible for expungement under La.R.S.

15:578.1.

On May 17, 2011, the defendant filed a motion requesting that the trial court

review DPS’s refusal to expunge the records. After a hearing, the trial court found

that, for defendants who enter pretrial diversion, after an expungement is granted,

La.R.S. 15:242 and 15:578.1 permit only the prosecuting attorney to maintain

records relating to that defendant’s OWI arrest. Accordingly, on July 20, 2011, the

trial court ordered DPS to expunge the defendant’s OWI arrest records.2

DPS now appeals, alleging as error:

the trial court’s granting of an order to expunge the defendant’s DWI
arrest records following completion of the pretrial diversion program
in contravention of the requirement that such a record shall be a public
record and maintained for a period of five years and not be subject to
expungement or destruction during that period in accordance with
La.R.S. 15:578.1.

Discussion

Eligibility for Expungement

DPS’s sole assignment of error concerns the interpretation of La.R.S. 15:242

and 15:578.1. However, DPS is appealing a judgment ordering enforcement of a

previously issued order. As part of our initial consideration of the underlying

order, we first address the defendant’s eligibility for expungement at the time the

trial court initially granted the motion for expungement. See La.Code Civ.P. art.

2164; Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-571 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507.
2
The trial court’s July 20, 2011 judgment ordered DPS to “expunge the arrest record of
Sam B. Wofford, III as previously ordered by the court and that the order of expungement that
was signed on August 25, 2010 be complied with pursuant to LSA-R.S. 15:242 and LSA-R.S.
15:578.1[.]” The trial court stayed its order during the pendency of this appeal.

2

The expungement of criminal records is provided for in La.R.S. 44:9. Only

specified criminal arrest and conviction records may be expunged pursuant to

La.R.S. 44:9. State v. Gerchow, 09-1055 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/11/10), 36 So.3d 304.

Criminal arrest and conviction records that do not satisfy the requirements of the

statute are ineligible for expungement. Id. The supreme court, observing the

“convoluted nature” of La.R.S 44:9 and its related statutes, has noted “that [o]ur

observation that the clarity of these laws, as amended, leaves much to be desired is

an understatement.” Expunged Record (No.) 249,044, 03-1940, p. 6 (La. 7/2/04),

881 So.2d 104, 108 (quoting State v. Savoie, 92-1586, 93-1955, p.1 (La. 5/23/94),

637 So.2d 408, 409).

Louisiana Revised Statute 44:9(A) provides for the expungement or

destruction of misdemeanor criminal records, stating, in relevant part (emphasis

added):

A. (1) Any person who has been arrested for the violation of a
municipal or parish ordinance or for violation of a state statute which
is classified as a misdemeanor may make a written motion to the
district, parish, or city court in which the violation was prosecuted or
to the district court located in the parish in which he was arrested, for
expungement of the arrest record, under either of the following
conditions:

(a) The time limitation for the institution of prosecution on the
offense has expired, and no prosecution has been instituted; or

(b) If prosecution has been instituted, and such proceedings
have been finally disposed of by dismissal, sustaining of a motion to
quash, or acquittal.

(2) If the court finds that the mover is entitled to the relief
sought as authorized by this Subsection, it shall order all agencies and
law enforcement offices having any record of the arrest, whether on
microfilm, computer card or tape, or on any other photographic,
electronic, or mechanical method of storing data, to destroy any
record of arrest, photograph, fingerprint, or any other information of
any and all kinds or descriptions. The court shall order such
custodians of records to file a sworn affidavit to the effect that the
records have been destroyed and that no notations or references have
been retained in the agency's central repository which will or might
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lead to the inference that any record ever was on file with any agency
or law enforcement office. The original of this affidavit shall be kept
by the court so ordering same and a copy shall be retained by the
affiant agency which said copy shall not be a public record and shall
not be open for public inspection but rather shall be kept under lock
and key and maintained only for internal record keeping purposes to
preserve the integrity of said agency's files and shall not be used for
any investigative purpose. This Subsection does not apply to arrests
for a first or second violation of any ordinance or statute making
criminal the driving of a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcoholic beverages or narcotic drugs, as denounced by R.S. 14:98 or
98.1.[3]

