Trent Harvey v. Kelly (Singleton) Harvey

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

13-81

TRENT HARVEY

VERSUS

KELLY (SINGLETON) HARVEY

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERNON, NO. 78,644, DIV. B
HONORABLE JOHN C. FORD, DISTRICT JUDGE

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MARC T. AMY
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Marc T. Amy, and James T. Genovese,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Donald W. Martin
2207 Parkdale Drive
Kingswood, TX 77330
(281) 358-7065
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Kelly (Singleton) Harvey

E. Grey Burnes Talley
Post Office Box 650
Alexandria, LA 71309-0650
(318) 442-5231
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Kelly (Singleton) Harvey

Scott Westerchil
301 South 3rd Street
Leesville, LA 71446
(337) 238-0019
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Trent Harvey

AMY, Judge.

In this custody dispute, the father alleged a change in circumstances and

sought to change custody from shared custody with both parents having co-

domiciliary status. After a trial, the trial court found that there was a change in

circumstances that warranted a change in custody and ordered that the parents have

joint custody with the father having domiciliary parent status. The mother appeals.

For the following reasons, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Trent Harvey, and the defendant, Kelly Grady, 1 have one child

together, Terryn Harvey. Mr. Harvey and Mrs. Grady separated in 2007, soon

after Terryn’s birth. Mrs. Grady took Terryn with her to Texas. As germane to

this appeal, the parties eventually entered into a stipulated custody agreement that

provided for joint custody with Mrs. Grady having domiciliary custody and

provided a visitation schedule. Mr. Harvey sought a change in custody in 2009,

which Mrs. Grady opposed. After a hearing, the trial court found that both Mr.

Harvey and Mrs. Grady were good parents who have good homes, love their child,

and pose no danger to her. However, the trial court found that the ―whole factual

scenario of this case is replete with a lack of communication by both parties‖ and

changed custody to shared custody with co-domiciliary status and ordered that

each parent have physical custody of Terryn on a two-week/two-week basis. Mrs.

Grady appealed, and in Harvey v. Harvey, 10-1338 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/9/11), 56

So.3d 467, writ denied, 11-719 (La. 4/29/11), 62 So.3d 117, a panel of this court

affirmed the custody determination but vacated the trial court’s finding of

contempt against Mrs. Grady.

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Kelly (Singleton) Harvey has remarried and is now known as Kelly Grady.

In 2011, Mr. Harvey filed another rule to modify custody. Therein, Mr.

Harvey requested that the trial court grant him sole custody of Terryn with Mrs.

Grady having visitation or, in the alternative, joint custody with Mr. Harvey being

designated as the domiciliary parent. After a trial, the trial court found that,

because Terryn was approaching school-age, there was a material change in

circumstances. Further, although the trial court noted that it was more probable

that Mrs. Grady’s home was ―perhaps the most stable considering the family unit

and Terryn’s sister,‖2 that Mrs. Grady’s conduct in responding to events since the

modification of custody has continued to create problems, rather than facilitate a

close and continuing relationship between Mr. Harvey and Terryn. Therefore, the

trial court found that it was in Terryn’s best interest that the parties have joint

custody, with Mr. Harvey being designated as the domiciliary parent and Mrs.

Grady having ―liberal physical custody.‖

Mrs. Grady appeals, asserting as error that:

1) It was error for the Trial Court to make Trent Harvey the
domiciliary parent when it found Kelly Grady’s home to be the most
stable environment.

2) It was error for the Trial Court to use an award of custody to punish
the domiciliary parent by changing the domiciliary parent, rather than
to place the child based solely on the best interest of the child.

Discussion

Change of Custody

In reviewing custody determinations, the trial court’s decision is to be

afforded great deference on appeal and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of

2
According to the record, Terryn has two younger half-siblings—Mr. Harvey’s daughter,
Tinsley, and Mrs. Grady’s daughter, Carly. We note that ―Carly‖ is also spelled ―Carlie‖ in the
record.

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discretion. Martin v. Martin, 11-1496 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/16/12), 89 So.3d 526.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 131 directs that ―[i]n a proceeding for divorce or

thereafter, the court shall award custody of a child in accordance with the best

interest of the child.‖ In this vein, custody cases are to be decided upon their own

particular facts and circumstances, keeping in mind that the paramount goal is to

do what is in the best interest of the minor child. Newcomb v. Newcomb, 01-1530

(La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/02), 810 So.2d 1269 (quoting Hebert v. Blanchard, 97-550

(La.App. 3 Cir. 10/29/97), 702 So.2d 1102).

