Jack L. Duty v. Louisiana Firefighters' Retirement System

(NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION)

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-1073

JACK L. DUTY

VERSUS

LOUISIANA FIREFIGHTERS’ RETIREMENT
SYSTEM AND CITY OF NACHITOCHES

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APPEAL FROM THE
TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF NATCHITOCHES DOCKET NO. 81,283
HONORABLE ERIC R. HARRINGTON, DISTRICT JUDGE
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SYLVIA R. COOKS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Elizabeth A. Pickett and Phyllis M. Keaty,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Edwin Dunahoe
Dunahoe Law Firm
402 Second Street
P.O. Box 607
Natchitoches, LA 71457
(318) 352-1999
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, Jack L. Duty

Ronald E. Corkern, Jr.
Corkern, Crews, & Guillet, L.L.C.
P.O. Box 1036
Natchitoches, LA 71458-1036
(318) 352-2302

Steven M. Oxenhandler
Michael J. O’Shee
Gold, Weems, Bruser, Sues & Rundell
P.O. Box 6118
Alexandria, LA 71301
(318) 445-6471
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, City of Natchitoches

Cooks, Judge.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Jack L. Duty, (Duty) is a retired firefighter who worked for the City of

Natchitoches (Natchitoches). Duty’s petition does not chronicle the dates or years

of his employment, or the date of his retirement as a firefighter for Natchitoches,

but alleges he is a retired firefighter receiving retirement benefits from the

Louisiana Firefighters’ Retirement System (LFRS). He asserts Natchitoches did

not make the proper contributions into the retirement system for him as its

employee, and, consequently, he is not receiving the amount of retirement benefits

he should be receiving. Duty alleges Natchitoches “failed to take into account

regularly scheduled overtime,” which La.R.S. 11:233(B)(2)(a) requires be used by

Natchitoches in calculating the contributions to be made to Duty’s retirement fund

with LFRS. This alleged miscalculation also adversely affects Duty’s Deferred

Retirement Option Plan (DROP) funds which Duty alleges he is entitled to receive.

Duty seeks to represent the class of all persons similarly affected but there has

been no class certification to date.

As this litigation proceeded, Natchitoches filed an exception of prescription

asserting that any of Duty’s claims which arose more than three years prior to the

date suit was filed are prescribed. The trial court granted Natchitoches’ exception

of prescription. In response to discovery requests filed by Duty, Natchitoches

thereafter filed a motion for a protective order seeking to limit discovery to three

years prior to the filing of Duty’s suit. During the hearing on Natchitoches’ motion

for a protective order, LFRS made an oral exception of prescription asserting that

any claims by Duty for recovery of compensation benefits to be paid by LFRS

should be limited to three years prior to the filing of this suit. The trial court

sustained LFRS’ exception of prescription. Duty appealed the trial court’s

judgment granting LFRS’ exception. This court, in an unpublished opinion,

dismissed Duty’s appeal as the judgment appealed from was not certified as a final

and immediately appealable judgment. See Duty v. Louisiana Firefighters’

Retirement System and City of Natchitoches, 10-1226 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/1/10), 51

So.3d 909. The trial court subsequently rendered written reasons for judgment and

certified the March 8, 2010 judgment on LFRS’ exception of prescription as a final

judgment immediately appealable. Duty now appeals that judgment alleging one

issue for our consideration. Duty asserts that his claim against LFRS for

improperly calculated retirement benefits is subject to a ten year prescriptive

period, not a three year period as applied by the trial court.

DISCUSSION

This court recently addressed this issue in Thibodeaux v. City of Breaux

Bridge, 11-851 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/14/11) (unpublished opinion). In Thibodeaux,

the plaintiff police officers employed by the city sued Breaux Bridge, alleging that

it never made any contributions to the retirement system on behalf of the plaintiffs

therein. Plaintiffs asserted, therefore, they were not receiving any benefits from

the Municipal Police Employee’s Retirement System (MPERS). The plaintiffs in

Thibodeaux argued that the matter was a contract dispute subject to the ten-year

liberative prescription provisions found in La.Civ.Code art. 3499. We rejected that

argument.

