Reginald Phillips v. City of Crowley

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

12-1306

REGINALD PHILLIPS

VERSUS

CITY OF CROWLEY, ET AL.

**********
APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ACADIA, DOCKET NO. 2010-10153-L
HONORABLE MARILYN C. CASTLE, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********

SYLVIA R. COOKS
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Jimmie C. Peters, James T. Genovese,
Shannon J. Gremillion, and John E. Conery, Judges.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

Conery, J., concurs in part, dissents in part, and assigns reasons.

Harold D. Register, Jr.
216 Rue Louis XIV
P.O. Box 80214
Lafayette, LA 70598-0214
(337) 981-6644
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Reginald Phillips

Rochell Jones
405 W. Main St., Suite 107
Lafayette, LA 70501
(337) 504-3437
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Reginald Phillips

James L. Pate
Sara Rodrigue
Laborde & Neuner
One Petroleum Center, Suite 200
1001 West Pinhook Road
Lafayette, LA 70503
(337) 237-7000
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
The City of Crowley

Thomas K. Regan
525 West Court Circle
Crowley, LA 70526
(337) 783-7141
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
The City of Crowley

Homer Ed Barousse, Jr.
Barousse & Craton, L.L.C.
P.O. Box 1305
Crowley, LA 70527-0730
(337) 785-1000
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
Wayne A. Melancon, Sheriff of Acadia Parish, Louisiana

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COOKS, Judge.
This appeal arose out of an incident where Kimberly Phillips shot her

husband, Reginald Phillips, in their home on July 16, 2009. In the weeks prior to

the shooting, Kimberly and Reginald had been involved in an ongoing domestic

dispute.

On July 1, 2009, Kimberly filed a Petition for Protection from Abuse against

Reginald. The district court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) against

Reginald, which required him to leave the family home. A hearing on the matter

was set for July 15, 2009, to determine whether a protective order should be issued.

A hearing officer denied the request for a protective order. Reginald then

requested an escort by the Crowley Police Department to the family home so he

could retrieve his personal belongings. After arriving at the police station he was

asked by the Assistant Chief to produce documentation that the protective order

had been dismissed. Reginald contacted Jack Miller, his attorney, and on the

following day, July 16, 2009, he went to Mr. Miller‟s office to secure a copy of the

court order. While there, he was told by Mr. Miller the Crowley Police Chief, K.

P. Gibson, had been informed of the need for a police escort. When Reginald

arrived at the police station later that afternoon, he produced the necessary

documentation and was then escorted by a Crowley Police Officer to the home.

Upon arrival at the home, Kimberly was informed that Reginald had court

approval to enter the home and retrieve his personal belongings. Soon after

Reginald arrived at the house, two more officers appeared on the scene. At that

time, there were three officers present: Richard Baudoin, Brandon LaFosse, and

David Hoffpauir.

Reginald claimed, while he was retrieving his belongings, Officer Baudoin

began to shout at him to “hurry up because he didn‟t have time to babysit.”

According to Reginald, the officers then began to demand he leave the residence.

At this point, Reginald phoned Mr. Miller to advise him what was occurring.

Reginald stated he suggested to Mr. Miller that it might be best to leave the

residence and return with officers that were willing to wait for him while he

gathered his personal belongings. Mr. Miller then spoke with Officer Baudoin on

the telephone and explained to him that Reginald was legally entitled to retrieve his

personal belongings.

After Officer Baudoin spoke with Mr. Miller, Reginald continued to gather

his belongings. During this time, the three officers left the premises. Reginald

maintained he was not told by the officers they were leaving, and was not aware

they had left the premises.

When Kimberly was informed by the officers that they intended to leave, she

called her friend, Danielle Domingue, and asked her to come over. Ms. Domingue

and Kimberly worked for the Acadiana Parish Sheriff‟s Office, although in

different departments (Ms. Domingue in 911 and Kimberly in the tax collection

department). Shortly after speaking with Kimberly, Ms. Domingue arrived with

her kids. Ms. Domingue stated when she arrived at the house, the officers asked

her if she was going to stay at the home because they could no longer stay. Officer

Baudoin, in his deposition testimony, stated all the officers left because Ms.