In cases where the trial court has previously entered a considered decree of

permanent custody, ―the party seeking a change bears a heavy burden of proving

that the continuation of the present custody is so deleterious to the child as to

justify a modification of the custody decree, or of proving by clear and convincing

evidence that the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is

substantially outweighed by its advantages to the child.‖ Bergeron v. Bergeron,

492 So.2d 1193, 1200 (La.1986).

A review of the record indicates that the trial court had previously awarded

the parties shared custody with co-domiciliary status, with each parent enjoying

two weeks of physical custody. There was testimony that the distance between the

parties’ respective residences is several hours. The record further indicates that

Terryn is approaching school age and that, because of the distance between the

parties, this physical custody schedule is no longer feasible. Mr. Harvey testified

that he had investigated a private school in Leesville and that he was informed that

Terryn could not attend based on his current physical custody schedule. The trial

court found that, based on these circumstances, the determination of custody must

be revisited. Neither party contests this issue, and we find that these circumstances

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meet the heightened standard for review of a considered custody decree delineated

in Bergeron. See Silbernagel v. Silbernagel, 10-267 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/10/11), 65

So.3d 724.

Application of Best Interest Factors

Having found that the Bergeron standard was met, the trial court then had to

determine what was in Terryn’s best interest. See Merriman v. Merriman, 05-1435

(La.App. 3 Cir. 5/3/06), 930 So.2d 235. In so doing, ―[t]he court shall consider all

relevant factors in determining the best interest of the child,‖ including:

(1) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each
party and the child.

(2) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child
love, affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education
and rearing of the child.

(3) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the
child with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.

(4) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate
environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that
environment.

(5) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or
proposed custodial home or homes.

(6) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the
welfare of the child.

(7) The mental and physical health of each party.

(8) The home, school, and community history of the child.

(9) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems
the child to be of sufficient age to express a preference.

(10) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and
the other party.

(11) The distance between the respective residences of the
parties.

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(12) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child
previously exercised by each party.

La.Civ.Code art. 134.

In its reasons for judgment, the trial court opined that:

The Court, in considering the 12 factors of Article 134 of the
Civil Code, finds that both these parents are good parents who
genuinely love their child and the child loves them. The Court
concludes that it is more probable that the family home with Kelly is
perhaps the most stable environment considering the family unit and
Terryn’s sister. That is not to say, however, that a single parent
cannot provide a stable home for a child. On the contrary, that is
exceedingly common in our present day society.

The underlying principle of joint custody is that the child
should enjoy the maximum contact with each parent which is possible
under the circumstances. When this case started, Kelly [Grady] was
the primary domiciliary parent with visitation to the father, Trent
[Harvey], but things didn’t go very well. After this, in February 2011,
the Court modified custody to co-domiciliary parents and a shared
custody plan hoping things would get better. The Court concludes
that Kelly’s conduct in responding to events since the modification of
custody continues to create problems between her and Trent which
tends to frustrate, rather than facilitate a close and continuing
relationship between Terryn and her father. The Court, therefore,
finds that it is in the best interest of Terryn that there be joint custody
with the father, Trent Harvey, as the primary domiciliary parent,
subject to liberal visitation with the mother, Kelly Grady.

One of Mrs. Grady’s assignments of error concerns the trial court’s judgment in

light of its determination that Mrs. Grady’s home was ―perhaps the most stable

environment.‖ She complains that the trial court erred in determining that Mr.

Harvey should be the domiciliary parent because of this finding.

We find no merit to Mrs. Grady’s contention in this regard. First, we note

that:

The court is not bound to make a mechanical evaluation of all
of the statutory factors listed in La. C.C. art. 134, but should decide
each case on its own facts in light of those factors. The court is not
bound to give more weight to one factor over another, and when
determining the best interest of the child, the factors must be weighed
and balanced in view of the evidence presented. Moreover, the

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factors are not exclusive, but are provided as a guide to the court, and
the relative weight given to each factor is left to the discretion of the
trial court.

Cooper v. Cooper, 43,244, p. 6 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/12/08), 978 So.2d 1156, 1160

(citations omitted).

Our review of the record indicates that, although the trial court found that

Mrs. Grady’s home was ―perhaps the most stable environment,‖ it did not make a

finding that Mr. Harvey’s home was an unstable environment. Of particular

import, at the time of trial, both parents had had equal physical custody, as well as

co-domiciliary status, for more than two years. The trial court heard evidence

concerning Mr. Harvey and Mrs. Grady’s respective living situations, financial

situation, and work obligations. There was testimony about the family members

involved in Terryn’s life at both Mr. Harvey and Mrs. Grady’s houses, including

grandparents, stepparents and half-sisters. The record supports a conclusion that

Terryn has a positive relationship with her extended family. Further, the trial court

heard evidence concerning Terryn’s daycare and educational situation in the

parties’ respective care.

