John T. Marcantel v. Pine Prairie Correctional Center

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

13-136

JOHN T. MARCANTEL

VERSUS

PINE PRAIRIE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
AND SOUTH LOUISIANA CORECTIONAL
FACILITY

**********
APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF EVANGELINE, NO. 70106-B
HONORABLE THOMAS F. FUSELIER, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********
J. DAVID PAINTER
JUDGE
**********

Court composed of J. David Painter, Shannon J. Gremillion, and Phyllis M. Keaty,
Judges.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

M. Candice Hattan, APLC
P.O. Drawer 91850
Lafayette, LA 70509
(337) 234-0431
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:
Pine Prairie Correctional Center and South Louisiana Correctional
Facility

Guy O. Mitchell
Mitchell Law Offices
225 Court Street
Ville Platte, LA 70586-4492
(337) 363-0400
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:
John T. Marcantel

PAINTER, Judge.

Plaintiff, John T. Marcantel, appeals the dismissal of his suit by the grant of

exceptions of prematurity filed by Defendants, Pine Prairie Correctional Center

and South Louisiana Correctional Facility. Finding that Marcantel was required to

comply with the mandated administrative procedures before filing suit in the

district court, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of his suit; however, we amend

the trial court’s judgment to reflect that the dismissal is without prejudice.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts of this case are simple and undisputed. On or about September 27,

2007, Marcantel was incarcerated at Pine Prairie Correctional Center. Two days

later, Marcantel was transferred to South Louisiana Correctional Facility. He

alleges that he received substandard medical treatment to his left eye at both

facilities.

On September 10, 2008, Marcantel filed suit against Defendants, seeking to

recover damages for the loss of sight in his left eye. It is undisputed that

Defendants have adopted the administrative remedy procedure set forth in the

Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure (CARP), which is found at La.R.S.

15:1171-1184. It is also undisputed that Marcantel did not attempt to comply with

any of the administrative procedures before filing suit. Defendants filed

exceptions of prematurity and no cause of action, or, alternatively, motions for

summary judgment. The trial court granted the exceptions of prematurity and

dismissed Marcantel’s claims against both facilities with prejudice. Marcantel

filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by the trial court. This appeal

followed.

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DISCUSSION

Appellate courts review the trial court’s decision regarding an exception of

prematurity under the manifest error standard. Pinegar v. Harris, 08-1112

(La.App. 1 Cir. 6/12/09), 20 So.3d 1081. ―The trial court has vast discretion in

deciding whether to grant a motion for new trial, and its decision whether or not to

do so is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard of review.‖ Burgo v.

Henderson, 12-332, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/19/12), 106 So.3d 275, 281.

Pursuant to CARP, the procedure to be followed by an inmate is set forth as

follows in La.R.S. 15:1172:

A. Upon adoption of the administrative remedy procedure, in
accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, and the
implementation of the procedure within the department or by the
sheriff, this procedure shall constitute the administrative remedies
available to offenders for the purpose of preserving any cause of
action they may claim to have against the state of Louisiana, the
Department of Public Safety and Corrections, or its employees, the
contractor operating a private prison facility or any of its employees,
shareholders, directors, or officers, or a sheriff, or his employees or
deputies. Any administrative remedy procedure in effect on January
1, 2001, including the procedure published in LAC 22:I.325, is
deemed to be in compliance with the provisions of this Section.

B. (1) An offender shall initiate his administrative remedies for
a delictual action for injury or damages within ninety days from the
day the injury or damage is sustained.

(2) The department is authorized to establish deadlines for an
offender to initiate administrative remedies for any nondelictual
claims.

(3) The department is authorized to establish deadlines for the
procedures and processes contained in the administrative remedy
procedure provided in LAC 22:I.325.

C. If an offender fails to timely initiate or pursue his
administrative remedies within the deadlines established in Subsection
B of this Section, his claim is abandoned, and any subsequent suit
asserting such a claim shall be dismissed with prejudice. If at the time
the petition is filed the administrative remedy process is ongoing but
has not yet been completed, the suit shall be dismissed without
prejudice.

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D. Any contractor operating a private prison facility shall
adhere to all provisions of this Part and the administrative remedy
procedures adopted by the department in accordance with this Part.

E. Liberative prescription for any delictual action for injury or
damages arising out of the claims asserted by a prisoner in any
complaint or grievance in the administrative remedy procedure shall
be suspended upon the filing of such complaint or grievance and shall
continue to be suspended until the final agency decision is delivered.

An ―offender‖ is ―an adult or juvenile offender who is in the physical or legal

custody of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, a contractor operating

a private prison facility, or a sheriff when the basis for the complaint or grievance

arises.‖ La.R.S. 15:1174(2).