Domingue was at the home.

After staying for a short period, Ms. Domingue also decided to leave

because her children were getting “antsy.” Ms. Domingue stated she returned back

to the residence about fifteen minutes after she left because she was worried when

Kimberly did not answer her phone or return a text message she sent. Upon

returning to the premises, she saw police cars and an ambulance present. After

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getting out of the car, she was informed that Reginald had been shot in the back

multiple times by Kimberly.

Reginald testified he was bent over a desk unplugging a wireless router,

when he heard Kimberly say “this is all you‟re going to have.” He then looked

over his shoulder and saw Kimberly standing in the hallway with a gun. Reginald

stated before he could move, Kimberly shot him in the back. As a result of the

shooting, Reginald suffered spinal cord injuries and is paralyzed.

Kimberly was eventually indicted by a grand jury for aggravated second

degree battery as a result of the shooting. Kimberly pled guilty, and is currently

incarcerated.

Reginald eventually filed suit against the City of Crowley and the Crowley

Police Department, alleging they were negligent in failing to protect and stay with

him while he was retrieving his belongings. Also named as defendants were the

Acadia Parish Sheriff‟s Office, Acadia Parish, and Sheriff Wayne A. Melancon for

their negligence in continuing to retain Kimberly and allowing her to keep

possession of a government-issued firearm after discovering she committed a

felony theft at the Acadia Parish Sheriff‟s Office.

On July 8, 2009 (eight days before the shooting), Kimberly was confronted

by her supervisor concerning three missing deposits from the tax department of the

Acadia Parish Sheriff‟s Office. Apparently, Kimberly admitted she had a

gambling addiction which led her to steal the money. In total, Kimberly stole

nearly $60,000.00 from the Acadia Parish Sheriff‟s Office.

Reginald asserted Sheriff Melancon did not terminate Kimberly from her

duties after he discovered the theft, nor did he require her to turn over the

government-issued gun (which was the weapon used to shoot Reginald). Reginald

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maintained Kimberly continued to work for the Sheriff‟s Office and keep her gun

until she was terminated after shooting him.

Shortly after suit was filed, the City of Crowley, the Acadia Parish Sheriff‟s

Office and Sheriff Melancon filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court

granted summary judgment in favor of the Acadia Parish Sheriff‟s Office and

Sheriff Melancon, finding the sheriff owed no particular duty to Reginald to

protect him against the risk of harm that occurred in this case. The trial court

stated “there was no foreseeability by the sheriff that his employee, who worked in

a civil department, would - - and, albeit that she had apparently stolen money at

some point before this - - that she would then commit a violent crime.”

The trial court also granted the City of Crowley‟s motion for summary

judgment, finding “under these facts, the City of Crowley did not breach a duty to

Mr. Phillips, because their general duty to protect the public did not extend to the

duty to prevent the harm that befell to him by this intentional act, which was not

foreseeable under the circumstances of this case.”

Reginald has appealed the trial court‟s judgment, contending it erred in

granting the motions for summary judgment filed by the City of Crowley, the

Acadia Parish Sheriff‟s Office and Sheriff Melancon.

ANALYSIS

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, an appellate court “applies a

de novo standard of review, „using the same criteria that govern the trial court‟s

consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate, i.e., whether there is a

genuine issue of material fact and whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.‟” Gray v. Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., 07-1670, p. 6 (La.2/26/08),

977 So.2d 839, 844 (quoting Supreme Servs. & Specialty Co., Inc. v. Sonny Greer,

06-1827, p. 4 (La.5/22/07), 958 So.2d 634, 638). As a general principle, our law
4

in Louisiana favors the summary judgment procedure as a vehicle by which the

“just, speedy, and inexpensive” determination of an action may be achieved.

La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(2). The trial court is required to render summary

judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code

Civ.P. art. 966(B).