Additionally, the parties testified at length about their ability to

communicate about Terryn’s needs and to mutually resolve issues concerning

Terryn’s health and well-being. Much of the testimony revolved around Mr.

Harvey’s efforts to have tubes placed in Terryn’s ears in order to alleviate her

ongoing chronic ear infection problems. 3 Other testimony concerned statements

3
Notes in Terryn’s medical records indicate several references, from both Terryn’s Texas
pediatrician as well as her Louisiana doctors, to the possibility of ear tubes starting in the late
summer/early fall of 2009. According to the record, Mr. Harvey eventually obtained a referral
and took Terryn to an ENT in Louisiana in August of 2010 and attempted to impress upon Mrs.
Grady that the ENT felt that the surgery should be done ―as soon as possible.‖ The record also
indicates that Mrs. Grady attempted to obtain Terryn’s Louisiana medical records in late August
and early September of 2010 so that Terryn’s Texas doctors could review them. The record

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that Terryn made concerning the actions of her parents.4

Based on our review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s determination that Mr. Harvey should be the domiciliary parent. The trial

court was ―not bound to give more weight to one factor over another[.]‖ Cooper,

978 So.2d at 1160. The record contains sufficient evidence to support a conclusion

that both Mr. Harvey and Mrs. Grady’s homes and family environment would be

appropriate for Terryn, and that Mr. Harvey and Mrs. Grady are both good parents

to Terryn. Given these circumstances, the trial court chose to place more weight

on the parties’ respective abilities to foster a close and continuing relationship with

the other parent. We find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that Mrs. Grady’s

actions in responding to issues has tended to create problems, rather than facilitate

a close and continuing relationship between Terryn and Mr. Harvey.

Mrs. Grady’s assignment of error in this regard is without merit.

Change of Custody as a “Punishment”

Mrs. Grady also contends that the trial court erred in appointing Mr. Harvey

as the domiciliary parent in order to ―punish‖ her. In support of this argument,

Mrs. Grady cites Fulco v. Fulco, 254 So.2d 603, 606 (La.1971), for the proposition

that ―[t]he purpose of a custody determination is not to punish a parent for any

[p]ast misconduct, it is rather to serve the best interests of the children of the

marriage.‖

indicates that tubes were placed in Terryn’s ears in May of 2011, more than six months after
Terryn’s initial visit to the ENT.
4
According to Mrs. Grady, Terryn stated that Mr. Harvey told her that he was going to
shoot Mrs. Grady. According to Mr. Harvey, Terryn told him that a policeman came and put
―bracelets‖ on Mrs. Grady and took her away. A psychologist retained by Mrs. Grady, Dr. Sally
Thigpen, noted that when she was observing Terryn, Terryn told her a story about putting her
finger in a possum’s mouth and that the possum was ―nice.‖ Dr. Thigpen opined that ―Terryn
has a very lively imagination and that she can create stories and that she is that – of that age.‖
Based in part on Dr. Thigpen’s observation, the trial court found that there was no danger.

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We find no merit to this contention. Although a custody decree may not be

used as a tool to regulate human behavior, see Cleeton v. Cleeton, 383 So.2d 1231

(La.1979), our review of the record indicates that the trial court did not do so. Mrs.

Grady points to the trial court’s determination that her reaction to events which

occurred since the trial court changed the custody arrangement in 2010 tended to

create problems rather than resolve them in support of her contention that the trial

court appointed Mr. Harvey as the domiciliary parent in order to punish her or

regulate her behavior. After carefully reviewing the record, we do not reach that

conclusion. As previously discussed, the trial court considered the best interest

factors delineated in La.Civ.Code art. 134, and determined that appointing Mr.

Harvey as the domiciliary parent was in Terryn’s best interest. Part of this

determination was that Mrs. Grady’s responses to issues did not facilitate a close

and continuing relationship between Terryn and Mr. Harvey. This is an

appropriate determination to make under La.Civ.Code art. 134 and the trial court

was entitled to make such a determination.

Mrs. Grady’s assignment of error in this regard is without merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in all respects the judgment of the trial

court signed on July 2, 2012, granting the parties, Trent Harvey and Kelly Grady,

joint custody of Terryn Harvey, and designating Mr. Harvey as domiciliary parent.

Costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellant, Kelly Grady.

AFFIRMED.

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