In the case where prosecution has not been instituted, in order for a

defendant’s arrest records to be eligible for expungement,4 the time limitation for

the institution of prosecution must have passed. La.R.S. 44:9(A)(1)(a). See State

v. Labauve, 05-1273 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/20/06), 943 So.2d 1186, writ denied, 06-

2525 (La. 12/15/06), 945 So.2d 694; State v. L.B., 95-2116 (La.App. 1 Cir.

5/30/96), 676 So.2d 179. 5 At the time the trial court granted the defendant’s

motion for expungement, the time period for prosecution had not passed.

Similarly, although the defendant asserts in his motion to expunge records that “the

City of Lafayette dismissed the charges in this matter on the misdemeanor
3
We note that the final sentence of La.R.S. 44:9(A)(2) was determined to be
unconstitutional in State v. Bradley, 360 So.2d 858 (La.1978).
4
The defendant was arrested on June 26, 2009 for a violation of La.R.S. 14:98.
According to a letter from the Lafayette City Prosecutor’s Office, the charges against the
defendant were refused on July 26, 2009. La.R.S. 44:9(A)(1) requires that the defendant petition
“the district, parish, or city court in which the violation was prosecuted or to the district court
located in the parish in which he was arrested” (emphasis added). The clear language of La.R.S.
44:9(A)(1) anticipates that, where prosecution has not been instituted, a defendant will file his or
her petition for expungement in the district court. Here, the record is unclear concerning whether
prosecution was instituted against the defendant. See La.Code Crim.P. art. 382, La.Code Civ.P.
art. 934(7). Moreover, according to the record, the underlying order was issued by the City
Court of Lafayette, not a district court.
5
We acknowledge that in State v. Granger, 07-2285 (La. 5/21/08), 982 So.2d 779, the
basis for the defendant’s motion for expungement was that the two-year time limitation for
prosecution had passed. As reported by the supreme court, the facts indicate that the time
limitation had not passed at the time the defendant filed his motion. However, the facts indicate
that prosecution had been instituted by bill of information and that the defendant entered a
pretrial diversion program. Further, the opinion does not indicate whether the defendant’s
prosecution was disposed of by dismissal, sustaining of a motion to quash, or acquittal.
Ultimately, in Granger, the supreme court found that La.R.S. 15:578.1 was constitutional and
dismissed the defendant’s motion for expungement. Consequently, we find that Granger does
not offer significant guidance in this case.
4

charge[],” the record does not indicate that, if prosecution had been instituted, any

charges were “finally disposed of by dismissal, sustaining of a motion to quash, or

acquittal.” La.R.S. 44:9(A)(1)(b).

In light of the ineligibility of the defendant for the relief granted in the

underlying order, we find error in the trial court’s granting of the motion to enforce

the August 25, 2010, order expunging the defendant’s OWI records. Accordingly,

we reverse the trial court’s July 20, 2011, judgment.

Applicability of La.R.S. 15:252 and 15:578.1 to DPS

In its sole assignment of error, DPS asserts that the trial court erred in

ordering it to expunge the defendant’s OWI arrest records. “It is well settled that

courts will not decide abstract, hypothetical or moot controversies, or render

advisory opinions with respect to such controversies.” St. Charles Gaming Co.,

Inc. v. Riverboat Gaming Comm’n, 94-2697, p. 7 (La. 1/17/95), 648 So.2d 1310,

1315. As we have reversed the July 20, 2011, judgment of the trial court, any

further discussion of DPS’s arguments concerning the interpretation of La.R.S.

15:242 and 15:578.1 is moot. Thus, we pretermit discussion of this issue.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and vacate the entirety of the July 20,

2011, judgment. All costs of these proceedings are cast to the defendant, Sam B.

Wofford, III.

REVERSED; JUDGMENT VACATED.

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