The burden of proof remains with the movant. However, if the
movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is
before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the movant's
burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential
elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to
point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for
one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or
defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual
support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his
evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of
material fact.

La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C)(2).

“[F]acts are material if they potentially insure or preclude recovery, affect a

litigant‟s ultimate success, or determine the outcome of the legal dispute.” Smith v.

Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751

(quoting South Louisiana Bank v. Williams, 591 So.2d 375, 377 (La.App. 3 Cir.

1991), writ denied, 596 So.2d 211 (La. 1992)). A genuine issue is one in which

reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one

conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue, and summary judgment is

appropriate. Id. Whether a fact is material is determined in light of the relevant

substantive law. Weingartner v. La. IceGators, 02-1181 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/17/03),

854 So.2d 898, writ denied, 03-1388 (La.9/13/03), 853 So.2d 645. In determining

whether an issue is “genuine,” courts cannot consider the merits, make credibility

determinations, evaluate testimony or weigh evidence. Smith, 639 So.2d 730;
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Simon v. Fasig-Tipton Co. of New York, 524 So.2d 788, 791 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writs

denied, 525 So.2d 1048, 1049 (La. 1988).

I. The Acadia Parish Sheriff’s Office/Sheriff Melancon’s Motions for
Summary Judgment.

Reginald contends the trial court erred in granting the Acadia Parish

Sheriff‟s Office and Sheriff Melancon‟s motion for summary judgment, asserting,

had the sheriff‟s office taken back the gun, he would not have been shot. Reginald

maintains “it is certainly foreseeable that someone who has committed a major

felony crime against the Chief Law Enforcement Office of Acadia Parish because

of a major gambling problem, also has the propensity to commit additional

criminal activity.” The trial court, in granting the motion for summary judgment

concluded the “harm that befell the plaintiff had nothing to do with her taking

money from the sheriff‟s department. It had to do with the fact that she turned

violent in some domestic situation.”

In Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So.2d 1032 (La.1991), the Louisiana Supreme

Court considered a case where Benoit, an off-duty police deputy, shot the plaintiff

accidentally while he was playing with his gun while intoxicated. A negligence

action was brought against the sheriff. The facts established Benoit was hired by

the sheriff to serve as a cook. It was common practice for all employees to be

commissioned and to undergo one day of firearm training.

The Roberts court noted the extent of protection owed a particular plaintiff is

determined on a case-by-case basis to avoid making a defendant an insurer of all

persons against all harms. The court examined the ease of association between the

risk posed by the deputy‟s conduct and the Sheriff‟s duty to exercise reason when

hiring and training deputies. The court found the ease of association in that case

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was, “at best, attenuated.” Id. at 1044. The court discussed the scope of protection

element of the duty-risk analysis in detail:

The most critical issue in the instant case is whether the injury
plaintiff sustained was within the contemplation of the duty discussed
above. There is no “rule” for determining the scope of the duty.
Regardless if stated in terms of proximate cause, legal cause, or duty,
the scope of the duty inquiry is ultimately a question of policy as to
whether the particular risk falls within the scope of the duty.

...

In short, the scope of protection inquiry asks “whether the
enunciated rule or principle of law extends to or is intended to protect
this plaintiff from this type of harm arising in this manner.”

Generally, the scope of protection inquiry becomes significant
in “fact-sensitive” cases in which a limitation of the “but for”
consequences of the defendant's substandard conduct is warranted.
These cases require logic, reasoning and policy decisions be employed
to determine whether liability should be imposed under the particular
factual circumstances presented. This is such a case. Particularly, the
court of appeal‟s “but for” conclusion is that had Benoit not been
commissioned as a deputy he would not have been carrying the gun
that caused plaintiff‟s injuries.

In determining the limitation to be placed on liability for a
defendant‟s substandard conduct--i.e., whether there is a duty-risk
relationship--we have found the proper inquiry to be how easily the
risk of injury to plaintiff can be associated with the duty sought to be
enforced. Restated, the ease of association inquiry is simply: “How
easily does one associate the plaintiff‟s complained-of harm with the
defendant‟s conduct? . . . Although ease of association encompasses
the idea of foreseeability, it is not based on foreseeability alone.”
Absent an ease of association between the duty breached and the
damages sustained, we have found legal fault lacking.

