Steven Paul Pesson v. Heather Dieterich

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-1447

STEVEN PAUL PESSON

VERSUS

HEATHER DIETERICH

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CAMERON, NO. 10-18756
HONORABLE PENELOPE RICHARD, DISTRICT JUDGE

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OSWALD A. DECUIR
JUDGE

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Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Jimmie C. Peters, and J. David Painter,
Judges.

AFFIRMED; SANCTIONS DENIED.

Henry R. Liles
Attorney at Law
940 Ryan Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 433-8529
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Steven Paul Pesson

Heather Dieterich
In Proper Person
3022 Weil Drive
Sulphur, LA 70663
(337) 912-8862

DECUIR, Judge.

Steven Pesson appeals a trial court judgment granting Heather Dieterich‘s

exception of no cause of action and dismissing his petition for declaratory

judgment and unjust enrichment.

FACTS

Pesson and Dieterich had a long-term intermittent relationship over some

sixteen years. In 2005, Pesson received a $1.3 million personal injury settlement.

In 2009, Pesson became interested in purchasing a lot at the end of Hebert Camp

Road in Big Lake. Agreement was reached with the sellers, Craig and Karen

Holston, at a price of $250,000.00. On February 12, 2009, Pesson, Dieterich and

the Holstons executed a Cash Deed transferring the property from the Holstons to

Dieterich as sole vendee. Pesson witnessed the sale together with Russell Tauzin

before a notary, and Pesson provided a check for the purchase price. Dieterich was

allegedly listed as vendee so that a homestead exemption could be claimed on the

property since Pesson already owned a home. The cash deed was recorded in the

public records the following day.

In August of 2010, Pesson ended the parties‘ relationship allegedly upon

finding that Dieterich lost $10,000.00 of Pesson‘s funds in online gambling.

Pesson alleges that Dieterich removed an additional $280,000.00 from various

bank accounts and refused to transfer the property on Hebert Camp Road into his

name when requested.

Pesson filed suit seeking declaratory judgment declaring him owner of the

Hebert Camp Road property and ordering Dieterich to execute the necessary

documents to have the property titled in his name. In the alternative, Pesson‘s

petition sought damages for unjust enrichment. Dieterich filed exceptions of no

right and no cause of action. Pesson amended his petition to allege the cash deed

was an absolute simulation.

The trial court granted Dieterich‘s exception of no cause of action. Pesson

lodged this appeal.

DISCUSSION

Pesson alleges three assignments of error which are really one. The trial

court erred in granting the exception of no cause of action because it did not allow

parol evidence, the sale was a simulation, and Dieterich was unjustly enriched.

Pesson is incorrect on all points.

In Fessler v. Brumfield, 09-1458, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/10), 37 So.3d

522, 525, this court reiterated:

―As a general rule, parol evidence is inadmissible to vary,
modify, explain, or contradict a writing.‖ Guidry v. Hedburg, 98-228,
p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/4/98), 722 So.2d 1036, 1039. However, there
are limited circumstances where parol evidence will be admissible.
Louisiana Civil Code Article 1848 provides:

Testimonial or other evidence may not be admitted
to negate or vary the contents of an authentic act or an act
under private signature. Nevertheless, in the interest of
justice, that evidence may be admitted to prove such
circumstances as a vice of consent, or a simulation, or to
prove that the written act was modified by a subsequent
valid oral agreement.

In this case, Pesson argues that the sale was an absolute simulation and, therefore,

parol evidence should have been allowed. ―A simulation is absolute when the

parties intend that their contract shall produce no effects between them. That

simulation, therefore, can have no effects between the parties.‖ La.Civ.Code art.

2026. Pesson was not a party to the cash deed, therefore, the question of

simulation does not establish a cause of action for him against Dieterich.

The trial court properly found that parol evidence was inadmissible.

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However, parol ―. . . is insufficient to create a title in one who
never owned the property or to show that the vendee was in reality
some other person than the person named in the act of sale.‖ Scurto v.
LeBlanc, 191 La. 136, 184 So. 567 (1938); Ceromi v. Harris, 187 La.
701, 706, 175 So. 462, 464 (1937). This rule applies whether the
party proffering the parol is an heir of the alleged vendee, Eberle v.
Eberle, 161 La. 313, 317, 108 So. 549, 551 (1926), or a creditor of the
alleged vendee, Hoffmann v. Ackermann, 110 La. 1070, 1076, 35 So.
293, 295 (1903).

Mitchell v. Clark, 448 So.2d 681, 685 (La.1984).

Finally, Pesson fails to state a cause of action for unjust enrichment. ―A

person who has been enriched without cause at the expense of another person is

bound to compensate that person. The term ‗without cause‘ is used in this context

to exclude cases in which the enrichment results from a valid juridical act or the

law.‖ La.Civ.Code art. 2298.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The

defendant‘s request for sanctions for frivolous appeal is denied. All costs of these

proceedings are taxed to appellant, Steven Pesson.

AFFIRMED; SANCTIONS DENIED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform Rules—Courts of
Appeal, Rule 2–16.3.

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