Thelma M. Hodges v. Michael A. Taylor

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

12-107

THELMA M. HODGES AND MARCUS J. McCOY

VERSUS

MICHAEL A. TAYLOR

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON DAVIS, NO. C-753-08
HONORABLE STEVE GUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE

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J. DAVID PAINTER
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, J. David Painter, and James T.
Genovese, Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Roy H. Maughan, Jr.
Namisha D. Patel
634 Connell’s Park Lane
Baton Rouge, LA 70806
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants:
Thelma Hodges and Marcus McCoy

Walter K. Jamison, III
Marjorie B. Breaux
Bryan Lege
600 Jefferson St., Ste. 410
Lafayette, LA 70501
Counsel for Defendant-Appellee:
Navarre Chevrolet, Inc.

PAINTER, Judge

Plaintiffs, Thelma Hodges and Marcus McCoy, appeal the trial court’s

grant of the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant, Navarre

Chevrolet, Inc. (Navarre). The trial court found that no question of fact

remained and that La.R.S. 32:862 did not give rise to a duty on the part of

Navarre to protect Plaintiffs from the injuries they suffered. Finding that a

question of fact remains, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

Plaintiffs allege in their original petition that, on December 21, 2007,

they were involved in a vehicular collision with Michael A. Taylor. The

accident occurred when the vehicle Taylor was driving southbound on U.S.

Hwy. 165 crossed the center line, struck the left side of a commercial

vehicle, rotated counter-clockwise, hit another vehicle, rotated further, and

hit the vehicle driven by Hodges with McCoy as a passenger. Taylor was

driving a 2007 Chevrolet Silverado that he bought from Navarre on

November 7, 2007, and he had no liability insurance.

Plaintiffs first filed suit against Taylor and later amended their petition

to name Navarre as an additional defendant, alleging that Navarre failed in

its statutory duty under La.R.S. 32:862 to secure an affidavit from the buyer

of a new or used vehicle attesting that the buyer had appropriate insurance

coverage on the vehicle. Navarre filed a Motion for Summary Judgment

alleging that no question of fact remained and that Navarre was entitled to

summary judgment as a matter of law because it had complied with its

statutory duty under La.R.S. 32:862 and that its duty under that statute did

not extend to third parties injured by an uninsured motorist. Plaintiffs appeal.

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DISCUSSION

Summary Judgment

An appellate court reviews summary judgments de novo,
applying the same criteria as the district court in determining
whether summary judgment is appropriate. Schroeder v. Bd. of
Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 591 So.2d 342 (La.1991).
A motion for summary judgment is properly granted when the
“pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that the mover
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code Civ.P. art.
966(B).

State v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co., 10-1341, p. __ (La.App. 3 Cir.

2/1/12), ___ So.3d ___, ___.

The trial court herein found that:

After reviewing the memoranda, affidavits, and
arguments of counsel, the Court finds that there is no genuine
issue of material fact remaining and that NAVARRE is entitled
to judgment in its favor. NAVARRE contends that when it sold
the vehicle to TAYLOR it obtained an affidavit of proof of
insurance in compliance with LSA R.S. 32:862 on November 7,
2007, before the December 2007 accident at issue in this case
occurred. In the affidavit, TAYLOR swore or affirmed that he
had and would maintain during the registration period vehicle
liability insurance required under Louisiana law. After the
affidavit was executed, NAVARRE sent it to the Office of
Motor Vehicles. Thus, NAVARRE argues that it complied with
the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law.

Furthermore, NAVARRE also argues that even if it had
not complied with LSA R.S. 32:862, it would have no duty that
would have extended to the plaintiffs. NAVARRE cites Fugler
v. Daigle [,555 So.2d. 15 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1990)] in which the
First Circuit Court of Appeal stated that the purpose of any duty
imposed on the dealership defendant is to obtain a form
confirming liability coverage and that duty did not include
within its scope the protection of third parties injured by the
motorist.

When reviewing the record, the Court notes that there is
no evidence to even suggest that TAYLOR did not execute the
affidavit dated November 7, 2007 that was introduced into
evidence. As a result, NAVARRE was in compliance with LSA
R.S. 32:862 by having TAYLOR execute the affidavit for proof
of insurance. Moreover, the plaintiffs have not introduced any
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persuasive evidence that NAVARRE owed a duty to protect
third parties from drivers without insurance or to keep
uninsured drivers off the roads. Consequently, the Motion for
Summary Judgment filed on behalf of NAVARRE
CHEVROLET, INC. is hereby granted.

Therefore, this court will examine the duty imposed by the statute and

whether Navarre breached that duty.