Id. at 1044-45 (citations omitted.) The Roberts court rejected plaintiff‟s argument

that the sheriff was negligent or vicariously liable, because the shooting was not

connected in any way to Benoit‟s duties as an employee of the sheriff. Specifically

the Roberts court found no liability as Benoit went “outside of his employment,

and without regard to his service, acting maliciously, or in order to effect some

purpose of his own.” Id. at 1038, quoting Collins v. City of New York, 11 Misc.2d

76, 171 N.Y.S.2d 710, 714 (Sup.Ct.1958), aff'd 7 N.Y.2d 822, 196 N.Y.S.2d 700,
7

164 N.E.2d 719 (1959). Likewise in this case we conclude Kimberly was outside

her employment and was effecting a purpose of her own when the shooting took

place. The trial court did not err in granting the Acadia Parish Sheriff‟s Office and

Sheriff Melancon‟s motion for summary judgment.

II. The City of Crowley’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

The trial court granted summary judgment in the City of Crowley‟s favor

because it believed once the officers had secured entry into the house of Reginald,

they had no further duty. A review of the following comments by the trial court

reveals its reasoning in granting summary judgment:

And while the police officers certainly had a duty – based on
the court order that is not in dispute was the only existing court order
– they did have a duty to assist him in regaining access to his house,
its undisputed at some point, they communicated to him that they
would not remain with him indefinitely. They asked him to leave. He
admits this. He called his lawyer. And his lawyer advised the police
officers you cannot make him leave.

At that point, the police officers had no further duty. They had
– They had acquired for Mr. Phillips what he asked for, which was
entry into his home. There is no evidence that there were any threats
being made by either party against the other or any other reason why
the police were required to remain there indefinitely.

And I do not accept the argument that Mr. Phillips was willing
to leave if the police officers were no longer remaining, because the
police officer made it known to them that they were not willing to
remain and that he should – and advised him that, had he wished to
have extended supervision, there were resources available through the
marshall‟s office.

A review of the record shows several of the above conclusions reached by

the trial court are, at a minimum, disputed questions of fact which are not properly

disposed of at a summary proceeding.

While it is clear that the officers did tell Reginald they wanted him to leave

the residence, Reginald responded to this by calling his attorney, who then spoke

with Officer Baudoin. While talking with Mr. Miller, Officer Baudoin left the
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room where Reginald was packing his things. Officer Baudoin testified as follows

regarding this sequence of events:

A. [Reginald] gave me the phone. I talked to Jack [Miller]. Jack was
telling me, you can‟t make him leave. I said, I know I can‟t make him
leave, but to help the situation, you know, he‟s packing up, he‟s
going. So it‟s going to be good, huh? He said, well, yeah. I gave him
the phone back, so –
...
Q. At any point, did you see Reginald stop packing, and say, hey, I
changed my mind, I’m not leaving?

A. A little while later, yes.

Q. A little while later?

A. Yes, ma‟am.

....

Q. Did Reginald, at any point in time, request that you stay, you stay
there until he finished –

A. I don’t remember –

It is not clear from this testimony whether, after the phone conversation between

Officer Baudoin and Mr. Miller, any of the officers present informed Reginald they

were all leaving. Reginald may well have assumed Mr. Miller‟s phone

conversation cleared up the problem. There also is no unequivocal evidence that

Reginald, at any point, was aware the officers left the premises while he was

inside.

More importantly, the trial court‟s conclusion that “[t]here is no evidence

that there were any threats being made by either party against the other or any

other reason why the police were required to remain there indefinitely” is not

supported by the record. Officer Baudoin testified in his deposition that the reason

he was dispatched to the scene was there was “a disturbance at that residence.”

