Jarvis Harmon, Sr. v. Victoria Williams Harmon
Jarvis Harmon, Sr. v. Victoria Williams Harmon, No. CA-0012-0580 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. Nov. 7, 2012).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Rosell v. Esco 549 So. 2d 840
- Barlow v. Barlow 87 So. 3d 386
- Westbrook v. Weibel 80 So. 3d 683
- State Ex Rel. Cac 83 So. 3d 1048
- Too Easy Entertainment, LLC v. Seven Arts Pictures, Inc. 954 So. 2d 790
- Coleman v. Coleman 541 So. 2d 1003
- Henry v. Henry 999 So. 2d 255
- Wolff v. Wolff 966 So. 2d 1202
- 6 So. 3d 10303 not in our corpus
- Diggs v. Diggs 6 So. 3d 1030
- Evans v. Lungrin 708 So. 2d 731
- Dupre v. Dupre 834 So. 2d 1272
- Guillory v. Guillory 29 So. 3d 1288
- Faucheux v. Faucheux 91 So. 3d 1119
Opinion text
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
12-580
JARVIS HARMON, SR.
VERSUS
VICTORIA WILLIAMS HARMON
**********
APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. MARTIN, NO. 77200, DIV. C
HONORABLE JOHN E. CONERY, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********
JAMES T. GENOVESE
JUDGE
**********
Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, James T. Genovese, and Shannon J.
Gremillion, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
Derriel C. McCorvey
The Law Office of Derriel C. McCorvey, L.L.C.
Post Office Box 2473
Lafayette, Louisiana 70502
(337) 291-2431
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Jarvis Harmon, Sr.
Judi F. Abrusley
407 East Sixth Avenue, Suite 2
Post Office Drawer 1114
Oakdale, Louisiana 71463
(318) 335-9771
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Victoria Williams Harmon
GENOVESE, Judge.
In this domestic case, the trial court found Defendant, Victoria Williams
Harmon, free from fault in the dissolution of her marriage to Plaintiff, Jarvis
Harmon, Sr., and ordered Mr. Harmon to pay Ms. Harmon final periodic support.
Mr. Harmon appeals the trial court‘s determination of non-fault and its award of
final periodic support without a specified duration. Ms. Harmon answered the
appeal, requesting an increase in the amount awarded to her as final periodic
support. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and
deny Ms. Harmon‘s request for an increase in final periodic support.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 23, 2010, after twenty-six years of marriage, Mr. Harmon
filed a petition seeking a divorce from Ms. Harmon pursuant to La.Civ.Code art.
102. On December 9, 2010, Ms. Harmon filed an answer and reconventional
demand, alleging that she was in need of interim periodic support and also that she
was free from fault in the breakup of the marriage for the purpose of pursuing final
periodic support.
On June 8, 2011, Ms. Harmon filed a rule for final periodic support.
Following a two-day hearing held on August 30, 2011, and October 10, 2011, the
trial court took the matter under advisement. On January 4, 2012, written reasons
for judgment were issued by the trial court. The trial court found Ms. Harmon free
from fault and in need of support. The trial court also found that Mr. Harmon had
the financial resources to pay Ms. Harmon final periodic support, and it ordered
Mr. Harmon to pay Ms. Harmon $2,250.00 per month as final periodic support
beginning on the date of the signing of the judgment. The trial court signed the
judgment on January 31, 2012. It is from this judgment that Mr. Harmon appeals.
On appeal, Mr. Harmon challenges the trial court‘s determination that
Ms. Harmon was free from fault ―in the break-up of the marriage prior to the filing
of the Petition for Divorce‖ and the trial court‘s amount of ―final periodic spousal
support[1] of no set duration.‖ Ms. Harmon answered the appeal, seeking an
increase in ―the amount of permanent spousal support from $2,250.00 per
month . . . to a substantially higher amount because the evidence shows that
[Mr. Harmon] has the resources to pay more[,] and [she] has the need for more
income than was awarded.‖
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I. The [t]rial [c]ourt erred in finding that [Ms. Harmon] was free
from fault in the break-up of the marriage prior to the filing of
the Petition for Divorce, entitling her to final periodic spousal
support.
II. The [t]rial [c]ourt erred in awarding [Ms. Harmon] final
periodic spousal support of no set duration.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
FAULT
Mr. Harmon argues that the trial court‘s judgment was in error because it
was based on the finding that Ms. Harmon was free from fault in the breakup of the
marriage when she was ―guilty of behavior classified as ‗fault‘ according to the
jurisprudence.‖ We disagree.
Standard of Review
An appellate court cannot set aside a trial court‘s findings of
fact in the absence of manifest error or unless those findings are
clearly wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). If the
findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety,
an appellate court may not reverse those findings even though
convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have
weighed the evidence differently. Id.
1
Though both Mr. Harmon and Ms. Harmon refer to ―final periodic spousal support,‖
La.Civ.Code art. 112 refers to only ―final periodic support.‖ Therefore, throughout the opinion,
except in direct quotes, we will use the phrase ―final periodic support‖ as it is listed in
La.Civ.Code art. 112.