Duty imposed by La.R.S. 32:862

The question of whether La.R.S. 32:862 imposes a duty which extends

to injured third parties is a question of law rather than a question of fact.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:862 provides in pertinent part:

B. (1) The commissioner shall adopt rules to implement the
provisions of this Section. The rules shall provide that
documentation of insurance or other security shall be required
for proof of compliance. The rules shall require that the
original or a copy of one of the following documents be
produced as documentation of insurance: an insurance card; an
insurance policy; or the declarations page of the insurance
policy showing coverages. The rules shall require insurance
and security companies to issue cards or similar documents
which indicate the existence of insurance or security coverage,
may establish the form for the cards or similar documents, and
may establish the form for the written declarations required by
this Section.

(2) The provisions of this Subsection with regard to the
documentation of insurance requirements shall not apply to new
and used automobile dealers as defined by law. However, the
rules shall provide for the use of affidavits to prove compliance
when registration is sought by a licensed new or used motor
vehicle dealer on behalf of a customer.

The original title of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law

included language indicating that its purpose was “to eliminate the reckless

and irresponsible driver from the highways, and to provide for the giving of

security and proof of financial responsibility by owners and operators of

motor vehicles; . . . the security following an accident; proof of financial

responsibility for the future . . . .” The courts of this state have found that the

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purpose of the law is to protect those injured by the fault of another driver.

See Marcus v. Hanover Ins. Co., Inc., 98-2040 (La. 6/4/99), 740 So.2d 603;

Czop v. White, 11-310 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/28/11), 80 So.3d 1255; Mednick v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 09-183 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/26/10), 31 So.3d

1133. Given this purpose, we find that the duties imposed by the statute

extend to third parties injured by the fault of another driver, since those are

specifically the people the law is meant to protect. We further note that

Fugler, 555 So.2d 15, cited by Navarre for the proposition that any duty

imposed on car dealerships does not extend to third parties, was overruled by

the Louisiana Supreme Court at 558 So.2d 246 (La. 1990).

Although the statute states that the rules regarding documentation do

not apply to licensed new or used car dealers, it further provides that when

dealers seek registration of vehicles on behalf of buyers, they may use

affidavits to show compliance with the statutory requirements. If a dealer

seeks registration, it must see to it that the requirements of the statute are

met whether by affidavit or other means.

Accordingly, the duty imposed on Navarre to comply with La.R.S.

32:862 extends to protecting those injured by Taylor.

Breach of duty

Having found that La.R.S. 32:862 imposes a duty on a car dealer

which extends to third parties, we must determine whether a question of fact

remains as to whether Navarre breached that duty.

Navarre asserts that it fulfilled its duty under the statute when it had

Taylor sign the attestation contained on the Louisiana Department of Public

Safety and Corrections Vehicle Application which states that:

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I do swear or affirm that the information contained in this
document is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

I have and will maintain, during this registration period, vehicle
liability insurance (security) required by LRS Title 32:861-865.
Failure to maintain as agreed will be a violation of law which
may result in criminal prosecution and/or suspension of
registration privileges.

If the vehicle being registered is defined as a commercial motor
vehicle by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulation and/or
Federal Hazardous Material Regulations, by signature below
registrant declares knowledge of those federal regulations.

The copy of the form submitted in support of the motion for summary

judgment carries, after this statement, the signature of Michael Taylor. The

signature is unwitnessed and unnotarized. Counsel for Navarre conceded at

oral argument that this was not an affidavit. Further, below the signature

lines, the form contains the further language as follows: “PROOF OF

LIABILITY INSURANCE MUST BE FURNISHED AS PROVIDED FOR

BY LAW BEFORE THIS FILE CAN BE PROCESSED.”

While the deposition of a representative of Navarre indicates that it is

the practice of Navarre to require proof of insurance and make a copy of the

insurance card, there is nothing of record to indicate that the salesman, or

any other representative of Navarre, obtained proof of insurance from

Taylor. The deposition of James Soileau, the salesman who sold Taylor the

vehicle, holds no indication that he talked to Taylor until the day after the

vehicle was delivered. Soileau called Taylor the next day, to obtain a policy

number and the name of an insurance agent. He called the insurance agent

and found out that the policy had been canceled in September 2007. Soileau

testified that he was unable to contact Taylor after that. He further indicated

that someone in the business office might have talked to Soileau about

insurance. According to the deposition testimony of Vicki Saxby,
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comptroller for Navarre, the salesman should have gotten a copy of the

insurance card. Further, it appears that Navarre may have submitted the

vehicle application to the state knowing that Taylor’s previous insurance had

been cancelled and without proof that he had obtained other insurance.

In light of the lack of any showing that Taylor provided proof of

insurance in connection with his signature on the state-provided vehicle

application form, which Navarre submitted on his behalf, we find that issues

of fact remain with regard to Navarre’s compliance with the statute so as to

constitute a breach of its duty under the statute.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment. This matter

is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs of this appeal are

assessed to Defendant, Navarre Chevrolet, Inc.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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