Officer Baudoin also stated, shortly after speaking on the phone with Mr. Miller,

Kimberly and Reginald “started arguing back and forth; screaming, screaming,
9

screaming.” Officer LaFosse testified Kimberly and Reginald were “bickering.”

Reginald‟s attorney, Jack Miller, testified one of the officers told him “there could

be a lot of trouble here so [Reginald] really ought to go.” There was also

testimony that police officers were previously called to the residence because of

reported domestic incidents. Officers Hoffpauir and LaFosse confirmed their

personal knowledge of prior incidents which required police intervention. Thus,

there are material issues of fact relating to whether the officers acted reasonably

considering their knowledge of prior incidents between the parties and the alleged

volatile exchanges at the scene.

We also reject the trial court‟s legal conclusion that once the officers secured

Reginald‟s entry into the residence, they no longer had any duty to remain at the

residence. This court, citing the case of Siripanyo v. Allstate Indemnity Co., 03-

559, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/23/03), 862 So.2d 1254, 1259-60, writ denied, 04-182

(La.3/19/04), 869 So.2d 860, has held if a sheriff‟s department undertakes the

responsibility to provide its services as an escort, “they must do so in a non-

negligent fashion.” Batiste v. Farm Bureau, 07-1586, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/08),

982 So.2d 975, 977.1

In this case, the City of Crowley Police Department, after requiring Reginald

to produce the required court documentation, agreed to escort him to the home he

shared with Kimberly. Thus, it must be determined whether the actions of its

officers were reasonable under the facts and circumstances of this case. This court

in Rhymes v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 10-1357 (La.App. 3 Cir.3/9/11), 58 So.3d

1068, discussed the evaluation of reasonableness in a summary judgment

proceeding:

1
Both Batiste and Siripanyo involved situations where the respective police department
undertook the responsibility of escorting funeral processions.
10

Summary judgment is ordinarily not an appropriate procedural
device when there are issues that require the determination of the
reasonableness of acts and conduct of parties under all the facts and
circumstances. Wylie v. Peltier, 10-332 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/3/10),
2010 WL 4325838.

We find, at a minimum, material questions of fact existed as to whether the officers

acted reasonably in leaving the residence under the circumstances of this case.

There was clear testimony the parties were hostile towards each other while the

officers were present and several of the officers on the scene were personally

aware police officers had previously visited the residence because of domestic

disputes between Reginald and Kimberly. The trial court‟s resolution of these

factual disputes at the summary judgment level was inappropriate.

We also note La.R.S. 46:2140 sets forth the duty of police officers in a

domestic abuse situation. It provides “[w]henever a law enforcement officer has

reason to believe a family or household member or dating partner has been abused,

the officer shall immediately use all reasonable means to prevent further abuse[.]”

The record established there were several incidents of domestic abuse situations

between the parties. There was an incident, acknowledged by the trial court, where

Reginald called the authorities because Kimberly had thrown a dangerous object at

him. Just two weeks prior to the incident in question, Kimberly filed a Petition for

Protection from Abuse against Reginald. Reginald also was arrested just one week

prior to the incident for domestic assault by the police. While Reginald

emphatically denied any incidents of abuse or assault on his part, the fact that these

incidents occurred (regardless of their true nature), was a clear indication of the

volatile and hostile relationship between the parties. Considering the officers‟

testimony that they were aware of the past domestic incidents between the two

parties, the duty imposed by the legislature in enacting La.R.S. 46:2140 may also

provide a legal basis for the claims raised by Reginald.
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In Wilson v. Town of Mamou, 07-409 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/19/07), 972 So.2d

461, writ denied, 08-198 (La. 3/28/08), 978 So.2d 307, the Town of Mamou was

found liable for its failure to escort a known victim of abuse to her home to pick up

her children. While at the home, she was shot and killed by her abusive boyfriend.

In this case, the police did provide an escort for Reginald, but chose to leave him at

the site despite knowledge of a history of domestic incidents between the parties

and a hostile exchange between the two at the scene. Accordingly, we reverse the

grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Crowley and remand for further

proceedings.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court granting summary

judgment in favor of the Acadia Parish Sheriff‟s Office and Sheriff Wayne A.