2
Barlow v. Barlow, 11-1286, p. 9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/11/12), 87 So.3d 386, 391-92
(quoting Westbrook v. Weibel, 11-910, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/7/11), 80 So.3d 683,
686, writ denied, 12-403 (La. 3/7/12), 83 So.3d 1048).
In seeking final periodic support, Ms. Harmon bears the burden of proving
that she was free from fault in the dissolution of the marriage. See Barlow, 87
So.3d 386 (citing Terry v. Terry, 06-1406 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/28/07), 954 So.2d
790).
―It is well settled that a trial court‘s factual findings
regarding fault in the area of domestic relations are given
great deference on review. If the trial court‘s findings are
reasonable, i.e. not manifestly erroneous or clearly
wrong, then they will not be disturbed.‖ [Terry, 954
So.2d] at 793 (citing Coleman v. Coleman, 541 So.2d
1003 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1989)).
Henry v. Henry, 08-692, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/10/08), 999 So.2d
255, 256-57.
Id. at 393.
As set forth by this court in Wolff v. Wolff, 07-332, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 3 Cir.
10/3/07), 966 So.2d 1202, 1204:
The statutes applicable to the award or denial of final periodic
spousal support are La.Civ.Code arts. 111 and 112. Louisiana Civil
Code Article 111 states:
In a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, the court
may award interim periodic support to a party or may
award final periodic support to a party who is in need of
support and who is free from fault prior to the filing of a
proceeding to terminate the marriage in accordance with
the following Articles.
The factors that the trial court considers to determine whether an award of final
periodic support is merited are listed in La.Civ.Code art. 112:
A. When a spouse has not been at fault and is in need of
support, based on the needs of that party and the ability of the other
party to pay, that spouse may be awarded final periodic support in
accordance with Paragraph B of this Article.
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B. The court shall consider all relevant factors in determining
the amount and duration of final support. Those factors may include:
(1) The income and means of the parties, including the
liquidity of such means.
(2) The financial obligations of the parties.
(3) The earning capacity of the parties.
(4) The effect of custody of children upon a party‘s
earning capacity.
(5) The time necessary for the claimant to acquire
appropriate education, training, or employment.
(6) The health and age of the parties.
(7) The duration of the marriage.
(8) The tax consequences to either or both parties.
C. The sum awarded under this Article shall not exceed
one-third of the obligor‘s net income.
Ms. Harmon denied being at fault in the dissolution of the marriage and
testified that Mr. Harmon‘s infidelity and dishonesty were an ongoing problem
during the marriage. Mr. Harmon accused Ms. Harmon of behaving in a manner
that made their marriage unsupportable. Ms. Harmon alleged that Mr. Harmon
admitted his indiscretions to her, only to later deny any wrongdoing to others and
to accuse her of defaming him among his congregation.2 Mr. Harmon also accused
Ms. Harmon of abusing prescription drugs, which he testified exacerbated her
irrational and paranoid behavior. Mr. Harmon alleges that Ms. Harmon‘s behavior
constituted fault and barred her from entitlement to final periodic support.
In its written reasons for judgment, the trial court stated, in pertinent part:
The [c]ourt finds that [Ms. Harmon] was free from fault within
the meaning of that phrase prior to the filing of the proceedings to
terminate the marriage. The main issue to be decided by the [c]ourt is
2
Prior to their separation, Mr. Harmon and Ms. Harmon were both affiliated with True
Vine Ministries in Lafayette, Louisiana. Mr. Harmon was a bishop; Ms. Harmon was a pastor.
4
one of credibility of the witnesses. [Ms. Harmon], Rose Harmon, the
sister-in-law of [Ms. Harmon] and sister of [Mr. Harmon], Edna Dean
Williams, the mother of [Ms. Harmon], Jamie Harmon and Jarvis
Harmon, Jr., the sons of [Mr. and Ms. Harmon], all testified that
[Mr. Harmon] had admitted to adultery and sexual sins. The [c]ourt
accepts their testimony as credible and believable.
....
Applying Diggs v. Diggs, [08-1271 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/1/09),
6 So.3d 10303], this [c]ourt specifically finds that [Ms. Harmon] was
free from fault in causing the breakup of the marriage and that she
should not be deprived of alimony due to a reasonable justifiable
response to the acts of [Mr. Harmon]. Though it is true that [Ms.
Harmon] became quite hostile towards [Mr. Harmon], the [c]ourt
nevertheless finds that her reaction and response to his adultery and
pornography were ―a justifiable response‖ to [Mr. Harmon‘s] acts[.]
Based on our review of the record, we find the trial court‘s ruling was not
clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous and that there was sufficient evidence to
support same. The trial court heard testimony from several witnesses who
corroborated Ms. Harmon‘s testimony. It is clear the trial court did not consider
Mr. Harmon‘s testimony credible regarding his reason for exiting the marriage.