Duty argues that his claims are for both contributions improperly made and

benefits which are being improperly paid to him. He acknowledges that what he

identifies as his claim for “contributions” improperly made is subject to a three

year prescriptive period. He argues, however, that his claim for “benefits” not

being paid to him are subject to a liberative prescription of ten years as provided in

La. Civ.Code art. 3499. Duty argues, as did the police officers in Thibodeaux, that
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this claim for “benefits” is a personal action and that La.Civ.Code art. 3499

provides: “Unless otherwise provided by legislation, a personal action is subject to

a liberative prescription of ten years.”

Prescription concerning recovery of “compensation for services rendered” is

provided for by other legislation, namely La.Civ.Code art. 3494 (emphasis added):

The following actions are subject to a liberative prescription of three
years:

(1) An action for the recovery of compensation for services rendered,
including payment of salaries, wages, commissions, tuition fees,
professional fees, fees and emoluments of public officials, freight,
passage, money, lodging, and board;…

Retirement contributions and retirement benefits are deferred “compensation for

services rendered.” Fishbein v. State ex rel. La. State University Health Sciences

Center, 04-2482, p.7, (La. 4/12/05), 898 So.2d 1260, 1265.

This petition to recover underpaid “compensation for services
rendered” is admittedly a personal action as defined by Louisiana
Civil Code of Procedure article 422. However, the ten year
prescriptive period set forth in article 3499, is only applicable to
personal actions “unless otherwise provided for by legislation.”
La.Civ.Code art. 3499. The prescriptive period for the instant
consolidated suits for the recovery of underpaid wages is otherwise
provided for in article 3494 … , for that article, as earlier indicated,
provides a three year prescriptive period for personal actions seeking
“compensation for services rendered.”
Grabert v. Iberia Parish Sch. Bd., 93-2715, p. 2 (La. 7/5/94), 638 So.2d 645,

647 (footnote omitted).

As the Louisiana supreme court stated in Fishbein, 898 So.2d at 1265-

66 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted):

This court has recognized that retirement contributions
represent “an increasingly important part of an employee’s
compensation for his services.” Andrepont v. Lake Charles Harbor &
Terminal Dist., 602 So.2d 704, 708 (La. 1992). Because of this, many
courts have found in a variety of factual contexts that retirement
benefits are deferred compensation for services. Id. In T.L. James &
Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So.2d 834, 851 (La. 1975) (on

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rehearing), this court concluded that an employer’s contribution into a
retirement-type plan “is not a purely gratuitous act, but it is in the
nature of additional remuneration to the employee who meets the
conditions of the plan. The employer expects and receives something
in return for his contribution, while the employee, in complying, earns
the reward. The credits to these plans, when made, are in the nature
of compensation (although deferred until contractually payable).”
Relying on this portion of T.L. James, the Andrepont court concluded
there is ample support for determining that contributions to retirement
plans are among the emoluments of employment and can be
considered deferred compensation. Andrepont, 602 So.2d at 708.
We reaffirm our previous statements that contributions to
retirement plans are a form of deferred compensation. Consequently,
we find that plaintiff’s claim is one for compensation for services
rendered. The applicable prescriptive period, then, is found in La.
C.C. art. 3494, which provides that an action for the recovery of
compensation for services rendered is subject to a liberative
prescription of three years.
Thus, both the “contributions” to Duty’s retirement fund with LFRS and

retirement “benefits” he is receiving are forms of deferred compensation for the

services he performed and as such his claims concerning either are subject to the

three year prescriptive period legislatively provided for in La.Civ.Code art. 3494.

We again reiterate that our holdings in Deshotels v. Village of Pine Prairie, 09-670

(La.App. 3 Cir. 12/9/09), 26 So.3d 975, writ denied, 10-429 (La. 4/30/10), 34

So.3d 293, Coker v. Town of Glenmora, 09-1432 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/10), 37 So.3d

532, writ denied, 10-1302 (La. 10/1/10), 45 So.3d 1096, and the state supreme

court’s holding in Fishbein, 898 So.2d 1260, are applicable here. Finding no error

in the trial court’s ruling, we affirm the judgment. All costs of this appeal are

assessed against Plaintiff/Appellant Jack L. Duty.

AFFIRMED.

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