Melancon is affirmed. We reverse the trial court‟s grant of summary judgment in

favor of the City of Crowley and remand for further proceedings. Costs of this

appeal are assessed one-half to the City of Crowley and one-half to plaintiff-

appellant, Reginald Phillips.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

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NUMBER 12-1306

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

STATE OF LOUISIANA

REGINALD PHILLIPS

VERSUS

CITY OF CROWLEY, ET AL.

CONERY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree with the affirmation dismissing Sheriff Melancon and the Acadia

Parish Sheriff’s Office. I disagree, however, with the denial of Summary

Judgment as to the City of Crowley.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 46:2142 provides civil immunity for police

officers under these circumstances: “Any law enforcement officer reporting in

good faith, exercising due care in the making of an arrest or providing assistance

pursuant to the provisions of R.S. 46:2140 and 2141 shall have immunity from any

civil liability that otherwise might be incurred or imposed because of the report,

arrest, or assistance provided.” (Emphasis added).

I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that once the officers assisted Mr.

Phillips in gaining entry into the residence, they had a duty to stay under R.S.

46:2140. The officers were called on a courtesy escort at the request of their

Police Chief, as requested by Mr. Phillips and his attorney, to help gain entrance to

the home and secure his personal belongings. The uncontradicted material

evidence introduced on the Motion for Summary Judgment indicates that, after

helping Mr. Phillips secure entrance to the home (the locks had been changed by

Mrs. Phillips) and standing by for a reasonable time while Mr. Phillips retrieved

his personal belongings, the officers informed Mr. Phillips that they had to leave
1

for other duties. The officers suggested that Mr. Phillips leave and obtain

additional assistance from the Marshall’s office. After talking to his lawyer, Mr.

Phillips chose to stay, even asking his lawyer to explain to the officers that he had

a right to be there. The officers owed no duty to accompany Mr. Phillips in the

first place, since they were on a “courtesy” call. After making sure there were no

threats of violence and everyone was safe, they left. Danielle Domingue, a friend

of Mrs. Phillips and an employee of the Acadia Parish Sherriff’s Office, was there

when they left.

Even assuming one or more of the officers may have been aware of past

domestic incidents between Kimberly and Mr. Phillips, the prior incidents involved

alleged violence and threats by Mr. Phillips against Mrs. Phillips. The officers had

no information to suggest Mrs. Phillips was in any way a threat to Mr. Phillips.

Ms. Domingue was present before the officers left, and, even according to Mr.

Phillips, the situation was calm and peaceful when the officers left.

The officers reported in good faith and exercised due care in providing

assistance pursuant to La.R.S. 46:2140. This case is exactly the type of case for

which the legislature provided an immunity for police officers rendering assistance

in a domestic situation pursuant to La.R.S. 46:2142. To hold otherwise would

have a “chilling effect” on all police officers rendering assistance or reporting in

good faith on a domestic call. The instant case is distinguishable from Wilson v.

Town of Mamou, 07-409 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/19/07), 972 So.2d 461, writ denied,

08-0198 (La. 3/28/08), 978 So.2d 307, cited by the majority, because in that case,

based upon her battered physical condition and her verbalization of her fear, the

officer was clearly aware of the imminent danger to Ms. Wilson yet failed to act to

at all to escort the victim to her residence or to pick up her children. The

undisputed facts of this case are more analogous to the facts in Latiolais v.
2

Guillory, 99-815 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/3/99), 747 So.2d 675, writ denied, 99-3350

(La. 1/28/00), 753 So.2d 832, and writ denied, 1999-3415 (La. 1/28/00), 753 So.2d

833, in which the officer had no evidence before him of any immediate danger. As

here, the scene before the shooting was calm, with the shooter in both cases giving

no indication or warning of violent behavior. In Latiolais and in this case, the

officers exercised due care based upon the facts before them.

For all of these reasons, I would affirm the Summary Judgment against the

City of Crowley and the police officers.

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