CA-0012-1093 Nonprecedential Processed

Ronald Brooks v. Dr. John Scott Sibille

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed January 30, 2013

Authorities cited

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Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 12-1093

RONALD BROOKS

VERSUS

DR. JOHN SCOTT SIBILLE, ET AL.

CONSOLIDATED WITH:

CA 12-1094

JENNIFER CHAVIS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NATURAL TUTRIX FOR
JAMESHA WILSON AND JALIYAH WILSON

VERSUS

DR. JOHN SCOTT SIBILLE, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 2009-2763 C/W NO. 2009-2764
HONORABLE DONALD WAYNE HEBERT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JIMMIE C. PETERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Billy H. Ezell, and J. David Painter, Judges.

MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED.
APPEAL DISMISSED AND REMANDED FOR CLARIFICATION.

Terry L. Rowe
Attorney at Law
Post Office Box 3323
Lafayette, LA 70502
(337) 232-4744
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
State Farm Fire & Casualty Company
Dr. John Scott Sibille
Paulette Sibille

H. Edward Sherman
Attorney at Law
1515 Poydras St., #1460
New Orleans, LA 70112
(504) 587-7100
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS:
Jennifer Chavis, individually and as natural tutrix for her minor
children, Jonas Chavis, Jamesha Wilson, and Jaliyah Wilson
Ronald Brooks

PETERS, Judge.

The defendants-appellees, Dr. John Scott Sibille, Paulette Sibille, and State

Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, filed a motion to dismiss as abandoned

the appeals taken by the plaintiffs-appellants, Jennifer Chavis, individually and as

natural tutrix for her minor children, Jonas Chavis, Jamesha Wilson, and Jaliyah

Wilson, and Ronald Brooks. The appellants filed a brief in opposition to the motion

to dismiss. For the reasons expressed below, we dismiss these appeals for lack of

jurisdiction and remand these cases for clarification of the judgment appealed.

The appellants filed these suits for damages arising out of the unfortunate

drowning of two minor children in a pond located on or nearby property owned by the

defendants, the Sibilles. The appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, which

the trial court granted. The trial court signed a written judgment which reads in

pertinent part, “IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted”. The appellants filed appeals from

this judgment.

The appeal records in these consolidated cases were lodged in this court on

September 21, 2012. Therefore, the appellants’ brief was due to be filed in these

appeals by no later than October 16, 2012. On October 11, 2012, the appellants’

counsel filed a motion with this court seeking an extension of the filing due date for

his appellate brief in these appeals. This court granted this request and set the new

due date for October 26, 2012.

On October 26, 2012, the appellants’ counsel again sought an extension of the

due date for his brief, and this court ordered the due date be extended to November 5,

2012. And yet again, on November 6, 2012, this court granted another requested

extension to the appellants’ counsel and further extended the briefing deadline to

November 8, 2012.

Since this court did not receive any brief by the appellants’ counsel within the

extended due date, on November 13, 2012, this court issued an order to the appellants’

counsel informing him that if the appellants’ brief was not filed within thirty days of

the mailing of that notice, the appeals would be dismissed as abandoned pursuant to

Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2−8.6. Thus, appellants’ counsel had until

December 13, 2012, within which either to deliver to this court or to place into a

delivery service the appellants’ brief in these appeals.

Despite these extensions and despite the thirty day notice sent to the appellants’

counsel, the appellants’ brief was neither filed with this court nor placed into a

delivery service by December 13, 2012. Instead, appellants’ brief was placed into the

Federal Express delivery system on December 14, 2012. This brief was actually

received by this court on December 17, 2012.

Therefore, on December 27, 2012, the appellees filed their motion to dismiss

these appeals as abandoned. The appellants’ counsel filed a brief in opposition to the

motion to dismiss attempting to explain why the briefs were not filed by December 13,

2012. Although this court now dismisses these appeals, we do not dismiss them as

abandoned; instead, we find that this court never had subject matter jurisdiction over

these appeals as the judgment appealed is improper and is not appealable.

In Gaten v. Tangipahoa Parish School System, 2011-1133 (La.App. 1 Cir.

3/23/12), 91 So.2d 1073, the plaintiff filed an appeal from a grant of summary

judgment in favor of the defendants. In dismissing the appeal, the appellate court

wrote:

Appellate courts have the duty to determine sua sponte whether their
subject matter jurisdiction exists, even when the parties do not raise the issue.
Motorola, Inc. v. Associated Indemnity Corporation, 02-1351 (La.App. 1 Cir.
10/22/03), 867 So.2d 723, 725. Under Louisiana law, a final judgment is one
that determines the merits of a controversy in whole or in part. La.Code Civ.
Proc. Ann. art. 1841. A final judgment must be identified as such by
appropriate language. La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 1918. A valid judgment
must be precise, definite, and certain. Laird v. St. Tammany Parish Safe
Harbor, 02-0045 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/20/02), 836 So.2d 364, 365. A final

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appealable judgment must contain decretal language, and it must name the
party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling
is ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied. See Carter v. Williamson
Eye Center, 01-2016 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/27/02), 837 So.2d 43, 44. These
determinations should be evident from the language of a judgment without
reference to other documents in the record. Laird, 836 So.2d at 366. The
amended judgment, like the first judgment, does not contain proper decretal
language. Specifically, although the judgment grants TPSS’s motion for
summary judgment, it does not specify what that relief entails. In the absence
of such decretal language, the judgment before us is defective and cannot be
considered as a “final judgment.” See Carter, 837 So.2d at 44. In the absence
of a final judgment, this court lacks jurisdiction to review this matter. Laird,
836 So.2d at 366.

In the instant appeals, the trial court’s judgment, just like the judgment in Gaten,

grants summary judgment in favor of the appellees and against the appellants;

however, there is no way to know the relief granted in this ruling from reference to the

judgment itself. Thus, as in Gaten, we find that this court lacks jurisdiction to review

this matter because the judgment is not appealable. Therefore, we find that we cannot

grant the appellees’ motion to dismiss the appeal on the basis of abandonment because

the appeals were never properly cognizable in this court. Instead, we hereby dismiss

these appeals at appellants’ cost and remand these cases to the trial court for further

proceedings in accordance with this court’s ruling, including reformation of the

judgment. See State v. White, 2005-718 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/06), 921 So.2d 1144

(where the appellate court dismissed the appeal and remanded the case for the

judgment’s reformation and any necessary clarification of the appellate record).

MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED.
APPEAL DISMISSED AND REMANDED FOR CLARIFICATION.

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