Marcantel argues that he is not required to comply with the administrative

procedures because Pope v. State of Louisiana, 99-2559 (La. 6/29/01), 792 So.2d

713, declared CARP unconstitutional and because La.R.S. 15:1177, entitled

―Judicial review of administrative acts; exception,‖ states in section C that: ―This

Section shall not apply to delictual actions for injury or damages, however styled

or captioned. Delictual actions for injury or damages shall be filed separately as

original civil actions.‖

Defendants contend that Pope has been legislatively overruled by the

amendments to CARP, which became effective April 18, 2002.

The second circuit succinctly discussed the amendments to CARP in Wood

v. Martin, 37,856, pp. 4-6 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/10/03), 862 So.2d 1057, 1060

(emphasis added):

In Pope v. State, 99-2259 (La.6/29/01), 792 So.2d 713, the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that those provisions of CARP that
then allowed the Department of Public Safety and Corrections to
exercise original jurisdiction in tort actions violated Article V, §
16(A) of the Louisiana Constitution which vests original jurisdiction
over all civil and criminal matters with Louisiana's district courts.
The inmate plaintiff in Pope had suffered injuries that had nothing to
do with prison disciplinary administrative proceedings, but instead
suffered injuries that occurred while the inmate was performing
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demolition work at a correctional facility. The supreme court’s
holding in Pope was directed at the application of CARP to such
traditional tort matters, not to actions related to conditions of
confinement.

In response to Pope, the Louisiana Legislature amended the
provisions of CARP relating to judicial review of administrative acts
and excluded ―decisions relative to delictual actions for injury or
damages.‖ As a result, such traditional tort actions are not subject to
the more limited judicial review available in district court for
administrative decisions. Instead, such delictual actions are governed
by the pertinent provisions of La. R.S. 15:1177(C):

This Section shall not apply to delictual actions for injury
or damages, however styled or captioned. Delictual
actions injury or damages shall be filed separately as
original civil actions.

Under the post-Pope statutory scheme, all complaints and
grievances, including traditional tort claims seeking monetary
relief, are subject to administrative procedures. This is clearly
shown by La. R.S. 15:1172(B)(1) stating that an offender shall
initiate his administrative remedies for a delictual action for
injury or damages within 90 days from the day the injury or
damage is sustained. However, regardless of the outcome of the
administrative remedy proceedings for such claims, once such
administrative review is complete, delictual actions for injury or
damages then shall be filed separately as original civil actions not
subject to the limited judicial review afforded other adverse
administrative decisions. In other words, an administrative remedy
decision on a true tort action, such as that involved in Pope, supra,
does not limit a district court's constitutional grant of original
jurisdiction in any way. Such an administrative review
nevertheless is required, apparently in hopes that an appropriate
remedy, including the possible award of monetary damages, may
be agreed upon without the necessity of litigation.

Furthermore, in Ngo v. Estes, 04-186, pp. 2-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/29/04), 882

So.2d 1262, 1263-65, this court recognized:

Pursuant to 2002 La.Acts No. 89, effective April 18, 2002, the
legislature amended CARP to cure the constitutional problems
identified in Pope. Specifically, the legislature amended La.R.S.
15:1172 to require that an offender initiate administrative remedies for
delictual actions within ninety days of the date of injury or damage;
to provide that an offender’s claim is abandoned if he fails to do so
and that any subsequent suit asserting such a claim shall be dismissed
with prejudice; to permit the district court to dismiss an offender’s suit
without prejudice if the administrative remedy process has not been
completed; and to provide that liberative prescription on an offender’s
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delictual actions shall be suspended upon the filing of such a
grievance until the final agency decision is delivered. Act 89 also
amended La.R.S. 15:1177 to exclude delictual actions for injury or
damages from the judicial review prescribed for other actions under
CARP.

....

Additionally, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), at
La.R.S. 15:1184(A)(2), provides: ―No prisoner suit shall assert a
claim under state law until such administrative remedies as are
available are exhausted. If a prisoner suit is filed in contravention of
this Paragraph, the court shall dismiss the suit without prejudice.‖
The PLRA defines ―prisoner suit‖ as ―any civil proceeding with
respect to the conditions of confinement or the effects of actions by
government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison....‖
La.R.S. 15:1181(2). Thus, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies applies to Mr. Ngo’s suit, regardless of
whether it is based in tort or whether it is a ―prisoner suit.‖ Because
the record does not demonstrate that Mr. Ngo complied with statutory
and/or regulatory procedures before filing suit, we find no error in the
dismissal of his suit without prejudice.

Thus, Marcantel was required to first comply with the mandated

administrative procedures before filing his action in the district court.

Accordingly, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s grant of Defendants’

exceptions of prematurity and no abuse of discretion in its denial of Marcantel’s

motion for new trial.

DECREE

Since Marcantel failed to comply with the administrative procedures as

required by La.R.S. 15:1171-1184, we affirm the trial court’s grant of Defendants’

exceptions of prematurity and dismissal of Marcantel’s suit; however we amend

that judgment to reflect that the dismissal is without prejudice. The trial court’s

denial of Marcantel’s motion for new trial is also affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal,
Rule 2–16.3.

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