CA-0011-1086 Nonprecedential Reversed Processed

Lakeisha Brooks v. Popeyes, Inc.

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed June 27, 2012

Also decided on this docket: La. Ct. App. 3d Cir., May 9, 2012; La. Ct. App. 3d Cir., March 14, 2012

Authorities cited

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Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 11-1086

ON REHEARING

LAKEISHA BROOKS

VERSUS

POPEYE’S, INC., ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. MARTIN, NO. 72626
HONORABLE CHARLES LEE PORTER, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks,
Elizabeth A. Pickett, J. David Painter, and Phyllis M. Keaty, Judges.

Cooks, J., dissents for the reasons assigned in her original dissenting opinion.
Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, dissents for the reasons assigned by Judge Cooks.

REVERSED.

Stanford B. Gauthier, II
Attorney at Law
1405 West Pinhook Road, Suite 105
Lafayette, LA 70503
(337) 234-0099
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Atchafalaya Enterprises, Ltd.

Michael L. Barras
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 11340
New Iberia, LA 70562-1340
(337) 369-6400
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
Lakeisha Brooks

PICKETT, Judge.

For the reasons assigned in the original opinion released by a five-judge

panel of this court on March 14, 2012, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.

REVERSED.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-1086

LAKEISHA BROOKS

VERSUS

POPEYES, INC., ET AL.

COOKS, J., Dissents.

Apparently, the majority attempts to distinguish the “weight of un-rebutted

prima facia evidence” in civil rights cases depending on whether such evidence is

used in establishing the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case versus plaintiff’s

burden to prove each element of a claim. Finding that the U.S. Supreme Court has

said that “the threshold number of employees for application of Title VII is an

element of a plaintiff’s claim for relief, not a jurisdictional issue,” the majority

concludes that plaintiff did not prove her employer hired 25 or more people at the

time of the alleged discrimination. The only thing wrong with the majority’s

conclusion is it is legally wrong. It is well settled law in Louisiana that “prima

facia” evidence left un-rebutted is sufficient to carry ones ultimate burden of proof

in establishing an element of a claim, which is exactly what occurred in this case.

After plaintiff completed her case in chief, defendant moved orally for involuntary

dismissal of the case—that motion was apparently deferred to the merits.

Defendant did nothing else gambling apparently that “technicality” would win the

case as opposed to presenting rebuttal evidence. Our courts have long held that

prima facia evidence to prove an essential element of a claim is sufficient if un-

rebutted. Such evidence establishes a “presumption” which is weighted in

plaintiff’s favor that the fact alleged is true and places a burden on defendant to

move forward with evidence rebutting the “presumed fact.” Without such rebuttal,

the trial court is permitted to deem the fact sufficiently proven. See Middleton v.

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Humble, 172 So. 542 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1937); Mc Corkie v. Service Cab Co., Inc.

305 So. 2d 589 (La. App. 4th Circuit, l974).

The Arbaugh case cited by the majority adds nothing to the present

discourse. That case simply says the “employee numerosity” requirement in a

Title VII case is not jurisdictional—the lack of proof at the outset that the

employer employs 25 employees will not preclude the court from hearing the case.

None of the parties here challenged the jurisdiction of the 16th judicial district

court to hear this case; and Arbaugh did not utter one word on the weight a

Louisiana court should accord prima facia evidence in establishing the numerosity

element when judging the merits of a discrimination claim under Title VII. Its

reference here, therefore, stands for nothing.

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