We find insufficient evidence in the record to support Mr. Harmon‘s claim that
Ms. Harmon was not free from fault prior to the filing of the proceeding to
terminate the marriage as required by La.Civ.Code art. 111.
DURATION OF FINAL PERIODIC SUPPORT
In his second assignment of error, Mr. Harmon argues that the trial court
erred in failing to set a duration for said award and offers comment (c)4 of
La.Civ.Code art. 112 in support of his contention. We disagree.
3
In Diggs, 6 So.3d 1030, the trial court ruled that the wife proved her entitlement to final
periodic support. This court affirmed the trial court‘s ruling that the wife‘s habitual intemperance
and cruel treatment of her husband during the marriage was not the cause of the failure of the
marriage.
4
Comment (c) relative to La.Civ.Code art. 112 provides, in pertinent part, ―The sixth
factor listed in this Article, coupled with the word ‗duration‘ in the first sentence of the Article,
permits the court to award rehabilitative support and other forms of support that terminate after a
set period of time.‖
5
Standard of Review
An appellate court may not set aside a trial court‘s finding of fact in
the absence of ―manifest error‖or unless it is ―clearly wrong.‖ Rosell
v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). ―However, where one or more
trial court legal errors interdict the fact-finding process, the manifest
error standard is no longer applicable and, if the record is otherwise
complete, the appellate court should make its own independent de
novo review of the record.‖ Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541, pp. 7-8
(La.2/6/98); 708 So.2d 731, 735. A legal error occurs when the trial
court incorrectly applies principles of law and those errors are
prejudicial. Id.
Dupre v. Dupre, 02-902, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/30/02), 834 So.2d 1272, 1276.
We find no merit to Mr. Harmon‘s assertion that the trial court is required to
set a duration for the final periodic support award. An award of final periodic
support may be modified if the circumstances of either party materially change and
shall be terminated if it becomes unnecessary. See La.Civ.Code art. 114. Further,
the obligation is extinguished if the party receiving support remarries or
cohabitates in the manner of a married person. See La.Civ.Code art. 115.
Mr. Harmon‘s reliance on comment (c) of La.Civ.Code art. 112 is misplaced. See
Guillory v. Guillory, 09-988 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/10), 29 So.3d 1288; see also
Faucheux v. Faucheux, 11-939 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/27/12), 91 So.3d 1119. Though
La.Civ.Code art. 112 permits a specified duration, it does not mandate such.
Therefore, it is discretionary with the trial court, and we find no legal error in the
trial court‘s failure to set a duration for the final periodic support.
We also note that Mr. Harmon, in brief, argues that ―[t]he [t]rial court erred
in awarding [Ms.] Harmon final periodic spousal support.‖ However, Mr. Harmon
does not allege in his assignments of error any error by the trial court in the amount
of final periodic support awarded to Ms. Harmon. Mr. Harmon‘s assignments of
error are specifically stated and are directed solely toward the issues of fault and
6
duration. Therefore, because that issue was not assigned as error, we do not
consider it. See Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–12.4.
ANSWER TO APPEAL
Ms. Harmon, in her answer to appeal, argues that the amount awarded to her
as final periodic support is erroneous, and she seeks an increase in the amount
awarded by the trial court.
In its written reasons for judgment, the trial court stated, in pertinent part:
[Ms. Harmon] has set out a list of expenses totaling $6,275.00.
She claims that based on the amount of money she is receiving she‘s
short about $5,275.00 a month. [Mr. Harmon] was averaging about
$16,000.00 a month. The [c]ourt finds that since the breakup of the
marriage, his income has been substantially reduced to $8,000.00 per
month. The [c]ourt nevertheless finds that Mr. Harmon‘s explanation
of his income and expenses is likewise not credible and believable
based on his history of past earnings and his ability to continue to earn
a high income from his church pursuits. After considering all of the
evidence, the [c]ourt finds that an award of $2,250.00 per month in
final permanent spousal support is well within the means of
[Mr. Harmon] to pay and certainly considerably less than the actual
needs established by [Ms. Harmon].
The issue before this court relative to the amount awarded to Ms. Harmon as
final periodic support is whether the trial court was manifestly erroneous in its
judgment. See Barlow, 87 So.3d 386. Considering the record before us, we find
sufficient evidence to support the trial court‘s determination. The court made a
factual determination and a credibility call. Though there may be two permissive
views of the evidence, we find no manifest error. We, likewise, find no abuse of
the trial court‘s discretion in awarding Ms. Harmon final periodic support in the
amount of $2,250.00. Ms. Harmon‘s argument relative to the amount awarded as
final periodic support is unsupported and without merit.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment finding Victoria Williams Harmon
free from fault and awarding her final periodic support is affirmed. Ms. Harmon‘s
7
answer to appeal requesting an increase in final periodic support is denied. Costs
of this appeal are assessed against Plaintiff/Appellant, Jarvis Harmon, Sr.
AFFIRMED.
8